I think a good argument can be made for the existence of God based on the existence of the universe. We know the universe began to exist. Given that whatever begins to exist requires a cause external to itself to bring it into existence, there must be a cause external to the universe to explain why it came into being. Whatever brought time, space, and matter into existence cannot itself be temporal, spatial, and material, and thus the cause of the universe must be eternal, non-spatial, and immaterial. Furthermore, the cause must be personal in nature since there are only two known sources of causation—events and personal agents—and it is impossible to explain the first event in terms of a prior event. Therefore, an agent must be the cause of the universe. A personal, eternal, non-spatial, and immaterial being is what most theists mean by “God.”
While I think this argument demonstrates the existence of the divine, it cannot tell us anything about the number of divine beings responsible for creating the universe. There could be one, or there could be billions. An additional argument is needed if one is going to prove the existence of one and only one God. In the past I argued for monotheism on the basis of divine omnipotence. I reasoned that the property of omnipotence cannot belong to more than one being, for if two or more beings have to share power, then neither being can be said to have “all” power. So God, then, must be one if He is omnipotent.
It came to me recently, however, that this argument fails on the grounds that it falsely construes power as a substance. Power is not a substance that can be divided up and distributed. Power is simply the ability do some particular thing. Indeed, if power is a substance, and God has all power, that would mean humans have no power. Clearly this is false. We have the ability to do a wide range of things. So to say a being is omnipotent is only to say that such a being possesses the ability to do any logically possible thing. It says nothing about the amount of power that other beings possess. It is logically possible, then, for there to be more than one omnipotent being. The argument for monotheism from omnipotence, then, fails. The only logical grounds I am aware of for thinking God to be one is parsimony: no more than one God is needed to explain the origin of the universe. If, according to Ockham’s Razor, we should not multiply entities beyond necessity, and if it is not necessary to postulate the existence of more than one divine being, then there is no good reason to think there exists more than one divine being. If you have any other argument I would be interested in hearing it.
Thinking to Believe 
March 9, 2010 at 10:57 am
Identity of indiscernibles, perhaps? If there were two (or more) personal, eternal, non-spatial, immaterial, and omniscient beings, how would anyone tell them apart? What property would one have that the other lacks?
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March 9, 2010 at 11:54 am
Aletheist,
Humans share properties in common with each other, and yet we can be distinguished from one another, so why think multiple divine beings who share a host of properties together could not be distinguished from one another. At the very least, the property of individual consciousness would do the job. Being 1 would have the property of being conscious of my his own existence, but not the property of being conscious of Being 2’s existence. That’s all that would be required to distinguish one divine being from another.
It’s not as if the properties of eternality, personality, non-spatiality, or omniscience logically exclude more than one being possessing them. More than one being can possess those properties. In the same way there is nothing contradictory about two beings possessing the property of temporality, there is nothing contradicotry about two beings sharing the property of eternality. So long as there is a distinction of consciousness between beings, they would be discernable.
Jason
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March 9, 2010 at 3:26 pm
Well, individual consciousness certainly distinguishes one divine Person from another . . . but of course, I deny that this is sufficient to ground a claim that there are multiple divine beings.
What you are sketching here sounds like a version of “theistic personalism” – the view that God is very similar to us, only without a body (except that of Jesus) and without the same limitations. By contrast, on the classical conception – where God is being itself, pure act, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, the uncaused cause, etc. – it is necessary that there be an entity who fits the bill, and impossible that there be more than one. For the classical theist, when we attribute properties to God – power, knowledge, goodness, etc. – we do so in an analogous sense, not a univocal sense.
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March 9, 2010 at 3:46 pm
Why would it be insufficient? How do we know identical twins aren’t the same person? Ideally, they share all the same properties: same height, same voice, same appearance, same laugh, same everything. So how do we know they are different persons? It’s because one is conscious of himself but not the other, and vice-versa. Consciousness is what distinguishes one from the other. There are two distinct consciousnesses, therefore there are two distinct beings. If both bodies were shared by a single consciousness, then there would only be a single being. It seems to me, then, that consciousness is fully adequate to ground the existence of multiple divine beings.
