Why is there Something, Rather than Nothing?
“Why is there something rather than nothing?” This is considered by many to be the most fundamental of all philosophical questions. The question, however, presumes that “nothing” and “something” are two equally possible states – that nothingness is a genuine alternative to something. If what I have argued thus far is sound, nothingness is metaphysically impossible, and thus it is not a logical alternative to something. Something must exist. But what if my reasoning is flawed, and it turns out that non-existence is logically possible? How would we answer this long-standing philosophical question, then?
To answer the question we first need to be clear about what is being asked. For example, what is meant by “why?” Are we seeking to discover the cause of existence, or the purpose for existence? If we are seeking a purpose for existence, then we are already presupposing the existence of some supreme mind, because only personal agents create things for particular reasons and with some purpose in mind. Without access to that mind, it is difficult to discover what purposes it had for creating. It is much simpler to identify the cause of existence: the what rather than the why.
We also need to clarify what is meant by “something.” Do we mean physical reality (the universe), or do we mean any existent at all (whether it is physical or non-physical)?
There are, then, four different ways our question could be understood, each of which has a slightly different answer:
- What is the cause of physical reality?
- What is the cause of all reality?
- What is the purpose of physical reality?
- What is the purpose of all reality?
I would argue that it is only meaningful to seek an explanation for physical reality (1 and 3), not all reality (2 and 4). While it is possible for there to be some existent beyond the universe that can explain why the universe exists, it is logically impossible for there to be some existent beyond the sum of all existents that can explain why everything exists, because there cannot be any existent beyond the sum of all existents.[1] Let me explain in more detail.
It makes sense to ask why a car exists because its existence can be explained in terms of some other existent (a prior “something”). But as philosopher Colin McGinn points out, when we ask why everything exists rather than nothing at all, we are seeking an explanation for the whole of existence, not just some part. In essence, we are looking for some reason or explanatory entity outside the whole of existence that can explain the whole of existence. The problem with such an inquiry should be clear: The whole of existence includes every existing entity, and by definition there cannot be additional entities outside the set of every existing entity. To think there could be something that exists beyond the sum of all existents is just as incoherent as thinking there are additional numbers outside the set of all possible numbers. Nothing exists outside a set containing all things. What we are looking for simply cannot exist.
We have two options at this point. We could either conclude that the causal form of the question (1 and 2) is incoherent and thus unanswerable, or we could explore the possibility that the explanation for the whole of reality is itself part of, or contained within the whole of reality. It would be rash to dismiss the question before all possible answers are explored, so let us explore the possibility that the explanation for why there is something rather than nothing is itself part of the something we are trying to explain.
On the face of it, this option seems incoherent. How could A explain the set of A,B,C,D,E,F,G… if A is part of what needs to be explained? Wouldn’t that require self-causation, in which A pre-exists itself as its own cause, as well as the cause of B,C,D,E,F,G…? Not necessarily. It depends on the kind of being A is. There are two types of beings: contingent, necessary. Contingent beings derive their being from some other existent. They are caused to exist by some transcendent existent. Necessary beings, on the other hand, have being in themselves. They are not caused to exist by something else, but are self-existing, and hence eternal. The nature of such a being requires that it exist. It cannot not exist. If every existent within the whole of existence were a contingent being, including A, then there cannot be an ultimate explanation for why there is something rather than nothing because every existent within the whole of existence would need a transcendent explanation, including A. The question would truly be meaningless and unanswerable. If, however, at least one existent within the whole of existence is a necessary being, such as A, the question is both meaningful and answerable. A necessary being needs no explanation. It must exist, and must exist eternally. So why is there something rather than nothing? It is because the very nature of A is such that it must exist. As an eternal, uncaused being, A is the transcendent source of all contingent beings within the whole of existence. Theists identify this necessary being as God. He is being, and the source of all contingent beings.
While we have concluded that it is only meaningful to seek a cause for physical reality rather than all reality (since there cannot be a cause outside all reality), what about seeking the purpose for physical reality? As stated previously, to discover the purpose for why the universe exists presupposes the existence of a personal agent who created the universe. Unless we have access to that agent’s mind, it would be difficult to ascertain the purpose it had for creating. The only sure way to know the agent’s purpose for the universe is if that agent reveals his purpose to us in some fashion. As a Christian, I would argue that the agent has done so in Scripture. God created everything for His good pleasure, to display His power, and so we could enjoy Him forever. Such purposes, however, are not discoverable by reason or through empirical investigation. So while I think question three can be answered, it cannot be answered philosophically or scientifically.
