David Baggett and jerry Walls have written an excellent book exploring God’s relationship to morality. The book aims to provide a moral argument for the existence of God, and to answer criticisms to theistic ethics. After showing how various non-theistic foundations for ethics fail, the authors take a close look at the most common objection to theistic ethics: the Euthyphro argument. They critique both horns of the dilemma: pure voluntarism (X is good because God commands it) and non-voluntarism (X is good wholly independent of God and His will). If goodness is determined by God’s commands, then morality seems arbitrary. Indeed, if God willed that rape is good rape would be good (abhorrent commands objection). There is also the epistemic problem. How would we know what God has commanded, or if God has changed His mind? The problem with non-voluntarism is that it makes God irrelevant to morality. Goodness stands outside of God. Indeed, God is subject to the good in the same way we are. At best His role is to communicate to us what is good. He is like the divine meteorologist who reports the weather rather can creating it. If goodness is independent of God, then God’s aseity (self-existence) is called into question. He cannot be the metaphysical ultimate.
Baggett and Walls split the horns of the dilemma by arguing that the good is neither metaphysically independent of God nor dependent on God’s commands, but rather metaphysically dependent on God’s nature. But some divine commands don’t appear to have anything to do with morality (such as building a fence on top of one’s roof), and yet those God commanded to do so were morally obligated to obey Him. If those commands have their origin in God’s will rather than His good nature, are we not back to voluntarism? Yes, but in a modified form that does not fall prey to the same errors as pure voluntarism. It’s at this juncture the authors make a critical distinction between the moral good and the moral right. The moral good is a matter of axiology (what is good), whereas the moral right is a matter of deontology (what is morally obligatory). Not everything that is morally good is morally right. For example, while it is morally good to give away one’s money to the poor, it is not morally obligatory to do so. While the good is grounded in the nature of God, our moral obligations (the moral right) are constituted by God’s commands. As Baggett and Walls note, “God’s commands determine what’s morally obligatory, but not what’s morally good.” (47) God’s commands not only inform us which of the morally good acts are also morally obligatory for us, but they are also expressions of the divine will. These amoral commands will always be in accord with God’s good nature, but they are not expressions of the good per se. And yet, we are morally obligated to obey these commands because they are issued from a legitimate authority.
Baggett and Walls argue that the nature of morality is a clue to the nature of God. Most people are keenly aware of their moral intuitions. Moral truths are not just objective, but necessary. For example, we cannot conceive of a possible world in which torturing an innocent child for fun would be morally good. Moral truths are necessary truths. If moral truths are grounded in the nature of God, then God must be a necessary being as well.
One question that often comes up in discussions is why we should think that God is good to begin with. Why think that if God exists, He is a good being rather than an amoral or even immoral being? Baggett and Walls point to the objectivity of moral truths as one key to answering this question. Moral truths are propositions about what is good and evil. But what sense does it make to speak of propositions of thought without the existence of a thinker who thinks them? As Alvin Plantinga writes:
How could there be truths totally independent of minds or persons? Truths are the sort of things persons know; and the idea that there are or could be truths quite beyond the best methods of apprehension seems peculiar and outré and somehow outrageous. What would account for such truths? How would they get there? Where would they come from? How could the things that are in fact true or false propositions, let’s say—exist in serene and majestic independence of persons and their means of apprehension? How could there be propositions no one has ever so much as grasped or thought of? It can seem just crazy to suppose that propositions could eist independent of minds or persons or judging begins. That there should just be these truths, independent of persons and their noetic activities can, in certain moods and from certain perspectives, seem wildly counterintuitive. How could there be truths, or for that matter, falsehoods, if there weren’t any person to think or believe or judge them?[1]
In this he echoes Aquinas who said, “Even if there were no human intellects, there could be truths because of their relation to the divine intellect. But if, per impossiblei there were no intellects at all, but things continued to exist, then there would be no such reality as truth.” (De Veritate Q. 1, A.6 respondio) Such moral truths could not exist apart from a mind. If the moral truths are necessary and eternal, then so is the mind that knows them. God does not merely believe these propositions, but rather conceives of them as necessary aspects of His nature.
In chapter six they turn their attention to divine command theory. God’s commands do not constitute the good, but do constitute our moral duties. While many of God’s commands are necessary reflections of His good character, some are contingent. While these command would never violate his good nature, they do not reflect it. Examples would include God’s command to Jewish males not to trim the edges of their beards, or the command to give 10% of one’s increase (rather than, say, 9%).
There is a decent chapter on the problem of evil and the challenge it poses to the existence of God. Walls and Baggett argue that the problem is not insurmountable, and to the degree that the moral argument for God’s existence is successful we have good reason for thinking the argument against God from evil is false.
