The third argument I offer for God’s existence in my “Does God Exist?” podcast series is the Kalam Cosmological Argument. This is my favorite argument for God’s existence.
The argument reasons to God based on the temporal finitude of the universe. The essence of the argument is that temporally finite things require a cause for their existence. Since the universe began to exist in the finite past, it also requires a cause. An examination of the properties required of such a cause match the properties of the theistic God.
You can listen to the first episode wherever you get your podcasts, or at https://www.buzzsprout.com/1958918/13599958. The first episode is a 1-N-Done episode where I summarize the argument. This will be followed by a series of episodes where I look at the argument in more detail. Those episodes are based on a paper I have written on the topic, available at the link below:
Kalam Cosmological Argument Paper
The paper clocks in at 92 pages, so if that’s more than you are willing to chew, I’ve also created two, more concise versions of the paper that may be more palatable.
Kalam Cosmological Argument Paper – A Condensed Case (10 pages)
Kalam Cosmological Argument Paper – A Brief Summary (3 pages)
I would also recommend you check out William Lane Craig’s short, animated videos on the argument. Here’s part 1:
And here’s part 2:
September 16, 2023 at 12:01 am
The Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), though more comprehensive than the argument from nothing, is still vulnerable to the same objections as those raised against the latter.
First, as you note, it does not demonstrate monotheism. Accepting the premises and the conclusion without objection gives us an immaterial cause of the universe. Via the argument itself, we simply cannot say whether the cause of the universe was a joint effort or an effort by one cause while other agents were busy with their own projects.
As noted previously, all theistic religions affirm the existence of angels, which are immaterial beings who are not deities and do not have anything close to what theists ascribe to God. Their immateriality does not entail their omniscience, omnipotence or omnipresence. Of course, theists believe that the angels were created by God, but there is nothing in the KCA which demonstrates that angels (or immaterial beings) have a beginning, which of course means that they may not be caused.
Given the possibility of myriad immaterial beings who are not God and who could be the causal agent(s) of creation, the KCA, as you acknowledge, neither gets us to God nor to monotheism.
Second, you state:
At a minimum, if matter has a cause, then its cause must be immaterial and non-spatial. However, it is a leap to infer that the cause is eternal (without beginning and without end). The fact that the cause is not subject to material time does not entail the absence of another kind of time. Material time is the measurement of motion in a linear direction. We simply do not know whether there is a non-material way to measure immaterial events. And since, per above, angels have motion, it is possible that there is an immaterial measurement of motion.
In any event, there is nothing in the KCA which compels us to affirm an eternal cause. An additional argument is needed to ground immaterial entities on something eternal.
Third, though the universe’s creation would necessitate something extremely powerful, at least from our perspective, it need not be omnipotent. It could perhaps be inferred that the power required to create the universe is greater than the power contained in the universe, but granting that does not entail the omnipotence of the cause. “Greater than material energy” is not “Infinite energy.”
Fourth, granting that the cause is intelligent also does not imply that said intelligence is all-knowing. All that is required is sufficient knowledge to cause material existence. The KCA does not give us any confidence beyond that. It simply points to a cause that is not subject to the dimensions of matter and material space, material time and material energy.
Fifth, again, as noted above, an immaterial cause need not be omnipresent. Immaterial agents are non-spatial in the sense that they are not composed of matter, but there is nothing in the KCA’s conclusion that compels us to affirm that they are everywhere present.
In sum, if we accept without question the KCA, we are not led to the conclusion that God exists, let alone that there is only one God. We are not led to the conclusion that the immaterial cause is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent. Powerful, immaterial intelligent beings are sufficient explanations for the origin of the universe under the KCA. And this is not a mere logical possibility explanation. Theists believe in the existence of angels. Given that, there is nothing in the KCA that precludes the existence of immaterial causes having nothing which approximates the attributes that God is affirmed to have.
There are much stronger arguments for the existence of God, for strict monotheism, and for all the attributes associated with what theists ascribe to God. There is only one God, and it is impossible in principle for there to be more than one God. One can conclude His existence, including His omnipotence and omniscience, without the gaps and leaps we see in arguments like the KCA.