In summary, the reason there is something rather than nothing is because existence is metaphysically necessary. Something must exist. Nothingness is logically/metaphysically impossible. At least one existent within the whole of reality is a necessary being who has always existed, who carries in himself the sufficient reason for his own existence, and is the source of being for every other existing thing.
Stay tuned for a look at some alternative explanations for why there is something rather than nothing.
[1]To make a distinction between physical reality and all reality as I have requires that I presuppose physical reality does not exhaust reality (i.e. it is only a subset of all reality). Obviously, a materialist would disagree. But that disagreement need not detract from the key point I am trying to make: there cannot be something that exists beyond everything that serves to explain why everything exists, because that “something” would be one of the existents that needs to be explained. If I were a materialist, then, I would have to say it not even meaningful to ask why physical reality exists (#1), because this presupposes there is some physical reality beyond the sum of all physical reality which is incoherent. There cannot be something outside of everything to explain everything, otherwise everything isn’t everything!
June 3, 2010 at 4:52 pm
Since our universe and we are composed of ‘something’, our vocabulary has evolved around that ‘reality’. Thus our term ‘existence’ seems to refer to matter in a space-time system. That does not, however, preclude the (no word available but I want to say ‘existence’) of a non-something state. That state is characterized by not being comprised of space, time, matter & energy but that does not mean it cannot (no word – but you know I mean ‘exist).
Now, if you want to connect these two states in a causal relationship, that’s your prerogative, but it will always be conjecture since you are attempting to understand a not-something state using a something-mind (and you thought anthropomorphism was tricky?)
Anyway, it is an enjoyable pastime and once I learn how to use WordPress I’ll be assembling ten years of thinking on this subject and we can talk so more.
leroque
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June 3, 2010 at 5:28 pm
Leroque,
I don’t think “existence” has to refer to matter, space, or time. I am a theist, and as a theist I believe God exists, but God is not material, spatial, or temporal. There is, I believe, such a thing as immaterial reality.
But to speak of a “non-something state” is not coherent, even pardoning the difficulty involved in formulating such terminology. A “state” refers to something, not nothing. Nothingness is not-even-a-state. I think nothingness, like an actual infinite, is only a concept, not a metaphysical possibility.
Jason
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June 6, 2010 at 4:19 am
Without space and time we would be one and now (with no personal free space). We were made ex nihilio, out of nothing. Nothing is not something that can really be thought or spoke about because it doesn’t exist. So I think you are right in stating it is not a metaphysical possibility because it is not existent. We have no symbol or word to speak about it because it doesn’t exist. It is not an it.
Creation was made in freedom and love. If creation was necessary then we would fall into pantheism. It would have somehow co-existed with God. But in the beginning God created out of nothing.
Even God is not a logically necessary being. As John Zizioulas states:
“God is not a logically ‘necessary being’. His being is constituted freely thanks to its being caused by a person, the Father. Contingency is not the logical alternative to necessity. The fact that God’s being is not contingent does not automatically mean that it is not attributable to freedom.”
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June 7, 2010 at 10:26 am
Tim,
Whether God is logically necessary is a debated issue among philosophers, but God is definitely a metaphysically necessary being. He cannot not exist.
Jason
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June 7, 2010 at 6:56 pm
Hi Jason,
The Father is the cause (outside of time -eternally) of the Son and the Holy Spirit. If we attribute the cause to anything else such as divine nature, then God did not beget in freedom and love. Yet God is love and free. Therefore necessity is not the correct word to describe God’s eternal existence. We’re probably saying somewhat of the same thing in different terms. Your terms sound like natural determinism. I’m trying to argue his existence in terms based in relational ontology.
-Tim
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June 8, 2010 at 12:02 pm
Tim writes,
This assumes the Trinity. Since we are not trinitarians, this assertion is unpersuasive. Moreover, a caused God cannot be God, by definition.
Freedom does not imply contradiction. Aquinas said, if I remember correctly, “Nothing that involves a contradiction falls within the realm of God’s omnipotence.” The fact God cannot do certain things (e.g. 2 Tim. 2:13; Heb. 6:18) does not impeach His freedom.
It is difficult, at best, to make sense of this statement. What is “freedom”? The “being” of God is attributable to God’s freedom? Freedom to do what, go out of existence? This affirms God is at liberty to go out of existence if He so chooses. Thus, God has potential for nonexistence; and what can possibly not be cannot be the ground for what is, much less itself. A non-finite being, by definition, cannot go out of existence for its existence would then be dependent in some manner. You cannot coherently affirm an infinite God only to deny what that term implies. You affirm in the same sentence the “fact” God’s being is “not contingent,” and, yet, it is contingent upon God’s freedom. This is a contradiction and thus incoherent.
