Back in March I authored a post titled “Omnipotence and Monotheism,” in which I argued that the divine property of omnipotence does not prove monotheism as I had once thought because power is not a substance, and thus need not be exhausted by a single being. Power is simply the ability to do some X. Omnipotence, then, is just the property of possessing the ability to do any and all things that are logically possible to do. It seemed logically possible to me that there could be more than one being who possessed the ability to do anything that is logically possible. The only logical grounds I could see for postulating monotheism was the principle of parsimony: no more than one God is needed to explain phenomena such as the origin of the universe, and thus there is no reason to postulate more than one divine being. Parsimony, however, does not make monotheism logically necessary.
With further dialogue on this topic in another forum, I believe I now have the logical grounds on which to conclude that monotheism is logically necessary, and ironically, it involves the divine property of omnipotence! Any being – if he possesses the property of omnipotence – must possess the ability to destroy other beings, and yet two omnipotent beings could not destroy each other. If omnipotent being A (OBA) cannot destroy omnipotent being B (OBB), then OBA lacks the power to do some X, and thus is not omnipotent after all. The same would be true of OBB, leaving us without a being that is truly omnipotent. And yet, if God is a metaphysically necessary being and omnipotence is a divine property, then omnipotence is a metaphysically necessary property. Since the property of omnipotence can only obtain in a world in which a single being possesses such a property, there can only be one divine being. While omnipotence does not prove monotheism in the manner I originally envisioned, omnipotence does make monotheism logically necessary.
As an interesting aside, I thought this argument would also provide a good argument against a Trinitarian view of God, and for a Unitarian view. I reasoned that if omnipotence requires the ability to destroy other beings, then the Father must be able to destroy the Son and Spirit (and the other two persons must be able to do likewise). If such was possible, then two of the persons in the Trinity must lack the divine property of omnipotence, and thus cannot be God. A participant in the forum, however, pointed out that since all persons of the Trinity share the same being, the Father could not destroy the Son or the Spirit without destroying His own being. Seeing that it is logically impossible for a metaphysically necessary being to destroy His own being, it would be logically impossible for the Father to destroy the Son/Spirit, the Son to destroy the Father/Spirit, or the Spirit to destroy the Father/Son. Omnipotence does not entail the ability to do the logically impossible, and thus the inability of the persons of the Trinity to destroy one another does not count against their deity, nor the logical possibility of a divine Trinity.
Thinking to Believe 
July 20, 2010 at 3:59 pm
Interesting article, but i thought, according to the Trinitarian doctrine, that the Son is suborinate to the Father and the Holy Spirit is subordinate to the Son. Doesn’t that imply that one divine person is greater than the other in some regard? Would they (Trinitarians) interpret “greater” in terms of authority ONLY or authority and power?
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July 20, 2010 at 9:54 pm
Although there are many variatians to the trinitarian concept of God, it is common to most that the Son is not subordinate to the Father, neither the Spirit to the Son, but rather, depending on who you listen to, the Son proceeds or is generated by/from the Father, and the Spirit from or through the Son, but also from the Father, unless you are Eastern Orthodox, which believes the Spirit proceeds from the Father only. So the question is one of procession, not subordination.
That being said, as far as suboridation goes, you have the kenosis idea from Philippians 2 which, according to the trinitarian view, indicates that the Son willingly emptied Himself of His divine perogative to become human, even though He was equal to God, and in His humanity, was and is subordinate to the Father. But the Son’s deity, as it were, is co-equal to the Father, likewise the deity of the Spirit co-equal to both, and vice versa.
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July 21, 2010 at 9:29 am
Aaron,
The trinnies I’ve read admit to a functional and not an ontological subordinationism.
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July 21, 2010 at 10:40 am
Jason wrote on another forum:
Similarly, Jason writes here:
In our previous discussion, I used a similar ancillary argument. I argued that it makes little sense asserting two or more beings have unlimited power if, in order to do anything, such a being would need the permission of all other beings. Once a causeless cause is identified, it makes little sense, as stated, to postulate additional beings.