I am not saying God is just like us except greater. I’m merely arguing that there is no divine property that logically excludes more than one being from sharing in it. More than one being can be eternal. More than one being can be omniscient. More than one being can be omnipresent. More than one being can be omnipotent. More than one being can be non-spatial. More than one being can be good. Etc. I don’t know of any property that, logically speaking, is exclusive to one being. That’s why I don’t think rationality alone can lead us to conclude monotheism. Granted, Ockham’s Razor makes it preferable, but it does not demand it. Rational arguments for theism only require one divine being to be successful, but they do not require that there be no more than one divine being.
Jason
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March 9, 2010 at 4:05 pm
In the case of identical twins, one reason why we know that there are two persons is because they do not share the same location in space; this is a property that they do not have in common. Besides, WE cannot tell that they have “two distinct consciousnesses;” only THEY can, and we have to take their word for it.
In the case of God, of course, we CAN take His Word for it. There is a consistent subject-object distinction between the Father and the Son, the Son and the Spirit, and the Father and the Spirit. But I am not really interested in reopening the Trinitarian vs. Oneness debate here.
Again, classical theism holds that God is being itself, pure act, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, the uncaused cause, etc. All of these are descriptions that, logically speaking, ARE exclusive to one being. That is why I think that rationality CAN lead us to conclude monotheism, but that is still not enough to reach the God of the Bible – we need special revelation for that.
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March 10, 2010 at 2:34 pm
aletheist,
I agree with your analysis. Identity of indiscernibles precludes two divine beings. As you observe, twins occupy different spatial coordinates, so they are discernible. Since one cannot differentiate non-contingent beings, we must conclude there is only one.
Geisler said it well,
There can be only one necessary existence. What is pure actuality must be one since there is no way for one thing to differ from another in its being unless there is some real potentiality for differentiation. But in a being of pure actuality there is no potential whatsoever. Hence, there is no real differentiation in it. All of it is one; there cannot be two or more, since neither would be really different from the other in its being.
Moreover, the First Cause is, by definition, not contingent. Material energy stems from creation. There is thus no pre-creation material energy. So the argument from omnipotence appeals to some sort of transcendent energy or power intrinsic to the First Cause. It is thus incorrect to argue that such a being having “all power” precludes material power for we are speaking of different types of power. If we argue the First Cause has “all power,” then whatever that “power” is, there can only be one First Cause. Nothing else could be a cause because it would lack any power to cause anything.
Omnipotence is the First Cause’s non-contingent ability. That means His power is absolute. In that light, there can be only one being having absolute power.
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March 19, 2010 at 10:53 am
aletheist,
I agree with both of your observations in your first paragraph, but it doesn’t change the point (it only shows that analogies all break down somewhere). You could just as easily change the analogy to make it less true-to-life to more easily illustrate the point. Let’s say there was one body with two persons living “inside” (similar to conjoined twins who share two arms, two legs, and one torso). In such a case, the persons could not be distinguished spatially. They could only be distinguished by the fact that the one body possesses two distinct, conscious beings.
Can we know that directly? No, it would require self-revelation on their part to us. But no one is claiming that self-revelation would not be required on the part of God. We are talking about logical possibilities, and there is nothing logically impossible with more than one being who share in all the properties ascribed to deity.
You say “classical theism holds that God is being itself, pure act, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, the uncaused cause, etc. All of these are descriptions that, logically speaking, ARE exclusive to one being.” I just don’t see how. Why can’t there be two beings beyond which nothing greater can be conceived? They would be equal in every respect except personal identity, so neither would be greater than the other, and thus it would remain true that no being higher than those two beings could be conceived. The same goes of pure actuality. Why can’t more than one being be pure actuality? Why can’t two eternal beings be pure actuality?
