A view of morality you’ll hear a lot in the public square is social contract theory. Contractarianism holds that “morality rests on a tacit agreement between rationally self-interested individuals to abide by certain rules because it is to their mutual advantage to do so.”1 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with murder, rape, or torture, for example, but since rational self-interested persons do not want these things being done to them, they agree to extend the same courtesy to others.2 Philosopher, Edward Feser, offers at least six helpful criticisms of Contractarianism: (more…)
Philosophy
Archived Posts from this Category
June 8, 2022
Problems with the Social Contract Theory of Morality
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Philosophy[3] Comments
July 7, 2021
Meaning and purpose can only be found in God
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheistic objections, Philosophy[2] Comments
Christians will often point out to atheists that if there is no God, then there is no objective meaning and purpose to life. Atheists will typically respond by saying that they create their own meaning in life. They find meaning in what they do, in family, etc. There are at least four problems with this, however.
First, they are substituting subjective, proximate meaning for objective, transcendent meaning. When people ask what the meaning and purpose of life is, they are not asking for advice concerning what meaning and purpose they should invent for their life. They are searching for something transcendent. They are looking to discover something that is already there, not invent something new. By substituting objective, transcendent meaning for subjective, proximate meaning, the atheist is referring to an entirely different understanding of meaning.
November 16, 2020
Certainty is a state of mind. One who is certain is one who does not doubt that some X is true. Having certainty regarding X does not guarantee that X is true, but merely that one believes X is true and has no doubts regarding its truth. Someone who seeks certainty regarding some X, then, seeks to justify belief in X to such a degree that they no longer have doubts regarding the truth of X.
Many post-modern types decry the desire for certainty as an “Enlightenment ideal,” preferring questioning and doubt instead. This is wrong. The desire for certainty is a basic human desire that has manifested itself in every generation. Humans want to know that what they believe is true. While certainty is not required to have knowledge (and philosophically speaking, not possible for most things), and while certainty is not required for everything we believe, and while an inordinate desire for certainty can be bad, the desire for certainty is natural, good, and obtainable in some matters.
October 13, 2020
When we hear something that fits with what we already believe, we are apt to adopt it without much reflection or critical thinking. Instead, we should be asking ourselves what the opposition might say regarding the information. We should subject our beliefs to critique – critiquing them as though we want to prove them false. This will help us to see how solid the evidence actually is and avoid confirmation bias.
August 22, 2017
If God knows everything, are we truly free?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Determinism, Philosophy, Theology[201] Comments
If God knows every choice we’ll make from eternity past, doesn’t that mean our choices are not free – that God has caused us to do what we do? No. Knowledge is not a cause. Knowing what someone will choose to do in advance of their actually doing it does not cause them to do it. While it’s true that if God knows X will happen, X will most certainly happen, but it’s not God’s knowledge of X that makes X happen. It’s our choice to do X. God merely knows what we will freely choose in advance. While God’s knowledge is chronologically prior to our acts, our acts are logically prior to God’s knowledge. If we would have chosen A rather than B on October 12, 2006, God would have known A rather than B. The reason He knew B would happen from eternity past is because He knew we would freely choose B from eternity past. God’s foreknowledge does not determine our choices, but is informed by our choices. In other words, God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of our actions; our actions are the cause of God’s foreknowledge.
November 23, 2015
Diversity is not a value
Posted by Jason Dulle under Philosophy, Pluralism, Political Incorrectness, Politics, Relativism[15] Comments
Diversity is not a value. Diversity just is. We don’t value diversity for diversity’s sake, but for what that diversity provides us. For example, we value diversity in food because we enjoy eating different kinds of food. We value diversity of clothing styles because we like to express ourselves in different ways, and we think it would be wrong to make everyone wear the same kind of clothes or eat the exact same food. But there are some examples of diversity that should not be valued or “celebrated.” We should not celebrate diversity in moral views, particularly when some of those moral views entail gross immorality. The British did not celebrate the diversity of Indians when they burned their widows on the funeral pyre. They forcibly ended that barbarism. We should not celebrate diversity in how women’s genitalia is treated – celebrating those who mutilate women’s genitalia alongside those who do not. We should not celebrate the diversity of killing one’s own daughter after she is raped to preserve the honor of the family. Not all ideas are of equal value. We celebrate the diversity of people, but not the diversity of ideas. Bad ideas should be fought against – first by persuasion, but if that fails, in some cases we must fight those ideas by force.
