Oneness Pentecostals believe God is one in both essence and person, and that Jesus is the incarnation of this single divine person. On this view, the deity of Jesus is numerically and personally identical to the deity of the Father. The Father and Son differ, not in their person, but in their mode of existence.
A common Trinitarian objection to Oneness theology is that it entails the idea that the Father suffered, and even died on the cross. The ancients called this view “Patripassianism” (Latin for “the Father suffers”) and deemed it heretical. But why?
It is to be expected that Trinitarians would object to the claim that the Father suffered in Christ since they believe God is three persons, of whom only the second (God the Son) became incarnate. The Trinitarian objection to Patripassianism, however, was not limited to the identity of the one who experienced the suffering, but extended to the very metaphysical possibility of the Father experiencing suffering. On their view, it was more than just a factual/historical error to think God the Father was the divine person who experienced suffering in Christ; it was metaphysically impossible for Him to do so. Only God the Son was capable of such.
Arguably, the notion that the Son is, but the Father is not passable was derived from Greek philosophy rather than Scripture. Even Trinitarian theologian Millard Erickson recognized this, noting that “it may well be that the chief reason for the repudiation of patripassianism was not its conflict with the biblical revelation, but with the Greek philosophical conception of impassibility.”[1] In the popular Greek philosophy of the day, neo-Platonism, there was thought to be one ultimate Deity (“the One”) from whom emanated numerous lower deities. The nature of the ultimate deity was perfect, and one of those perfections was the impossibility of experiencing suffering. In their adoption of divine impassibility, Trinitarians did not apply it to God’s nature as we might expect, but specifically to one of the divine persons: God the Father.
This move is significant because it reveals the tendency of these theologians to see God the Father in some sense as “more god” than the other two persons, despite their claim that the three persons are co-equal. God the Father was often spoken of in terms that implied His superiority to God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. God the Father was the ultimate deity – the Source – while God the Son and God the Holy Spirit were derivative[2] of the Father (which is why God the Son is capable of experiencing suffering). Here I have in mind the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. This is reflected in the writings of the Fathers as well as in the catholic creeds. Athanasius wrote, “The Son has His being not of Himself but of the Father”.[3] Likewise Hilary says of the Son, “He is not the source of His own being. … It is from His [Father’s] abiding nature that the Son draws His existence through birth.”[4] Finally, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed describes the Son as derivative of the Father when it speaks of Him as being “begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God.” I agree with Trinitarian philosopher William Lane Craig’s assessment of this theological viewpoint: “This doctrine of the generation of the Logos from the Father cannot, despite assurances to the contrary, but diminish the status of the Son because He becomes an effect contingent upon the Father. Even if this eternal procession takes place necessarily and apart from the Father’s will, the Son is less than the Father because the Father alone exists a se, whereas the Son exists through another (ab alio).”[5]
Despite the theological difficulties involved in applying the property of impassibility to the Father alone, this move was necessary if the church wished to consistently affirm the following propositions: (1) God is impassible; (2) Jesus is a single person; (3) Jesus experienced suffering. Trinitarians recognized that if the property of impassibility belonged to God’s nature, the property would apply to all three persons in virtue of their shared participation in the divine nature. That would render Jesus incapable of experiencing suffering, and yet Scripture is clear that He did experience suffering. One way of solving this problem would be to affirm two persons in Christ—one divine and one human—of whom only the human person experienced the suffering. This was unacceptable, however, because it split Christ in two. The only way to affirm the singularity of Christ’s person, the reality of Jesus’ suffering, and the impassibility of God was to apply the property of divine passibility to the Father alone.
While the church fathers limited the property of impeccability to the Father to solve a theological conundrum, arguably, if impeccability applied to God at all it would apply to His nature since natures are composites of properties that define what kind of thing a substance is. As previously noted, this would render Jesus incapable of experiencing suffering and death. Given the lack of Biblical justification for the doctrine of divine impassibility, as well as the theological and philosophical problems associated with claiming the Father is but the Son is not impassible, it is best to jettison divine impassibility as an argument against Oneness theology.
While I think these considerations exonerate Patripassianism of heresy prima facie, the question remains as to whether Oneness adherents should confess that the Father suffered and died on the cross. The answer to this question is partially entailed in the answer to another, namely, who was the subject of Christ’s suffering and death? To whom did that experience belong?
Many would identify Jesus’ human nature as the subject of suffering and death, but this cannot be. Natures are just a set of properties that demarcate what kind of thing something is. Natures are not conscious, do not think, and do not act. In short, they do not experience anything. They are objects, not subjects. Only persons are subjects, capable of conscious experience. It should be obvious that death is an experience. If experiences belong to persons, and death is an experience, then who experienced the suffering and death of the cross? If Jesus is a single person, and if we believe the divine person became incarnate, then it follows that the person who experienced the suffering and death of the cross is none other than God Himself.[6]
Some will object, “God cannot die! He is an eternal being, and the nature of eternal beings is such that they neither come into nor go out of existence.” But this objection falsely presumes that death is the cessation of existence. The Biblical portrayal of death is the separation of the spirit from the body, not the cessation of existence. When you die, you will not cease to exist. You (your spirit) will continue to exist, but in a disembodied state. And that experience—the separation of your spirit from your body—is one that you will experience. The same is true of the divine person in Christ. God experienced a separation of His spirit from His body, and thus it is entirely appropriate to ascribe the experience of death to God. In Christ, God experienced the suffering and death of the cross. That is why Luke could write that God purchased the church with His own blood (Acts 20:28).
