To say it is impossible to know anything about God is self-refuting, because it is itself a claim to know something about God: that he is unknowable. How can one know that about an unknowable God? To know He is unknowable is to know something true about Him, and thus He is no longer unknowable.
July 9, 2009
“I Know God is Unknowable”
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Pluralism, Relativism, Theism[17] Comments
Thinking to Believe 
July 15, 2009 at 8:13 pm
Is it self-refuting to say “God can do anything but fail”?
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July 16, 2009 at 11:54 am
Arthur,
No, that statement is not self-refuting (but I do think it is false). I suspect you already know that, and that you raised the question merely to challenge my claim that saying “God is unknowable” is self-refuting. If I am privy to your line of reasoning, you see the two statements as logically equivalent. Your argument would be that if the claim about “divine do-anything” is not self-referentially false, then neither is the claim about divine ineffability. The problem, as I see it, is in thinking the two claims are logically equivalent. They are not.
A self-refuting statement is one that is false, if it is true. It is self-refuting to claim that nothing can be known about God, because that in itself is something one claims to know about God. What makes it self-refuting is the fact that it makes an absolute, universal claim (no exceptions are made or permitted), and yet the very act of making the claim requires an exception. It’s like saying “There are no such things as apples, including the one I am eating.” It is comparable to someone saying in English, “I do not know how to speak one word of English.” The claim is an absolute and universal, so speaking the phrase itself constitutes its own falsification. But to say “God can do anything except fail” is not a universal claim. It is only a broad claim with an exception built right into it. In essence it says God can do A, B, C, D, E…and Y, but not Z. It is not self-refuting, then, to claim God cannot do Z, when God’s inability to do Z is built into the claim itself.
Of course, the defender of divine ineffability could similarly alter his claim to include the exception, saying “Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that He is unknowable.” That would exempt it from being self-referentially false, but now the defender faces a different problem. Now he must justify his exception. Why is it possible for us to know that truth about God, but no other truth about God? How did he come to know that truth? If his lone exception lacks any rational basis, and is added only to avoid the otherwise self-referential falsity of the claim, then it is ad hoc and should be dismissed as illegitimate. Indeed, I think that is the case with this claim.
to be continued…
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July 16, 2009 at 11:54 am
…continued
Of course, one could argue that the defender of “divine do-anything” is merely excepting “failure” from God’s abilities to avoid an otherwise self-referential falsity as well. But this is not true, for there is nothing self-referentially false about the claim that God can do anything. It may be logically or theologically false, but it is not self-referentially false, because there is nothing about the claim that makes it false, if it were true. That’s why I say the two claims are not at all equivalent.
But let’s say for the sake of argument that without the “failure” qualifier, the “divine do-anything” claim is self-refuting. Does that make this claim with its qualifier equivalent to the divine ineffability claim with its qualifier? Arguably, no. I think the “divine do-anything” qualifier is rationally justified, and thus not ad hoc as is the divine ineffability qualifier. Strictly speaking, failure is not something one does. Failure is a value judgment based on some abstract goal. One could fail that goal by (1) not acting at all to achieve it, or by (2) acting in ways other than those required to achieve it. Since failure is not an act by definition, it is legitimate to except failure from what God is able to do.
One might respond that I am being overly technical, and missing the point: that God can accomplish whatever He wills to accomplish. Fine. Even then, it could be argued that the qualification is rationally justified based on the very definition of God. If God is a perfect being, and failure is not befitting perfection, then God is incapable of failure.
Either way, the fact remains that the two claims are not logically equivalent. The divine ineffability claim is self-refuting without the qualifier, and ad hoc with it. The “divine do-anything” claim is not self-refuting without the qualifier, nor ad hoc with it.
Jason
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July 21, 2009 at 11:22 am
First, talk about “lengthwise” posts, Jason! It appears you’re as verbose as I when you want to be. 🙂
Second, I agree with what you say, except as explained below. Arthur’s rhetorical question misfires.
Third, I believe the re-worked ineffability statement does not avoid self-stultification. It contains, of course, two statements:
1) Nothing can be known about God.
2) God is unknowable.
