The truth of a doctrine is not determined by its age or by a historical consensus, and yet we naturally assign great weight to doctrinal tradition. After all, there’s something to be said for a historical consensus, and it should not be dismissed lightly. We should not ignore the understanding and insights of the majority who have preceded us. And in general, we should not dismiss a doctrinal tradition unless we have compelling reasons to do so.

I find it interesting, however, that when Protestant theologians agree with a doctrinal tradition, we appeal to that tradition as evidence that our understanding is right. When we disagree with a doctrinal tradition, however, we dismiss the significance of doctrinal tradition by noting that many people can be wrong – and be wrong for a long time. If tradition is a mark in favor of a view, then it is also a mark against contrary views. That doesn’t mean a view that is contrary to doctrinal tradition must be mistaken, but we should at least be willing to admit that it’s a mark against the view.

For example, I recently argued against a particular doctrine on the basis that no one taught this doctrine for the first 1900 years of the church. And yet, a Roman Catholic could argue against my understanding of divorce and remarriage on the basis that it was not taught by anyone in the church for 1600 years. I must admit that this is a mark against my view, but I do not think it is decisive because the evidence decisively favors the Protestant interpretive tradition. The same could be said of the Protestant understanding of justification by faith. Luther’s view flew in the face of a thousand years of traditional doctrine. That didn’t make Luther wrong, but it did make his view immediately suspect. Fortunately, the evidence is such that we should conclude that Luther was right and the traditional doctrine was wrong.