They also address the question of why God is needed for morality if one can recognize moral facts and behave morally without belief in God: “[I]t might seem inconsistent to argue that moral truth is dependent on God if we can know it without even thinking of God. This alleged inconsistency can be dispelled if we recognize…that the order of being is different from the order of knowing.” (18)
One aspect of the book that disappointed me was the amount of attention paid to Calvinism. While the authors were right to bring up how one’s theological views might affect the cogency of the moral argument, I think they were guilty of treating the issue too simplistically, and perhaps even constructing a straw man. They essentially equated Calvinism with determinism. The same problems that arise for materialistic versions of determinism arise for theological versions as well. But not all Calvinists hold to theological determinism. Salvation can be monergistic, and yet humans still have libertarian freedom in other matters. They also misconstrued what Calvinists believe at points. For example, they equated irresistible grace with a love potion that creates infatuation in the beloved but not genuine love. But on a Calvinistic view, God unilaterally regenerates man so that man is able to freely love God—something He is not able to do when He is dead in His sins.
Overall, I would highly recommend this book for anyone seeking to explore in more detail how God relates to morality, and how the existence of morality is a powerful argument for the existence of God.
[1]Plantinga, “How to Be and Anti-Realist”, 67.
July 30, 2012 at 2:01 pm
I have various disagreements on this one (I’m a determinist, I’m an advocate of “God as moral meteorologist,” etc.), but I’ll limit this response to the bad distinction created by Baggett and Walls between “morally good” and “morally right.” Those terms are synonymous. Everything that is morally good is morally right, and everything that is morally right is morally good. Deontology is false; morality is a matter of axiology.
The dilemma, “A particular divine command doesn’t appear related to morality” is solved much more simply by saying what we already accept: That we don’t know how various things connect to the higher good. There are all sorts of apparently nonsensical old laws, and we say that however mysteriously, these laws ostensibly catalyzed good things. We do not accept that they were actually, literally pointless, which is something deontology lets us accept if we want to, which is a sign of deontology’s backwardness.
The dilemma, “If giving to the poor is good, how is it not absolutely obligatory?” is solved with simple explication: “It is circumstantially, or even often, or even usually good to give to the poor, but sometimes it is bad to give to the poor.” These contextual qualifiers break the issue down as a matter of mechanism (“How do things work in terms of causes and effects, and how does that impact my decision about whether to give to the poor in this situation?”) rather than axial interests (that needless suffering ought be prevented). And since the mechanisms of charity are so complicated (“Does it apply if I’m already poor? Will giving to the poor make me poor? Make everyone poor? Spoil the poor person? Fail to effectively prevent suffering?”), we hesitate to say that giving to the poor rises to imperative, absolute status (and are correct in doing so).
It can be stimulative to break apart terms and create new pattern boxes in which to shoehorn complicated concepts. That’s because we’re predisposed to doing so (the neurochemical is called “dopamine”). When I witnessed this attempt to separate “morally good” from “morally right” I nearly shouted in agony. These issues are resolved with detail, nuance, and explication, not box-making.
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July 30, 2012 at 2:35 pm
Stan, the distinction between good and right is not unique to them. And I think it’s common sense. Giving away all of your money to the poor would surely be a moral good, but that does not mean it is morally obligatory for you to do so (as you pointed out, circumstances could actually make it an unwise thing to do). Indeed, moral philosophers speak of such acts as superogatory acts–acts that go above and beyond what is morally required of us to do.
Are you a Christian theist?
As a determinist, what sense can you even make of moral obligations? How can we have moral obligations if we are incapable of choosing A versus B?
Jason
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July 31, 2012 at 1:30 am
Hi Sir Jason!
I’m long seeking for a book that deals with the Moral Argument, since that, for me personally, is the most compelling argument for God.
Based on your review, I think this book have effectively defended or demonstrate how the Theistic Foundation of Morality is sound. But I got the impression, by reading other reviews, that it does not engage on refuting the other alternative proposed by Naturalist, which for me is the only difficulty of the argument, does it?
By the way, is this still you e-mail address sir – jasondulle@yahoo.com?
Please see my urgent e-mail sir!
Thanks!
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July 31, 2012 at 6:54 am
TheTruth., Google covenant morality for humanity- the presumption of humanity to see how we humanists ground morality and how theistic morality cannot grount itself in a law giver. Also see my previous detailed posts here about that!
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July 31, 2012 at 7:06 am
The dilemma applies also to His nature,so that won’t do, and begs the question of His nature. Two fallacies = a no,no!
That we can know the good without His input reflects realism-objective morality. All theists ever do with supplanting morality and natural causes by God is ” to invent a secondary and superfluous hypothesis for what already is accounted for,” Percy Bysshe Shelley, gnu atheist.
This is the Aquinas superfluity argument.
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July 31, 2012 at 9:21 am
That is basically true. It addresses non-theistic views on morality, but not in great depth. They examine them enough, however, to conclude that they cannot explain the basic features of our moral experience.
Jason
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August 8, 2012 at 10:51 am
Jason, you said, “Giving away all of your money to the poor would surely be a moral good, but that does not mean it is morally obligatory for you to do so (as you pointed out, circumstances could actually make it an unwise thing to do).”
I would not say that it is surely a moral good. Rather, I would say that in the case where it is wise to do so, it is a moral good. In the case where it is unwise to do so, it is a moral ill.
You said, “Are you a Christian theist?”
Yes.
You said, “As a determinist, what sense can you even make of moral obligations? How can we have moral obligations if we are incapable of choosing A versus B?”