Having established that the divine person experienced suffering and death, would it be just as appropriate to say the “Father” suffered and died on the cross as it is to say the “Son” or “Jesus” suffered and died on the cross? After all, according to Oneness theology the divine person in Jesus is numerically and personally identical to the Father. If Jesus suffered and died, in virtue of His ontological identity with the Father, wouldn’t it be accurate to say the Father suffered and died as well? No, for two reasons. First, this falsely assumes that because the person who is Father is the same person who is Son, both Father and Son share the same conscious experiences. Such is not the case. Let me explain.
God became man by bringing human nature into union with His person. The properties of that nature allow God to function as a human in every way, including psychological functioning. In Jesus, then, God is conscious of Himself as man in a truly human way, and yet because God continues to exist beyond the incarnation (and because He retained His divine nature) He continues to be conscious of Himself as God as well. So we have a unique situation in which a single person is conscious of Himself in two distinct ways simultaneously, in two distinct modes of existence. As Father, the single person is conscious of Himself as God, and as Son, the same divine person is conscious of Himself as man. A distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in experience as well. As Father, YHWH experiences everything in a divine way via His divine nature; as Son, YHWH experiences everything in a human way via His human nature. While YHWH is the subject of both modes of consciousness—and hence both modes of experience—because death is a human experience, YHWH only experienced suffering and death in and through His human mode of existence as Son.
The second reason we should not say the Father suffered and died is because this is a misuse of Biblical terminology. Scripture uses the appellation “Son” to designate YHWH’s human mode of existence, and “Father” to designate YHWH’s cosmic mode of existence. Since “Father” has no reference to the incarnation, it is misleading to employ that appellation in connection with the suffering and death of God incarnate. Is the divine person in Christ the same person as the Father? Yes, but that does not warrant using Biblical terms in unbiblical ways. Given the modal distinction between Father and Son, it is more appropriate to describe the death of God incarnate by saying “Jesus” or “the Son” suffered and died on the cross since these appellations refer to God’s human existence.
[1]Millard J. Erickson, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 335.
[2]They did not understand “source” and “derivation” in a temporal sense, but in a logical and metaphysical sense.
[3]Athanasius On the Opinion of Dionysius 15.
[4]On the Trinity 9.53; 6.14.
[5]William Lane Craig, “A Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity”; excerpted from chapter 29 of Philosophical Foundation of a Christian Worldview (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003); available from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5909; accessed 10 January 2010.
[6]While natures are not capable of conscious experience, persons utilize the properties inherent in their nature to experience reality. Natures define the kind of experiences persons are capable of. In Christ, God utilized the properties of His human nature to experience the physical world in a human way, including death. God experienced death through His human nature.
Oneness Pentecostals believe God is one in both essence and person, and that Jesus is the incarnation of this single divine person. On this view, the deity of Jesus is numerically and personally identical to the deity of the Father. The Father and Son differ, not in their person, but in their mode of existence.
A common Trinitarian objection to Oneness theology is that it entails the idea that the Father suffered, and even died on the cross. The ancients called this view “Patripassianism” (Latin for “the Father suffers”) and deemed it heretical. But why?
It is to be expected that Trinitarians would object to the claim that the Father suffered in Christ since they believe God is three persons, of whom only the second (God the Son) became incarnate. The Trinitarian objection to Patripassianism, however, was not limited to the identity of the one who experienced the suffering, but extended to the very metaphysical possibility of the Father experiencing suffering. On their view, it was more than just a factual/historical error to think God the Father was the divine person who experienced suffering in Christ; it was metaphysically impossible for Him to do so. Only God the Son was capable of such.
Arguably, the notion that the Son is, but the Father is not passable was derived from Greek philosophy rather than Scripture. Even Trinitarian theologian Millard Erickson recognized this, noting that “it may well be that the chief reason for the repudiation of patripassianism was not its conflict with the biblical revelation, but with the Greek philosophical conception of impassiblity.”[1] In the popular Greek philosophy of the day, neo-Platonism, there was thought to be one ultimate Deity (“the One”) from whom emanated numerous lower deities. The nature of the ultimate deity was perfect, and one of those perfections was the impossibility of experiencing suffering. In their adoption of divine impassibility, Trinitarians did not apply it to God’s nature as we might expect, but specifically to one of the divine persons: God the Father.
