The evidential problem of evil points to the improbability that the amount of evil we see in the world – particularly gratuitous evil – would exist if an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exists. The argument usually takes the following form:
(1) If God exists, gratuitous evil would not exist
(2) Gratuitous evil exists
(3) Therefore God does not exist
Many theists attempt to undermine this argument by attacking the veracity of premise two. For example, William Lane Craig and William Alston argue that humans are not in an epistemic place to judge any act of evil as gratuitous since we cannot see the big picture of history. For all we know, an act of seemingly gratuitous evil will result in a greater good years or even centuries from now, either in the life of the person who experienced the evil or in the life of another person in another country. Our cognitive limitations should not be used as evidence that gratuitous evil exists. At best we must remain agnostic on the question.
This is an appeal to the Greater-Good Defense, which argues that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting all evils—including those that appear gratuitous to us—such as using them to bring about some greater good that could not have been brought about apart from those evils.
In the latest issue of Philosophia Christi, Kirk R. MacGregor provides some reasons for thinking that this response to the evidential problem of evil is misguided. Just because our cognitive and temporal limitations make it impossible for us to prove that any act of evil is truly gratuitous does not mean that gratuitous evil does not exist. He argues that the belief that some evils are gratuitous is a properly basic belief. For example, we do not believe that every time we are bitten by a mosquito or stub our toe, that these evils have some greater purpose or will be used to accomplish a greater good. Such things make virtually no difference in our own lives, yet alone on the grand scheme of things. Given the proper basicality of belief in gratuitous evil, MacGregor says the burden of proof is on those who would deny the existence of gratuitous evils, and to meet their burden of proof they must explain how every instance of gratuitous evil actually results in some greater good. This is not possible, and thus the person who believes in the existence of gratuitous evil is prima facie justified in maintaining that belief, even given his cognitive and temporal limitations.
He also finds fault in the Greater-Good Defense, arguing that it turns the universe into an overdetermined system:
The absurdity of the Greater-Good Defense is multiplied by its transformation of the universe into a philosophically overdetermined system, where hidden benefits are needlessly assigned to all instances of ostensibly pointless evil therein. For example, every time a tree falls upon and kills a raccoon in the forest or I get a headache, God allows it in order to bring about some clandestine greater good at some unspecified point in world history that would not have otherwise transpired, which proposition seems outrageously ad hoc.[1]
Thirdly, MacGregor argues that there is a logical incompatibility between the claim that God uses all acts of evil to accomplish a greater good and the Biblical command to do what we can to prevent evils. If acts of evil are the means by which God accomplishes a greater good, then to prevent those acts of evil would prevent God from accomplishing His intended good. Only if some acts of evil are gratuitous could a prevention of evil be compatible with God’s good purposes. One could counter-argue that God still wants us to prevent evil, even if doing so might prevent some greater good since it is better to have some good without evil rather than more good with evil. God may furnish us with a greater good as a reward for enduring the evil, but would prefer that we do not have to endure the evil to begin with.
Given MacGregor’s acceptance of gratuitous evil, does he accept the atheist’s argument? No. He thinks the best way to undermine the evidential problem of evil is to challenge premise one. It is not true that if God exists gratuitous evil would not exist. The existence of gratuitous evil is what we would expect in a freedom-permitting universe, for if God creates a world in which creatures enjoy freedom of the will, they can use that will for either good or bad. For their will to remain free, they must be allowed to choose even the most horrendous of evils. Gratuitous evils are “simply a logically unavoidable necessity of contingent living in a freedom-permitting world.”[2] While God can surely use many of those individual acts of evil for our good, it does not follow that every act of evil that God allows, He allows for the purpose of accomplishing some greater good. He allows acts of evil, even gratuitous acts of evil, because He values and honors the freedom of our will.
What about Romans 8:28 and Ephesians 1:11? These passages promise us that God will ultimately use even acts of evil for our good. They do not promise us that the good will outweigh the evil, nor do they require us to think that every act of evil will be used for good. Romans 8:28 in particular is a general affirmation that God is working on our behalf, using both the good and the bad to our ultimate advantage.
