What is the scientific method? Everyone who sat through grade-school science class knows the answer to this question, right?: observation, hypothesis, prediction, experimentation, conclusion. What may surprise you is that there is no such thing as the scientific method. There are a variety of methods scientists employ in their quest to discover the truth about the natural world, none of which can be claimed as the scientific method. Which method a scientist uses depends on what he is studying. While the method outlined above works well for “experimental scientists” such as chemists and physicists, it doesn’t apply to “historical scientists” (i.e. those who study the past) such as paleontologists, astronomers, and evolutionary biologists. Those in the historical sciences require a different method.
Historical scientists study the past, not the present. They seek to discover the historical causes responsible for past events – effects that we observe in the present. For such a task the scientific method outlined above simply won’t work. It’s the wrong tool. To explain the structure of the fossil record, for example, one cannot engage in experimentation. Likewise, there is no need for making predictions since predictions address the future, not the past. How, then, do historical scientists test their theories?
Famed Harvard paleontologist Stephen J. Gould explained that those working in the historical sciences test their theories by means of their explanatory power. In their search for historical causes they operate according to a principle called the “method of multiple working hypotheses.” Essentially, they postulate multiple causes that could be responsible for the observed effect, and then compare them to see which cause best explains the data in question. This sort of approach is also called abductive reasoning, or “inference to the best explanation.”
How do scientists determine what constitutes the “best” explanation? To establish some cause X as the best explanation one must show (1) that X is capable in principle of explaining the effect in question [causal adequacy], (2) was present and operative at the time the effect was produced [causal existence], and (3) has greater explanatory scope and explanatory power than competing hypotheses. And if it can be shown that there is only one known cause in operation today that is capable of producing the observed effect (causal uniqueness), then scientists can be reasonably certain that that cause was responsible for producing the effect in question.
Let me illustrate how this process works. If when I wake up, I look out my window and see that my driveway is wet, there are several possible causal explanations for this historical event: (1) the lawn sprinklers went off in the night; (2) someone washed the car with a garden hose; (3) it rained. Those are my multiple working hypotheses. Which can best explain the data? If I observe that the driveway is wet but not the road, the rain hypothesis is ruled out since we would expect the road to be wet as well. If I observe that the lawn is also dry, that eliminates the possibility of sprinklers as the cause. Finally, I observe that the car is shiny clean. The garden hose hypothesis best explains these observations. But was that cause present? Yes, I observe it lying in the driveway next to the car, so the garden hose hypothesis satisfies the causal existence criterion as well. It follows, then, that the driveway is wet because someone washed the car with the garden hose.
Now that we understand the method historical scientists use to discover past causes, what is the best explanation for the origin of the machinery, processes, and information in the cell? Most scientists think a valid scientific explanation must appeal to purely naturalistic processes: (1) chance, (2) necessity, (3) or a combination of both. But what about intelligence? Could the cause of life be an intelligent agent? We know information routinely originates from thoughtful, conscious beings, so it seems at least possible that a designing intelligence could be responsible for the specified complexity found in the cell. If so, intelligent agency should be included as a possible explanation for consideration as well. Indeed, since the only known source for generating complex specified information is intelligent agents, prima facie a designing intelligence should be considered the best explanation of the data.
Many scientists will dismiss this option out-of-hand on the grounds that science cannot detect the actions of intelligent agents. But this is not a scientific conclusion; it is a philosophical presupposition (and a false one at that, seeing that branches of science such as archaeology and forensics regularly detect the presence of intelligent agents in the natural world). Why should a priori philosophical commitments prevent us from considering all possible causes, especially when this philosophical bias excludes what appears to be the best explanation? If the goal of science is to discover the truth about the physical world, and the evidence points to the activity of an intelligent agent, shouldn’t we be allowed—in principle at least—to conclude that an intelligent agent is responsible? Either the goal of science is the pursuit of truth, or it is not. The goal of science should be to find the right answers, not the right kind of answers: those that conform to philosophical naturalism.
Historical science is a search for past causes. Our search should not be limited to natural causes alone, but should include any and all possible causes. We should be allowed to follow the evidence to wherever it leads, not only where naturalism allows. As Greg Koukl has opined, “The object and domain of science should be the physical world, but its goal should be truth, not merely physical explanations. Though science is restricted to examining physical effects, when causes are inferred, there should be no limitation.”[1]
The only cause in operation today that is known to be capable of producing specified complexity (causal adequacy) is intelligent agents, so if we find specified complex things in the past, we are rational to conclude through abductive reasoning that they have been caused by an intelligent agent. And since intelligence is the only cause capable of producing specified complexity (causal uniqueness), it follows that an intelligent agent is the best explanation for the origin of biological information.