This move is significant because it reveals the tendency of these theologians to see God the Father in some sense as “more god” than the other two persons, despite their claim that the three persons are co-equal. God the Father was often spoken of in terms that implied His superiority to God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. God the Father was the ultimate deity – the Source – while God the Son and God the Holy Spirit were derivative[2] of the Father (which is why God the Son is capable of experiencing suffering). Here I have in mind the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. This is reflected in the writings of the Fathers as well as in the catholic creeds. Athanasius wrote, “The Son has His being not of Himself but of the Father”.[3] Likewise Hilary says of the Son, “He is not the source of His own being. … It is from His [Father’s] abiding nature that the Son draws His existence through birth.”[4] Finally, the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed describes the Son as derivative of the Father when it speaks of Him as being “begotten of the Father before all worlds, Light of Light, very God of very God.” I agree with Trinitarian philosopher William Lane Craig’s assessment of this theological viewpoint: “This doctrine of the generation of the Logos from the Father cannot, despite assurances to the contrary, but diminish the status of the Son because He becomes an effect contingent upon the Father. Even if this eternal procession takes place necessarily and apart from the Father’s will, the Son is less than the Father because the Father alone exists a se, whereas the Son exists through another (ab alio).”[5]
Despite the theological difficulties involved in applying the property of impassibility to the Father alone, this move was necessary if the church wished to consistently affirm the following propositions: (1) God is impassible; (2) Jesus is a single person; (3) Jesus experienced suffering. Trinitarians recognized that if the property of impassibility belonged to God’s nature, the property would apply to all three persons in virtue of their shared participation in the divine nature. That would render Jesus incapable of experiencing suffering, and yet Scripture is clear that He did experience suffering. One way of solving this problem would be to affirm two persons in Christ—one divine and one human—of whom only the human person experienced the suffering. This was unacceptable, however, because it split Christ in two. The only way to affirm the singularity of Christ’s person, the reality of Jesus’ suffering, and the impassibility of God was to apply the property of divine passibility to the Father alone.
While the church fathers limited the property of impeccability to the Father to solve a theological conundrum, arguably, if impeccability applied to God at all it would apply to His nature since natures are composites of properties that define what kind of thing a substance is. As previously noted, this would render Jesus incapable of experiencing suffering and death. Given the lack of Biblical justification for the doctrine of divine impassibility, as well as the theological and philosophical problems associated with claiming the Father is but the Son is not impassible, it is best to jettison divine impassibility as an argument against Oneness theology.
While I think these considerations exonerate Patripassianism of heresy prima facie, the question remains as to whether Oneness adherents should confess that the Father suffered and died on the cross. The answer to this question is partially entailed in the answer to another, namely, who was the subject of Christ’s suffering and death? To whom did that experience belong?
Many would identify Jesus’ human nature as the subject of suffering and death, but this cannot be. Natures are just a set of properties that demarcate what kind of thing something is. Natures are not conscious, do not think, and do not act. In short, they do not experience anything. They are objects, not subjects. Only persons are subjects, capable of conscious experience. It should be obvious that death is an experience. If experiences belong to persons, and death is an experience, then who experienced the suffering and death of the cross? If Jesus is a single person, and if we believe the divine person became incarnate, then it follows that the person who experienced the suffering and death of the cross is none other than God Himself.[6]
Some will object, “God cannot die! He is an eternal being, and the nature of eternal beings is such that they neither come into nor go out of existence.” But this objection falsely presumes that death is the cessation of existence. The Biblical portrayal of death is the separation of the spirit from the body, not the cessation of existence. When you die, you will not cease to exist. You (your spirit) will continue to exist, but in a disembodied state. And that experience—the separation of your spirit from your body—is one that you will experience. The same is true of the divine person in Christ. God experienced a separation of His spirit from His body, and thus it is entirely appropriate to ascribe the experience of death to God. In Christ, God experienced the suffering and death of the cross. That is why Luke could write that God purchased the church with His own blood (Acts 20:28).
Having established that the divine person experienced suffering and death, would it be just as appropriate to say the “Father” suffered and died on the cross as it is to say the “Son” or “Jesus” suffered and died on the cross? After all, according to Oneness theology the divine person in Jesus is numerically and personally identical to the Father. If Jesus suffered and died, in virtue of His ontological identity with the Father, wouldn’t it be accurate to say the Father suffered and died as well? No, for two reasons. First, this falsely assumes that because the person who is Father is the same person who is Son, both Father and Son share the same conscious experiences. Such is not the case. Let me explain.
God became man by bringing human nature into union with His person. The properties of that nature allow God to function as a human in every way, including psychological functioning. In Jesus, then, God is conscious of Himself as man in a truly human way, and yet because God continues to exist beyond the incarnation (and because He retained His divine nature) He continues to be conscious of Himself as God as well. So we have a unique situation in which a single person is conscious of Himself in two distinct ways simultaneously, in two distinct modes of existence. As Father, the single person is conscious of Himself as God, and as Son, the same divine person is conscious of Himself as man. A distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in experience as well. As Father, YHWH experiences everything in a divine way via His divine nature; as Son, YHWH experiences everything in a human way via His human nature. While YHWH is the subject of both modes of consciousness—and hence both modes of experience—because death is a human experience, YHWH only experienced suffering and death in and through His human mode of existence as Son.
The second reason we should not say the Father suffered and died is because this is a misuse of Biblical terminology. Scripture uses the appellation “Son” to designate YHWH’s human mode of existence, and “Father” to designate YHWH’s cosmic mode of existence. Since “Father” has no reference to the incarnation, it is misleading to employ that appellation in connection with the suffering and death of God incarnate. Is the divine person in Christ the same person as the Father? Yes, but that does not warrant using Biblical terms in unbiblical ways. Given the modal distinction between Father and Son, it is more appropriate to describe the death of God incarnate by saying “Jesus” or “the Son” suffered and died on the cross since these appellations refer to God’s human existence.