Both statements say the same thing, so the exception doesn’t make a differentiation. It reduces to, “God is unknowable, except that God is unknowable.” It’s also akin to saying, “There are no absolute truths, except the absolute truth that there are no absolute truths.” Again, we have two identical statements. Adding except is an illegitimate maneuver designed to restate the assertion to justify the assertion. And if one is contradictory, so is the other.
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July 23, 2009 at 12:48 am
Scalia,
Yes, I am usually verbose. That’s the prerogative of being the blog owner. 🙂
As for the reworked ineffability statement, I am not convinced that it’s saying the same thing twice. It’s saying that nothing can be known about God except for one thing: the fact, in itself, that nothing can be known about God. So rather than being an absolute statement, it is saying we cannot know A,B,C,D,E…Y, but we can know Z. So whereas the original problem was its self-refuting nature, the new problem is its ad hocness. There is no justification for making such an exception, other than to avoid an otherwise self-refuting claim, and thus it is not a rationally justified move.
Jason
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July 23, 2009 at 8:35 am
Hello again, Jason! Yes, that is your prerogative and most of what you write is very good. Even the stuff I disagree with is well-written. 🙂
But, as Geisler observes, this reduces to saying, “I know enough about God to say that nothing can be known about God.” If one knows nothing whatsoever about God, then one has no basis for making any claim about God. One cannot say this is not that without some knowledge of that. I cannot legitimately say we cannot know what Pepsi tastes like if I know nothing whatsoever about Pepsi:
Knowledge of Pepsi is unknowable, except for the fact that Pepsi is unknowable.
But if I cannot know anything about Pepsi, I cannot know any facts relevant to it (s/he, whatever).
To flesh this out, you ask the right question:
See? The agnostic is claiming in h/er exception knowledge about God to the effect that God is not knowable. Your counter question effectively demonstrates the claimant must presuppose knowledge of God to make an exception. And if s/he isn’t claiming to know anything about God, then s/he has no basis for the claim. Hence, the assertion and the exception presuppose knowledge of a subject s/he claims is unknowable.
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July 28, 2009 at 3:42 pm
Scalia,
I think Geisler’s point applies to the unqualified, absolutist statement that “God is unknowable,” but not the qualified statement that “Nothing can be known about God except for the fact that He is unknowable.” The unqualified statement is self-refuting, whereas the second is ad hoc, and thus rationally incredible. The qualified statement is not saying that God is completely unknowable. It is saying that God is virtually unknowable. We can know A about God, but not B,C,D…Z.
Your Pepsi analogy illustrates a principle that Frank Turek explains by saying (rough quote), “‘Nothing but’ statements imply ‘more than’ knowledge.” If you say X is nothing but Y, it presumes knowledge of some Z that Y is not. Your Pepsi analogy demonstrates the divine ineffabilist has to admit there is a second thing He knows about this otherwise unknowable God: that He exists. And of course, as the number of things he knows about this purportedly unknowable God add up, one must ask why/how these things can be known, but nothing else can be known. And it soon becomes evident that the claim is unfounded, even if it is not logically self-refuting, strictly speaking.
Jason
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July 28, 2009 at 5:09 pm
Well, it appears we’re inching a little closer to each other…well…perhaps inching is a bit too optimistic! How about “millimetering” closer? 🙂
Let’s blue-pen this, shall we?
Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that God is unknowable.
We both agree the statement “Nothing can be known about God” is self-refuting. That statement is then followed by except for the fact that. These words assert an exception to the first statement, namely, that something can be known of God to the exclusion of everything else. What “fact” is that? God is unknowable. And what do the words God is unknowable mean? “God” is a repetition of the proper noun of the first statement and is, consequently, identical to said proper noun. “Unknowable” is the adjective which means Impossible to know, being beyond the range of human experience or understanding. The “fact” that is the exception is that God is unknowable — identical to the first statement.
If somebody came to you and said, “God is unknowable” s/he is saying it is impossible to know, experience or understand God. This is self-refuting because s/he must know, experience or understand something about God to make that statement. There is no linguistic difference between the two statements. It isn’t A, B, C…except Z because s/he is really saying “Nothing can be known about A, B, C…Z, except for the fact that A, B, C…Z is unknowable. As I affirmed in my initial reply, the words reduce to a common meaning.
