In the latest edition of Philosophia Christi, the Evangelical Philosophical Society’s journal, philosopher Stephen C. Dilley wrote a really nice article titled “Philosophical Naturalism and Methodological Naturalism: Strange Bedfellows?” in which he argued that philosophical naturalists should dispense with the principle of methodological naturalism in science.

For those of you who may be unfamiliar with these terms, philosophical naturalism (PN) is the view that only physical things exist, while methodological naturalism (MN) is the view that we must restrict our method of scientific inquiry to naturalistic processes.  MN does not require one to presuppose the truth of PN, but it does require that one investigate the natural world as if God does not exist, or if He does, as if He has no causal relationship to the natural world.  According to MN, for an explanation to be considered “scientific” it must be naturalistic; i.e. it must appeal to naturalistic entities and processes.

Dilley argues that philosophical naturalists should reject MN as the defining principle of science because, strangely enough, it prevents them from appealing to science to demonstrate the epistemic superiority of their philosophical view over theism.  How so?  By eliminating the competition.  Theistic theories are dismissed a priori as unscientific.  Only naturalistic explanations are allowed.  If the only competitor to PN—theism—is prevented from competing in the game of science by definitional fiat, then PN wins by default rather than merit.  What if a theistic explanation has greater explanatory power and explanatory scope than a naturalistic theory?  It doesn’t matter.  A naturalistic explanation will always be the considered the best “scientific” explanation simply in virtue of it being naturalistic—not necessarily because it is an adequate explanation, or the best explanation.  So not only does MN set PN above critique and falsification, but it also forces one to accept inferior explanations as the best scientific explanations.

If only one team is allowed to compete in the game of science, it should be no surprise if that team wins every tournament.  By defining science in terms of MN, PN ensures itself endless victories, but such victories are worth little.  Only if theistic explanations are allowed to compete head-to-head against naturalistic theories could philosophical naturalism be confirmed or disconfirmed.  Until then, science cannot be appealed to in support of philosophical naturalism and against theism.