Moral relativists have the difficult position of grounding their moral persuasions. Why should one do x and not y, given the relative nature of morals? For example, why should person p not murder person q when it is not in their interest to do so? A standard response is that murder is wrong because society has collectively determined it is wrong. This response invites three questions:
(1) What if a majority of society determined murder was acceptable? Would the relativist change his position to affirm that murder is morally acceptable? If not, why not?
(2) Why is person p obligated to abide by the dictates of the majority? After all, morals are just personal tastes. A cultural consensus is nothing more than the sum of individuals’ personal tastes. Why should person p be concerned about the personal tastes of the group? Why not assert his own interests over those of the group? Where does the moral obligation to follow the dictates of the majority come from?
(3) If morality is determined by the collective majority, is the moral relativist prepared to acknowledge that all minority views are, by definition, immoral? This would include such views as homosexuality, same-sex marriage, and cloning—all of which do not enjoy the support of a majority in society. A moral relativist cannot argue for the morality of homosexuality within a relativistic framework of morality in which society determines what is right.
The fact of the matter is that moral relativists have no grounding for morality. They try to ground it in the consensus of the public whole, but cannot ground the moral obligation to follow the public consensus in anything but thin air. Finally, they are inconsistent in their application of moral relativism. They try to argue that things such as same-sex marriage are good, even when the public consensus disagrees. They can’t have their cake and eat it too.
Thinking to Believe 
May 8, 2007 at 10:06 am
If the moral relativist cannot justify a rule against murdering your neighbors, yet they do not murder their neighbors, doesn’t that argue against the needs to appeal to a deity for morality? It also suggests that a conscious understanding of morality is irrelevant. Does that explain why the moral behavior of American Christians is indistinguishable from that of non-Christians?
Perhaps humans have evolved to have a sense of morality. (Eg, those humans who murder others were systematically weeded from the gene pool, while those who acted in the group’s interests survived.) There were interesting studies performed on monkeys that show human-like behavior and “morality” connected to money, even the use of money to buy sex from other monkeys.
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/05/magazine/05FREAK.html?ei=5089&en=6bcb661222c32ba6&ex=1275624000&pagewanted=all
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May 9, 2007 at 4:18 pm
Theists do not argue that one cannot behave morally without belief in God; we argue that one cannot ground their moral experience in objective reality without God. If there is no transcendent law-giver, then there can be no such thing as good or bad, right or wrong–only personal preferences. One cannot say rape is wrong; only that they do not prefer rape. Morality is reduced to autobiography.
Without God as the grounds for morality, some form of moral relativism always results. Only a transcendent source can properly ground objective moral values.
I’ll post a separate comment regarding the idea that morality can be explained by evolution.
Jason
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May 9, 2007 at 4:23 pm
An evolutionary account of morality is bankrupt for the following reasons:
1.Moral principles are non-material things. Evolution can only explain physical things and processes.
2.Morality is prescriptive. Evolution’s explanation is descriptive. Doesn’t capture the essence of our moral experience.
3.Commits the naturalistic fallacy: assumes that we can get an ought from an is. Explaining why things are the way they are is one thing, but explaining why they ought to be the way they are is another. At one point does the is become the ought? Naturalistic versions of ethics cannot make the transition from is to ought.
a.Evolution might explain how the behavior we call “moral” came to be, but it cannot tell me why I ought to live that way now.
b.“A solely materialistic universe might produce in us feelings and beliefs of obligation—like the protection of our children or survival of our species or subculture—but that’s a different matter from actually having such obligations we ought to carry out.”
4.Morality cannot be reduced to behavior because behavior in itself is not always moral or immoral. The extenuating circumstances often make something moral or immoral. Cutting for murder or surgery? Taking because you are borrowing or stealing?
a.”Motive and intent are vital parts of moral conduct. This cannot be determined by observing physical conduct. Stealing and borrowing look the same. The difference is a non-physical element called permission. The Darwinian explanation must reduce morality to behavior. If morality entails more than actions, though, evolution can’t explain it.”
b.Morality cannot be a mere way of acting because there’s an oughtness we feel prior to the behavior itself that compels us to choose certain behaviors. If the moral element is prior to the behavior, then it can’t be the behavior itself.
c.Matter and energy in motion is not sufficient to account for the force of the moral law. Molecules and genes are not good or evil.
d.Morality does not pertain to instinctual traits, but chosen behaviors. We hold people responsible for their choices, not their instincts. If morality was just genetic, it would not longer be morality. If morality is not related to the genes, however, evolution is incapable of explaining it.