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August 4, 2009 at 1:20 pm
Scalia,
Maybe a ½ millimeter! 🙂
The person who qualifies the statement that “Nothing can be known about God” by saying “except for the fact that He is unknowable” is demoting an otherwise absolutist statement to relative statement, making room for the principle itself. Just like the person who says “there is no truth, except for the truth that there is no truth” means there are no other truths besides the truth that there is no truth (which is ad hoc, not self-contradictory, the person who says “Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that He is unknowable” means there are no other truths we can know about God besides the truth that He is unknowable. Since an exception is being made for one piece of knowledge about God, there is no self-contradiction. The problem with the exception is that it is ad hoc.
Paul did something similar in 1 Cor 15:27. He wrote, “For he has put everything in subjection under his feet. But when it says ‘everything’ has been put in subjection, it is clear that this does not include the one who put everything in subjection to him.” Without Paul’s qualification that God is excepted from an otherwise absolute statement, the Scripture would be self-contradicting, because it would require that God be both the one who subjected all things under Christ, and be one of the things subjected to Him. One cannot claim that everything is subject to Christ, and yet claim that God is not. So Paul qualifies the Scripture to make it clear that “everything” includes everything except for God (A,B,C…Y, but not Z).
Here’s another example. If I said, “I cannot write a sentence with more than five words in English,” that would be self-refuting. However, if I said “I cannot write a sentence with more than five words in English other than the sentence, ‘I cannot write more than five words in English,’” the qualification eliminates the self-contradiction. The person is acknowledging that they cannot write more than five words in English, with the exception of a single sentence. Or similarly, the person who is in France who responds to a question posed to him in French by saying, “Je ne parl pas Francais” (I do not speak French), is not making a self-refuting statement. It is obvious that he means he cannot say anything in French other than “I do not speak French.” Likewise, the person who says “Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that He is unknowable” is acknowledging that one thing can be known about God, but nothing else. The problem then becomes, why that is knowable, but nothing else. Furthermore, how did they come to know that?
Jason
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August 5, 2009 at 10:39 am
Jason,
It doesn’t appear you’re engaging my argument. Rather, I see you restating your position again and again (with different examples). I think you are misidentifying the second subject clause of the statement in question. It is not a qualified statement; rather, it is absolute.
Please define this statement: God is unknowable. I have previously interpreted this. Please analyze this statement without regard for any previous example. Please do this from the dictionary. If this isn’t a categorical statement, then no statement is.
A person making this claim (God is unknowable) is making a knowledge claim. If s/he is not making a knowledge claim, then s/he is saying nothing relevant to anybody but h/erself. S/he knows enough about God to know God is unknowable. Note, s/he is not saying s/he knows enough about sewing to say God is unknowable. Knowledge must be relevant to the object of the claim. Hence, this statement, in itself, is self-refuting for the same reason “Nothing can be known of God” is.
What is the logical difference between “Nothing can be known of God” and “God is unknowable”? Again, I’m not asking you about the “exception” statement. I’m asking you to demonstrate, by definition, what the substantive difference is between these two statements. The answer is there isn’t any. Until you can demonstrate linguistically otherwise, your argument fails.
There is a difference between what one means and what one says. When I say, “I don’t have no money,” I mean I don’t have any money. But, textually speaking, that is not what is being said. The double negative translates to a positive which means one does have money. Regardless of intention, the grammar is bad and should be corrected. Similarly, one may think one has made a valid exception, but the words used demonstrate otherwise.
Your counterexamples do not work. When you offer there is no truth except the truth there is no truth the same mistake is made. What is the exception? The exception is “there is no truth.” Repeating the mistake does not erase the mistake. Words have meaning, so what do the words there is no truth mean? Its meaning is identical to the first subject clause. If not, and you mean something else, then you are stating the logical equivalent of “moo-ja-wah” (There is no truth except the truth of moo-ja-wah). If you mean something else, whatever it is, then the exception may be valid. It isn’t valid when you restate the subject clause. The only possible exception here is when the sentence itself (a mere symbol string) is asserted as true without regard to meaning (moo-ja-wah). For example, how would you respond to the following: I own no automobile except for the fact I don’t own a car? If the words in the first subject clause are defined exactly like the words of the second subject clause, the claimant is merely making the same claim twice. The word except is, therefore, misused.
