Using AI to Answer Moral Dilemmas

I posed a moral dilemma to a few Christian thinkers, but none were able to provide a fully satisfactory answer. While I think most ended up at the right conclusion, no one could really articulate the moral principles used to come to that conclusion. So I thought I would pose the dilemma to AI and see what it had to say. Could it provide any additional insights into Christian moral reasoning? I chose to use ChatGPT and Gemini. I will reproduce the chats below for your reading pleasure, but I would like to make several observations first.

First, I told each platform to assume the role of a conservative, Evangelical Christian when responding to the dilemma. Each took that role on very seriously. Not only were their responses based on Scripture and Christian moral reasoning, but they were truly conservative in their approach. It was like I was talking with an actual Christian moral philosopher. That surprised me given the philosophical bias of most AI programs. I’m assuming that my instructions to assume the role of a conservative Christian made a difference.

Second, while each platform responded in very different ways to my question, they also employed many of the same moral principles. I can’t necessarily say I preferred one platform over the other. I would definitely recommend using multiple AI platforms for this kind of research.

Third, I was not satisfied with the initial answer of either platform. I identified some false assumptions and inconsistencies that I needed to challenge, and then AI modified its answer accordingly. So if you are going to use AI to think through moral dilemmas, you should not accept their immediate answer. Look for false assumptions and be prepared to debate the AI program a bit.

Fourth, both programs brought legal issues up. If I had it to do over again, I would have instructed AI to ignore legal considerations and only focus on moral considerations.

Finally, in the end, I thought their answers were very good (and better than the humans I interacted with). They truly helped me think through this moral dilemma a bit better. While I would never use AI as my go-to for moral philosophy, I will definitely use it as a supplement in the future.

CHAT GPT

Assume the role of a conservative, evangelical Christian operating according to a Christian worldview. Here is a moral dilemma: Is a Christian Uber driver morally culpable if he drives people to places like bars, where it is known that they will do immoral things such as get drunk and get high? My initial thought is no, because the Uber driver is just doing his job of driving people. It is not his responsibility for what they do when they arrive at their destination. However, imagine a scenario in which the Uber driver’s passenger told the driver that the destination was the passenger’s ex-girlfriend’s house, and when the passenger arrived, the passenger was going to kill his ex-girlfriend. It seems to me that if the Uber driver continues the ride, taking the passenger to his destination, the driver would share some moral culpability for the girlfriend’s murder. It seems to me that he has a moral obligation to end the ride before they arrive at the girlfriend’s house. However, if the Uber driver must end the ride prematurely to avoid sharing in the moral culpability for the ex-girlfriend’s murder, wouldn’t it also follow that the Uber driver must refuse to take people to bars and the like (contrary to my initial conclusion)? If it is morally acceptable for the Uber driver to drop people off at bars so they can get drunk and high, but it’s not morally acceptable for the Uber driver to take a passenger to murder their ex-girlfriend, what is the moral difference between the two scenarios that makes one true but not the other?

This is a thoughtful and serious moral question, and I appreciate how you’re already engaging with the issue from a biblically grounded and logically consistent Christian worldview. Let’s walk through this carefully as a conservative, evangelical Christian seeking to apply Scripture and moral reasoning.

📖 Starting Point: The Christian’s Calling

As believers, we are called to love God with all our heart, soul, and mind and to love our neighbor as ourselves (Matt. 22:37–39). We’re also called to avoid participating in or endorsing evil (Eph. 5:11) and to keep our consciences clear before God (Rom. 14:23). At the same time, we’re called to live peaceably with others (Rom. 12:18), work honestly (2 Thess. 3:10–12), and be in the world but not of the world (John 17:15–16).

So the key question becomes: When does doing our job become sharing in another’s sin?