5.Cannot make sense of altruism (such as was exhibited by the Holocaust rescuers). Getting caught put one’s whole family at risk, and there was no honor for doing so. Why did they transcend their selfish gene?
6.If absolute morals evolved or came into being by chance, why should we think they apply to us, and only us? Their mere existence is insufficient to establish our personal obligation to them. Only theism can provide a match between our moral make-up and the structure of reality.
7.Where did our moral reasoning come from? Why don’t apes exhibit it? Math? Art? Can a bigger brain account for it? Now, it’s certainly true that big brains are correlated with increasing intelligence. But correlation, as anyone who has taken a course in research methods knows, is not causation. There are examples of people with little brains, or reduced brains who continue to exhibit rationality of an extraordinary measure. Is this just redundancy in the brain? If so, why couldn’t we have evolved such functions with smaller brains? Bigger brains are disadvantageous for our species because they don’t come out of the birth canal easily.
8.The evolutionary perspective on morality is echoed by Richard Dawkins: “In a universe of blind physical forces and genetic replication some people are going to get hurt, other people are going to get lucky; and you won’t find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is at the bottom no design, no purpose, no evil, and no good. Nothing but blind, pitiless indifference. DNA neither knows nor cares. DNA just is. And we dance to its music.”
Jason
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May 9, 2007 at 4:25 pm
I would like to elaborate on my first comment. Here is something I wrote along similar lines in the past:
If God does not exist there is no ontological foundation on which to accept the existence of objective moral rules, moral duty, and moral accountability, and no practical reason to perform our moral obligations. But if we have good reason to believe that objective moral rules exists, that we have a duty to follow them, and we will be held accountable for our moral choices, then we have good grounds for believing God exists. In syllogistic form our argument is as follows:
P1 If God does not exist objective moral values and duties would not exist.
P2 Objective moral values and duties do exist
_________________________________
Therefore God exists
Some atheists who cannot stomach the moral nihilism that logically follows the atheistic worldview argue that objective moral rules simply exist, having no foundation. Even if we granted that objective moral rules could have a meaningful existence independent of God, why should we think we are obligated to follow them? Obligations do not hang in mid-air; obligations are grounded in relationships. The concept of obligation only makes sense in the context of personal agents. Modern atheistic ethicist, Richard Taylor wrote, “To say that something is wrong because . . . it is forbidden by God, is . . . perfectly understandable to anyone who believes in a law-giving God. But to say that something is wrong . . . even though no God exists to forbid it, is not understandable…. … The concept of moral obligation [is] unintelligible apart from the idea of God. The words remain but their meaning is gone.”
Even if we granted that objective moral duties existed apart from a personal God our moral choices would be insignificant because the finality of the grave allows for no moral accountability. Whether I choose to yield to, or resist my obligation to obey the moral laws the outcome is the same. Only theism can ground objective moral values, our duty to submit to those values, and supply us with a rational reason to fulfill our moral obligations.
The best account of our moral sense is that it is derived from our perception of objective moral laws, and those moral laws are derived from a transcendent Moral Law-Giver. The moral laws are not arbitrary, but flow from God’s very nature.
Jason
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May 10, 2007 at 6:17 am
Jason,
You write that “A solely materialistic universe might produce in us feelings and beliefs of obligation—like the protection of our children or survival of our species or subculture—but that’s a different matter from actually having such obligations we ought to carry out.”
Agreed. Let’s assume the innate desires to act in certain ways have a genetic, evolutionary origin. If “morality” is simply a set of preset human inclinations, dressed up with deities and additional arbitrary rules tacked on, then it can be dispensed with. Especially when the moral codes routinely fail to make people act any differently than they do without the codes.
Arthur
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May 10, 2007 at 1:35 pm
Arthur,
You’re right. There is no imperative to keep behaving “morally” given the evolutionary understanding of what morality is. Of course, the evolutionist would argue that we should continue to behave in those ways because they improve our fitness for survival, and hence reproduction. But that begs the question. I would ask them, Why should I be concerned to reproduce? Why not just live for the moment in any way that makes me happy? There may be rational reasons not to, but there can be no moral objection.
Jason
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