However, I don’t yet see logical necessity here. If the inability of OBA to “destroy” OBB undermines omnipotence, then it appears the inability of OBA to destroy OBA undermines it as well. But if OBA remains O even if it cannot destroy itself, why doesn’t O hold if OBA cannot destroy OBB? If OBA cannot destroy OBA due to the necessity of OBA, then it appears to follow that OBA cannot destroy OBB for the same reason. The inability of an OB to commit a logical contradiction does not mitigate O. So it appears the inability to destroy another OB cannot count against O either. Monotheism, under this explanation, thus does not appear logically necessary.
Per our previous discussion, I think Identity of Indiscernibles (IDI) is the best “lay” defense for monotheism. I also think the classical argument for divine simplicity which uses IDI is superior to other models. However, that will take us off topic. 🙂
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July 21, 2010 at 11:49 am
“RandyE” wrote on the other forum,
As stated in my previous post, the inability of an OB to destroy itself does not count against O. However, RandyE makes no sense here. If the members of the Trinity are “separate” from each other, then they are separate “beings,” by definition. Perhaps the principle of charitable interpretation allows us to replace separate with distinct, but that makes his statement incoherent in another way.
How can an “indivisible” being be divisible by persons? Is God’s mind “divisible” from His being? If so, then God is either divisible or His mind isn’t God. Moreover, are there not then two Gods under his paradigm (God’s mind and God’s being)? Inaddition, s the mind of God divisible? If not, how are the persons of the Trinity distinguished? His affirmation either composes omniscience or it creates three Gods. If the former, the Trinity cannot be a necessary being; if the latter, well…one cannot be a monotheist.
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July 21, 2010 at 3:47 pm
This brings to mind the question of Jesus’ prayers. If, according to Trinitarian theology, Jesus is one of three – distinct, not separate – divine persons, how is it that He could become separate from them so as to be incarnated? Is it a “functional separation” but not an actual separation? And what does that mean? Or is it that all three persons became incarnated? If they were all incarnated, to whom was Jesus praying? Was He praying to the very deity residing in Himself? And how is this not ironic seeing that OPs are ridiculed for asserting God’s unipersonal nature in the face of Jesus’ prayers? The only response I’ve ever gotten when putting these questions forward was the “perichoresis” (yet another instance of extra-biblical terminology employed in an attempt to shore up questionable theology).
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July 21, 2010 at 7:09 pm
If omnipotent being A (OBA) cannot destroy omnipotent being B (OBB), then OBA lacks the power to do some X, and thus is not omnipotent after all. The same would be true of OBB, leaving us without a being that is truly omnipotent.
Why can’t OBA destroy OBB? Perhaps there are 17 omnipotent beings in our universe, each with the ability to destroy one another but which (so far) haven’t chosen to destroy each other? Perhaps there used to be 20 of them but three have been destroyed by the others?
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July 21, 2010 at 10:21 pm
“Aaron,
The trinnies I’ve read admit to a functional and not an ontological subordinationism.”
Yeah, functional, which relates back to the kenosis concept, which according to them, allows for the Son to be subordinate, or to function subordinately to the Father.
Ontologically subordinate? They say no. Functionally subordinate out of love and a willingness to become human and die for the sins of the world? They say yes.
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July 22, 2010 at 3:43 pm
Arthur, The situation you envision depends on the actualization (or lack of) of a certain power. You reason that so long as OBA chooses not to destroy OBB, OBC, etc., that OBA can be omnipotent. But what makes a being omnipotent is his ability to actualize every logical possibility if he so desires. But in the situation you envision, OBA could not destroy OBB et al if he so desired. He is only omnipotent in the sense that he is able to do all that he chooses to do, but that falls short of a full definition of omnipotence. Indeed, a being who cannot do X is not a being who has all power. Jason
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July 22, 2010 at 4:07 pm
Dale, The problem you raise isn’t specific to the incarnation. The same question can be raised regarding a pre-incarnate Son. How can there be multiple, distinct persons within a single being? If it can be shown that such is logically possible, then it would not be problematic to envision just one of those persons becoming incarnate. After all, he’s been distinct from the other two persons of the Trinity for all eternity. All that changes is the mode in which He carries out His own distinct acts: a human mode of existence. Jason
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July 22, 2010 at 4:09 pm
Jason,
You write “In the situation you envision, OBA could not destroy OBB et al if he so desired.”