But wait, how do we know an intelligent agent existed at the times in question? By logical deduction. If there is only one known cause of a certain effect, and we observe that effect, we are justified in concluding that the cause was present at the time. As Meyer writes, “Logically, one can infer the past existence of a cause from its effect, when the cause is known to be necessary to produce the effect in question. If there are no other known causes—if there is only one known cause—of a given effect, then the presence of the effect points unambiguously back to the (uniquely adequate) cause.” For example, if only volcanic eruptions can explain certain rock formations, then when we observe those rock formations in the fossil record we are justified in concluding that volanoes must have existed at that time in history. Likewise, if biological information can only be explained in terms of intelligent agency, then the presence of biological information proves the presence of a designing intelligence in the history of life’s formation on Earth.
Consider the following parable. Imagine that researchers in Antarctica discover certain markings on a stone, as well paintings of animals in cave buried beneath the ice. Testing proves that the markings and paintings are 25 million years old, which is much earlier than the arrival of intelligent hominids. Because we know that such patterns can only be produced by intelligent agents, we would be justified in concluding either that hominids evolved much sooner than we thought, or that there were other intelligent beings prior to hominids, even if we are ignorant of their identity. The same is true of the cell. It evidences specified complexity, and thus we would be justified in concluding that life was created by a designing intelligence, even if we do not know the identity of that designer.
Now that we have established the methods by which historical scientists do their research, and the validity of including intelligent agency in the mix of our multiple working hypotheses, we will turn our attention to the possible causes of life, beginning with the naturalistic hypotheses. Next time….
If you haven’t already done so, read parts 1 and 2 of this series as well.
[1] Greg Koukl, Solid Ground, July/Augusts 2005 issue, page 3.
December 14, 2009 at 12:07 pm
When looking at the distant past (i.e., prior to humans), I am not convinced that it is possible (even in principle) to demonstrate scientifically that a particular cause “was present and operative at the time the effect was produced.” And why is it relevant “if it can be shown that there is only one known cause in operation TODAY that is capable of producing the observed effect” (emphasis added)?
My problem with historical science is that it requires the dubious assumption that the natural laws that we observe locally in time and space are equally valid always and everywhere (i.e., uniformitarianism). I realize that such a presupposition is pragmatically necessary, but this does not entail that it is actually consistent with reality. At this point, it has become an article of FAITH within the scientific community.
Science can tell us a lot about what is going on in the physical realm here and now, but skepticism is warranted regarding its attempts to explain things that happened long ago or far away. I prefer to trust the testimony of the One who witnessed them firsthand!
LikeLike
December 15, 2009 at 5:16 pm
Aletheist,
It depends on what you mean by “demonstrate.” If you mean “prove without a doubt,” then you are right in large measure. But by the same token science cannot “demonstrate” anything since science works on induction, and induction cannot yield certainty.
Why doubt that the laws of nature have changed over time? I can’t speak authoritatively in this area because I have not done much research in it, but it’s my understanding that scientists can demonstrate that certain laws and other phenomenon are constant. For example, astronomers can observe light in the past and measure its speed, and its speed has remained constant over billions of years. Or consider the four basic forces: the strong nuclear force, weak nuclear force, electromagnetism, and gravity. Calculations show that if the strength of these forces changed even in the slightest degree life would be impossible, and the universe would be a wasteland of either hydrogen or helium. Since additional and heavier elements exist, and since life exists, it would appear that these forces have been constant.
Even if there was no way to affirm that any natural law has been constant throughout history, I wouldn’t say it is an article of faith within the scientific community. At best it would be a presupposition–and a necessarily pragmatic one as you noted. To be able to measure things in the past one must assume that the same processes at work today were at work back then. If that cannot be assumed, science cannot know anything about the past.
I agree with you that the historical sciences are less certain than the hard sciences such as chemistry and physics that study the here and now (even though these are not always clear cut either). That doesn’t mean it’s just a shot in the dark, but it does mean their conclusions are more tentative.
The main takeaway I hope you and everyone else get from this post is that the way historical scientists go about their discipline is different than other branches of science. Conclusions about historical causes are more tentative, but there are ways of coming to reasonable conclusions. Historial scientists are searching for historical causes, and the way they go about identifying them is by suggesting several different hypotheses, each of which is thought to be casually adequate and causally existent, and then exploring the explanatory power of each in comparison to the others. Since intelligent agency is causally adequate to explain what we find in the cell, it should be considered a possible explanation, rather than be ruled out a priori on philosophical grounds.
Jason
LikeLike
December 16, 2009 at 11:29 am
I can see the potential benefits of adopting typical scientific assumptions and turning them against naturalist/materialist/physicalist conclusions, but I also think that those assumptions themselves should be subjected to critical scrutiny.
“it’s my understanding that scientists can demonstrate that certain laws and other phenomenon are constant.”