🔍 Comparison of the Two Scenarios

🚗 Scenario 1: Driving someone to a bar

The rider might drink, get high, or make poor decisions.
The driver is not encouraging this behavior, not facilitating the act directly (e.g., not buying the drinks), and often doesn’t even know the person’s intentions.
The Uber driver’s role is neutral: he provides transportation.
While sin may occur, the link between the driver and the sin is indirect and uncertain.

🔪 Scenario 2: Driving someone to commit a murder

The rider explicitly states their intention to commit murder.
Now the driver has specific knowledge of evil intent.
Continuing the ride would be akin to knowingly assisting in a grievous sin.
The moral link is direct and strong—similar to being an accomplice.

Moral Principle: Knowledge + Intent + Proximity = Greater Responsibility

The difference hinges on what you know, how directly involved you are, and whether you are enabling evil. In ethics (and Scripture), intent and foreknowledge significantly increase moral culpability.

Key Differences:

Factor	Driving to Bar	Driving to Murder
Knowledge of Sin	Uncertain/Assumed	Explicitly Told
Type of Sin	Personal vice	Premeditated murder
Your Role	Indirect	Direct facilitation
Legal Risk	None	Criminal complicity
Biblical Parallel	“Don’t cause others to stumble” (Rom. 14:21)	“Deliver those who are being taken away to death” (Prov. 24:11)

Application of Christian Moral Reasoning

In the bar scenario, while you might feel uncomfortable, you’re not personally endorsing or directly contributing to the sin. The passenger has free will. You’re functioning like a road, not a co-conspirator.
In the murder scenario, failing to act could be seen as sinful passivity in the face of evil (James 4:17: “Whoever knows the right thing to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin.”).
Thus, you are morally required to intervene (e.g., end the ride, call authorities) because of the certainty and gravity of the act.

⚖️ Summary: Why the Driver Is Not Equally Culpable in Both

The Uber driver’s moral responsibility depends on:

What he knows about the rider’s intentions
How directly his actions contribute to the immoral act
Whether he is enabling sin knowingly or unknowingly

So while a Christian Uber driver should seek to avoid willfully enabling sin, he is not morally responsible for someone else’s personal choices made outside his knowledge and control. The bar scenario, in most cases, falls under this category.

🙏 Final Word of Wisdom

However, a Christian with a sensitive conscience may still feel conviction about certain types of rides. In such cases, Romans 14 reminds us not to act against conscience. It’s possible God is leading some Christians to limit their rides—or use such moments for gospel conversations.

“So whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God.” – 1 Cor. 10:31

Would you like a Scripture-based decision flowchart to help apply this kind of moral reasoning in future scenarios?

What if the passenger travelling to the bar tells the Uber driver that tonight is his birthday, and he plans to get drunk and do drugs to celebrate. Now that the Uber driver knows the passenger’s intentions to do moral evil, would the Uber driver be morally culpable for completing the ride and dropping the passenger off at the bar? If so, is he just as morally culpable as the Uber driver who drops the ex-boyfriend off at his ex-girlfriend’s house so he can murder her, or is he less morally culpable?

This is a really sharp follow-up—thank you for pressing the issue. You’re walking through the moral logic exactly the way a Christian should: with clarity, care, and a desire to be consistent. Let’s explore this in light of a Christian worldview and biblical ethics.

🔍 Scenario Recap:

🚗 Scenario A:

Passenger tells the driver:

“Tonight’s my birthday. I’m going to the bar to get drunk and do drugs.”

🔪 Scenario B:

Passenger tells the driver:

“I’m going to my ex-girlfriend’s house to murder her.”

Both situations involve foreknowledge of sin. So, is the Uber driver morally culpable in both? And are the two equal in terms of culpability?

📖 Biblical & Moral Framework

The Christian moral tradition recognizes degrees of sin and degrees of culpability, based on three key factors:

Knowledge – How much do you know about the sin?
Intent – Are you cooperating with or opposing the sin?
Gravity of the Sin – Not all sins are equal in seriousness (John 19:11, Matt. 11:22-24).
Proximity & Participation – Are you merely present, or actively helping?