No, in my scenario OBA could destroy OBB and vice versa but for some reason they haven’t done so.
I think you’re implying that an omnipotent being would have to be invulnerable and immortal. I don’t see why that would be the case. Perhaps OBA and OBB have the power to make themselves invulnerable and immortal, but they’ve chosen not to.
Arthur
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July 24, 2010 at 8:24 pm
Arthur,
I misunderstood your illustration. But I don’t think your “voluntary non-destruction” view will work either. A being who is omnipotent has the power to do all things, including the power to sustain his own being. So long as it is even possible for OBB to be destroyed by OBA, OBB cannot be omnipotent (and vice-versa).
If OBA could destroy OBB but simply chooses not to, then OBB is not omnipotent because he would lack the power to sustain his own being when it is attacked by another being. If OBB could also destroy OBA, then OBA could not be omnipotent either. To be omnipotent one must have the power to do anything power is able to do, should he desire to do it.
One could respond by saying OBA or OBB could choose to allow themselves to be destroyed. Perhaps they want to be annihilated by the other being. While such a response would evade the argument I presented above, it would fall on tough ground when we consider the other attributes of a divine being such as eternality. An eternal being cannot cease to exist, and thus OBA/OBB could not choose to be annihilated by the other.
Jason
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July 24, 2010 at 8:24 pm
Scalia,
I’m not ignoring you. I’m just backed up a million miles right now and your comments require some more thought on my part.
Jason
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July 25, 2010 at 3:37 pm
Jason,
You write:
If OBA could destroy OBB but simply chooses not to, then OBB is not omnipotent because he would lack the power to sustain his own being when it is attacked by another being… One could respond by saying OBA or OBB could choose to allow themselves to be destroyed. Perhaps they want to be annihilated by the other being.
It’s not so much that they choose to allow themselves to be destroyed, but that they don’t make the choice to make themselves invulnerable if they started out mortal and vulnerable. (Something like the genie in the lamp, able to do anything magically but never using its magic to release itself from the lamp.)
I think my argument parallels the argument that God doesn’t send people to Hell, they send themselves to Hell and a good, moral God just chooses to not stop them. The two are possible but equally preposterous.
Arthur
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July 27, 2010 at 12:13 pm
Arthur,
I’m not following your last comment. Could you elaborate?
The issue is not about choice, but logical possibility. If it is logically possible for OBA to destroy OBB, then OBB lacks the power to sustain his own being and cannot be omnipotent. Omnipotence is something that either 1 being has, or no beings have. If one accepts the ontological argument as sound, then 1 being has the property of omnipotence.
Jason
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February 16, 2011 at 2:37 pm
Scalia,
Sometimes it may take me 7 months to respond, but if I say I will…then I will. I finally got back to this topic and I’ve given your points some more consideration. I am inclined to agree with you that “if OBA cannot destroy OBA due to the necessity of OBA, then it appears to follow that OBA cannot destroy OBB for the same reason. The inability of an OB to commit a logical contradiction does not mitigate O. So it appears the inability to destroy another OB cannot count against O either.”
If it is impossible for an eternal, metaphysically necessary being to cease to exist—and it is—then it would be just as logically impossible for OBA to destroy OBB as it would be for OBA to destroy himself seeing that both are metaphysically necessary beings. Thus, the inability of OBA to destroy OBB and vice-versa does not count against either’s omnipotence, and my newfound proof for monotheism fails! So disappointing!
Perhaps the problem with the existence of more than one OB is with volition, as you suggested when you said “in order to do anything, such a being would need the permission of all other beings.” If OBA wanted to exercise his power to instantiate X, OBB and any other OBs in existence would also have to will that X obtains in the actual world. If OBB did not want OBA to exercise his power such that X obtains, then OBA would be forced to choose between instantiating X against OBB’s will, or not instantiating X. If OBA chooses to instantiate X and succeeds in doing so, then OBB must not be capable of actualizing any logical possibility he chooses (because he desired a world in which –X obtains, and yet X obtained anyway), and thus OBB is not omnipotent. If OBA chooses to instantiate X but is prevented from doing so due to a counter-exercise of OBB’s power, then OBA is not omnipotent. Even if OBA chooses not to exercise his power to instantiate X so as to avoid a conflict with OBB, then OBA is not omnipotent since his desire to do X was constrained by the power of OBB. It is impossible to have more than one free, omnipotent being.
