The second argument I offer for God’s existence on the Thinking to Believe podcast is the Argument from the Impossibility of Nothingness. This is a lesser-known argument for God’s existence, but I think it is quite powerful.
Here’s the essence of the argument: If there was ever a time when nothing existed, there would still be nothing now because nothing has no potential to become something. And yet something exists, so there could never be a time in the past when nothing existed. Something must have always existed. The universe is not that something since physical reality came into existence at the Big Bang, so the eternal something must transcend physical reality. The eternal something must be immaterial, spaceless, and eternal, which is a basic description of God.
Listen to the episode wherever you get your podcasts, or at https://www.buzzsprout.com/1958918/13557972. I am also including the argument in written form. You can download the PDF here.
Argument from the Impossibility of Nothingness
You may also be interested in reading a series I wrote on the concept of nothingness, and why there is something rather than nothing:
Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 1
Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 2
Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 3
Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 4
Thinking to Believe 
September 9, 2023 at 6:03 pm
TR, well said but those that reject the supernatural will just repeat their delusional …………… “nothing is something” silliness.
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September 9, 2023 at 6:03 pm
TR, well said but those that reject the supernatural will just repeat their delusional …………… “nothing is something” silliness.
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September 12, 2023 at 2:01 pm
You are correct that nothing has no potency whatsoever, in which case something cannot proceed from nothing. However, it is a leap to conclude that the cause of the universe (or matter) is singular. What argument do you offer that the cause is one?
Theists affirm the existence of angels. Thus, it is possible on an alternate worldview that immaterial beings who are nowhere near what God is caused the universe. And since the logical prior point of the universe is timeless, what argument do you offer that refutes the proposition that myriad infinite beings exist eternally? And do you have an argument that precludes their ability to create matter?
Consequently, it appears that the argument from nothing does not get us to God. At best, it gets us to an immaterial cause, but it fails to obtain monotheism.
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September 12, 2023 at 2:04 pm
Correction: A sentence in the second paragraph should be amended to read as follows:
“…what argument do you offer that refutes the proposition that myriad immaterial beings exist eternally?”
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September 21, 2023 at 12:26 pm
Scalia,
Many of the questions you ask, I deal with in my examination of the Kalam cosmological argument since both arguments are akin to one another. That said, let me briefly address your points.
Why think the cause is singular? Technically speaking, this argument is not even a causal argument, so all causal questions could be sidelined as irrelevant. The argument is simply trying to show that something must be eternal, and the eternal something can’t be the universe because the universe – including space, matter, and time – has not always existed. Whatever the eternal something is, it cannot be spatial, material, or temporal; however, this argument does not require the further claim that the eternal something caused the universe to come into being. I think I did go there in my presentation, but it’s not required. Granted, it stands to reason that the eternal something is what caused the universe to come into being, but that’s the domain of the Kalam cosmological argument rather than the argument from the impossibility of nothingness. The KCA argues that things which begin to exist have a cause, and that the universe must have a cause.
With that caveat, why think the cause is singular? Occam’s razor. No more than one cause is necessary to explain a single effect. The burden of proof would be on those who think more than one cause is necessary to explain the single effect of the universe coming into being.
Could the cause be an angel? Even if an angel could have caused the universe, it could not be the ultimate explanation for contingent reality since it would also be contingent (this gets us into the territory of the contingency argument for God’s existence). But I would argue that an angel (or any finite spiritual being) could not be the cause of the universe. Remember, this argument gets you to an immaterial, transcendent, eternal, non-spatial, powerful, and intelligent cause. While an angel is immaterial, transcendent, powerful, and intelligent, arguably it is not non-spatial and it definitely cannot be eternal since it is finite.
You write, “Consequently, it appears that the argument from nothing does not get us to God. At best, it gets us to an immaterial cause, but it fails to obtain monotheism.” So? Who says every argument has to be a homerun to be useful? Hitting a single is quite valuable in itself because it gets one closer to the truth. I believe in a cumulative case approach to the question of God’s existence. One argument may only get you X, another argument may only get you Y, and a third argument gets you Z, but when you put all of them together they point to the God of theism – and more particularly, the Christian God. The fact that you can’t argue to the Christian God in a single argument is not a liability in my view.
That said, I would contend that this this argument at least gets us into the territory of theism because the properties of the eternal something are consistent with theism. It does not give us every attribute of God, but it gives us many attributes of God. I would go even further, however, to say that the attribute of eternality necessitates the God of theism because a contingent being could not be eternal (while it’s possible to conceive of contingent beings who are eternal, they would have to be coeternal with a necessary being). An eternal being would have to be necessary, and only the God of theism fits that bill.