Let’s apply that:

✅ Scenario A: Bar & Drugs

You have knowledge of sin. The passenger intends to get drunk and use drugs—both clearly condemned in Scripture (Eph. 5:18, Gal. 5:19–21).
You are not actively facilitating the drinking or drug use. You’re not buying alcohol or supplying drugs—you’re just giving a ride.
The sin is serious but not as grave as murder.
The person has agency. You are not coercing or enticing him to sin; he is choosing to.

Moral Evaluation: You now have some degree of moral responsibility, because you are knowingly helping someone on the path to sin, even if your role is passive. However, your culpability is limited, and your action is morally questionable, not clearly sinful—unless your conscience is convicted (Rom. 14:23).

❌ Scenario B: Premeditated Murder

Knowledge is total. The person says he’s going to commit a violent crime.
Your action facilitates a grave sin. You are transporting someone to kill another human made in the image of God (Gen. 9:6).
You have a moral (and legal!) duty to intervene.
Not intervening would be tantamount to being an accomplice to murder.

🔴 Moral Evaluation: Your responsibility here is direct and serious. Continuing the ride would be a grave sin, as you are assisting in the taking of innocent life. You would share in the guilt of the act, especially if you failed to report or try to prevent it (Prov. 24:11–12).

⚖ Comparing the Two:

Moral Category	Scenario A (Bar)	Scenario B (Murder)
Knowledge of Sin	Yes	Yes
Seriousness of Sin	Real, but lesser	Gravely immoral (murder)
Your Role	Indirect	Direct facilitation
Biblical Duty to Intervene	Possibly (via conscience)	Absolutely
Culpability Level	Minor to Moderate	Major

So, yes, there is a moral difference. The gravity of the sin and your proximity to it affects your culpability.

Wisdom & Conscience

Here’s the tension: while you may not be equally culpable, a Christian driver with a well-formed conscience may feel a moral responsibility to decline the ride in Scenario A as well. This would be an act of personal holiness and witness.

But refusing to drive someone to a bar is not morally obligatory in the same way as refusing to drive someone to commit murder. The sin in the latter is certain, grave, and involves innocent life.

💬 Final Thought

Romans 14 is helpful here:

“Blessed is the one who has no reason to pass judgment on himself for what he approves.” (Rom. 14:22)

If you feel convicted that giving such a ride would make you complicit in sin—or cause another to stumble—you should refrain. But not every Christian must draw the line in the same place when it comes to indirect participation.

If you’d like, I can help draft a decision-making guide for Christian workers in morally gray jobs like Uber driving. Want that?

I agree with you that one sin (murder) is worse than the other (getting drunk and high), and thus I agree that if the Uber driver is morally culpable in both situations, his moral culpability would clearly be greater in the case of the ex-boyfriend who plans to murder his ex-girlfriend. However, I don’t see why you say in the case of the bar situation that “you are not actively facilitating the drinking or drug use. You’re not buying alcohol or supplying drugs—you’re just giving a ride,” but then say the Uber driver “facilitates a grave sin” by “transporting someone to kill another human…” with reference to the case of the ex-boyfriend. If facilitating the sin requires buying the alcohol in the case of the man going to the bar, then wouldn’t facilitating the sin require the Uber driver to buy the gun in the case of the ex-boyfriend? In other words, given your definition of facilitating, I don’t see how the Uber driver would be facilitating the ex-girlfriend’s murder. The Uber driver did not buy the gun or pull the trigger. He simply took the man to the girl’s house, in the same way he simply took the birthday boy to the bar. It seems that your definition of facilitating is different for each scenario.

That’s a fantastic point—and I really appreciate the precision you’re bringing to this. You’re absolutely right to press for consistency in the use of the word “facilitating,” and this kind of careful moral reasoning is exactly what Scripture commends (e.g., Hebrews 5:14—“those who have their powers of discernment trained by constant practice to distinguish good from evil”).