[1]Millard J. Erickson, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 335.
[2]They did not understand “source” and “derivation” in a temporal sense, but in a logical and metaphysical sense.
[3] Athanasius On the Opinion of Dionysius 15.
[4] On the Trinity 9.53; 6.14.
[5]William Lane Craig, “A Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of the Trinity”; excerpted from chapter 29 of Philosophical Foundation of a Christian Worldview (Downer’s Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003); available from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5909; accessed 10 January 2010.
[6]While natures are not capable of conscious experience, persons utilize the properties inherent in their nature to experience reality. Natures define the kind of experiences persons are capable of. In Christ, God utilized the properties of His human nature to experience the physical world in a human way, including death. God experienced death through His human nature.
Thinking to Believe 
January 24, 2011 at 8:06 am
Jason, great post. Thanks for posting your thoughts. This has always been an intriguing discussion for me. Reflection on this subject is moving and satisfying for me existentially as well.
What of Moltmann or Brueggeman, who are Trinitarians, and believe the Father suffered via the death of the Son? I think both of their views, then, would reflect God as passable, and as Brueggeman says, “impinged upon” with us in relationship.
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January 24, 2011 at 8:13 am
“A distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in experience as well.”
It also necessitates a distinction in person. As you stated earlier, “Only persons are subjects, capable of conscious experience.” The Bible repeatedly makes a subject-object distinction between the Father and the Son, as well as between the Father and the Holy Spirit and between the Son and the Holy Spirit.
“As Father, YHWH experiences everything in a divine way via His divine nature; as Son, YHWH experiences everything in a human way via His human nature.”
No–ever since the Incarnation, the Son has both a divine nature and a human nature, not just the latter. The fact that He has a human nature is why He was able to suffer and die, which is not the case for the Father and the Holy Spirit, who only have a divine nature.
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January 24, 2011 at 12:37 pm
Hi, aletheist. You write,
How does this engage Jason’s argument? Jason’s post clearly demonstrates he understands this issue, so that makes this observation of yours superfluous.
You say Christ’s human nature enabled Him to suffer and to die, but that implies His divine nature did not suffer and die. If that is what you intend, then your position opposes filiopassianism (Son suffers) as much as patripassianism. The patripassian charge, therefore, if you are consistent, is equally superfluous. Under your theology, the Father cannot suffer, but neither can the Son in His divine existence; and the fact you restrict the enabling of suffering to the Incarnation renders any objection to Oneness in this regard incoherent — unless you make Christ two persons, which neither orthodox trinitarians nor oneness believers do.
You also write in reply to Jason’s, “[a] distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in experience,”
But if this necessitates a distinct person, then you cannot cogently argue the Incarnation enables the suffering of the Son without arguing the Son is two persons. You either argue the Son is two persons, or you argue the Son is one person who suffered in the flesh. If you believe the latter, how does your position count against the Oneness doctrine?
You further write,
This “subject-object” distinction, under a trinitarian paradigm, is a person-person distinction; but a person-person distinction defaults to a composite Godhead. A composed Godhead cannot be divine, so you are left with embracing divine simplicity. Under simplicity, the Godhead cannot be divided, for God is identical to His nature. Wherever the “Son” goes, so goes the “Father.” Hence, the Son assuming a human nature “necessitates” the same for the Father, else God can be divided (the opposite of simplicity).
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January 24, 2011 at 2:11 pm
Scalia:
I am always somewhat reluctant to get into Trinitarian vs. Oneness debates here; it is Jason’s blog, after all, and frankly I am no expert on the relevant issues. In this case, I simply offered a couple of comments that came to mind upon reading his post; I was not necessarily seeking to engage his argument.
To me, the traditional doctrine of the Trinity is the most straightforward and consistent interpretation of Scripture as a whole, not to mention the one with the best historical support. The philosophical aspects are secondary, but suffice it to say for now that there is no inconsistency between Trinitarianism and divine simplicity. Saying that the one God exists in three persons is not the same as saying that God has three parts.
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January 24, 2011 at 3:27 pm
aletheist, unless you’re committed to history over logic, you should readily agree with Jason that the patripassian charge is a non-starter. If you disagree with him, then by all means explain why. The bulk of my previous reply relates to that. The charge is incoherent in light of what trinitarians profess to believe.
As to the other matters relating to the Godhead itself, you should not have raised them if you did not want to discuss them. Suffice it to say “God in three persons” is rationally defensible only if you define “persons” as “modes of revelation”; but if you define “persons” as “conscious relationships” then you cannot have one “conscious relationship” going someplace without the other conscious relationships under divine simplicity. Such a definition is a contradictio in terminus.
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January 24, 2011 at 4:15 pm
Scalia:
I am committed to divinely inspired Scripture over both human logic and human history. Of course, there is not necessarily a conflict between them.