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September 21, 2023 at 3:53 pm
Occam’s Razor isn’t a law. Searching for an explanation with the smallest possible set of elements may be the most personally useful, but there is nothing in logic or metaphysics which requires it. It is not a convincing principle that forecloses an objection. We never appeal to it in argument for that reason.
The burden of proof is not on the one who objects to any conclusion that a possible cause is singular because said person is merely analyzing the argument; she or she isn’t making a claim that more than one cause must exist. An objective opponent would say that one cause is possible, but more than one cause is also possible.
With respect to angels, I elaborate under your Kalam thread. Since theists acknowledge the existence of angels, consistency would dictate the acknowledgement of immaterial beings who are not divine. However, why couldn’t such beings have the necessity of existence without having all the divine attributes? Of course, we as Christians acknowledge that angels are contingent, but it would be question-begging to project contingency on immaterial beings who caused the universe who are not angels. What argument do you offer against the existence of immaterial beings who are eternal? The KCA does not entail an omnipotent, omniscient cause (as explained in the other thread).
Your point about hitting a single is well taken, if that’s what one’s objective is. However, when you have a hitter who’s able to win the game now with a home run, why approach matters incrementally? Aquinas’ arguments from motion and contingency get you to home plate immediately without having to prove the creation of the universe or the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite.
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September 27, 2023 at 1:38 pm
Scalia,
I agree that Occam’s Razor is not a law, but it doesn’t have to be for my point to stand. If only one cause is necessary to explain some X, then we should explain X by that single cause because there is no reason to multiply causes. For example, if we are trying to explain why water boils, and I postulate that it is due to the presence of heat alone while you postulate that it is due to the presence of heat plus a fairy who adds pixie dust to the water, my explanation should be preferred. Again, I’m not claiming that Occam’s Razor PROVES that a theistic God is the single cause of the universe. Rather, a theistic God (a single cause) can fully explain the effect in question, and there is no reason to seek other, additional causes. It doesn’t prove that the universe could not have been caused by multiple, finite entities, but there is no reason to prefer that explanation over the theistic explanation given Occam’s Razor.
As for the burden of proof, I’m not saying the objector has a burden of proof because he is claiming more than one cause MUST exist. I’m saying he has the burden of proof to demonstrate why we should prefer multiple causes over a single cause, all things being equal. Again, Occam’s razor is not a metaphysical law, but it is intuitively useful in such situations. Indeed, I would argue that we live by Occam’s razor all the time in our daily lives. We engage in abductive reasoning all the time, and we almost always prefer the simplest explanation that is capable of fully explaining all of the data. That’s why I contend that the burden of proof would be on the person who wants to multiply causes (in this case, angels), rather than on the person who can point to a single cause sufficient to bring about the effect.
I’m not sure where you get the idea that “we” (not sure who you are referring to here) never appeal to Occam’s razor in an argument. Philosophers and scientists appeal to this principle all the time, and legitimately so. When you have to decide between multiple competing hypotheses to explain an effect, all things being equal, we should prefer the hypothesis with the fewest causal entities and fewest ad hoc adjustments.
As for angels, the fact that they are localized beings alone shows that they must be contingent, even if they are eternal. As such, they can’t be necessary beings. I’ll say more on the Kalam thread.
As for singles vs. homeruns, your point is well taken too. I don’t think we have to decide between either, though. Both can and should be used. We need to consider the fact that the cogency of any argument is person-specific. There are some homerun arguments that people don’t find very persuasive, such as the ontological argument. They may find the contingency argument or moral argument more convincing. So we should reach people where they are and use whatever argument works for them.
I think we should also question whether any argument is a homerun argument. Does “homerun” refer to bare theism, or Christian theism? You may be referring to the former, but many would not consider that a homerun. For example, the ontological argument may get us the God of theism in all His basic attributes, but it does not get us the Christian God. Some would argue that the argument for God from Jesus’ resurrection is a homerun argument that gets you to Christian theism, but again, many do not find that argument persuasive.
Jason
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September 27, 2023 at 11:56 pm
Jason, you write:
And since it isn’t a law, no listener is compelled to believe that there is only one cause. You are arguing for the existence of God. It is therefore incumbent upon you to demonstrate a singular cause. There is no logical necessity in appealing to a singular cause. Your listeners are under no obligation whatsoever other than to evaluate the merit of your argument. Does the KCA prove one cause? On your own acknowledgement, it doesn’t.
Well, that’s a rather obvious attempt to stack the deck. Given that scenario, I’d go with the former as well. But postulating what you acknowledge as a weakness in your argument isn’t “pixie dust” by a longsthot. Your comparison of acknowledged mythical creatures with immaterial causes is disanalogous at best. As I mentioned, granting the KCA without objection gets us to an immaterial cause or immaterial causes but nothing more.