Your citation of Paul in 1 Corinthians 15 is not a counterexample. It’s similar to saying Everybody came to church except Jason. That is a legitimate use of language and does not exemplify self-stultification. For your biblical example to work, Paul would have say All things are put under Him except for the fact all things are put under Him. You’re replacing a categorical statement with a qualified one.
Again, this is not the same kind of statement. A like-for-like statement would be, “I cannot write a sentence containing more than five words in English, except for the fact I cannot write a sentence with more than five English words.” Your “other than the sentence” is a qualification not found in the statement under question because you are not restating the first clause the same way. In the first subject clause, the claimant means s/he is not fluent enough in English to put any five-plus word sentence together. In the second subject clause, s/he is claiming to have written the sentence by rote, not by command of the language. This claim contrasts knowledge with memorization, whereas the “topic” statement contrasts categorical knowledge with categorical knowledge. If you said, “Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that God is immaterial,” we would not be having this friendly, loving, warm and fuzzy conversation. You are excepting one part of the categorical and that is valid. Similarly, when you say “other than this sentence, I cannot write an English sentence more than five words,” you are validly excluding the sentence you’re writing. But when you except the categorical from the same categorical, your claim self-destructs.
Agreed, but when you formulate that statement with the main example we’re analyzing, you’ll get, I do not speak French except for the fact I do not speak French” (in French). Whether spoken in French or English, it is nonsensical. However, this example is also inexact. The self-refuting nature of this kind of statement is in the language spoken, not the words, per se. If I said, I cannot speak a word of German in English, there isn’t a contradiction. If I make that same statement in German, I automatically contradict myself not because the sentence is contradictory, but because my language contradicts the meaning of the words spoken.
Nothing can be known of God (~KG), and God cannot be known (also ~KG). Hence, what you are saying is ~KG x ~KG.
“…the fact that” is a dependent noun clause to the subject clause “God is unknowable.” Being dependent, it cannot refer to anything else. THE FACT is God is unknowable. The first part of the statement is, “I know nothing can be known of God; and the second part is, “I know God is unknowable.” Same thing, Jason. Clear as day.
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August 5, 2009 at 8:30 pm
Oops! Running a little quick here. These words are actually logically dependent upon “God is unknowable.”
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August 14, 2009 at 4:12 pm
Scalia,
I didn’t engage your grammatical argument because I was of the opinion that you missed the point I was trying to make, so I was trying to restate it in different words and with different examples to help you see my point.
I still don’t care much for your grammatical argument, but after reading and re-reading your comments several times, I think I am beginning to see your point, and what I now think to be my error. This is what you said that made the light bulb go off in my head:
“If you said, ‘Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that God is immaterial,’ we would not be having this friendly, loving, warm and fuzzy conversation. You are excepting one part of the categorical and that is valid. Similarly, when you say ‘other than this sentence, I cannot write an English sentence more than five words,’ you are validly excluding the sentence you’re writing. But when you except the categorical from the same categorical, your claim self-destructs.”
Initially I began to write, “Your statement claims that no property of God can be known except for one: the property of being immaterial. But I see this as the same as the statement made by the qualified ineffabilist. He is saying ‘No property of God can be known except for one: the property of being unknowable.’” And that’s when I saw the difference between the two statements. Your statement was exempting one property from the total sum of properties, whereas my statement was exempting the entire category itself. Rather than exempting a single item from a larger category, the qualified ineffabalist is trying to exempt the entire category from itself, and thus refutes himself.
I’ll have to continue to think on this, but at this point I think I’m safe to admit I was wrong. Of course, previously I was psychologically certain that I was right. So here’s a live example of being certain of something for which I could be wrong, and indeed, was wrong, and thus a demonstration of the very point I am trying to make in our “self-deception” dialogue. One can have psychological certainty, but still be mistaken. And that’s why it’s always important to be openminded to contrary evidence.
Jason
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August 18, 2009 at 4:13 pm
You don’t think much of my grammatical argument? That’s okay, because now that I look at it again, I don’t think much of it either. I was misidentifying except as a conjunction rather than a preposition.
Not that it matters, but for the record:
Nothing (subject noun) can be known (verb phrase) about God (adjectival prepositional phrase) except for the fact (prepositional phrase) that God is unknowable (dependent adjectival clause).
The words “for the fact” are superfluous and may be removed. Hence, the sentence should read, Nothing can be known about God except that God is unknowable.