[1]Kirk R. MacGregor, “The Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil” in Philosophia Christi, Vol. 14, Number 1, 2012; pp. 165-180, 168.
[2]Kirk R. MacGregor, “The Existence and Irrelevance of Gratuitous Evil” in Philosophia Christi, Vol. 14, Number 1, 2012; pp. 165-180, 180.
July 19, 2012 at 3:54 pm
Apologetics + Star Wars picture. You just made my day.
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July 19, 2012 at 4:04 pm
Great, a fellow SW fan! I need to find more reasons to use SW pictures on this blog.
Jason
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July 19, 2012 at 11:18 pm
I’m kind of surprised that anyone would undertake to undermine premise #2, especially under the circumstances you listed. It would seem to me, that since premise #1 is a supposition, that #1 would be the easier target, and that the reasons for attempting to undermine premise #2 are better suited for undermining premise #1.
I wonder, do either Craig or Alston hold to a deterministic view of God’s sovereignty? That might explain why they attack premise #2.
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July 20, 2012 at 2:27 pm
The two defenses discussed here are more or less equivalent if human free will is itself recognized to be the greater good for the sake of which God allows evil to exist.
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July 20, 2012 at 2:49 pm
The theodicy outlined below called “Theodicy from divine justice” may show that there is no gratuitous evil, no matter what happens:
(1) God’s perfect justice prevents Him from relieving people with unforgiven sins from their sufferings (see Isaiah 59,1-2).
(2) Unlike God Christians are not perfectly just. Therefore, unlike God, they are in a position to help people with unforgiven sins. By doing this they may make those among them who haven’t yet accepted God’s salvation receptive of it (Matthew 5,16, 1 Peter 2,11-12, and 3,1-2), which in turn frees these persons from suffering in the afterlife.
(3) The greater God’s beneficial power due to His love, the greater God’s destructive power due to His justice (see Matthew 13,27-29). Striving to prevent as much suffering as possible God can only interfere to such a degree that the beneficial effect of the interference is not neutralized by the destructive effect of it.
(4) Someone who dies before he or she reaches the age of accountability, i.e. before he or she can distinguish between good and evil (see Genesis 2,16-17, Deuteronomy 1,39, and Isaiah 7,16) faces no punishment in the afterlife, as he or she would not have been able to commit sins. So, God may not be inclined to prevent such a person’s death.
(5) A person’s suffering in this life may have a redeeming effect (Luke 16,25) and consequently contribute to a decrease of the respective person’s suffering in the afterlife; the amount of suffering in this life is so to speak subtracted from the amount of suffering in the afterlife. So, God may not be inclined to relieve this person’s suffering.
(6) A person’s suffering in this life may make the person receptive of God’s salvation (Luke 15,11-21), which in turn frees this person from suffering in the afterlife.
(7) There are degrees of punishment in the afterlife depending on one’s moral behaviour (Matthew 16,27, 2 Corinthians 5,10), one’s knowledge of God’s will (Matthew 11,20-24, Luke 12,47-48), and, as mentioned before, one’s amount of suffering in this life (Luke 16,25).
(8) Those people who suffer more in this life than they deserve due to their way of life are compensated for it by receiving rewards in Heaven.
(9) As for animal suffering, animals will be compensated for it on the “new earth” mentioned in Isaiah 65,17-25, 2 Peter 3,13 and Revelation 21,1.
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July 20, 2012 at 4:42 pm
Aaron, good point. Tactically speaking, since premise 1 is a presupposition it would be easier to attack. But I think that many theists share that presupposition, and thus aren’t willing to attack it. They do not think that gratuitous evil can exist if God exists because they think that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting every evil. That had been my view as well until I read MacGregor’s paper. But I think MacGregor has some valid points. There is a good case to be made that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting acts of human free will–even if they result in gratuitous evils–and not necessarily a morally sufficient reason for permitting every act of evil. Whether gratuitous evil exists or not, I think that what MacGregor has shown is that both premises of the atheist’s argument can be successfully attacked, which makes it a bad argument.