Modes of existence, consciousness, experience, or revelation do not suffer and die; persons do. Scripture tells us that Jesus Christ suffered and died, but the Father did not, and neither did the Holy Spirit. This is plainly inconsistent with the claim that all three are the same person.
Again, the proposition that the one God exists in three persons does not entail that He has three parts; divine simplicity is not at issue here. I do not pretend to understand fully the whole notion of “persons” in the context of the Trinity; but then, if humans could fully understand the nature of God, would He really be God?
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January 24, 2011 at 4:57 pm
aletheist, you keep talking about something you say you’re reluctant to talk about but you appear to ignore the topic of this thread. So, based upon what has been written thus far, you agree the patripassian charge is false, correct?
You say,
I’ve already addressed this (Jason has too). If you care to engage my (our) argument, I’m all ears.
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January 24, 2011 at 8:39 pm
Scalia:
I never intended to address “the patripassian charge” in any of my comments. I simply offered a couple of remarks prompted by statements that Jason made in his subsequent discussion of “whether Oneness adherents should confess that the Father suffered and died on the cross.” Specifically, “Natures are not conscious, do not think, and do not act. In short, they do not experience anything. They are objects, not subjects. Only persons are subjects, capable of conscious experience.”
I only quoted the last sentence previously, but the whole passage is relevant. To show this, let me make a simple substitution.
Modes of existence/consciousness/experience/revelation are not conscious, do not think, and do not act. In short, they do not experience anything. They are objects, not subjects. Only persons are subjects, capable of conscious experience.
Therefore, if the Father is a different subject than Jesus Christ, then by definition the Father is a different person than Jesus Christ. If the Father is the same person as Jesus Christ, and Jesus Christ suffered and died, then necessarily the Father also suffered and died; that is what being numerically and personally identical entails. If it is indeed “a misuse of Biblical terminology” to say that “the Father suffered and died,” as Jason acknowledged, then it is equally unbiblical to claim that the Father is the same person as the Son.
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January 24, 2011 at 9:58 pm
aletheist writes,
But you did, nonetheless. You wrote in Post 2:
You thus affirm the “impassability” of God the Son sans the Incarnation. Consequently, your critique is self-defeating.
It appears you’re now attempting to limit your comments to a critique of the Oneness position because you recognize the problem your own theology has with this issue. That’s why what you later write in Post 8 boomerangs (as we’ve already elucidated).
You go on to provide us with a “simple substitution” —
Ok, let’s compare your line of reasoning with trinitarianism. You’ve already told us God the Son experiences suffering via the Incarnation, meaning of course that the Son, as God, cannot suffer, except in the flesh. It was through assuming a human nature that He could suffer; but as you affirm in Post 8, natures do not suffer, persons do. So either the Son is two persons or one person having two natures suffered (there is no other option). On your account of the Trinity, the Son is indivisible from the Father (simplicity), consequently it is just as impossible for the Son to suffer as the Father. However, since the Son could suffer in the flesh without “necessitating” the creation of another person, your objection to Oneness fails. On both accounts, Oneness/Trinity the Incarnation does not necessitate another person. For your line of reasoning to be coherent, you must affirm Christ is two persons.
You write,
Let’s do some more “substituting.” I’ll replace the word “Father” with “God the Son,” —
So, which is it, aletheist? If God the Son can suffer and die (the opposite of what you’ve argued), and if God the Son is God in simplicity (indivisible from the Father and Spirit), then God, in His divine mode of existence can suffer and die. In that case, you’re a Deopassian (and, as noted above, a Filiopassian). But if God can suffer and die in His human mode of existence, patripassianism as heretofore observed, is a non-starter.
You can also argue Christ is two persons (which is the logical extension of your take on Jason’s argument), but since it appears you reject that notion, you’re rationally compelled to reject the Incarnation necessitates the creation of another person.
As Jason wrote, “In Christ, God experienced the suffering and death of the cross. That is why Luke could write that God purchased the church with His own blood (Acts 20:28).” Hence, it is entire appropriate to say God suffered in the flesh; and if that is the case, your objections vanish.
What you’re left with is not a justification of the unintelligible trinitarian doctrine, you’re left with a quibble over some aspects of Jason’s terminology. In that regard Jason can speak for himself.
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January 25, 2011 at 6:20 am
Jason, could we not just throw out the greek philosophy on this and say that God can suffer?
We know that God suffers in the emotional aspect of His creation (unless you want to argue over the definition of suffering).
As to “oneness vs trinitarian”, while I find both difficult doctrines, I find it hard not to see a distinct difference and simultaneous existence of the Father and Son (since the Son sits at the right hand of the father). (To clarify, I would see myself on your scale of trinitarians on the pluralistic side rather than the singular. How I rectify this, I just believe that the three (or seven if you read revelation) are somehow one.)
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January 25, 2011 at 11:58 am
Scalia:
I am troubled by your repeated attempts to assign intentions and realizations to me, rather than just dealing with what I actually write and leaving it at that.
To me, patripassianism is beside the point, because we all seem to agree that Jesus Christ suffered and died, but the Father did not. Where we differ is in sorting out how this is possible. You and Jason believe that they are the same divine person, who suffered and died in only one of His three modes of existence – a position that I find incoherent. I believe that they are one divine substance but distinct divine persons, only one of whom suffered and died – a position that you apparently find incoherent.