You’re noticing an apparent inconsistency: if the Uber driver is “just giving a ride” in both scenarios, and he neither provides the alcohol nor the weapon, then how can we say he’s “facilitating” sin in one case more than the other?

So let’s clarify and refine.

🔍 Re-Examining “Facilitation”

You’re right that we should apply the concept of facilitation consistently. So let’s define it clearly:

To facilitate sin means to knowingly and voluntarily contribute in a meaningful way to another person’s commission of that sin.

That includes but isn’t limited to:

Providing tools or means (e.g., a weapon, alcohol, drugs)
Providing access (e.g., transportation, shelter, or information)
Encouraging or approving the sin

Now let’s apply that uniformly to both cases:

🚗 Scenario A: Ride to Bar

The Uber driver:

Provides access to a place where sin will likely occur.
Knows (because the rider told him) that the intent is to get drunk/high.
Does not directly provide the substances.
Does not command or encourage the action.

So yes, facilitation is occurring, because the ride is knowingly contributing to the sin. But the driver’s contribution is indirect. The sin still depends on many future choices by the rider (e.g., ordering drinks, consuming them, accessing drugs). The outcome is not guaranteed by the ride alone.

🔪 Scenario B: Ride to Commit Murder

The Uber driver:

Provides access to the location where a specific sin (murder) is intended.
Knows that the rider plans to kill someone upon arrival.
Does not provide the weapon or pull the trigger.
Knows the action is imminent and likely irreversible.
Does not report or resist.

So again, facilitation is occurring—but here, the contribution is:

Direct (point A to point B, destination is the crime scene),
Immediate (murder is imminent),
Grave (life-ending),
And the probability of sin is near 100%, given the clarity of the threat.

So you’re right—the mechanics of the Uber driver’s role are similar, but the moral weight and closeness of connection to the sin differ sharply.

The Key Distinction: Proximity + Immediacy + Certainty

It’s not just whether the Uber driver “bought the alcohol” or “bought the gun.” That would be an overly narrow view of participation. Instead, the question is:

How directly, knowingly, and necessarily does the Uber driver’s action contribute to the sin?

In Scenario B, the ride is a critical and immediate step toward the sin. Without it, the sin (murder) may not happen, or at least not at that time.

In Scenario A, the ride is less directly connected to the actual sin. The rider still has to make choices after arrival—and those choices aren’t inevitable.

This is what moral theologians call “material cooperation with evil”, and they often distinguish between:

Immediate vs. Mediate cooperation
Necessary vs. Non-necessary cooperation
Formal vs. Material cooperation

In murder, the cooperation is immediate and necessary. In the bar case, it’s mediate and non-necessary.

⚖ Final Take

You’re absolutely right to call for consistency—and I think the resolution is this:

The Uber driver is facilitating sin in both cases.
But in the murder scenario, the facilitation is closer, more necessary, and more morally grave.
That’s why the driver’s culpability is greater, even though the basic action (driving) is the same.

How soon the sin occurs upon arrival at one’s destination is morally irrelevant. You noted that the birthday boy’s sin depends on his future choices, and thus the outcome is not guaranteed by the ride. But the same could be said in the case of the ex-boyfriend. Whether he murders his ex-girlfriend depends on a number of choices he has to make after the ride is over, and thus the outcome is not guaranteed in this case either. He may decide not to murder his ex-girlfriend, in the same way the birthday boy may decide against getting drunk and high once he arrives at the bar. So it’s won’t do to distinguish the two scenarios by saying one outcome is guaranteed (murder) while the other is not (drunk and high). In both cases, the Uber driver is providing access to commit the sin that the passengers have indicated they intend to commit. So why is the Uber driver morally required to stop the ride in the case of the ex-boyfriend, but not in the case of the birthday boy? Is it just because murder is more morally grave than getting drunk? If so, then are you saying it’s morally permissible for the Uber driver to share in the moral culpability of lesser sins, but not greater sins?