Now, is God a sufficient singular explanation for the beginning of the universe? Of course. But is a very powerful but non-deity immaterial being also a sufficient singular explanation for the beginning of the universe? The answer to that is yes as well. By my lights, it would thus seem more in the spirit of Occam’s Razor to postulate an immaterial cause without leaping to the conclusion that the cause must be God.As for the burden of proof, I’m not saying the objector has a burden of proof because he is claiming more than one cause MUST exist. I’m saying he has the burden of proof to demonstrate why we should prefer multiple causes over a single cause, all things being equal.But it’s not a matter of an interlocutor’s insistence that multiple causes are preferred. It’s simply that since the KCA doesn’t preclude multiple causes, it fails as a demonstration.
The “we” are classical theists. Our arguments for the existence of God are not approximations or better-than-alternative attempts. They are demonstrations that one God and only one God in principle is the cause of contingent being. And in order to be the ground of contingent being, He must BE ALL the attributes ascribed to Him. The demonstration from creation is so powerful, the unbeliever is “without excuse” (Rom. 1:20). There is no wiggle-room whatsoever.
But the KCA doesn’t touch any of that. Indeed, the KCA is unnecessary altogether if one is merely arguing from contingent being. One can even affirm the eternality of the universe for argument’s sake to prove an absolute ground for contingent being. However, since you reject classical theism, I don’t think your follow-up argument will be able to close the door on legitimate objections.
And with that I can fully agree. Classical arguments are highly abstract and many people, scholars and philosophers included, have a hard time grasping them (they often get them wrong). An apologetic approach should be tailored for the persons we encounter. They should not be force-fed something they cannot grasp. But with any apologetic, there are simple versions and more complex ones. And I think that all theists should agree that any theistic argument, whether simple or complex, should get us to the one God of the universe.
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September 28, 2023 at 8:20 am
I’m enjoying the series so far Jason as well as the back and forth here
That said , while I usually enjoy’s Scalia’s input , I find myself a bit confused as to his objections. As an outsider to this whole thing , it looks like a ton of straw-manning just for something to argue about.
Example : Jason said “ With that caveat, why think the cause is singular? Occam’s razor. No more than one cause is necessary to explain a single effect. The burden of proof would be on those who think more than one cause is necessary to explain the single effect of the universe coming into being.”.
To which Scalia responds with “ The burden of proof is not on the one who objects to any conclusion that a possible cause is singular because said person is merely analyzing the argument; she or she isn’t making a claim that more than one cause must exist. An objective opponent would say that one cause is possible, but more than one cause is also possible.”
Why is Scalia straw-manning Jason here ? Why are is he arguing against something Jason didn’t claim ? It’s honesty frustrating to read at times because no progress can be made. It just comes across as arguing to argue
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September 28, 2023 at 8:49 am
Hi, Joshua. Thanks for your comments. I don’t see where the scarecrow is. Jason appeals to Occam’s Razor (OR) in saying that no more than one cause is necessary to explain a single effect. He then says, as you accurately quote, that the burden of proof is on those who say that more than one cause is necessary for the universe to come into being.
My reply is simply that no objector has the burden of proof to demonstrate that more than one cause is necessary. The only thing an objector needs to do is to point out, quite accurately, as Jason acknowledges, that a singular cause isn’t demonstrated. That isn’t mischaracterizing Jason’s argument at all. Indeed, if we’re being technical, Jason is misstating my objection. All I said was that multiple causes, as a matter of logic, can account for the universe, and even if the cause is singular, the cause doesn’t have to be God.
I hear you about your concern over whether I’m arguing just to argue, and I apologize for giving that impression. That is not my intent. I just think that the KCA is deficient due to it’s inability both to demonstrate a divine cause for the universe and to show that there is only one God. There are far stronger arguments in a Christian’s arsenal that shut down the kinds of objections commonly lodged against the KCA.
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July 27, 2024 at 10:18 am
I just think that the KCA is deficient due to it’s inability both to demonstrate a divine cause for the universe and to show that there is only one God. There are far stronger arguments in a Christian’s arsenal that shut down the kinds of objections commonly lodged against the KCA.
That doesn’t mean the KCA has no utility whatsoever, so why denigrate it?
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July 29, 2024 at 12:25 am
krazeeboi says:
I neither think nor argue that the KCA has no place on the table. If you read the entire back-and-forth between Jason and me, I acknowledge that different approaches are called for with different people.
My objection is over the claim that the KCA is a proof for God’s existence. As I’ve shown here and elsewhere, it doesn’t do that. At best, it proves that the universe was caused. That’s it! And I’ve repeatedly asked Jason why a being couldn’t be necessary while lacking the other attributes of God (without an answer from him). I argue some of these points above and in the KCA thread. If one wants to use the KCA to prove that the universe has a beginning, then by all means use the KCA. But the claim that it proves the existence of God is, at best, a reach.
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