LikeLike
September 19, 2023 at 7:23 pm
Angels are spatially limited beings. They are capable of being stymied by other angels fallen or otherwise. They were created during the creation of finite time limited things. God is. He exists prior to spacetime. He is is in a category with only one member himself. Angels are many of varying powers and authority. God is one and all power and authority is derived from him.
LikeLike
September 19, 2023 at 11:09 pm
@Richard Hill,
Yes, I agree with you, but that’s not the point. The KCA doesn’t address the possible existence of myriad immaterial beings who are powerful and causeless but are not God. There is nothing in the KCA that precludes these kinds of beings from being the cause of the universe.
Why couldn’t causeless, immaterial beings exist without having all the attributes of God? Why couldn’t they have necessity in themselves without that necessity entailing everything we think that God is? Given that we’re now in the immaterial realm, a stronger metaphysical argument is needed to definitively answer these questions. Indeed, the same kind of metaphysical argument would apply to the material realm as well. To cut to the chase, only classical theism is able to answer these questions and lead inquirers unavoidably to God.
LikeLiked by 1 person
September 20, 2023 at 2:17 pm
exactly ………. by definitions angels are created beings and therefore can not be the 1st cause.
LikeLike
September 20, 2023 at 3:35 pm
@Paul writes,
Of course, but that’s not in dispute. We know that angels are created via the special revelation of the Bible, but we don’t know that via the KCA. The KCA does not prove an infinite cause of the universe. The best it can do is give us an immaterial cause. My reference to angels is to show Jason that since theistic religions acknowledge the existence of angels (created immaterial beings), then it is possible that immaterial beings (not created) caused the universe.
Without the special revelation of the Bible, what argument is employed against the assertion that there cannot be immaterial beings who are not God but are causeless? Why can’t something be independent of others as to its existence without having all the attributes of God? The answer is clearly not the in KCA, so another argument is needed to demonstrate that such beings must be grounded in God.
LikeLike
September 20, 2023 at 9:02 pm
scalia ……….. irrelevant — and you miss the point. in your flawed comment you just renamed God as angels.
the only argument that can be made by those that dont believe in God is — the universe always existed but we dont know how it happened. and the logical and reasonable response is …….. that means God could have always existed.
LikeLike
September 20, 2023 at 10:28 pm
@Paul writes:
No, I did not. It is you who missed my point. I merely used angels as a point of reference. I specifically explained all of this in Post 1. I’m referring to immaterial beings who are not omniscient, omnipresent or omnipotent. They are thus not God at all. So, if the claim is made that these immaterial beings are causeless, what argument does a theist offer that entails those divine attributes and precludes the argument that necessity can rest in non-divine beings? Indeed, there ARE good arguments that lead ineluctably to both monotheism and all the divine attributes. It’s just that the KCA doesn’t do that.
Yes, every atheist reply is lame, from quantum mechanics to multiple universes to the possibility that we’re nothing but software in some alien’s computer program. But that doesn’t make theism true by default. Those who believe in God are obligated to provide sound arguments for what they believe. The statement, “God exists,” is a positive statement that obligates the speaker to prove his claim. That, of course, can be done. I’m only contending that the KCA doesn’t do the job.
LikeLike
September 24, 2023 at 10:19 am
Scalia,
You wrote, “To cut to the chase, only classical theism is able to answer these questions and lead inquirers unavoidably to God.”
Would you mind showing how classical theism doe this?
Or post a link to where I would find this argument?
LikeLike
September 24, 2023 at 4:24 pm
@mizpeh1,
I believe I recommended this to you previously. You may read an intermediate introduction in Ed Feser’s Aquinas. It’s an inexpensive but valuable contribution to the subject. Of course, since you’ve already pronounced the argument “refuted” prior to understanding it, it’s probably not what you’re looking for.
LikeLike
September 27, 2023 at 2:02 pm
@scalia,
It was Boyd who refuted an aspect of classical theism…pure actuality. https://reknew.org/2007/12/do-you-believe-god-is-pure-actuality/. I agree with Boyd.