Jason
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July 20, 2012 at 5:10 pm
[…] The evidential problem of evil points to the improbability that the amount of evil we see in the world – particularly gratuitous evil – would exist if an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God exists. The… […]
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July 21, 2012 at 1:43 am
“Thirdly, MacGregor argues that there is a logical incompatibility between the claim that God uses all acts of evil to accomplish a greater good and the Biblical command to do what we can to prevent evils.”
This needn’t be the case. There can be cases when a specific act has different consequences, depending on whether it is carried out by God or by man. Let’s assume that a sinner is in need of help. If he received help from God by means of a supernatural divine intervention he certainly would interpret it as an approval of his way of life and thus be encouraged to continue with his sinful way of life, but this would not be the case if he received help from a Christian.
“He thinks the best way to undermine the evidential problem of evil is to challenge premise one. It is not true that if God exists gratuitous evil would not exist. The existence of gratuitous evil is what we would expect in a freedom-permitting universe, for if God creates a world in which creatures enjoy freedom of the will, they can use that will for either good or bad. For their will to remain free, they must be allowed to choose even the most horrendous of evils.”
Evil resulting from exercising free will is not gratuitous, as it does indeed serve a greater purpose, namely the exercise of free will. In my view it is only natural evil that can be identified as gratuitous.
In my previous comment I wrote that the theodicy outlined there might show that there is no gratuitous evil. Strictly speaking, whether or not this is correct depends on which of its points one takes into account. Points (1), (2), (3), and (6) show, if true, that God’s existence is compatible with the existence of gratuitous evil. If points (4), (5), (7), (8), and (9) are true, there is no gratuitous evil.
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July 23, 2012 at 10:58 am
Hi Patrick,
When it comes to the issue of a greater good resulting from evil, usually the object of the greater good that people have in mind is the person who suffered from the evil (or anyone else other than the perpetrator of the evil). Of course, it’s possible that an evil act could result in a greater good for the perpetrator as well. For example, person A kills person B, lands himself in prison, meets a chaplain, and gives his life to Christ. But is it possible for a greater good to come from preventing evil?
I think you are on to something. One way of challenging MacGregor’s third point is to say that God is able to bring about a greater good whether sinful act X is actualized or prevented. For example, a man kills his lover in the heat of passion (he caught her in bed with another man), lands himself in prison, meets a chaplain, and gives his life to Christ. If the same person was prevented from committing the murder, however, the same result could have occurred. Perhaps a Christian man walking in front of the house hears the commotion, runs inside the house, wrestles the gun out of the man’s hand, and prevents the murder. Later on the would-be-murderer reflects on the situation, is glad that he was prevented from committing the murder, and reaches out to the Christian to express his gratitude, which ultimately leads to his salvation. I can’t think of any reason to believe that God only provides greater goods for evils. Why can’t He provide greater goods for acts of good too? If preventing evil is an act of good, then God can bring about an even greater amount of good from that as well. That said, I still think MacGregor is right that this creates an overdetermined system.
While free will has a purpose, that does not mean that every act of evil committed with that freedom has a purpose.
Why do you think that? It seems to me that many good can result from natural evils.
Jason
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July 29, 2012 at 9:07 am
If God and Satan both claim to be eternal, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, how are we to judge who is telling the truth?
If we aren’t in a good position to judge whether claims are true or false, or what is good or evil — as there could potentially be information that would make the true appear false or the false appear true, especially when dealing with magical spiritual beings — then we should not make any conclusions whatsoever, including whether God and Satan exist or which of the two, if they exist, is the good one.
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July 30, 2012 at 3:48 pm
Jerry (or is it Arthur?),
Is this a hypothetical question you are asking about God and Satan? Because Satan is not eternal and omnipotent.
Why are we not in a position to judge what is good? All of us know what is good.
As for the question of existence, that is a separate question from moral qualities, so we could speak to one issue without speaking to the other. We could know that God exists even if we don’t know what moral qualities he has.
Jason
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March 29, 2018 at 8:47 pm
The Question of Gratuitous Evil and the Evidential Problem of Evil | Theo-sophical Ruminations
[…]Much of humanity on this planet is sunk in what may be called ‘The Restricted Consciousness Syndrome’.[…]
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December 30, 2018 at 5:29 pm
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