I am exploring two other potential arguments for monotheism as well. One is based on God’s aseity (self-existence), while the other is based on God’s ontological necessity. First I’ll spell out the argument from aseity.
According to theism, God is self-existent. He does not derive His being from an external source, but has being in himself. Since being is something one either has or does not have, being is indivisible (while there are an infinite number of forms in which being is expressed, being itself is singular). If being is indivisible, then only one entity can have being in itself. If there were two OBs, one of them would have being in himself while the other would depend on the first for his being. Any entity whose being is derived from an external source cannot be God, and thus if OBB’s existence is dependent on OBA, for example, OBB cannot be God.
Perhaps we could envision a scenario in which both OBA and OBB are mutually dependent on the other for existence. This only makes the problem worse because if both OBA and OBB depend on an external source for their being, then neither is God! Thus, we conclude that “there cannot be two ontologically necessary beings who are mutually interdependent for their existence.” It’s simply not possible for there to be two self-existing beings, so if aseity is essential to divine nature, then there can only be one God.
The second argument is based on God’s ontological necessity. If God has being in Himself, then anything that exists that is non-identical to God must derive its being from God (God is the source of all being). If there were two gods—OBA and OBB—and both were sources of being, it would be possible for something to exist that derives its existence from OBA but not OBB. Since ontological necessity requires that one be the source of all being, however, OBB would not be ontologically necessary, and thus would not be God.
What if OBA and OBB caused all contingent beings to come into being through mutual acts of power? This might circumvent my argument, but then we would have to ask why we should think there are, in fact, two beings rather than one. The law of the indiscernability of identicals states that if all the properties of X are identical to Y, then X is Y. If the will and acts of OBA are always indiscernible from the will and acts of OBB, then OBB is identical to OBA. Either way, the rational evidence points to the existence of only one God.
What do you think of these two arguments?
Jason
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February 16, 2011 at 2:54 pm
[…] at offering a rational argument for monotheism. The first one failed, and Scalia challenged my second one. I did not respond to his challenge immediately because I knew it would require some […]
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February 16, 2011 at 2:54 pm
[…] the previous post, you might be interested in checking out the comments section again for my response to Scalia’s objection, and my new proposals. Hopefully you can weigh in on their strengths and […]
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February 16, 2011 at 2:54 pm
[…] you might be interested in checking out the comments section again for my response to Scalia’s objection, and my new proposals. Hopefully you can weigh in on their strengths and weaknesses. If they […]
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February 20, 2011 at 11:44 am
Omnipotence entails the ability to exist outside of space-time. You can’t quantify over something outside of space-time. Therefore, either monotheism is true, omnipotence is false, or omnipotence doesn’t entail the ability to exist outside of space-time.
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February 23, 2011 at 7:15 am
Dparker83,
I’ve never heard anyone define omnipotence in such a fashion before. While it may be necessary for a divine being to exist outside of space and time, omnipotence itself does not entail this.
Jason
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February 23, 2011 at 7:19 am
You don’t think perfect power intuitively places one outside of space-time? How could one have power to create space-time, a modest requirement for perfect power?
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February 23, 2011 at 1:31 pm
David Parker,
That is a separate question from the definition of omnipotence. Omnipotence has traditionally been defined as the power to do anything that is logically possible to do. While it may be that this definition requires God to exist transcendent to time and space, that would be an implication of omnipotence rather than part of the definition itself.
As for your question, however, no, I don’t think that is necessary. One could be a theist and claim that God Himself is both spatial and temporal, but that His spatiality and temporality are infinite in extent. I’m not saying that is my view, but it is a coherent claim at least, which shows that omnipotence does not demand a certain view about God’s relationship to time and space.