Jason
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March 19, 2010 at 12:10 pm
Jason wrote,
This doesn’t work. If these twins have different heads, “they” have distinguishing properties (two brains). Moreover, their heads have distinct spatial locations.
A better attempt is two minds living within one body (one brain, central nervous system, etc.); but all instances of this phenomenon are diagnosed personality disorders. The “minds” are really the same mind acting out different roles.
“Logical possibility” is a rather loose term here. A concept is logically possible if it cannot be assigned a truth value of zero without reference to experiential data. Conversely, a logical impossibility is a concept that can be assigned a truth value of zero without reference to experiential data. Merely saying there can be two gods is not, in itself, a logical impossibility; but that is not what I think aletheist is arguing; and it is certainly not what I am arguing. I am saying that once “deity” is defined, it becomes impossible to distinguish gods if we are talking about theism.
This relates to your definition of omnipotence. You say it is the ability to do anything logically possible. I think a more accurate definition is how I’ve defined it in Post 6. Two transcendent beings having absolute, that is unlimited power is incoherent, for one being’s power is necessarily limited by the other being. And if each being’s power is limited by the other being, then neither being’s power is absolute. Hence, they must combine their power to make unlimited power. And if they have to combine unlimited power, then neither being is truly God.
Moreover, how do these “minds” relate to deity? What is deity? Is the mind a non-god mental faculty, or is it an essential aspect of deity? If mind is a necessary aspect of a divine being, then both (or more) beings possess a necessary aspect of divinity the other being lacks. God #1 doesn’t have the mind of God #2, but if the mind of God #2 is what makes a divine being God, then God #1 doesn’t have what it takes to be God. That fact alone eliminates all contenders. And if mind is a creation of an unintelligent divine force, then there is no logical way to distinguish mindless divine forces. Hence, the definition of “god” becomes equivocal. In any case, multi-theism is incoherent.
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March 19, 2010 at 12:30 pm
Against the objection that human minds are necessary aspects of human beings (the abortion controversy notwithstanding), and multi-minds are possible, I would reply we are discussing transcendent, unlimited beings, not finite beings. A divine mind is unlimited (omniscient).
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March 19, 2010 at 1:12 pm
Scalia,
You say we cannot discern non-contingent beings. Why not? I see no reason to think two necessary and personal beings could not exist together for eternity, distinguishable from one another in virtue of their distinct personal identity/consciousness. Necessary Being A would be conscious of Himself as a personal agent but not conscious of Himself as Necessary Being B, and vice-versa. That in itself would be sufficient to establish the existence of two distinct entities. You might say, “Yes, but we would not be able to distinguish them, even if they could distinguish themselves from each other.” That could be the case, but epistemology does not determine ontology. Just because we cannot tell the difference between them due to the nature of the difference (1st person consciousness) does not mean there is no difference.
I agree that the First Cause is not contingent. It is a necessary being. But what logical law/principle precludes the possibility of more than one necessary being? Indeed, on Platonism, abstract objects are thought to be necessary beings, and they are near-infinite in number. There are many Christian Platonists who would affirm both that God is a necessary being, as well as abstract objects like numbers. Such a confession entails no logical contradiction (though I think it is theologically and philosophically problematic).
I disagree with the classical conception of God as a being of pure actuality. This notion does not derive from the Scripture, but from Aristotle, and thus I have no reason to affirm it. I reject the notion that God is pure actuality because it would require that God be incapable of experiencing change. But if that were the case, then God would be incapable of becoming incarnate, because becoming incarnate is a change in God’s mode of existence and experience. Indeed, God had the potential to become a man, and then had that potential actualized—not by another of course, but by His own choice.
Some will counter that if God experiences change, that means He is not perfect, but this assumes that change must be vertically oriented from bad to best. Change can also be horizontally oriented from best to best (lateral). Change qua change does require that one lack something, or that one improves. What fails to change is God’s character, not His experience. God is always perfectly changing in His experience and interaction with the world, while His character remains immutable.