That doesn’t mean that I’m against a proof of the existence of God even from a classical theist. I have the book. I purchased it at your suggestion. I haven’t read it yet. Where would I find the proof in the book? Under the chapter “Metaphysics”?
LikeLike
September 27, 2023 at 11:16 pm
@mizpeh1,
Yes, I recall your mentioning Boyd in our last discussion. His position doesn’t refute pure actuality at all for the fundamental reason that he doesn’t understand it. The claim that a position one doesn’t understand is refuted is ignorant at best. Aquinas and other great classical thinkers have written reams of analysis and tightly woven argumentation, and Boyd thinks that he can sweep that all away with an extremely short column of but a few paragraphs which doesn’t even engage the arguments?
Refuting a view one doesn’t understand is a version of the straw man fallacy. By not fully understanding the argument, a person is not addressing the actual position of the other party, but rather a distorted, simplified version of it. Now, a person may sincerely believe that he understands what he’s objecting to, but he can avoid that by going to source material and first adopting the view he is analyzing. He then should restate it in terms his opponents would fully endorse. Only then would he be in a position to write a rebuttal. However, to dismiss a view beforehand after one acknowledges ignorance is another thing altogether.
LikeLike
September 29, 2023 at 10:25 am
@mizpeh1 writes,
I’m glad that you purchased the book. There isn’t a section to jump start a person’s understanding of the topic. It’s really the whole book because the theological framework is dependent upon all its parts. To understand the Five Ways, one must understand the causal principle which includes a thorough understanding of the principles of being, including act and potency, motion/change and the nature of composition.
Classical theists were not looking for simplistic arguments to demonstrate God. They took God’s charge in Romans 1:20 seriously that creation itself stands as evidence of God’s nature, and in properly understanding nature, one would understand God’s essence (at least in a finite way). And all of that entails a thorough knowledge of change, becoming, contingency and permanence. Once these things are understood, it becomes obvious why creation, including the incarnation, entails no change in God whatsoever, and why the biblical record confirms rather than impeaches that understanding.
LikeLike
September 29, 2023 at 7:55 pm
@Scalia,
When God is described as changing his mind in the Bible, would you say that is not possible? or is that different than a change in God himself, like when he became a man?
LikeLike
September 29, 2023 at 7:56 pm
@Scalia,
I won’t return to this topic with you until I’ve read the book.
LikeLike
September 29, 2023 at 8:02 pm
@Scalia,
How do you know that Boyd doesn’t understand Aquinas? His undergrad degree was in philosophy.
https://reknew.org/?s=aquinas
LikeLike
September 29, 2023 at 10:34 pm
@mizpeh1, you ask:
I know that due to the content of his “refutation.” His statements show that he’s entirely unfamiliar with both the arguments that lead to the doctrines of immutability and impassibility and with how his objections are addressed. His are the most common, elementary questions raised. If he were familiar with the subject, his attack would be argued very differently. I’ve read what I consider decent rebuttals (e.g., those raised by skeptics like Joseph Schmid) from philosophers who’ve at least attempted to learn the system. Even Schmid stumbles on key points, but he at least made a good faith effort to learn the system. Boyd fails miserably. William Craig, who is normally very prepared, badly flubs in his critiques of divine simplicity as well.
As with any topic you’re familiar with, you know right away if somebody who claims an interest in the same topic knows what he’s talking about. Years ago, I met a self-proclaimed Bible scholar who told me that he had read the Bible many times. It took but a few moments of conversation to understand that he wasn’t anywhere near being a scholar, as he was clueless on the most elementary matters of theology. He didn’t even know why animals were sacrificed! It is no different in classical theism. I know instantly if somebody has done his homework. Like I said, sister, one should never take it upon himself to rebut a system he does not understand. And to properly understand it, one must go to source material, adopt the view in question, and mentally argue in its defense with arguments its proponents would fully endorse. I’ve seen others argue the same things Boyd does, and all that does is elicit laughs, groans and eye-rolling from those who really know what they’re talking about. Scholars and philosophers are specialists in particular fields. The fact that a man is a philosopher does not mean that he’s an expert in Thomism. I’ve seen both mess it up. Interestingly, I saw Schmid, who doesn’t at all espouse classical theism, do a facepalm at another atheist who was spouting off about it. It’s like the atheist mantra, “If everything needs a cause, then what caused God?” That’s actually been uttered by atheist philosophers and scientists, and it’s one of the stupidest comments anybody has ever made in the debate.