So how could God create space-time if He Himself is spatial and temporal? If I’m not mistaken, Isaac Newton adopted a viewpoint similar to the one mentioned above, in which he distinguished between absolute/metaphysical time and physical time. He would say absolute/metaphysical time/space have always existed because they are part of God’s nature. What hasn’t always existed, and what God brought into being is physical time/space. God transcends physical time/space, but not metaphysical time/space. Again, that’s not my view, but it’s coherent.
Jason
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February 23, 2011 at 6:06 pm
If it is logically possible to exist outside of space-time, then omnipotence entails that ability. You appear to be confused about what an entailment statement is…I’ve never said that omnipotence is defined as such, only that is entails such.
One could be a theist and think that an actually infinite collection of space and time exists? That seems rather implausible…it would destroy the cosmological argument for one. And two, it would mean destroy the doctrine of divine simplicity. So no, I disagree…a theist who thinks God is infinitely everlasting has serious problems.
Isaac Newton’s metaphysics are interesting, but remember I am only making an argument for monotheism that assumes some reasonable theistic background beliefs.
All you’ve done so far is point out a bunch of odd and implausible theistic beliefs….do you think the argument works aside from that?
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February 24, 2011 at 12:11 pm
Hi, Jason. My reply is a little late due to an extremely hectic schedule. Here goes:
You write,
Yes, I agree with this.
I have attempted to avoid our disagreement over the nature of God, but it appears I can do so no longer. If a being is indivisible, it is by definition simple. Anything divisible is composed, but no composition can exist in an indivisible being. A composed being is ontologically posterior to its parts and is thus dependent upon its parts for its existence. Such a being cannot be God by definition. Each component would either have being in itself (as a simple being — in which case we have polytheism) or a component’s omni-attributes are contingent upon the other components. Both options are incoherent given theism. The former both momentarily defers the question and asserts polytheism, and the latter implodes because the sum of dependent parts is dependent by definition.
You write,
Although I agree with these statements, I think it needs to be made clear that you are perhaps tying dependence and freedom together. You mentioned this earlier, but you break the flow of your argument by adding that you are exploring “two other potential arguments for monotheism.” A questioner may wonder why one independent being need be dependent upon another independent being. You do not explicitly state why one being is dependent upon the other. One way to demonstrate that is to point out that nothing could be done by one without the consent of the other, thus dependence is entailed by definition.
You tie your second argument to the identity of indiscernibles and, as stated before, I agree with this. One being cannot be necessary in a way the other is not, else we equivocate. A being lacking necessity cannot be necessary. Two beings possessing necessity are indiscernible and are thus identical.
Brian Leftow puts it nicely,
“There can be at most one God. For suppose that there are two simple beings, A and B. A and B must differ in some attribute, else they would be identical. So suppose that A and B differ in that A has and B lacks an attribute F. If F is the attribute of being simple, then if A and B are both simple, both A and B have it. But A and B differ in F. So F is not being simple. But then if A has F, A has two distinct attributes, F and being simple. Whatever has two distinct attributes is not simple; all of a simple being’s attributes are identical, as all are identical with the simple being itself. Hence if A has F, A is not simple. So only B is simple. Thus there can be at most one simple being. So given (N) [his earlier argument that, necessarily, whatever is God is simple] there can be at most one God: divine simplicity guarantees monotheism.”
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February 19, 2012 at 2:56 am
Scalia,
Nearly one year later and I am finally getting back to this topic. I had been putting it off because I had planned to restudy the issue of divine simplicity…but alas I never got around to it. But I do want to respond before the official 1 year mark, and I’ve resolved to just do so by consulting the top of my head. Let’s see where it leads. Perhaps it will lead to me eventually having to crack some books on this subject again.