I fail to see how that is possible, given the definitions of the words you use.
There can be no relation of any kind without existence. Relation assumes existence.
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June 8, 2010 at 12:05 pm
Oh, Jason, by the way, excellent posts on “nothing.” 🙂
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June 8, 2010 at 2:23 pm
Scalia writes:
This assumes the Trinity. Since we are not trinitarians, this assertion is unpersuasive. Moreover, a caused God cannot be God, by definition.
If you don’t believe in the Trinity then you don’t believe in love, for love is other-centered. The Father is the cause of the Son and the Holy Spirit eternally. The Son was not begotten out of necessity but in love and freedom otherwise the Father was forced to beget the Son by something.
Scalia writes:
There can be no relation of any kind without existence. Relation assumes existence.
This is false there is not existence without relation.
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June 8, 2010 at 2:50 pm
Tim, if you care to engage my argument, I’m all ears. Bald assertions lack rational heft.
We’re not debating the mythical Trinity. To make your claim persuasive, you must prove love is “other-centered.” You have not done this.
Then neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are God because God, by definition, is uncaused.
Another hairless statement. Care to prove this?
Relation– An existing connection; a significant association between or among things; the mode or kind of connection between one person and another, between an individual and god, etc.; A logical or natural association between two or more things; relevance of one to another (Random House & American Heritage Dictionaries).
There can be no association, connection, etc., between nothing. Thus, relation assumes existence.
Tim, it does nothing for your cause to merely throw statements into cyberspace. Define your terminology and rationally connection those definitions to the conclusions you draw. Otherwise, you’re merely talking to yourself.
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June 9, 2010 at 8:12 am
Hi Scalia,
You write: “To make your claim persuasive, you must prove love is “other-centered.”
I write: Does this really need proving? If your life is centered around yourself and all you care about is yourself is that love? Who do we consider loving?: heroes. why? They selflessly give themselves for others.
You write: “Then neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are God because God, by definition, is uncaused.”
I write: You are thinking about causation in terms of time. There has never been a time that the Son was not begotten of the Father. The Father however is the begetter and the Son the begotten. Causation doesn’t necessarily imply finitude.
As far as there being no existence apart from relation: God is at the same time the One and the Many. The One didn’t precede the Many therefore constitutive relationality is eternal. You yourself are not self-existent, you are the fruit of relation and were constituted by those relationships. Your existence is a relational gift. The Trinity is also relational gifts of person. Therefore relation is as primordial as existence.
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June 9, 2010 at 10:44 am
Tim writes,
In answer to your first question, of course. We get philosophical definitions from philosophical dictionaries. We get biblical definitions from, of course, the Bible. Since “love” is a central biblical theme, it behooves us to pay attention to how the Bible uses that term:
Leviticus 19
18. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people, but thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself: I am the LORD.
Quite a few biblical passages cite this principle, and the relevant aspect of this principle insofar as our discussion is concerned is the fact a person can and should love h/erself. If self-love is evil, then God’s command becomes nonsensical. In other words, it’s evil to love myself, therefore, it is evil to love others. But this passage, and others like it, demonstrate self-love is not evil and is the basis of our love for others. Although I legitimately love myself, I should also love others. Since self-love does not necessitate being “other-centered,” your argument collapses. Denying the Trinity does not preclude the love of God, for God can and does most certainly love Himself.
Moreover, since God is timeless, His creation is known of Him sans its materialization.
Jeremiah 1
5. Before I formed thee in the belly I knew thee; and before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee, and I ordained thee a prophet unto the nations.
Hence, if one denies in the face of biblical evidence self-love, “other-centered” love does not necessitate another divine being. God has always known His creation and loved it logically prior to its materialization.
In either case, your assertion fails.
This is more equivocation on your part. Causation is causation, regardless of time. God, by definition, is an uncaused being. If God is a caused being, then you’ve redefined God. You keep insisting the Father caused the Son and the Holy Spirit. What caused the Father? Do the Son & Spirit simultaneously cause the Father? Why not? Is the Father uncaused? If all three Persons are self-caused, then you’re asserting a logical contradiction. Removing time does not disentangle your belief from incoherence. For the Son & Spirit are nonetheless ontologically dependent upon the Father for existence. By definition, then, they are finite. You’re changing the definition of “finite” in mid-argument to sustain your conclusion. You are also changing the definition of “God” to do the same. Your argument is thus unintelligible.