I do not see how this could be “demonstrated”, since we do not have billions of years of human observations to corroborate it. All we can say is that certain laws and other phenomena SEEM to have remained constant during the limited time period over which we have been studying them.
“For example, astronomers can observe light in the past and measure its speed, and its speed has remained constant over billions of years.”
Astronomers can only observe light that reaches them TODAY. They infer that it was emitted in the distant past based on uniformitarian assumptions, including the permanent constancy of the speed of light. I am not saying that they are wrong about this, just pointing out that it is a presupposition – not a fact.
“To be able to measure things in the past one must assume that the same processes at work today were at work back then. If that cannot be assumed, science cannot know anything about the past.”
Well, why assume that science CAN know anything (definitively) about the past? Again, it is a reasonable presupposition; but it is still a presupposition nonetheless.
“Conclusions about historical causes are more tentative, but there are ways of coming to reasonable conclusions.”
The problem is that neither the scientific community nor the general public consistently treats those conclusions as “more tentative”. Historical science is typically given the same level of credibility as current science. For example, few people today question the notion that the material universe came into existence some 14 billion years ago.
“Since intelligent agency is causally adequate to explain what we find in the cell, it should be considered a possible explanation, rather than be ruled out a priori on philosophical grounds.”
Yes, but this risks making the existence of God a mere scientific hypothesis, subject to probabilistic assessment, rather than a metaphysical necessity.
LikeLike
December 19, 2009 at 5:04 pm
A good post. Very well thought out and written.
LikeLike
December 19, 2009 at 8:18 pm
Thanks Thomas.
Jason
LikeLike
December 19, 2009 at 8:18 pm
aletheist,
If an object is 3 million light years from us, the light that astronomers are observing is the light as it existed 3 million years go. And they can measure the speed of that light. They can do the same for objects 4 million light years away as well. The same is true of objects 250 million light years away, etc. If they measure the speed of light in every instance, then they will know the speed of light as it was 3 million, 4 million, and 250 million years ago. And if it is the same in every instance, then they can infer that it has remained constant throughout the ages.
Of course, this assumes that the distances of these objects has been calculated accurately, and that it has taken light that long to reach us. Young earth creationists would typically deny the latter. I’m not inclined to do so myself. I have not taken a strong stance on the age of the universe, but I don’t think a Biblical view requires a young universe. In my opinion, we should not focus on that issue. The real debate is not the age of the universe, but whether the universe came to exist (and came to exist in its present form) by blind chance, or by the activity of a divine creator. So I am much more interested in demonstrating that naturalism cannot account for the universe/life than I am in demonstrating how old the universe is. The Bible is very clear that God created the universe and all of life; it is not nearly as clear on how long He took to do so. The age of the universe is an “in-house” issue for Christians to work out scientifically and hermeneutically. As it relates to our battle with Darwinism, however, the real issue is divine involvement vs. naturalistic processes alone.
Yes, science has presuppositions, and we need to consider what those are so that we can distinguish what they know by direct observation and what they know by inference from their presuppositions, but the fact that science is built on presuppositions that are not themselves demonstrable from science is not a mark against science. It’s just the nature of human knowledge.
tbc…
LikeLike
December 19, 2009 at 8:18 pm
Continued…
True, the conclusions historical scientists such as evolutionary biologists offer are not usually proffered as being tentative. There should be more transparency about the matter coming from the scientific community.
I don’t see how God becomes a “mere” scientific hypothesis if we allow intelligent agency as a possible explanation for past biological events. God no more becomes a mere scientific hypothesis than humankind becomes a mere scientific hypothesis when a forensics scientists concludes that someone was murdered. In both cases a personal entity is inferred to explain past events. The fact of the matter is that if God caused events in the physical world, it cannot be wrong to explain the effect in terms of God’s causal agency.
I understand your point about making God’s existence a probabilistic assessment rather than a metaphysical necessity, but the design argument is not the only argument offered on behalf of God’s existence. There are other philosophical arguments as well. But truth be told, only one argument can prove that God is metaphysically necessary: the ontological argument. And this argument is hotly contested by philosophers, with some viewing it as a mere word game. If the ontological argument is not successful, then there is no argument, scientific, philosophic, or otherwise that can demonstrate God’s existence to be metaphysically necessary. I don’t count this as a demerit against these arguments, however.
Jason
LikeLike
December 20, 2009 at 5:58 pm
I agree that, when dealing with non-believers, we need not be dogmatic about the age of the earth. The more important point is that the metaphysical assumptions underlying modern science are adopted unconsciously and uncritically by most people, including most Christians, probably because they are implicitly presupposed throughout the educational system. We ought to call attention to them and subject them to just as much scrutiny as scientific data and interpretations.