Furthermore, you seem to think that my only objection to Oneness theology is the necessity that the Father and the Son be different persons in order for only one of them to suffer and die. It should have been clear from my comment #4 that the grounds for my affirmation of the Trinity are found primarily in Scripture and secondarily in history; philosophical considerations are a distant third.
As for reconciling the Trinity with divine simplicity – minds far more capable than mine have worked that out, and did so many centuries ago. It is just not the case that the three persons in the one Godhead are different parts thereof; rather, the one divine nature is utterly simple, and each person is fully God.
To summarize . . .
1. Trinitarian theology – God the Son suffered and died according to His human nature, but not according to His divine nature.
2. Oneness theology – God suffered and died in His human mode of existence, but not in His divine mode of existence.
Right?
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January 25, 2011 at 12:48 pm
aletheist writes,
I have been quoting you word-for-word and have rationally analyzed the logical warrant for your statements. If you do not “intend” what you say, you should probably say something else.
You continue:
But in alleging incoherence you refute your own position, as shown above.
You write,
No, I’ve never stated that is your only objection to Oneness theology, except in respect to the topic of this thread.
You write,
I do not find the Incarnation to be incoherent. What is incoherent is your objection to Oneness in that regard. You clearly reject a two-person Christ. Given that, you must rationally affirm a dual consciousness on par with what Jason is arguing. God the Son did not suffer as God, He suffered as man. His divine consciousness did not know suffering according to His divine nature. Yet, simultaneously, His human consciousness knew pain and suffering. In other words, His human consciousness knew suffering but His divine consciousness did not. That is exactly what Oneness adherents believe, sans two extra persons. Yet you claim a distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in person (Post 2). That claim is unintelligible given your theology. You cannot consistently claim, “God the Son suffered and died according to His human nature, but not according to His divine nature” (distinct conscious experiences simultaneously), on one hand, and deny Christ is two persons on the other. When you claim a distinction in consciousness is a distinction in person, you either profess a two-person Christ, or you’ve committed a blatant contradiction — in which case you haven’t thought through your theology.
I’ll reply, with Jason’s indulgence, to your continual attempt to discuss what you claim a reluctance to discuss here in a later post.
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January 25, 2011 at 1:58 pm
Scalia:
I affirm a dual nature in Christ, not a dual consciousness. The two are not the same, as you seem to be assuming. Again, a dual consciousness implies two persons, which – as you acknowledge – I clearly reject.
God the Son was and is one person – one consciousness – with two natures. He suffered and died according to His human nature. He did not (and does not) have separate divine and human consciousnesses; that would make Him two persons.
I continue to discuss this subject here, despite my general reluctance to do so, because you keep responding to me – which is fine. I appreciate the opportunity to learn more about the Oneness position and refine my own thinking.
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January 25, 2011 at 2:19 pm
aletheist, to be “conscious” is simply to be aware. “Natures” are not conscious, persons are. The divine being assumed humanity. It then follows the divine being is “aware” in a human way, and “aware” in a divine way; but if God cannot suffer in any way, how then can this one divine person suffer in a human way unless He is so identified with humanity as to have a “distinct” consciousness? The word “consciousness” is simply the state of being aware. Again, you state in Post 2 that distinct consciousness necessitates a distinction in person. And given the awareness of divinity is distinct from the awareness of humanity, that distinction “necessitates” another person. Hence, you are still contradicting yourself because that means that in order for Christ to assume humanity He had to create another person. Moreover, such a claim is factually untrue. My experiences as a husband are distinct from my experiences as a hiker, but I am not two persons.
If you realize the terminology you’ve chosen is poor, we can move on. If not, your objections remain incoherent.
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January 25, 2011 at 3:30 pm
Scalia:
Not surprisingly, it is your terminology that seems muddled to me. You said it yourself – natures are not conscious, persons are. But then you went on to claim that the divine being somehow has two different “ways of being aware,” which is not equivalent to having two natures.
On what grounds do you assert that “the awareness of divinity is distinct from the awareness of humanity”? It seems to me that, rather, the one consciousness of Jesus Christ is aware of both being divine and being human; and this is not the case for the distinct consciousness of the Father and the distinct consciousness of the Holy Spirit, which are only aware of being divine.
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January 25, 2011 at 4:37 pm
aletheist, I am merely taking your words to their logical conclusion. The following numbered points correspond to the assertions you have made:
1) God cannot suffer.
2) God can suffer if He has a human nature.
3) God the Son took on a human nature.
4) God the Son did not create another person.
5) Christ has two (“dual”) natures — human and divine.
6) Christ does not have two (dual) consciousnesses.
7) A dual consciousness necessitates another person.