Your first sentence is question-begging if you are referring to the Trinity. If by “many” you mean multiple characteristics then your statement is irrelevant. If by “many” you are referring to creation, then you are a pantheist. That takes the conversation way off course and is not germane to this thread.
“MY” existence is not the topic because I am not God. Insofar as “relation” is concerned, you are redefining that term to fit your bias. I say “bias” because you still haven’t constructed anything close to a logical argument in defense of your views.
Redefining terms in mid-argument commits the fallacy of equivocation; affirming one thing and in the same context denying it commits the fallacy of contradiction; and assuming what you have not proved commits the fallacy of begging the question. Your arguments make no sense and merely restating them constitutes flag-waving, not rational dialog.
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June 9, 2010 at 3:27 pm
I didn’t say we shouldn’t love our self. We should be grateful for our creation and take care-love of ourself. We can love ourself out of gratitude for the gift of ourselves from God. Yet the other should come first. For example the hero doesn’t hate himself, he denies himself for the sake of the other.
So was your God all alone prior to creation? If you believe in a loving God doesn’t that make creation necessary. If it does you have fallen into Pantheism. Do you believe in a personal God? If so then there must be other persons. There is not such thing as a solitary person.
By many I mean persons. God is both One as in from the Father and Many as in Father, Son, Holy Spirit.
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June 9, 2010 at 3:29 pm
The Father is uncaused. Yet He is who He is by relation to the Son and the Holy Spirit. Father doesn’t make sense unless you have a child.
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June 9, 2010 at 3:46 pm
Tim,
I wholeheartedly concur with Scalia: a person who is caused to exist by another cannot be God. Even assuming Trinitarianism, if the Son and Holy Spirit are caused by the Father in eternity, then the Son and Holy Spirit are contingent beings since they do not have existence in themselves, but derive their being from the Father. As Trinitarian theologian and philosopher William Lane Craig noted”
“The Son in their view derives his being from the Father. … This doctrine of the generation of the Logos from the Father cannot, despite assurances to the contrary, but diminish the status of the Son because He becomes an effect contingent upon the Father. Even if this eternal procession takes place necessarily and apart from the Father’s will, the Son is less than the Father because the Father alone exists a se, whereas the Son exists through another (ab alio). … [T]o be dependent upon the Unoriginate for one’s existence is to lack a ground of being in oneself alone, which is surely less great than being able to exist on one’s own.”
You seem to think that the timeless nature of the derivative relationship makes a difference, but it doesn’t. Time is not the issue. Ontology is the issue. One of the sine qua nons that separate God from creation is the fact that God is a necessary being, while creation is contingent; i.e. it does not have being in itself, but derives its being from a transcendent source. If the Son and Holy Spirit derive their being from God, even if this cause and effect relationship is an eternal one, it means the Son and Spirit are contingent beings, and hence part of creation. They would differ from other creations only in that they are eternal rather than temporal. But they would be contingent creations nonetheless.
As it relates to the discussion of whether God is a metaphysically necessary being, I should point out that even on your account, at least the Father would be a metaphysically necessary being because He does not derive His being from anyone, but simply has it in Himself.
Tbc…
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June 9, 2010 at 3:46 pm
Continued…
As for freedom, again I agree with Scalia. Necessity of existence does not imply a lack of freedom; only the impossibility of non-existence. But if it’s possible for God to not exist, then he’s not God!
As for relations and existence, it is logically possible to conceive of relations as being concomitant with existence, but as Scalia noted, there can be no relations without the existents. Logically speaking, existence is ontologically prior to relations. This is confirmed by our modal intuitions, for we can conceive of a universe in which there is only one existent. In such a world there would be existence, but no relations, and thus existence is logically prior to relations.
Jason
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June 9, 2010 at 4:18 pm
Stephen Hawking was recently interviewed by ABC’s Diane Sawyer. Hawking was asked about the greatest mystery he would like to see solved. His answer? “I want to know why the universe exists, why there is something greater than nothing.” If he read my blog he’d discover the answer!
I find the cognitive dissonance of atheists like Hawking revealing. On the one hand he denies the existence of anything outside of the material world, but on the other hand he is looking for something that can explain why the material world exists. This is a perfect example of the incoherence I discussed in the blog entry: looking for something outside of everything to explain everything. There cannot be something that exists outside the whole of reality. If all that exists is the material universe, it is pointless to think there is any reality/reason that can explain why it exists, or why it exists the way it does.