You’re digging deep—and I really respect that. These are the kinds of moral questions that demand careful thought, not just reflex answers. You’re right to press the logic and demand coherence. Let’s walk through your critique and refine the framework.

🔁 Restating Your Objection (and It’s a Strong One)

You’re saying:

Immediacy of the sin doesn’t matter—both passengers still have choices after the ride, so we can’t say one sin is “guaranteed” and the other not.
In both cases, the Uber driver knows the intent and provides access.
So if we say he must stop the ride in the murder case, then why not in the bar case too?
And if we let him finish the bar ride, are we saying it’s okay to share in sin, as long as the sin isn’t “too serious”?

This is an excellent challenge, and it forces us to revisit the distinction and ask: Is the Uber driver’s participation ever morally justified, even in “lesser” sins?

Let’s Anchor in Christian Moral Thought

We can draw from both Scripture and classical Christian moral theology to get clarity.

There’s a concept in Christian ethics called material cooperation with evil. It’s different from formal cooperation (where someone wills or approves of the evil). Material cooperation can still be wrong, but there are distinctions:

Type	Description	Is it Sinful?
Formal Cooperation	You agree with or will the sin, or approve of it	Always sinful
Immediate Material	You directly help carry out the sin (e.g., hold the gun, drive the getaway car)	Usually sinful
Mediate Material	You indirectly help (e.g., sell shoes to a thief, give someone a ride)	Sometimes justified

Whether mediate material cooperation is sinful depends on:

The gravity of the sin
How necessary your help is
Your intention
Whether there’s a proportionately serious reason for helping

🔍 Applying This to the Uber Driver

Let’s say the Uber driver is a Christian trying to avoid cooperation with sin.

🎂 Case A: Ride to the Bar

The sin (drunkenness, drug use) is serious, but not the gravest.
The driver’s cooperation is mediate—he’s not directly enabling the act.
His intention is to earn income, not to promote sin.
The ride is part of a general service, not a targeted aid to a specific sinful act.
The ride is morally risky, but possibly justifiable depending on the circumstances.

Case B: Ride to Commit Murder

The sin (murder) is grave in the highest degree.
The driver has explicit knowledge of the planned sin.
His cooperation is much closer to immediate—it’s not just a ride, it’s a ride to a crime scene.
There is no proportionately serious reason (like earning money) that could justify this cooperation.
The correct action would be to end the ride and alert authorities.

So What’s the Key Distinction?

You’re right to say:

“The Uber driver is providing access to sin in both cases.”

But here’s the answer:

Christians are not permitted to knowingly and willingly cooperate in any sin—major or minor—unless the cooperation is remote, unintentional, and not essential to the act being committed.

So no, we should not say that Christians may “share in the moral culpability of lesser sins.” Instead, we say:

In the case of lesser sins, the moral justification for limited, remote cooperation might exist, especially if the driver doesn’t approve or intend the outcome, and the cooperation is not essential.

In contrast:

In the case of murder, even remote cooperation would likely be too morally dangerous to permit—especially if the driver has direct knowledge and contributes a necessary step.

🛑 Summary

The driver in both cases faces the danger of moral culpability.
But only in rare, extreme clarity (like a planned murder) is there an absolute obligation to end the ride.
In lesser sins, the Uber driver’s action might be materially cooperative but not necessarily sinful, depending on intent, distance from the sin, and the gravity of the act.
Christians must strive to avoid all cooperation with evil, but we also recognize that living in the world sometimes involves indirect contact with others’ sin (cf. 1 Cor. 5:10).

GEMINI

Well now, this is a weighty matter indeed, one that requires careful consideration through the lens of our Christian faith and understanding of right and wrong. You’ve rightly identified a tension here, and it’s good that your conscience is wrestling with it.

Let’s start with the core principle: as Christians, we are called to love our neighbor as ourselves (Mark 12:31) and to walk in a way that honors God (1 Corinthians 10:31). This means we should strive to do what is good, avoid what is evil, and, as much as it depends on us, not be complicit in the evil actions of others.