It took me literally years to get a good handle on classical theism. It’s not something normal people can learn overnight. And it’s no wonder people resort to what they consider a simpler approach to apologetics. Regrettably, several of those simpler arguments leave advocates ill-equipped to logically demonstrate the significant errors of other doctrines relating to things like the Trinity and morality.
As to your other question, no theist, to my knowledge, takes any biblical verse literally which ascribes materiality to God (references to His feet, hands, eyes, and even feathers—and I’m not referring to the incarnation). One could at least argue a kind of dualism in God whereby He is both spirit and corporeal. However, theists, on the main, completely reject that because they are convinced both biblically and metaphysically that God is an immaterial being. Thus, all such references are interpreted metaphorically, analogically or understood as accommodations to human understanding and perception. The same is true with passages that ascribe change to God. They are not meant to be taken literally. They are like the sun standing still in Joshua’s day. Everybody now knows that the Earth revolves around the sun, but to us, the sun appears to move across the sky. Thus, we are told that the sun stood still even though it never moves (in the relevant sense). Such a statement is an accommodation to our perspective and is not to be taken literally.
One cannot even begin to interpret the Bible without presupposing the authority of reason. One of the most basic, fundamental, metaphysical principles is contradiction. Something cannot be true and not true in the same respect. A statement conjoined with its negation is a contradiction, and under no circumstance can a contradiction be true. And this is why the Trinity is a non-starter when it comes to doctrine. Since it is inherently contradictory, it is false on its face. So, no matter how “plain” or “obvious” the scriptural record is with respect to the personal distinctions between the Father and the Son, we know that given a trinitarian’s commitment both to monotheism and the full deity of both persons, all such personal distinctions either result in two gods or a complex unity. The former contradicts monotheism, and the latter makes God a created being. Consequently, the Scriptures must be interpreted without the template of trinitarianism. And we would say “ditto” with respect to ascribing attributes to God which are direct contradictions to His aseity.
LikeLike
October 6, 2023 at 1:26 pm
lol ………. scalia you are hilarious. of course you did oh del us ion al one. because the 1st cause is “God” and in your silly post angels were the 1st cause.
the only way your nonsense would have made any sense is if you used a term like “Divine Beings” instead of “angels.”
but even that would be hilarious because every sane person here should automatically think of …….. “The Holy Trinity” or what I call “The biblical Godhead.” so that begs the question ……… why not just use “The Holy Trinity” instead of angels.
but again you make me lmao because that’s not the topic and in the past youve chastised me and others for being off topic.
LikeLike
October 10, 2023 at 12:49 pm
Scalia,
Thank you for your comments. They are well-formulated and well thought out. You’ve said a lot, and unfortunately, I’ll have to say a lot more in the way of response to adequately address your points.
To be clear, none of your questions/objections call into question the validity or soundness of the Kalam argument itself. What you are calling into question is what the argument gets us: Does it provide us with a homerun for theism, or does it only hit a double? As I noted in my comments on the nothingness thread, I don’t think any argument has to be a homerun to be useful. With that said, I do think we can get a homerun for theism from the KCA – not from the argument proper, but from further logical analysis. So let me address your feedback….
Does the KCA give us monotheism? Technically speaking, the KCA proper only gives us a cause of the universe. Everything else is a matter of logical reasoning about the properties of such a cause, and as such, are not part of the KCA properly speaking. The most obvious properties of such a cause is that it must be immaterial, eternal, spaceless, and powerful. I think sound argumentation can also be made that it is personal and intelligent as well, endowed with the powers of volition. Can equally sound argumentation be offered for it being a “he” rather than a “they”? Yes, I think so.