The argument you have given for simplicity is a good argument when discussing material objects, but I don’s find it persuasive when dealing with the immaterial. Sure, my pizza is divisible into separate parts: dough, cheese, pepperoni. As such, my pizza is ontologically posterior to its parts and depends on those parts to exist as a pizza. But I see no reason to think that if we admit omnipotence is not identical to omniscience is not identical to love is not identical to aseity, is not identical to God’s being, that we must think God is composed of parts and thus depends on something else for His existence (a logically prior Assembler of those parts). Why? Because I see no reason to think that immaterial substances are anything other than basic substances that are indivisible by nature. There are no immaterial parts that could be or need to be assembled. Properties/attributes such as intelligence, goodness, and love are not like dough, cheese, and pepperoni. It’s not as if one can construct different kinds of spiritual substances by mixing and matching spiritual components as if spirits were some kind of Mr. Potato head. Immaterial substances qua immaterial substances are simple (by which I mean not reducible to a simpler form), even though we can make a distinction between various properties or functions of that spiritual substance. Something that is not composed of parts is not divisible. Perhaps an analogy might be helpful here. While a real pizza is reducible to a simpler form because I can remove the pepperoni and cheese, a picture of a pizza is not. Try as you may, but you’ll never be able to remove the pepperoni from a picture of a pizza. It is not reducible to a simpler form, and yet that does not mean you conclude that there is no distinction between the pepperoni and the cheese. I see God like the picture of the pizza. It is clear that there are distinct attributes of God, but that does not mean that God is reducible to a simpler form.
Thinking of immaterial beings as being composed of parts seems to me to impose material conceptions on immaterial reality, which is a category mistake. God is not a physical being composed of parts. We can distinguish particular properties within that indivisible substance without thinking that each property is a distinct part that constitutes God, and making God contingent on the assemblage of those parts.
It makes more sense to me to admit that spiritual substances are irreducible (what I would also call “simple”) by nature than it does to say that spiritual substances have no distinct properties. I just don’t see how one can truly believe there is no difference between omnipotence and love. It’s obvious that they are different. If they were all the same, then to explain to someone what it means to say God has being should also convey the fact that God is love, justice, omniscient, etc. That’s not the case, because those characteristics are not identical to “being.”
Jason
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March 8, 2012 at 12:18 pm
Hi, Jason. Sorry for the delayed reply. I’ve been swamped with myriad projects. Thanks for revisiting this topic. I would have preferred to read a reply after the completion of your “restudy” of simplicity, but here goes…
You write,
That is due to how classical theologians view reality. Your implied view of “property” is seen as an automatic affirmation of God’s composition. My comment about God’s simplicity (DS) was a reaction to your affirmation that God is indivisible. An indivisible being is simple by definition. The fact that we distinguish omnipotence from omniscience, love, etc., has no bearing on DS if we affirm an indivisible God. Saying “omnipotence is not identical to omniscience,” according to classical theology, defaults to composition unless you are describing the distinction analogously. You need to flesh out exactly what you mean when you say one is not the other. Is God an instantiation of the property omniscience? does He generate omniscience? or IS He omniscient? What is omniscience in relation to God’s spirit? Many non-classical theologians describe God’s attributes in a manner we think un-Gods God. Since God is a se, He does not depend upon anything for His existence. Everything distinct from God is contingent upon divine creation and conservation. So, it appears that to deny DS is to either affirm God created His properties or they are independent of God. Theism doesn’t work in either case.
Your objection here parallels most of the “street” objections to DS (in my experience). Since many things can be true of the same object, it is difficult at this point to know where you are going with that objection. It appears you are arguing that love and goodness, being distinct, do not make God complex. Again, that depends on how you define “property.”
On the other hand, if you say distinct properties count against DS, that objection has heft only if we understand those terms univocally (properties exist independently as self-contained entities). That is precisely what is rejected by proponents of DS. As Aquinas writes, “In God the absolute and the relative do not differ really, but only logically” (On the Power of God, 7:1). In other words, God is love and God is good by virtue of His mode of being. Our conceptions of His attributes are distinct, but they are not distinct in Him. Hence, the description of His attributes is understood analogically, not univocally. It appears the only rejoinder is to affirm a Platonic realist sense of properties (properties exist as genuine universals). There are obvious problems with this view, but I’ll suspend further argumentation along this line lest I rebut a position you do not hold.