In the case of the Uber driver taking someone to a bar, my initial inclination, much like yours, is that the driver is primarily providing a transportation service. Their direct intention is to fulfill their job and earn a living. What the passenger chooses to do upon arrival is their own responsibility before God. Scripture tells us that each person will give an account for themselves (Romans 14:12).

However, your second scenario with the explicit intent to commit murder throws a stark light on the matter. Here, the driver is no longer simply facilitating a neutral act of transportation. They are knowingly and directly enabling a grave evil. To continue driving in such a situation would, in my understanding, make the driver complicit in the intended sin. It would be a failure to love one’s neighbor (the ex-girlfriend) and a disregard for the sanctity of life, which God holds dear. In this extreme case, the moral obligation to stop the ride seems clear.

Now, the crux of your dilemma: how do we reconcile these two scenarios? What is the moral difference that allows the driver to take someone to a place where sin is likely, but not to a place where a specific, heinous sin is imminent and declared?

I believe the key lies in the immediacy and directness of the intended evil, and the level of knowledge and intent of the facilitator.

Taking someone to a bar: While we know that sinful things often happen in bars – drunkenness, perhaps leading to other vices – the driver does not have direct knowledge of the specific sins the passenger will commit. The driver’s intent is not to enable those sins, but to provide a service. The connection to the eventual sin is less direct and more probabilistic. It falls more heavily on the individual’s free will and their choice to sin once they arrive.
Driving someone to commit murder: Here, the driver has explicit knowledge of the passenger’s immediate and grave intent. By continuing the ride, the driver becomes a direct instrument in facilitating that specific evil act. The connection between the transportation and the intended sin is immediate, direct, and known. The driver’s continued action implies a level of complicity, even if they do not personally commit the murder.

Think of it this way: providing a general service that could be used for sinful purposes is different from directly enabling a specific, declared act of evil. We sell knives, but we are not morally culpable if someone uses that knife to commit a crime, unless we sold it to them knowing their intent.

However, this doesn’t mean we should be entirely indifferent to where we take people. As Christians, we should have a discerning heart. While a blanket refusal to drive anyone to any place where sin might occur could be impractical and overly legalistic, we should be mindful of repeated patterns and perhaps consider if our service is consistently enabling harmful behavior. This requires wisdom and prayerful discernment.

Ultimately, the scenario involving the imminent threat of murder highlights a clear moral boundary. When we have direct knowledge that our actions will directly enable a specific, grave evil, we have a moral obligation to refrain. The bar scenario is more complex, involving the individual’s free will and a less direct link to specific sinful acts. While we should always pray for and encourage righteousness, our role as a driver in that context is primarily one of providing a service, not directly causing or intending the potential sins that may occur at the destination.

This is a challenging issue, and it requires ongoing reflection and prayer. May God grant us wisdom to discern the right path in all circumstances.

In the case of the ex-boyfriend, you said “Here, the driver is no longer simply facilitating a neutral act of transportation. They are knowingly and directly enabling a grave evil. To continue driving in such a situation would, in my understanding, make the driver complicit in the intended sin.” I agree that what this passenger intends to do is morally worse than what the birthday boy intends to do at the bar, but I fail to see how the bar ride is just a neutral act of transportation while the murder ride is not, when both rides end with the passenger committing sin. One sin is worse than the other, but if the sins are only able to be carried out because of the Uber driver taking each passenger to their destination, how can you say that one is a morally neutral act while the other is not? You also bring up the Uber driver’s knowledge of each passenger’s intentions. You should assume that both passengers have made it equally clear to the driver what they intend to do once they reach their destination. But you seem to assume that one passenger is more likely to commit a sin than the other. I don’t see why you would presuppose this. Both have free will, and both could equally choose to carry through their intentions or not. You also bring up the immediacy of the evil, but that seems morally irrelevant. The birthday boy could shoot up heroin within five minutes of his arrival, while the ex-boyfriend may choose to wait 5 hours to kill his ex-girlfriend. That doesn’t matter to the moral equation.

