One of the most common objections against Intelligent Design is that if an intelligent agent is causally involved in the natural world, then science is no longer predictable because at any time the agent could intervene and mess with our experiments.  For example, Michael Ruse writes, ““[T]he relationship of the natural and the supernatural are unpredictable … [if] the cause of a natural event is the whim of a deity, the event is neither predictable nor fully understandable.”[1]

I think this objection is misguided.  First, it is based on a faulty understanding of ID.  ID only claims to have discovered evidence of a designer’s activity in the past.  It takes no position on the question of whether the designer is still in existence, whether the designer is presently involved in the cosmos, or whether the designer will be involved in the cosmos in the future.  Those are philosophical and religious questions.

Secondly, the materialist seems to forget that even in the absence of a designing intelligence there is no guarantee that the empirical world will be predictable in the future, because there is no guarantee that natural laws will continue to operate in the future as they do in the present.  If this possibility is not a science-stopper, then neither is the possibility that the designing intelligence may act in the natural world in the future.

Thirdly, this is a red herring.  The truth of a hypothesis, rather than its implications, is the most important issue at hand.  If the evidence points to the activity of a designing intelligence in the past, then scientists ought to conclude that a designing intelligence was causally active in the natural world regardless of what consequences it may have for future science.


[1]John A. Moore, Science as a Way of Knowing, (Harvard University Press, 1993), 502.