The only rational explanation is the existence of some being who transcends physical reality, who is metaphysically necessary. That would be God, but Hawkins considers the option of a personal God to be “most impossible.”
While Hawking may deny the existence of any reality outside the contingent universe, he cannot escape the intuition that there is some cause/reason for the universe, and hence something that exists beyond the universe. I think this just goes to show that while one can deny the existence of God, just like Paul said, they cannot escape the knowledge of God. They simply suppress it, leading to the cognitive dissonance so evident in Hawking et al.
Jason
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June 9, 2010 at 11:00 pm
Tim writes,
Here’s what you said. In Post 8, you wrote:
This claim has been shown to be false. Denying the Trinity does not preclude love. Since you acknowledge it is possible to love oneself, you should abandon making the claim that denying the Trinity denies love.
Of course. God is logically prior to all creation.
How can that be? How can God loving Himself necessitate creating others? Creation is the free act of God. Again, freedom does not imply contradiction.
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June 10, 2010 at 12:14 am
Correction. Hawking said the existence of a personal God is “most implausible,” not “most impossible.”
Jason
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June 10, 2010 at 5:05 am
“X. But they say, The Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same; and if this is so, neither is the Son the same as the Father. It is clear, without saying so, that this line of argument manifestly excludes either the Son or the Father from the Godhead. For if to be Unbegotten is the Essence of God, to be begotten is not that Essence; if the opposite is the case, the Unbegotten is excluded. What argument can contradict this? Choose then whichever blasphemy you prefer, my good inventor of a new theology, if indeed you are anxious at all costs to embrace a blasphemy. In the next place, in what sense do you assert that the Unbegotten and the Begotten are not the same? If you mean that the Uncreated and the created are not the same, I agree with you; for certainly the Unoriginate and the created are not of the same nature. But if you say that He That begot and That which is begotten are not the same, the statement is inaccurate. For it is in fact a necessary truth that they are the same. For the nature of the relation of Father to Child is this, that the offspring is of the same nature with the parent. Or we may argue thus again. What do you mean by Unbegotten and Begotten, for if you mean the simple fact of being unbegotten or begotten, these are not the same; but if you mean Those to Whom these terms apply, how are They not the same?” -St Gregory Nazianzen Third Theological Oration
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June 10, 2010 at 7:55 am
Tim, name-calling, even by proxy, gets you nowhere. I can just as easily say what you believe is “blasphemy” too. Since you refuse to engage the arguments Jason and I have put forth, we’re left to conclude you are incapable of doing so. That means, of course, you will continue to believe what you do in spite of the evidence. That’s your choice, but you can dispense with the name-calling stuff.
Since you refuse to offer rational arguments and refuse to engage the ones presented you, how about this — We’re right because the Yankees are the Yankees.
Your quotation of Gregory contains the same type of equivocation errors you’ve exhibited. He attempts shift the definition of “same” in order to sustain the inherently contradictory assertion that a being can be both God and begotten in the same sense. A begotten being is a contingent being and cannot be God. His (and your) retort that a son has the same nature as his father is not only ditheistic, it is equivocal. It is ditheistic because the gods of the Pantheon have the same “nature” but that doesn’t make them one god. Two idols of stone have the same nature, but that doesn’t make them one god. It is equivocal because we’re arguing “same” in the sense of how God is defined (necessary). Gregory’s (and your) comment doesn’t touch that.
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June 10, 2010 at 10:40 am
[…] mentioned in my second post, Colin McGinn (echoing Immanuel Kant) makes a distinction between asking why some particular […]
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June 10, 2010 at 4:33 pm
Scalia,
It is suprising to me that you think a God who has always existed and always will and is of the same nature in three persons is contingent. I don’t believe in your self-centered God. I believe God has always been other centered.
Which children come to love themselves? Ones that have been loved as an other by an other or ones who have had self-centered parents? A person comes to love themself by participating in the other-centeredness affirmation of an other. So even properly formed self-love is a participation in other centered love.
Did your God go from being eternally self-centered to being other-centered when he created? Did he change?
Just because there is an order, causation, or begetting in the eternal God doesn’t imply contingency. All three always existed.