I agree the grammar angle doesn’t prove much. I was just trying to find an alternate way of making myself clearer.
Thanks much for the dialog and for investing your time in this blog – including the Institute. They are very informative and valuable.
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August 20, 2009 at 10:23 am
Scalia,
I’ve been doing some more thinking on this issue. I may have conceded too quickly. Maybe not.
I was arguing that the statement, “Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that God is unknowable” is not self-refuting because it is not an absolute statement like the unqualified claim, “Nothing can be known of God” (which would exclude the knowledge that God is unknowable). Rather, it is a qualified claim of the “A,B,C…Y, but not Z” variety (nearly absolute, only excepting one thing).
The first statement is equivalent to saying, “The only thing we can know about God is that He is otherwise unknowable,” which is itself comparable to a foreigner saying in English, “I do not speak any English” (whereby the speaker obviously means he cannot speak anything in English, other than the statement required to convey this otherwise universally true claim).
You said that even with the qualifying statement “except for the fact that God is unknowable,” the claim is still self-refuting because it is excepting the category from the category. As an example of truly non-self refuting claim that is of the nearly absolute type (i.e. one that is true with one exception) you offered the following: “Nothing can be known about God, except for the fact that God is immaterial.” You reasoned that it is not self-refuting because this is “excepting one part of the categorical” rather than the entire category itself.
But as I thought more on this, I’m not so sure that’s true. To speak of that which can be known about God is to talk about His attributes. So isn’t another way of stating your claim as follows: “None of God’s attributes can be known, except for the attribute of immateriality”? This statement, and the one you offered appear equivalent in meaning to me. If they are, then aren’t you excepting the category from the category? In one breath you are saying “none of God’s attributes can be known,” but in the next breath you name one that can be known. How is that different from saying “nothing can be known by God,” but in the next breath stating one thing that can be known? I’m not seeing the difference. That could mean I am tired, or it could mean I am on to something. If I am on to something, it could mean that both of our examples are truly self-refuting after all, or it could mean that neither is self-refuting (perhaps being merely ad hoc as I originally claimed). It seems to me that neither are self-refuting, because both are excepting a part from the whole (not the whole from the whole. Both statements claim that of all there is to know about God, the only thing we can know is Z (A-Y cannot be known). This is just like the foreigner who excepts a part (the single statement “I cannot speak English) from the whole (all English phrases he could possibly utter).
What are your thoughts?
Jason
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August 22, 2009 at 8:05 pm
God is knowable. “I am the way, the truth, and the life:no man cometh unto the Father, but by me.” (Jn.14:6) “I and my Father are one.” (Jn. 10:30) (See Matt.11:28-30)
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August 22, 2009 at 8:06 pm
God is knowable. Jesus is God.
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August 25, 2009 at 12:17 pm
Hi, Jason! For some reason, I’m not getting email notifications when you post under this thread. Very odd, because I got Robert’s.
Anyway, you write:
Immateriality is one of God’s attributes, not the whole category of His attributes. If I say, nothing can be known about Jason except that he has brown hair (at least, that’s how it looks in your picture), I am not excluding the entire category of your attributes — JA — (height, weight, etc.) from my claim; I am excluding only one attribute — JAhc (Jason’s Attribute of hair color). The category is the sum of your attributes while the exception is but one of your attributes. Hence:
~kJA x JAhc
But if we exclude the claim (Nothing can be known about Jason’s attributes except that Jason’s attributes are unknowable), it would read:
~kJA x ~kJA
And this appears to cancel itself.
God is unknowable (~kG) and Nothing can be known about God (also ~kG) are synonymous. As aforementioned, the statement would read:
~kG x ~kG
My counter example (nothing can be known about God [kG] except that God is immaterial [kiG]) is formatted:
~kG x kiG
So…it appears my counterexample holds.
I normally post comments when I disagree with something you’ve stated. However, I’ll say again I agree with most of what you write and have great respect for your intelligence and analytical ability. Please don’t think I revel in debate or that I’m trying to be a curmudgeon. 😉 I know you haven’t accused me of such, but I feel a little like a cad when the only time you hear from me is when I don’t like something you’ve written. I enjoy the dialog because it helps me learn.
Thanks again,
Scalia
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