October 8, 2015
Does Libertarian Freedom Require the Possibility of Evil?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Calvinism v Arminianism, Determinism, Philosophy, Theology[43] Comments
Steven Cowan and Greg Welty argue contra Jerry Walls that compatibilism is consistent with Christianity.[1] What they question is the value of libertarian free will (the freedom to do other than what one, in fact, chooses to do, including evil). Why would God create human beings with the ability to choose evil? Libertarians typically argue that such is necessary in order to have genuine freedom, including the freedom to enter into a loving relationship with God. After all, if one could only choose A (the good), and could never choose B (the evil), then their “choice” of A is meaningless. The possibility of truly and freely choosing A requires at least the possibility of choosing B. The possibility of evil, then, is necessary for a free, loving relationship with God. It is logically impossible for God to create free creatures who are unable to choose anything other than A.
Cowan and Wells ask, however, what would be wrong with God creating us in a way that made it impossible for us to desire or choose evil, and yet our choice would still be free. All that would be required is the presence of more than one good to choose from (A, C, D, E, F…). No matter what we choose, we could have chosen some other good, but never evil. This avoids the logical contradiction and preserves real freedom of choice. Cowan and Wells argue that such a world would be superior to our world since this possible world preserves libertarian free will, but lacks evil. In their assessment, there is no reason for the actual world if the value of libertarian free will (relationship with God, gives us freedom to choose the good, gives us the freedom to do otherwise) could be obtained without the possibility of evil. For the libertarian who wants to maintain that the actual world is superior to this possible world, they must maintain that the greatest value of libertarian freedom is that it gives us the opportunity to do evil. Why would God value our ability to do evil if He is good and hates evil? Why would God create a world in which libertarian freedom results in evil if He could have achieved all of the goals of libertarian freedom without evil?
September 21, 2015
Compatibilists: Why do you deliberate?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Calvinism v Arminianism, Determinism, Epistemology, Philosophy, Theology[111] Comments
Compatibilists are those who believe that freedom and determinism are compatible with each other. On their view, one is free so long as they make actual choices. And they maintain that people do make actual choices: They choose what they desire. Of course, the problem comes when you ask where those desires come from. The desires are determined by God or physics. So what if physics or God determined for you to desire to kill your roommate? Then you will “choose” to kill your roommate.
In my estimation, this is not a very robust sense of freedom. Indeed, I would argue that it is not freedom at all. If desires cause actions, but the desires are determined by something other than the self, then the actions are determined as well, even if only in a secondary or intermediate sense. More could be said in the way of critique, but I have done so elsewhere.
For this post, I just want to pose a simple question to compatibilists: If our choices are caused by our desires, are our desires are determined by God/physics, then why is “choosing” so hard? Why do we struggle with deliberation? The only reason we experience deliberation is because we possess conflicting desires and we need to weigh them to decide which desire to act on. If our desires are determined, does that mean God (or physics) determined for us to have conflicting desires? If so, what would the purpose be other than to give us the false appearance of having libertarian free will?
June 23, 2014
Materialism is falsified when you think about it
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Logic, Mind, Naturalism, Philosophy, Thinking[43] Comments
Materialists will tell you they don’t believe anything other than the material world exists, but seem oblivious to the fact that propositions – such as the proposition that only the material world exists – are not material. That means materialism is falsified the moment you think about it. Pun intended.
March 19, 2014
“I don’t think. I know.” We’ve all heard this, and most of us have probably uttered this phrase ourselves a time or two. But when you think about it (no pun intended), this phrase represents a misuse of language. It sets up a contrast between thinking and knowing, wherein “thinking” denotes uncertainty and “knowing” denotes certainty. While this may reflect a popular connotation of these words, denotatively speaking, neither has anything to do with certainty.
“Think” is a description of what the mind does. It describes the mind’s activity. Knowledge is “justified, true belief.” Certainty is not part of the definition, and thus certainty is not required for knowledge. To know something only requires that we have adequate justification.
January 16, 2014
Atheists may lack belief in God, but they do not lack beliefs about God
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Philosophy, Tactics[286] Comments
He who makes a claim bears a burden to demonstrate the truth of his claim. Theists have a burden to demonstrate their claim that God exists, and atheists have a burden to demonstrate their claim that God does not exist. Nowadays, however, it’s common for atheists to claim that the theist alone bears a burden of justification. They try to escape their own burden of justification by redefining atheism from a “belief that God does not exist” to “the absence of belief in God.” Since only positive beliefs can be defended, they are off the hook. All the pressure lies with the theist.
While I think their attempt to redefine atheism is intellectually dishonest, let’s grant the validity of their redefinition for a moment. Greg Koukl observed that while it’s certainly true atheists lack a belief in God, they don’t lack beliefs about God. When it comes to the truth of any given proposition, one only has three logical options: affirm it, deny it, withhold judgment (due to ignorance or the inability to weigh competing evidences). As applied to the proposition “God exists,” those who affirm the truth of this proposition are called theists, those who deny it are called atheists, and those who withhold judgment are called agnostics. Only agnostics, who have not formed a belief, lack a burden to demonstrate the truth of their position.