While God’s being itself is necessary, this does not mean there is nothing contingent about God. God is a personal being possessing volition. He has the potential to choose any number of things, but He only chooses certain things. If God can choose to act, or choose to refrain from acting, then there is contingency in God. Even Geisler recognizes this (http://www.ankerberg.org/Articles/_PDFArchives/theological-dictionary/TD3W0603.pdf). So even if I accepted the idea of pure actuality, it only applies to God’s self-existence, not His acts (which is what omnipotence pertains to).
Indeed, the doctrine of omnipotence means that God can do anything He chooses to do. Implicit to this definition is the understanding that God has infinite potential! No one thinks that God actually does everything that is logically possible for Him to do. He chooses to do some things that He had the potential to do, while not doing other things He had the potential to do. So the very idea of potentiality is built into the concept of omnipotence.
In your comments about power, you seem to be making the very mistake I talked about in my post. Power is not a substance. Power refers to one’s ability to exercise their volition freely. To have all power means one can do any possible (i.e. not self-contradictory) thing that he chooses to do. And I see no reason to think there cannot be more than one being with the power to do any possible thing he chooses to. While the principle of parsimony would suggest we don’t multiply entities beyond necessity, logical modality requires no such thing.
When you say omnipotence means one’s power is “absolute,” what do you mean by that? And where did you get this definition of omnipotence?
Jason
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March 20, 2010 at 11:47 pm
Jason, after reading your post, I thought of several responses, but I think it best to go a step at a time. You write,
I’ve already explained this. I don’t know how I can make it clearer.
Absolute, defined, is “free from imperfection; complete; perfect; free from restriction or limitation; not limited in any way.” Since God is an independent being, His power is unlimited.
Now, I asked you several questions that you did not answer. You may reply your rejection of God’s pure actuality does that, but it doesn’t. So please precisely define what God is. Tell me precisely how the mind of God relates to that definition. I know you affirm His necessity and contingency, but that is too general.
Thanks, in advance.
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March 25, 2010 at 12:40 pm
Jason wrote,
Where does Geisler say what you attribute to him in this link?
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March 29, 2010 at 12:17 pm
If anybody is following this thread beside Jason and me, Jason has provided me via email a basic presentation of his views. For now, that satisfies my curiosity.
As a reminder, Jason states and asks the following:
This appears to ask for a logical argument for one God, but Jason, in Post 7, says,
This comment raises the bar considerably. Rather than ask for a logical argument precluding multi-theism, it appears Jason is asking for a proof that makes it logically impossible (via identity of indiscernibles — IDI) for there to be more than one God. But if that is the standard, then the “good” cosmological argument (CA) fails on the ground it is possible our senses do not accurately perceive the Universe. In other words, the CA doesn’t render competing claims logically impossible.
Jason wrote,
But this amounts to saying logical possibility warrants refutation. If so, then your argument fails for the same reason. If we have no good reason to believe in more than one God, then we are not justified positing more than one. If there is no rational way to distinguish one mind from another, then we are not justified insisting there is another. Granted, you do not insist there is more than one God; you are merely looking for an argument precluding alternatives. I think IDI does just that. If a fella named Jason Dulle was born February 27, 1976 at St. Peter’s Hospital in Los Angeles, California, to Bob and Betty Dulle, am I justified in thinking there’s another Jason Dulle born on the same date, at the same place, to parents with identical names? This is possible, but if there is no way to distinguish one Jason from the other, if every characteristic is identical and we’ve exhausted every effort to prove a difference, we are justified in concluding there is only one Jason Dulle.
To be continued…
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March 29, 2010 at 1:36 pm
Jason wrote,
If the First Cause is not contingent, then no aspect of His being can be contingent. The fact He is uncaused means He can never come into existence nor can He go out of existence. He is thus infinite (not finite). If he is infinite, He cannot be divided. For whatever can be divided is composed; but a composite being cannot be necessary, nor can it be infinite (only potentially so). It thus becomes clear there cannot be two infinite beings, since there cannot be two beings who are exactly the same (IDI). For two or more to exist, they must differ in some way; but they cannot differ by the very respect in which they are identical.