In my paper, I address your objection directly. I note that logical reasoning alone cannot prove that the cause of the universe is one rather than many, but provide two reasons for thinking the scale tips in favor of monotheism over polytheism. The first is Occam’s razor. The razor does not prove monotheism, but establishes that all things being equal, monotheism should be preferred because we should not multiply causal entities beyond what is necessary to explain any given effect. Ordinarily, one cause is sufficient to explain one effect. We should only invoke multiple causes to explain a single effect if it can be demonstrated that no single cause is sufficient to explain the effect. A single theistic God, however, is sufficient to explain the effect in question, and thus theism should be preferred. The burden of proof would be on the polytheist to explain why a single theistic God is not sufficient to explain the effect. One way of doing that would be to show some logical contradiction in the concept of theism, ruling it out as a logical possibility. That has never been shown.
My second argument for monotheism was based on the property of power. While the KCA does not give us the property of omnipotence, the concept of a theistic God does. If the concept of theism is logically coherent, we just need to ask ourselves what kind of properties such a being would have. As the greatest conceivable being, He would not just have some power, but would have all power because it is greater to have all property than it is to just have some power. I further argued that there cannot be more than one omnipotent being. If we are to prefer the simplest causal explanation that is sufficient to explain the effect in question, and if theism is the simplest causal explanation that is sufficient to explain the effect in question, and if a theistic being must possess the property of omnipotence and this property cannot be possessed by more than one being, then we conclude that the cause of the universe is monotheistic.
What about angels? Angelic beings (or any supernatural beings similar to them such as the gods of the Greeks) are localized, spatially finite beings. As such, even if they are eternal, they are not necessary beings and thus cannot be the ultimate explanation of reality. One might respond, “Who says the cause of the universe must be a necessary being?” or “Who says the cause of the universe must be the ultimate explanation for all reality (both physical and non-physical).” Good questions. The KCA proper does not require this. It only requires a proximate cause of the universe. Even a logical analysis about the nature of that cause does not yield the property of necessity. It only gives us a spaceless, eternal, immaterial, powerful, intelligent, personal being. Whether that being is contingent or necessary is unknown by a logical analysis of the necessary properties of the cause alone. So I’m happy to agree that, logically speaking, it could be the case that an angel or group of angels caused the universe even if the angel itself (or angels themselves) also require a cause because it is a contingent being. That said, two things must be considered.
First, why think any finite being – or even group of finite beings – has the power to create a universe from nothing? The power to create something from something else clearly belongs to finite beings, but I have no reason to believe that any finite being has the power to create something from nothing. All contingent beings (and by “beings” here, I mean existents) borrow their existence from some other contingent being. It seems to me that only a necessary being has the power to create new being from absolutely nothing (no need to borrow). Contingent beings can only create other contingent beings from existing contingent beings.
Secondly, even if it’s plausible to think that finite beings like angels have the power to create ex nihilo, angels are not the only plausible explanation. Theism is also a plausible explanation, and the preferred explanation given Occam’s razor. As the greatest conceivable being, a theistic God would have the property of necessity because it is better to exist necessarily than to exist contingently. Theism, then, not only provides us with a sufficient cause to explain the universe, but also gives us the ultimate explanation of all reality. In other words, theism is a twofer: (1) It provides us with a cause for the universe, and (2) it provides us with the ultimate explanation for all reality. So while it’s logically possible to think angels created the universe, theism is the preferable explanation because (1) it does not need to multiply entities to explain the effect and (2) it gives us the ultimate explanation for all of reality – not just the universe. If angels could explain the existence of the universe, we would still need to search for what caused the angels, and what caused the cause that caused the angels, etc. until we finally reach the necessary being. It is preferable, then, to take out the unnecessary middle men and conclude that the necessary being itself (a theistic God) is the cause of the universe.
You also dispute whether the cause must be eternal. You suggest that there could be a non-physical form of time. You write, “Material time is the measurement of motion in a linear direction. We simply do not know whether there is a non-material way to measure immaterial events.” I presume that your argument is that if time existed prior to the Big Bang, the cause of the universe could have come into existence at some finite point in metaphysical time, and as such, would not be eternal. A few things should be said in response.