Jason,
I agree that God is a metaphysically necessary being if we argue from creation backwards but since creation is not necessary for God to exist we can’t logically assert that it was necessary for him to exist because of creation (even though he has).
thanks,
-Tim
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June 10, 2010 at 5:10 pm
Tim,
I would argue the way I am arguing even if I were a Trinitarian. William Lane Craig is a Trinitarian, and yet he offers the same argument I am. It’s one thing to say there is an eternal relation of some sort between the Father and the other two persons of the Trinity, but it is a wholly other matter to say the Father caused the other two persons. If the relation is a causal one, then the being of the Son and Spirit is dependent on the Father. That would make the Son and Spirit contingent beings. Only the Father would be a necessary being; i.e. one whose existence is necessary–not derived from anything or anyone else.
As for God’s metaphysical necessity, it doesn’t matter whether one is looking forward or backward. To say God is metaphysically necessary means it is impossible that God not exist. He must exist. This has nothing to do with creation. Creation is contingent, but God is not. If God determined not to create anything, He would be metaphysically necessary. Likewise, He would be metaphysically necessary if He determined to create. Metaphysical necessity is a truth about God’s being independent of anything else. It is a claim that He must exist. He is the eternal ground of all being.
Jason
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June 10, 2010 at 6:47 pm
“We must distinguish between the level of nature or ousia and that of person or hypostasis in divine being. Both denote being, but the former refers to the what and the latter to the how of being. Giving existence or being to the Son by the Father is a matter not of nature, of the what God is, but of how God is. This implies that the idea of causation is used in order to describe the how of divine being and avoid making the emergence of the Trinity a matter of transmission of ousia. What the Father ’causes’ is a transmission not of ousia but of personal otherness (i.e. of the how of being). The principle of causality distinguishes the persons, it involves the emergence of otherness in divine being. The Fater as ’cause’ is God, or the God in an ultimate sense, not because he holds the divine essence and trasmits it — this would indeed endanger the fullness of the divine being of the other persons and would also turn him into an individual conceivable prior to the other person — but because he is the ultimate ontological principle of divine personhood. -John Zizioulas “Communion and Otherness”
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June 10, 2010 at 10:53 pm
Tim writes,
This shows you’re not even paying attention. If you really are surprised, you need to re-read the posts and reply to the arguments raised. We’re still waiting.
Yes, and people believe in Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy too. Believe anything you want to believe, Tim. You offer no logical argument for your views, so you might was well keep talking to yourself.
The rest of your Post 22 has already been addressed. You seem to think repeating yourself will somehow shore up a bad argument. It doesn’t.
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June 10, 2010 at 11:57 pm
This is part of the typical Catholic account of the distinction of Persons in the Godhead. This account is, of course, incoherent because both the Father and Son share ousia indivisibly; but since ousia cannot be divided, and since, under divine simplicity, mind is identical with ousia (God cannot be divided), “otherness” is incoherent. There cannot be a “region” or “area” of the Godhead that is the exclusive domain of a Person. A division of mind is a division of substance under simplicity, so the use of “otherness” seeks to create and deny division in the same context. This equivocal language renders such an account unintelligible.
The Catholic rejoinder affirms the unity of substance and distinction of Persons in mystery (while insisting such a position is not contrary to reason). Insisting there is a division of being while simultaneously denying it is most certainly contrary to reason. As William Craig has observed, this account is closer to modalism than what he considers an accurate account of the Trinity. But mere modes of revelation is not what Catholicism affirms. It rather affirms genuine personal distinctions in the Godhead. Thus, this account of the Trinity is rationally unaffirmable.
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June 11, 2010 at 2:07 pm
Scalia,
You are mistaking distinction with division. Persons in communion are not divided though different. Person is a relational term.
You have yet to explain how its reasonable to have a loving God who lived in isolation until he created.
-Tim
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June 11, 2010 at 2:46 pm
I am mistaking nothing here. The terminology you use is incoherent. You’re not paying attention to the definitions of the words you’re using. You fail to see why your argument is unintelligible and you fail to demonstrate a grasp of the issues elucidated heretofore.
Talk about chutzpah!! You have consistently ignored our arguments and appeals for reasoned dialog, and all you do is repeat yourself and “forget” I’ve already explained this to you.
I really have little interest in discussing this with somebody who isn’t paying attention to what I’m saying.
Your question has already been answered.
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June 12, 2010 at 6:56 am
Where is the post in which you answered Tim? I’d like to read it.
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June 12, 2010 at 1:05 pm
Hi, Carol Jean!
Please read Post 11. If you have follow-up questions, I’ll be happy to address them.
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December 13, 2010 at 4:11 pm
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