We are certainly capable of choosing A versus B. But choicemaking is a deterministic process, not a burst of magical spontaneity. Here’s a post I wrote on the subject called “The Chess Chooser”:
http://extremestan.blogspot.com/2008/04/chess-chooser.html
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August 8, 2012 at 11:05 am
I see your point regarding the poor analogy, but I don’t think someone who gives all of their money to the poor to their own detriment would be doing a moral wrong necessarily. It would be foolish, but foolishness and evil are not the same things. Now, it could be wrong. As a Christian I believe that a man is responsible for providing for his own family. So if someone gives away everything he owns to the poor, and in doing so is not able to provide for his family, then he has broken a moral obligation to do something that he was not morally obligated to do, and that is wrong.
If choice-making is a deterministic process, then it is meaningless to speak of choosing A versus B because one is not free to choose either of those options (or neither). If they have been determined to choose A, they cannot choose B. That is not freedom. If we program a robot to say “I love you,” it would not make any sense to speak of the robot choosing to say those words. He was determined to say those words, and could not have said any other words. There is no freedom in that.
Jason
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August 8, 2012 at 11:28 am
You said, “If choice-making is a deterministic process, then it is meaningless to speak of choosing A versus B because one is not free to choose either of those options (or neither).”
You are not free to choose both/either, because A and B are mutually exclusive. This is true in any world. “Or” is a funny word, because there is both an inclusive “or” and an exclusive “or.” In programming, we call the latter something else, to avoid the vaguery: “xor.”
So the question is, given mutually exclusive perceived-potential options A and B, can you choose “A xor B” under determinism? The answer is “yes.”
You said, “If they have been determined to choose A, they cannot choose B. That is not freedom.”
We must agree that A and B are mutually exclusive. If you choose A, you cannot choose B. If you choose B, you cannot choose A.
Given that, it appears that you take issue with the fact that the particular choice was determined. Do you believe freedom only comes from spontaneity? I believe freedom comes from the unimpeded expression of our constitutions. If my constitution (my neurons, my soul, etc.) does not determine my choices, then I’m not even acting willfully, let alone freely.
My position is that libertarian notions of free will are incoherent and not found in Scripture.
You said, “If we program a robot to say ‘I love you,’ it would not make any sense to speak of the robot choosing to say those words.”
That’s true, but that’s because the robot didn’t *choose* to say I love you, if I just hardcode “PRINT ‘I LOVE YOU'” or something. If, on the other hand, I program an artificial neural network, one which algorithmically perceives, contemplates, and acts therefrom, then it CAN make choices (because that’s what choicemaking is).
Its choices do not become any less choices even if I know exactly how it will choose, and even if I gave it hardcoded interests conforming to my own. Its choices are correctly called subordinate to my own, but they are still choices, when we get rid of the libertarian baggage from which the word “choice” usually suffers.
It is this same sense that we are subordinate to the sovereignty of God. We don’t surprise him, we don’t overrule him. We’re tools of his higher purposes, whether of honorable (“timen”) use or dishonorable (“atimian”) use.
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March 9, 2015 at 3:37 pm
[…] What I’ve Been Reading – Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality […]
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June 6, 2018 at 10:46 am
Jason writes:
The so-called problem of evil is an academic question. If God exists, then there necessarily must be a morally sufficient reason for evil—full stop.
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June 6, 2018 at 10:53 am
The author is correct to locate goodness in the nature of God, but your review doesn’t spell out what it is about God’s nature that is good. Why is God’s nature considered good? You mention Aquinas, but since you don’t subscribe to his metaphysics, on how would you justify your assertion that God is good?
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June 22, 2018 at 1:09 pm
When it comes to morality mankind’s created concept caricatures, God(s), is irrelevant.
The foundation of morality is based on equity: the state or quality of being just and fair. This is, in part, a learned condition.
Behavior is determined by a combination of inherited traits, experience, and the environment. Some behavior, called innate, comes from your genes, but other behavior is learned, either from interacting with the world or by being taught.
Fairness and impartiality are the foundational companions of morality; as long as fair balance is maintained, the standard for morality is set.
To explain objective morality, the debating “believer” presents the argument that objective morality is grounded in and dictated by an external influence of the theist’s creation; that is, the caricature concept, God. By using the term “objective” the theist hopes to, if not eliminate, at least obfuscate the possibility that morals are subjective in nature and are not formulated within humanity apart from some mythological entity.
That “objective” notion however is based more on, if not, only on, belief rather than reason.
The grounding of morality not only is not grounded in and dictated by the caricature concept influence theists call God but “objective” morality is; in fact, founded on “subjective” discernment of what is just and fair.
The byproduct of an equity-based grounding of what is fair and just we call “moral”; while the opposite, inequity, we call immoral. And each condition encourages tangential fanning covering many aspects of humanity.
From the essence of being equitable, MORAL; and the absence of being equitable, IMMORAL comes the familiar proverb derivative: “What is good for the goose is good for the gander.”
The following video experiment illustrates, in a way you cannot possibly fail to understand, when, why, how and what happens when Equity; thus morality, is debauched by sensual pleasures to a degree perceived to be morally harmful.
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