Given these statements you’ve made, it is easy to see why your objections fail. If God cannot suffer, there has to be a distinction in the way He is aware (conscious) of the natural world. If there is no distinction, there cannot be the kind of awareness you said He has as to His human nature. This follows logically from your stated beliefs. For if He is aware in the same way, He cannot suffer; but if He is aware in a different way, He can suffer. But He cannot be aware in a different way if there isn’t some distinction in how He is aware; and once such a distinction is made, another person is necessitated, according to you. For us (and, really, you — only you seem unaware of it), the answer is the Incarnation. Assuming a human nature “allows” God to experience the world in a manner He did not “previously.” The person remains the same (for you, God the Son), but the way in which He knows it is different. A very common example of this is Christ’s statement that He did not know the hour of His own coming. He, of course, knew it as God, but did not know it as man. A dual consciousness is merely a different manner of knowing. Again, if it isn’t different, the assumption of a human nature is superfluous.
The record shows you have no problem saying Christ has two natures. You also cannot quibble about God the Son having two modes of existence (spirit & flesh), but you cannot bring yourself to profess a dual and/or distinct consciousness, even though the terminology you use entails it.
Your most glaring error (other than your Godhead statements) is your insistence that a distinct consciousness necessitates another person. That’s why your argument falls apart.
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January 25, 2011 at 5:13 pm
Scalia:
For the sake of clarity, I would rearrange and edit your list of my beliefs to read as follows.
1) God cannot suffer according to His divine nature.
2) God the Son assumed a human nature in the Incarnation.
3) Christ has two (dual) natures — human and divine (follows from 2).
4) God the Son can suffer according to His human nature.
5) A dual consciousness necessitates another person.
6) God the Son did not create another person in the Incarnation.
7) Christ does not have two (dual) consciousnesses (follows from 5&6).
Taken together, these statements are fully consistent with each other. The key ones are 1, 4, and 7. Combining them, we get
8) God the Son – Jesus Christ – is a single person with one consciousness Who cannot suffer according to His divine nature, but can (and did) suffer according to His human nature.
The problem is that you want to insert an additional proposition that I have never stated or affirmed; namely, “If God cannot suffer, there has to be a distinction in the way He is aware (conscious) of the natural world.” You seem to be binding suffering to awareness/consciousness, such that if God the Son is consciously aware of His suffering according to His human nature, then He must also be suffering according to His divine nature. However, you have offered no justification for this; you seem to take it as a given.
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January 25, 2011 at 6:38 pm
aletheist writes,
No, the problem is you do not realize this “inserted” proposition is logically entailed by your argument.
1) God cannot suffer according to His divine nature.
This means God is incapable of suffering in His divinity.
4) God [the Son] can suffer according to His human nature.
His human nature isn’t suffering, God is, else Jesus isn’t God; but if it is impossible for God, as such, to suffer, then it follows His awareness of suffering in the flesh is distinct from His awareness as Spirit, else the flesh is superfluous (as previously noted). And if the flesh is superfluous, then 1 is false. God’s consciousness, under simplicity, is identical to His being. He, therefore, cannot because an infinite being cannot experience privation. A distinction in consciousness is the only way to rationally bridge the gap. Consequently, your argument is inherently contradictory.
I’ve neither stated nor implied any such thing. What He knows as Spirit is different from what He knows as flesh, as already demonstrated.
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January 25, 2011 at 8:09 pm
“No, the problem is you do not realize this ‘inserted’ proposition is logically entailed by your argument . . . if it is impossible for God, as such, to suffer, then it follows His awareness of suffering in the flesh is distinct from His awareness as Spirit”
You cannot simply impose your terminology on my statements. They do not say anything about “awareness,” “flesh,” or “Spirit,” so how can you allege that this assertion of yours is “logically entailed by” them? Please spell it out for me – proposition by proposition, inference by inference. If you cannot formulate a valid deductive argument to get from A to B, then you have no warrant for claiming that A logically entails B.
“God’s consciousness, under simplicity, is identical to His being. He, therefore, cannot [suffer] because an infinite being cannot experience privation.”
I am not sure that the way in which we are using the term “consciousness” in this context is consistent with it being an attribute of God. In any case, God the Son is indeed an infinite being according to His divine nature; but He is a finite being according to His human nature, and thus He can suffer. The same is not true of God the Father or God the Holy Spirit, since each of them only has a divine nature.
“A distinction in consciousness is the only way to rationally bridge the gap.”
Okay, but I do make a distinction in consciousness – between the Father and the Son as two distinct persons, only one of whom has a human nature and thus is capable of suffering.
“What He knows as Spirit is different from what He knows as flesh, as already demonstrated.”
Sincere question – if, according to Oneness theology, the key difference between the Father and the Son has to do with the distinction between Spirit and flesh, how is the Holy Spirit not superfluous?
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January 25, 2011 at 10:00 pm
aletheist writes,
My terminology? I’ve explained over and over why your position logically refutes itself and why it contains all that is needed to refute itself — if words mean anything. I am truly amazed you cannot see it. However, in the interest of clearing the log jam, I’ll take it step-by-step. Please answer this question:
Did God the Son remain God during the Incarnation?
The answer is either yes or no. According to your theology, I know what your answer will be. Before you answer that question, you should be able to anticipate my reply.
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January 26, 2011 at 8:07 am
While we await aletheist’s answer, let’s do a little review. The word conscious simply means aware. The word consciousness means state of awareness.
According to aletheist’s argument, God cannot suffer (1). Since aletheist also believes God is simple (indivisible), God’s being cannot be composed. Hence, God’s mind is identical to God’s being. If God cannot suffer, then God cannot be conscious of suffering in His divine state (also from 1). For example, if I am rendered incapable of feeling pain (via anesthesia), then I cannot be conscious of pain.