Moreover, since God is not contingent, He has no potential to go out of existence. For if God could go out of existence, He would not be necessary. And lacking potential for nonexistence precludes division of being (since it has no potential for division or destruction; and a being who cannot be divided is, by definition, indivisible, which of course means He is simple.
The only two ways beings differ is either being itself or nonbeing. Nonbeing is nothing which means there is no difference. Thus they must differ in being. But a being who has everything a necessary being must have to be necessary cannot differ in being with another being who has everything a necessary being has. For if there is a difference of being, then one being has a necessary aspect the other being lacks; and if this is the case, one or both of the beings cannot be God. Consequently, there can only be one God.
Unless one is a Platonist, I fail to see the relevance here. Abstract objects cannot be the ground for existence and “near infinite” is not infinite. A non-contingent being is infinite by definition.
Although discussing the nature of God is unavoidable to some degree under this thread, I think this will take us way off course if we argue this here. I think it is sufficient to find points of agreement and use IDI to demonstrate why there can be only one God. I will only say I strongly disagree with the article you wrote about divine eternity and your rejection of pure actuality. I welcome your opening another thread on the topic of God’s nature. If you prefer to take it to email, let me know and we can pursue it there.
Power, in the material sense, refers to usable energy. All living beings necessarily avail themselves of usable energy or they will die. In that sense, no finite being can possess absolute power, for even if a being could somehow “bank” all the usable energy in the Universe, s/he would eventually run out of energy because the usable supply is finite.
With respect to God, there is no extrinsic transcendent power. Nor is God a power factory generating something other than what He is in order to be able to accomplish things. Rather, He is power by virtue of His being. Since He is a non-contingent being, His power is absolute. It then becomes evident another being cannot have absolute power because that requires us to affirm both beings can control one another. A being under another’s control does not possess absolute (unlimited) power, so one must equivocate to affirm this. God has absolute power over the Universe. He can bring it into existence, sustain its existence, and put it out of existence. But if there is another being having absolute power, He is then unable to create, sustain or annihilate it. His “absolute” power is thus limited by the presence of another God. It is, therefore, contradictory to speak of two beings having absolute (unlimited, infinite) power.
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April 28, 2010 at 5:08 pm
Scalia,
I’m trying to catch up on comments, and I’ve put this one off until last. You had a lot of comments, and made a lot of points. I only have the time and mental energy to respond to the most pertinent points (I hope I even remember what we were discussing!). And since the dialogue has veered away from the point of the post, I don’t plan to pursue it further.
You wrote, “I know you affirm His necessity and contingency, but that is too general.” I want to clarify here. God’s existence is ontologically necessary, but there are certain truths about God that are contingent. For example: God chose to make me rather than not make, but He could have done otherwise.
As for your question about where Geisler affirmed that God’s ability to choose reveals a contingency in God, I got that from the following quote: “God is Pure Actuality, with no potentiality in his being whatsoever. Whatever has potentiality (potency) needs to be actualized or effected by another. … Of course, God has the potential to create other things. But he cannot bring himself into being. He always was. And while God has the potential to do other things, he cannot be anything other than what he is.”
I didn’t quite understand your point about cosmological arguments in comment 13, but let me say this about my views on logic and monotheism. I am saying that the principle of parsimony does not require that we postulate the existence of any more than one God. But not needing more than one God, and there actually being only one God are two different things. After all, only one human is needed to explain how a house got built, but the fact of the matter is that more than one was involved. That’s why I would like to find a logical argument that precludes the existence of more than one God. At one time I thought the argument from omnipotence could do that, but I don’t think it can anymore.