First, I acknowledge the possibility of a preexisting metaphysical time in my response to Hawking’s objection against the first premise of the KCA (he argues that the universe can’t have a cause because causes must precede their effects in time, and yet there is no time prior to the origin of the universe).
Second, if time pre-existed the Big Bang, it would be the same kind of time we experience today. The difference between physical time and metaphysical time is not the nature of time itself or even the subjective experience of time, but how time would be measured. Time is simply duration, marked by periods of earlier than and later than. If time existed prior to the Big Bang (metaphysical time), it would be the same kind of time that exists now in the universe (physical time). All that would differ is how one measured the passage of time. Unlike physical time, in metaphysical time there is no objective, mind-independent way to measure the passage of time. The passage of time is experienced, but is not objectively measurable. It is only measured subjectively in experience.
Third, there are good reasons for thinking that time itself began to exist with the universe, namely the impossibility of actual infinites. I cover these in my paper/podcast. The first is the impossibility of instantiating an actual infinite. If time is eternal and did not have an absolute origin at physical creation, then time would have to be infinite because God has no beginning and no ending. But, the actual infinite leads to logical absurdities, which is why even the founder of infinite set theory concluded that infinity can only exist in the mind, not in reality.
The second reason for thinking time must be temporally finite is that it is impossible to traverse an actual infinite. Even if it were metaphysically possible for time to be infinite in duration, one could never traverse the series of temporal moments to arrive at the present moment. It’s like attempting to climb an infinite staircase. No matter how long you have been climbing, you will never reach the top. And yet, today marks the end of the prior series of moments. We have reached the end, and thus the prior series of moments cannot be infinite.
The third reason for thinking time must be temporally finite is that infinities cannot be built through successive addition, and yet the passage of time works by successive addition: One moment (the present moment) is always added to another moment. That moment then passes away into the past and another moment is added in the present, etc. Even if the past were without beginning, we would still have a finite number of moments. The number would simply be growing larger and larger over time. It would never become infinite.
There is also the problem of why, if God has endured through an infinite number of temporal moments, He created the universe when He did. Why did He wait so long? And why not create sooner, or later? At any point in time that God would choose to create, an infinite amount of time had already transpired, so why create at t1 rather than t1-1 or t1+1? What would be different at time t1? It seems inexplicable as to why God created when He did. If time began with the universe, however, this difficulty vanishes.
You also object that the KCA does not provide us with the property of omniscience. Agreed, strictly speaking. A logical analysis of the necessary properties of the cause of the universe only requires that the cause be intelligent. However, as I noted in my comments about the property of power, when we try to identify the being who would possess such properties, there are only a few possibilities. One of those possibilities is a theistic God, and a theistic God would have those properties par excellence. I’ve already provided reasons for preferring the theistic explanation. As such, it would follow that the cause of the universe is also all-knowing despite the fact that the KCA proper does not require that.
What about omnipresence? If space did not exist until the Big Bang, then the cause of space would be an essentially non-spatial being. He wouldn’t be omnipresent because there would be no “here” or “there” to be present at. In other words, the question of whether the cause of the universe is omnipresent would only come into play after creation, when space existed in which one could be present. This doesn’t even take into consideration the question of how we should understand the property of omnipresence. I don’t think it means that God is within the universe at every spatial location, but rather that He has direct knowledge of and is causally active at every point in space. As such, omnipresence is not so much a distinct property of God as it is an extension of both His omniscience and omnipotence.
Jason
LikeLike
October 10, 2023 at 1:50 pm
Excellent post, Jason. I do agree with much of what you write. There are, of course, some critical differences which I’ll expand upon as time permits, but I very much appreciate your reply.
LikeLike
October 30, 2023 at 10:42 pm
Jason, I finally have some time to reply to your excellent post. As stated in Post 19, I agree with much of what you say. And I have conceded everything in the KCA proper in my initial reply. This reply will highlight some of the critical differences I have with your explanation. You write:
Yes. We’re on the same page here, excepting the assertion that the cause of the universe is eternal. A supplemental argument may indeed show that the cause of the cause is eternal, or that the ultimate cause of the cause is eternal, but the fact that the universe was caused does not in itself prove or demonstrate that its proximate cause is eternal.