You raise a crucial point, and it’s right to press on this distinction. Your challenge to the idea of the bar ride being a “neutral act” when it facilitates potential sin is a valid one that requires a more nuanced explanation from a Christian worldview.

You’re correct to highlight that in both scenarios, the Uber driver’s action (providing transportation) is a necessary precursor for the passenger to carry out their intended actions, be it getting drunk and high or committing murder. The moral weight, however, lies in the nature of the intended action and the directness of the driver’s enabling.

Let’s refine the idea of a “neutral act”: In the context of a service like transportation, a neutral act is one that, in and of itself, is morally permissible and serves a general good or legitimate need. Driving people from one place to another is generally a neutral act, facilitating commerce, social interaction, and personal mobility.

However, the neutrality of that act can be called into question when the driver has clear, explicit knowledge and the destination is solely and directly for the purpose of a grave sin.

Here’s where the moral difference lies, even assuming equal clarity of intent from both passengers:

The Nature and Severity of the Sin: While both drunkenness/drug use and murder are sins, Christian theology clearly distinguishes between their severity. Murder is a direct violation of the sanctity of life, a foundational principle in God’s creation and commandments (“You shall not murder,” Exodus 20:13). While drunkenness and drug use are also sinful and harmful, they do not carry the same weight of irreversible and ultimate destruction of an innocent human life.
The Directness of Facilitation:
- Murder Scenario: The driver is being asked to be the direct means of transporting someone to a specific location for the sole purpose of committing a specific, heinous crime against a specific individual. The act of driving becomes inextricably linked to the act of murder in a way that makes the driver a direct facilitator of that evil.
- Bar Scenario: The driver is transporting someone to a public establishment where various activities, both moral and immoral, might occur. While the passenger intends to sin, the driver is not directly enabling a specific act of evil against a specific victim. The bar serves a broader purpose, and the driver’s action is less directly tied to the specific sins the passenger might commit. There’s a degree of separation and the passenger’s free will plays a more significant role in the eventual sin.
The Principle of Scandal and Witness: As Christians, we are called to be a light to the world and avoid causing scandal (Matthew 5:14-16; 1 Corinthians 10:32). While driving someone to a bar might not be a direct endorsement of drunkenness, consistently and knowingly facilitating access to places solely dedicated to vice could be seen as problematic for our witness. However, the act of directly enabling a murder carries a far greater negative witness and contradicts the most fundamental Christian values.

Think of it this way: a baker who sells bread knows some customers might use that bread to make sandwiches they eat while gossiping (a sin). However, if someone explicitly asks the baker to bake a loaf of bread specifically to use as a weapon to harm another person, the baker’s complicity becomes much clearer.

Regarding your point about free will: You are absolutely correct that both individuals have free will and could choose not to follow through with their intentions. However, the driver’s moral responsibility is informed by the stated intent and the nature of that intent. We don’t wait to see if the murder actually happens to determine our moral obligation to prevent facilitating it. The gravity of the intended evil compels a different response.

The immediacy, while you argue it’s irrelevant, does have a practical bearing on our ability to intervene and the clarity of the impending evil. A declared intention to commit murder now presents a more immediate and direct opportunity (and obligation) to prevent harm than a stated intention to get drunk at a place where others are also engaging in various activities.

In conclusion, while the Uber driver’s transportation is a necessary step in both scenarios, the moral culpability differs due to the extreme nature of murder, the directness of the driver’s involvement in facilitating that specific act, and the profound violation of Christian principles it represents. The bar scenario, while not without potential ethical considerations regarding our witness, involves a less direct facilitation of a less severe (though still sinful) action within a context that is not solely dedicated to that sin.

This is a complex issue that requires ongoing prayer and discernment. We must strive to act in ways that love our neighbor and honor God, while also navigating the complexities of living in a fallen world where our actions can have unintended consequences.