November 4, 2013
Science defies common sense?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Logic, Philosophy, ScienceLeave a Comment
I’ve heard science types like Lawrence Krauss claim that science has shown us over and over again that we can’t trust our common sense, and by extension, philosophical reasoning. One of the go-to illustrations is our solar system. It’s said that common sense tells us the sun revolves around the Earth, and yet Copernicus, through science, showed common sense was unreliable as a guide to truth. Only science can tell us what is true.
I think this is a misconstrual of the issue. Daniel N. Robinson said it best: “What Copernicus said was not hostile to common sense but was inconsistent with common experience.”[1] Indeed. While science has discovered physical phenomenon which is weird, to say the least, it does not defy common sense, but our common experience. Rationality is not at odds with science, and cannot be disproven by science. Indeed, the task of science presupposes rationality from start to finish.
[1]Daniel N. Robinson, “Neuroscience and the Soul,” Philosophia Christi, Vol. 15, Number 1, 2013, 17.
October 24, 2013
Is it rational to believe in something without verifiable, empirical evidence?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Philosophy, Resurrection, Science, Theology[16] Comments
Those who subscribe to empiricism believe that we should not believe the truth of some X based on a competent authority. We are only justified in believing some X if we have empirically verifiable evidence supporting the truth of X. It goes without notice that this principle itself is not empirically verifiable, and thus empiricism is self-refuting as a complete theory of knowledge. But let’s ignore the man behind the curtain for a moment, and explore other deficiencies in an empirical epistemology.
In his book, A Universe from Nothing, physicist and empiricist Lawrence Krauss describes the state of the cosmos in the distant future. Due to cosmic expansion, in two trillion years all of the evidence for the Big Bang (cosmic microwave background, redshift of distant objects/the Hubble expansion, and the measurement of light elements in the cosmos), and all 400 billion galaxies visible to us now, will no longer be detectable via empirical methods. Worse yet, all of the evidence for the dark energy that caused the cosmic expansion will be gone as well. For scientists living in that day, all of the empirical evidence will point to a static universe inhabited by a single galaxy that is no more than a trillion years old (based on the ratio of light elements at the time).
June 13, 2013
Does apologetics place reason in authority over God’s Word?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bible, Logic, Philosophy, Theology, Thinking[49] Comments
Some Christians think that if we appeal to reason and evidences to demonstrate that the Bible is truly God’s Word, then we are elevating reason and evidence to a place of authority over God’s Word. I think this conclusion is misguided for several reasons. First, I don’t think it is legitimate to consider reason an “authority.” Reason is merely a tool for assessing reality. It is basic to all human thought. Indeed, one cannot even understand God’s revelation apart from reasoning. It would be a mistake, then, to pit reason against revelation as if they are two competing authorities. As Greg Koukl has argued, using reason to assess whether or not the Bible is God’s revelation to man no more puts reason above the Bible than using grammar to understand God’s revelation puts grammar above the Bible.
Secondly, this confuses the order of being (ontology) with the order of knowing (epistemology). While the Bible is first in terms of authority, it is not first in terms of the order of knowing. Knowledge of the divine origin and revelatory status of the Bible is not innate. We must acquire this knowledge. Knowledge of a proposition requires three elements: (1) belief that the proposition is true; (2) justification for the belief that the proposition is true; (3) the proposition must actually be true. Put another way, knowledge is justified true belief. Given the fact that knowledge requires justification, it cannot be wrong to require justification for believing the Bible is God’s Word. We could not know the Bible is God’s Word apart from such justification. As Kelly Clark has pointed out, reason is not autonomous as the standard of truth, but it is the best tool for discovering the truth.
A proper use of reason is not an exercise of subjecting God’s Word to a higher authority, but an examination of the Bible to determine if it is truly what it claims to be. We use our God-given reason to discover the truth that the Bible is a product of divine revelation.
June 10, 2013
Coyne on free-will: “we don’t have free will” but “we have no choice but to pretend that we do choose”
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Determinism, Philosophy[32] Comments
Scientists say the darndest things. Last January I blogged on an article Jerry Coyne wrote in USA Today regarding free will. At one point he said, “So if we don’t have free will, what can we do? One possibility is to give in to a despairing nihilism and just stop doing anything. But that’s impossible, for our feeling of personal agency is so overwhelming that we have no choice but to pretend that we do choose and get on with our lives.”
Coyne is still spinning the same gobbledygook. Recently, on Coyne’s own blog, a commentator took Coyne to task for acting as though humans have freedom, while being adamant that they do not. Coyne responded:
June 6, 2013
Are all truth-claims subjective?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Logic, Moral Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments[2] Comments
When talking about subjective and objective truths, I’ve heard it claimed that every truth claim is “subjective” since humans are subjects. On this view, there can be no such thing as objective truth since all truth claims are made by subjects.