Recall also we are discussing a logical proof for monotheism. IDI demonstrates monotheism for there is no way one can differentiate identical beings. Differentiation entails composition. What makes God, God? The Divine substance is by definition perfectly divine–it cannot be otherwise. It is therefore absurd to posit another divine being because one would have to differ from the other. They cannot differ in what is identical, so they would have to differ in what is not. However, a perfect being cannot fail to be everything a perfect being is. Hence, differentiation must be in some imperfection; but a being that possesses an imperfection cannot be God. And if a being is both perfect and imperfect, such a being is (again, by definition) composed. Consequently, there can be only one infinitely perfect being.
But that is precisely what many theologians do when describing God (e.g. God is a family of three separate persons). Remember: I deny there can be any composition in God. If “God” is a “family” (corporation, club, etc.), then by definition God is composed of “parts” (something akin to the angelic host).
You appear to deny the possibility of a composed immaterial being. You do of course understand that many theist philosophers believe in metaphysical “parts” like form and matter, substance and accidents, essence and existence. They deny the essence of God is compound in any way (which makes Him unique among existents). This follows from the Five Ways elucidated by Aquinas. It is the metaphysically necessary stopping point of creation. If immaterial beings can be composed, then my objection stands: The composite is logically posterior to its components.
But given the axioms of classical theology, the assertion all spiritual substances are absolutely “simple” makes no sense at all. A truly simple being is God by definition. The assertion there can be more than one is seen as a metaphysical impossibility.
I think I understand your “makes more sense” approach, but the fact many theologians have no difficulty making sense of DS should prompt you to investigate it a little further. Perhaps we can flesh this out as this conversation develops.
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July 20, 2014 at 6:27 pm
Logical proof of Monotheism & the Holographic Universe explained.
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The Universe is a 2 dimensional Hologram with an additional 1 dimension of time and is controlled by a Quantum Computer.
Physicists find Black holes do not Eat matter, rather all matter from the beginning of time remains on the Event Horizon (black surface). Protons can be both a Wave or a Particle but depends on observation, this leads to conclusion the Universe is a Quantum Computer. Observation of atoms shows subatomic particles come into and out of our Universe, this leads to understanding that another Universe exists in a lower dimension where all gravity originates. Humans interaction in this Hologram Universe is from Chemical Causality and Thermodynamics. Physicists understand Time is linear and Time travel is possible.
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Having a dull day? Spare a thought for the Universe – it just found out that to outsiders it always looks the one colour … and that colour’s beige! By Karl S. Kruszelnicki *Checkout online.
Note: Erwin Schrodinger who mathematically proved that there is no separation, and everything is in the same space and time, it just appears far away. (12 August 1887 – 4 January 1961) Awards: Nobel Prize in Physics, Max Planck Medal.
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Scientists Confirm That Reality is an Illusion Our 3D Universe Is a Hologram (the size of a green pea). – YouTube
On Jan. 17, 2000 at 2pm, while crossing a river bridge in Burswood on my bicycle, I observed a velvet textured beige pearl covering the sun. Within the entity there were containers in the shape of elongated, seven-pointed Koch snowflake fractal crystals seven times the length of the width of the diameter, immersed in a white misty light traveling in a ten o’clock direction. I later deduced that the light flashes on the inner space of the crystals were a binary language conversion pertaining to the senses of all mortals, that is, a holographic universe.
The following day, I imparted this observation to the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights, Dr. Mary Robinson and the Hon. Justice Michael Kirby AC CMG of the High Court of Australia.
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Theos – The Supreme Good
Time must exist before matter can be created and only an animate entity can conceive of space-time; time must be a stabilized and uniform condition before matter can form, thus monotheism is a Truth.
The universe consists of space-time, which is functionally active, stable and growing; and these characteristics combined are indicative of a living entity, thus Pantheism is a reality. As a consequence, all mortals’ behaviours and attitudes become conspicuous by our Creator.
If all electrical particles were in different time zones, matter would not form, thus, time is controlled electromagnetic radiation (energy) E = mc2 To be perfect, one must know the past, present and future; there is only one, the one that created time.
The atheists and agnostics presumptions are nothing less than nonsense.
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