With respect to monotheism, you again highlight Occam’s razor (OR). You state:
Yes, as a practical matter, there is no need to assume multiple causes when one cause is shown to be a sufficient explanation of an effect. Nonetheless, as you acknowledge, it is not a proof. And even if nobody contests a singular cause of the universe, that does not entail monotheism. There could be myriad gods who were doing other things while one of the gods decided to create a universe. I’m just the kind of guy who prefers a demonstration over the most practical option, especially when a demonstration is readily available.
Well, there’s a difference between an ultimate explanation of reality and the cause of the universe. Acknowledgement of finite immaterial beings or eternal immaterial beings affirms a reality beyond the universe. In the context of the KCA, the fact that there may be an ultimate cause of reality does not obligate us to affirm that as the cause of the universe. We simply need a cause sufficient to explain the universe. Indeed, you acknowledge that very point, as follows:
And this is precisely one of my main objections to the KCA. Conceding everything doesn’t get us to God.
Again, yes. We, thus, need another argument to prove that even if immaterial beings are eternal, their explanation lies in a singular cause who is absolutely necessary.
While that is an excellent philosophical question, we cannot assume or jump from a question for which there appears to be no answer to the conclusion that the power to create must be omnipotent. We need an argument why creation entails omnipotence.
But if you concede that a non-divine immaterial being can be the cause of the universe, then it appears that OR would stop there. Why assert a cause greater than one sufficient to explain an effect? If we should not multiply causes beyond a causally sufficient explanation, then it appears that we shouldn’t magnify the cause beyond what is necessary for an effect.
Excellent points, and this gets us further into the crux of the problem. What argument do you offer against the assertion that non-divine immaterial beings are eternal and necessary? Why couldn’t a being have necessity as to existence without having all the omni-attributes of God? When we say that a being is finite, we usually mean that its very existence is contingent on another being or beings. But why couldn’t a non-divine being exist necessarily? Why does it have to have all the attributes of God? And when the answer to those questions is provided, it will be seen that said answer applies to all of reality, not just immaterial beings. Thus, if the arguments which are in supplement to the KCA demonstrate the ground of all reality in God, then the KCA isn’t needed at all. If we have to rely on this supplemental argument to cross the finish line or to touch home plate, then let’s get right to it. The KCA just seems to be an unnecessary diversion.
Now, given the length of this response, I’ll quickly address your analysis of infinite time. If there are immaterial beings in motion, then it stands to reason that there is some kind of measurement of motion. You, of course, acknowledge this as at least a logical argument. And you base your rejection of that with an appeal to one of the key components of the KCA and that is the impossibility of traversing an actual infinite. My reply is twofold:
First, as we’ve noted, I’m conceding the entire KCA arguendo, so in accordance with that concession, immaterial time must be grounded in an eternal cause. Thus, immaterial beings would have to be eternal and thus not subject to objections relating to actual infinities. And that of course brings us back to the question of why non-divine immaterial beings cannot be necessary existences.
Second, there are nonetheless substantive objections to arguments relating to infinity. For those interested, I recommend Jimmy Akin’s excellent analysis of The Kalam Cosmological Argument. The link contains several articles relating to arguments about actual infinities. A KCA apologist would do well to familiarize himself (or herself) with these arguments. There is also a substantive analysis of the issue on YouTube:
And even if at the end of the day a KCA apologist is unconvinced by these arguments, one would have to familiarize oneself with some very technical analysis before being able to pronounce them false. It cannot be assumed that simply saying, “an actual infinite cannot be traversed,” is a show-stopping argument.
At bottom, since we agree that the KCA doesn’t technically get us to God, including by way of rational demonstration, and since supplemental argumentation would ultimately apply to all of reality anyway, I see the KCA, at best, as an apologetic tool to get some people moving in the direction of theism who would otherwise remain unconvinced by more philosophically complex arguments.
LikeLike
February 9, 2024 at 7:16 pm
[…] in case you missed it, I also posted my papers for the Kalam and contingency arguments a while back […]
LikeLike