This is often applied in the context of the moral argument. Theists argue that morality is objective, and finds its ontological grounding in the character of God. In response, some will argue that since God is a subject, His moral commands are subjective, and hence even theistic ethics cannot provide an objective basis for morality.
This is a gross misunderstanding of the terms. Subjective and objective tell you what a statement is about – not where it comes from. To say a truth is “subjective” is to say it is about the subject himself; to say a truth is “objective” is to say it is about a mind-independent object in the world.
May 13, 2013
What philosophers believe about God, morality, et al
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Determinism, Epistemology, Mind, Naturalism, Philosophy, Relativism, Science, Theism[14] Comments
Philosohpers David Bourget and David Chalmers recently surveyed 931 philosophy faculty members to determine their views on 30 different issues. Here were some of the more interesting results:
God: atheism 72.8%; theism 14.6%; other 12.6%.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism 49.8%; non-naturalism 25.9%; other 24.3%.
Mind: physicalism 56.5%; non-physicalism 27.1%; other 16.4%.
Free will: compatibilism 59.1%; libertarianism 13.7%; no free will 12.2%; other 14.9%.
Meta-ethics: moral realism 56.4%; moral anti-realism 27.7%; other 15.9%.
Normative ethics: deontology 25.9%; consequentialism 23.6%; virtue ethics 18.2%; other 32.3%.
Science: scientific realism 75.1%; scientific anti-realism 11.6%; other 13.3%
Time: B-theory 26.3%; A-theory 15.5%; other 58.2%.
Truth: correspondence 50.8%; deflationary 24.8%; epistemic 6.9%; other 17.5%.
Notice that although 72.8% of respondents are atheists, 56.4% are moral realists. This goes to show the strength of our moral intuitions. While atheists do not have a sufficient ontological grounding for objective moral values, they still believe in them nonetheless.
I was surprised that only 13.7% believe in libertarian free will. I would expect it to be much higher. Perhaps this correlates with the high rates of physicalism.
HT: Scot McKnight
February 26, 2013
“Burden of justification” rather than “burden of proof”
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Logic, Philosophy, Tactics, Thinking1 Comment
In philosophy, a burden of proof refers to one’s epistemic duty to provide reasons in support his assertion/claim/position. While listening to a debate recently, I noticed that one of the participants spoke of a “burden of justification” rather than “burden of proof.” I thought this terminological shift was helpful since when most people hear the word “proof” they think “certainty.” Clearly, no one has the burden to demonstrate their position with apodictic certainty. “Justification,” on the other hand, makes it clear that one only has a burden to back up their claims with good reasons. I am going to be intentional about adopting this terminology in the future.
December 19, 2012
What I’ve Been Reading: Reasonable Faith
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Book Reviews, Philosophy, Resurrection, Theistic Arguments[8] Comments
Dr. William Lane Craig is my favorite Christian apologist. I’ve read countless articles he has authored and several of his books, listened to virtually every debate he has participated in as well as his podcasts and Defenders lectures, and even read his weekly Q&A on reasonablefaith.org. I could rightly be called a Craigite, and yet I had never read his signature book, Reasonable Faith, which is now in its third edition.
I finally purchased the book and read through it with slobbering delight. I must confess that having followed Craig for so long, there wasn’t much in the book that I had not encountered before. But that is more of a personal commentary, and does nothing to detract from the wealth of information contained in this book.
Craig begins the book by answering the question, How can one know Christianity is true? After surveying what important past and present thinkers have to say on the matter, Craig adopts a Plantingian-based model in which we can know Christianity is true in virtue of the witness of the Spirit in our hearts. Craig makes an important distinction, however, between how we personally know Christianity to be true, and how we demonstrate to others the truth of Christianity. While the witness of the Holy Spirit is sufficient for the believer to be persuaded of the truth of Christianity, we demonstrate the truth of Christianity to unbelievers through evidence and rational argumentation.
October 19, 2012
Nothing is what is real?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Logic, Philosophy, Science, Thinking[3] Comments
New Scientist has a short video discussing the proper understanding of reality. It’s a 2:30 philosophical mess! It’s almost as bad as their video on how the universe came from nothing, but I won’t go there.
They present two definitions of reality. Their first definition is that “reality is everything that would still be here if there was no one around to experience it.” But they find this view problematic because “as far as we know, we humans actually do exist, and a lot of the things that we can all agree are real, like language, or war, or consciousness, wouldn’t exist without us.” What?
This objection is irrelevant. Yes, humans exist, but how does that count against this definition of reality? The definition doesn’t assume or require that people do not exist. It merely holds that some X is real if and only if X would still obtain in the absence of a mind to think about it. While it goes without saying that those things germane to humans would not exist if humans did not exist, what does that have to do with everything else non-human? The question is whether anything else would exist if we didn’t exist, not whether things unique to humans would exist if humans did not exist.
Thinking to Believe 