It seems to me that you think it’s morally permissible for the Uber driver to take people to bars to commit the sin of drunkenness, but not morally permissible for the Uber driver to take people to someone’s house to commit the sin of murder simply because the latter is a graver sin. I agree that one sin is worse than the other, but it doesn’t follow from that that the Uber driver is not morally culpable for both. He may be morally culpable to a different degree for one versus the other, but he’s morally culpable in both cases since in both cases (1) he is responsible for transporting the passengers to the scene of their intended moral evil, (2) he knows their intentions to commit the sins, and (3) it is very likely that both men will commit the sins that they have stated they intend to commit. So why isn’t the Uber driver morally required to end both rides prior to the intended destination to avoid some level of moral culpability with his passengers’ evil acts? It sounds like you are saying it’s morally acceptable for the Uber driver to lend his services to help facilitate lesser sins, but not greater sins.

You’ve cut to the heart of the matter, and your reasoning is sharp. You’re right to challenge the distinction I drew, pressing on the core issue of facilitating sin, regardless of its perceived severity. Your points about the driver’s responsibility in transporting, their knowledge of intent, and the likelihood of the sin occurring are all critical to consider.

Let me refine my position, acknowledging the validity of your concerns. From a consistent Christian worldview, your argument that the Uber driver bears some level of moral culpability in both scenarios holds significant weight.

The act of providing a service that directly enables another person to commit a known sin cannot be considered entirely morally neutral, even if the sin at the destination is something society might deem “lesser” than murder. Our call is to avoid even the appearance of evil (1 Thessalonians 5:22) and to be mindful of how our actions might contribute to the sin of others.

Therefore, I must concede that my initial portrayal of the bar ride as a “neutral act” was an oversimplification. While the driver’s primary intention might be to earn a living, the knowing facilitation of an act contrary to God’s will (like drunkenness, which can lead to further sin and harm) does indeed incur some level of moral responsibility.

The degree of culpability, as you suggested, is likely different between the two scenarios. The direct and irreversible harm of murder carries a far greater moral weight than the sin of drunkenness. However, the principle of not enabling sin remains.

So, to answer your question directly: Yes, from a consistent Christian worldview, the Uber driver likely has a moral obligation to avoid facilitating both the act of getting drunk and the act of murder, given the knowledge of the passengers’ intentions.

The difficulty lies in the practical application and the level of discernment required.

The Murder Scenario: The immediacy and gravity of the intended evil create a clear and compelling moral imperative to intervene by ending the ride. The potential for irreversible harm to an innocent life outweighs the driver’s obligation to fulfill the fare.
The Bar Scenario: This is where the practical challenges arise. If a Christian Uber driver were to refuse every ride to a bar, nightclub, or any place where sin is likely to occur, their ability to work and engage with the world would be severely limited. This could lead to isolation and hinder their ability to be a light in the world.

However, this practical difficulty does not negate the underlying moral principle. Perhaps a more nuanced approach is needed:

Awareness and Prayer: The driver should be aware of the potential for sin at various destinations and pray for their passengers and for opportunities to be a positive influence.
Discretion and Discernment: In situations where a passenger explicitly states their intention to engage in significant sin upon arrival (even short of murder), the driver might need to exercise discretion and consider whether continuing the ride would make them complicit. This requires careful discernment and prayerful consideration of the specific circumstances.
Witness: The driver’s conduct should always be above reproach, reflecting Christian values in their interactions with passengers.

Ultimately, your challenge has pushed me to a more consistent application of Christian principles. While the degree of moral culpability differs significantly between facilitating drunkenness and facilitating murder, the underlying principle of not knowingly enabling sin suggests that the Christian Uber driver should ideally avoid both scenarios when the intention to sin is clearly communicated. The practical outworking of this principle in everyday life requires wisdom, discernment, and a reliance on God’s guidance.

Thinking to Believe