I disagree that the ontological argument is the only one that can prove that the existence of God is a metaphysical necessity. The same is true of all Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas, given his metaphysical assumptions. This is important, because Aristotelian/Thomist notions like potency and act, matter and form, and the four causes seem to be making a bit of a comeback, even in certain secular circles. I do not think that it is much of an exaggeration to say that the rejection of formal and final causes by modern philosophy (and modern science) may have been one of the biggest mistakes in intellectual history.
LikeLike
December 23, 2009 at 4:56 pm
You are right. There is one other argument that I failed to account for that would supply a metaphysically necessary being: the Leibnitzian cosmological argument (a.k.a. the argument from contingency). But I don’t know of any other unique arguments. Remember, to say a being is metaphysically necessary is to say it is a being who cannot not exist–a being who must exist in every possible world. Arguments like the telelogical argument or kalam cosmological argument do not provide such a being (and I consider the argument from motion to just be a variation of the contingency argument).
Jason
LikeLike
December 27, 2009 at 7:57 pm
What I meant by a metaphysically necessary being is one who must exist, given certain metaphysical assumptions. All Five Ways of Aquinas satisfy this definition.
LikeLike
December 28, 2009 at 6:20 pm
aletheist,
I would disagree. The teleological argument definitely doesn’t prove the existence of a metaphysically necessary being. It only shows that the universe is designed. It doesn’t say anything about who the designer is (that requires other lines of philosophical reasoning + revelation) or about the nature of the designer (whether he is metaphysically necessary or contingent). The universe could be designed by a supernatural being who in turn was designed by another more powerful supernatural being ad infinitum. The teological argument cannot weigh in on this matter.
The cosmological argument just gives you a first cause. It doesn’t tell you anything whether that uncaused causer is metaphysically necessary or not. It’s existence could just be a brute contingent fact. The argument can’t prove otherwise. To prove that the uncaused causer is metaphysically necessary the argument would have to show that this particular uncaused causer must exist in all possible worlds. It doesn’t. It only shows that it does exist in the actual world.
Jason
LikeLike
December 28, 2009 at 7:49 pm
Talk of “possible worlds” is completely foreign to Aristotelian and Thomist metaphysics. You are still imposing the modern definition of “metaphysically necessary,” even though I already clarified that I am referring to something that must exist in the ACTUAL world, given certain metaphysical assumptions.
All Five Ways of Aquinas fit this bill. His First, Second, and Third Ways are different cosmological arguments that lead to “a first mover,” “a first efficient cause,” and something “having of itself its own necessity,” respectively. His Fourth Way results in something which is the cause of the “being, goodness, and every other perfection” of all beings. His Fifth Way is not to be confused with Paley’s version of the teleological argument; its conclusion is NOT merely that the universe is designed, but that “some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end.”
Aquinas spent hundreds of pages explaining why, in all five cases, what has been demonstrated is the necessary existence of what “everyone understands to be God,” including all of the traditional divine attributes. He must be unique, immutable, immaterial, eternal, omnipotent, intelligent, omniscient, volitional, perfect, good, personal, and simple.
LikeLike
December 29, 2009 at 9:11 pm
As I understand it, you are right, modal logic entailing the concept of possible world semantics is rather recent in the world of philosophy, and thus it would be foreign to Aquinas. But I think this more refined concept of metaphysical necessity is an improvement. Something might be factually necessary in the actual world, but why think it is anything more than a contingent, brute fact? True metaphysical necessity, it seems to me, is something that is not only factually necessary, but logically necessary. If it is logically necessary it will be necessary in all possible worlds, whereas something can be factually necessary in this world but may not be necessary in another possible world. I just don’t think that all of Aquinas’ arguments prove the existence of a metaphysically necessary being in the more refined sense. They only seem to prove a factually necessary being in the actual world.
I freely admit to not having read Aquinas. I have only read brief summaries of his arguments. But I haven’t seen anything that makes me think his teleological argument proves a metaphysically necessary being. Even adding the concept of purpose to the design argument only shows that the designer had a purpose for the design. It doesn’t tell us anything about the designer himself. Other arguments are necessary for that. If you can show otherwise I’m open to it.
Jason
LikeLike
February 5, 2010 at 1:26 pm
[…] for design from his new book, Signature in the Cell. Past posts can be found here: Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, and […]
LikeLike
February 23, 2010 at 11:40 am
[…] This post will conclude my review/summary of Meyer’s book. Links to the entire series: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, […]
LikeLike
April 7, 2010 at 9:11 am
[…] theories and powerful argument for the intelligent design of the first life (parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7a, 7b). But what about the proliferation of life? Can a fully naturalistic theory […]
LikeLike
April 23, 2014 at 9:46 am
[…] good example of this is the origin of life (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). We have plenty of knowledge about how life works, the minimum requirements for […]
LikeLike
July 18, 2020 at 4:52 am
[…] https://theosophical.wordpress.com/2009/12/12/signature-in-the-cell-part-3-the-methodology-of-histor… […]
LikeLike