As for the issue of discerning two different beings, I don’t see any headway being made here. If there were three persons in the infinite being of God, they would be distinguished from one another by their own self-consciousness. Person 1 would know He is not person 2 or 3, and the same would be true of the other two persons. This would be true even if you and I, as outside observers, could not tell any difference between the two. It would be similar to twins. They could be identical in every respect except for self-consciousness (and space, but that’s where the analogy would break down since we are talking about immaterial, non-spatial beings). Anyone other than themselves would not be able to tell that they are in fact, two persons, but they could know that because they have 1st person awareness of themselves, and they are aware that they are not each other.
I know you don’t like my thoughts on divine temporality, but I don’t see how it can be avoided if you believe in the incarnation. At the very least, God became temporal at the incarnation, unless you are prepared to say that it was not God who was active in Christ. But an incarnation without God coming into and acting in time is nonsensical.
I like where you are going when you write, “It then becomes evident another being cannot have absolute power because that requires us to affirm both beings can control one another. A being under another’s control does not possess absolute (unlimited) power, so one must equivocate to affirm this. God has absolute power over the Universe. He can bring it into existence, sustain its existence, and put it out of existence. But if there is another being having absolute power, He is then unable to create, sustain or annihilate it. His “absolute” power is thus limited by the presence of another God. It is, therefore, contradictory to speak of two beings having absolute (unlimited, infinite) power.”
But of course, this presumes there would be, or at least could be a conflict in volition between the multiple entities. So long as there is no conflict, it would not be a problem. But this line of thinking is fruitful.
Jason
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May 3, 2010 at 1:00 pm
Jason, to some degree discussing the nature of God is unavoidable, but it need not be full-blown, unless you make your objections dependent upon your different view of God’s nature. Unless you give the green light, I will refrain from doing so here, except to reply to some of the comments you have made.
But what is God’s existence?? Is God half necessary and half contingent? Your first sentence denies that. God’s existence is His mind and spirit. If you affirm God’s ontological necessity, it is incoherent to affirm contingency to any aspect of His being. Consequently, no aspect of God’s being is contingent. We either affirm a contingent (unnecessary) God or a necessary God whose acts do not change His being.
With respect to Geisler, he does not “recognize” your point. He would, and has, vehemently objected to the characterization that there is contingency “in God” (Post 10). He argues the acts of God do not change the being of God. Though creation may have begun in time, the will to create was from eternity. If God “came up” with the idea of creation, then God would be contingent in some manner; but that would require a redefinition of God. God did not create by a new idea. The idea is eternal.
I thought I explained that. It is one thing to ask for a logical argument precluding polytheism. It is another thing altogether to as for an argument that renders competing claims logically impossible. That raises the bar exponentially. If that is the standard you require, then the CA fails because it fails to render competing claims logically impossible.
But that makes God divisible, and a divisible being cannot be infinite. Each “person” possesses a mind the others do not have and a “sphere” the others do not access, else the “distinction” becomes meaningless. God isn’t omniscient, the three persons are. If each person is omniscient, then you have three omniscient beings. If divine omniscience is composed, then it is composed and a composite mind cannot be infinite. Again, such an assertion requires equivocation. Under you explanation, then, my inability to tell the difference will not sustain multiple persons in God or multiple Gods because such concepts are incoherent.
Now, Jason, this WILL definitely veer us off course. I’ll only say that your voice on a CD does not change your being whatsoever. It is the CD that changes, not you. God took the seed of Abraham to become a man, His spirit did not partially morph into a human being.
Of course, I believe thinking along these lines makes the case decisive. “Unlimited power” is a rather odd way of describing a being who is dependent upon another being’s cooperation to do anything.
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May 3, 2010 at 2:52 pm
The sentence If divine omniscience is composed, then it is composed and a composite mind cannot be infinite, should be amended to read, If the divine mind is composed, then it is finite; it cannot be infinite.
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February 16, 2011 at 2:54 pm
[…] have made two attempts at offering a rational argument for monotheism. The first one failed, and Scalia challenged my second one. I did not respond to his challenge immediately […]
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