From aletheist’s (4), God can suffer via the human nature. Hence, the Incarnation moves God’s awareness from negative to positive. In His divine state, He cannot be conscious of suffering, but from His human state, He can.
Let A represent aware, G represent God, and H represent human existence.
~A x H
H –> A
or
~S (suffer) x H
H –> S
From this, it is easy to see that God’s state of awareness moved from negative to positive at the Incarnation.
Since a negative state is different than a positive state (distinct), then God’s state of awareness went from negative to positive at the Incarnation with respect to suffering. Hence, the Incarnation established a distinct state of awareness.
If God the Son remained God during the Incarnation, and God the Son, in His divine state, cannot experience suffering, then God the Son experienced dual states of awareness simultaneously (one negative, one positive). Since aletheist argues a dual consciousness necessitates another person (5), then Christ must be two persons. If Christ cannot be two persons, then (5) is false.
Although there are many other problems with aletheist’s argument, (5) renders it automatically incoherent.
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January 26, 2011 at 11:46 am
Scalia:
This all started because I said that a distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in person. I could not (and still cannot) conceive of one person having more than one consciousness, because having a single, unified consciousness is an integral part of the definition of what it means to be a person.
You apparently think that this is inconsistent with the traditional doctrine of divine simplicity/impassability. Your assumption seems to be that if God the Son has two distinct natures, divine and human, then He also must have two distinct consciousnesses. However, you have yet to demonstrate this from premises that I accept; you just keep asserting it over and over in different ways.
I would affirm instead that God the Son has a single consciousness because He is a single person, but that His various experiences are properly categorized as being either according to His divine nature or according to His human nature. The same person – the same consciousness – is aware of having both kinds of experiences. God the Son has never experienced suffering according to His divine nature; but God the Son has experienced suffering according to His human nature.
So, to answer your question – yes, God the Son remained God during the Incarnation; but in assuming a human nature, He did not thereby acquire a second consciousness. You subsequently wrote about His “awareness” being “negative” or “positive” and introduced a supposed contrast between His “divine state” and “human state,” but these are more examples of non-standard terminology.
To sum up, God the Son – Jesus Christ – is one person who has a divine nature and a human nature. He does not have a divine consciousness and a human consciousness; He has one consciousness. He does not have a divine awareness and a human awareness; He has one awareness. He does not have a divine state and a human state; He has one state.
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January 26, 2011 at 12:22 pm
You write five paragraphs and none of them engage my argument. You merely deny it (hands over ears?) because of “nonstandard terminology”??
You write,
The only reason for my repetition is my incredulity something so obvious is denied by an apparently intelligent person. Given the fast I was once a trinitarian, I have invested extra time in the event you’re commitment to tradition prevents you from looking outside your bias. It is now clear, to me at least, that you simply will not accept ANY logical argument unless it fits your bias. Any subsequent post under this thread will, therefore, be addressed to others.
To the reader, since aletheist will not engage Post 21, I invite you to address it. aletheist claims I offer premises he does not accept; but all I’ve done is take his exact words and have taken them to their logical conclusion. I’ll gladly “listen” to anything that approaches an engagement of the issues.
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January 26, 2011 at 3:27 pm
Scalia:
I am sorry that you have gotten frustrated with me; that has certainly not been my intention. You asked me one direct question, and I gave you a direct answer (in the fourth paragraph of #22). I honestly thought that I was engaging your argument. It would help if you could just spell it out for me from start to finish.
So far, you have NOT taken my exact words to their logical conclusion; instead, you keep introducing new terms. You have NOT explicitly formulated a valid deductive argument that begins with my two premises and ends with your apparent conclusion.
P1. God the Son cannot suffer according to His divine nature.
P2. God the Son can suffer according to His human nature.
C. God the Son has two distinct consciousnesses.
I do not see how C follows necessarily from P1 and P2. Can you show me the steps and justify each one? Why do you think that having two natures entails having two distinct consciousnesses? How do you define a person if having one unified consciousness is not essential to personhood?
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January 26, 2011 at 4:49 pm
aletheist, I have already answered every question in my previous responses. Your latest post demonstrates you are unaware of that.
Insofar as P1, P2 & C are concerned, I’ve explained over and over my rationale for each step. I do not know how I can make that clearer; but since you ask, I will try one more time.
1) God cannot suffer, as Jason explains the trinitarian objection above, because it is metaphysically impossible for Him to suffer. Suffering is contrary to the nature of God. If you dispute this, then you must precisely define what you mean by “God cannot suffer.” Given the fact you do not appear to dispute that, we may proceed.
a) Suffer, defined, is to undergo or feel pain or distress.
b) Feeling pain or distress entails a conscious state. One cannot feel pain if one is not conscious of it.
c) State, in this context, is the condition of a person or thing, as with respect to circumstances or attributes or any mode of existence (Random House Dictionary, Collins English Dictionary).
d) If God cannot be aware of pain in His divine state, something must change in order to render possible what is impossible.
d1) To explain, let us say it is metaphysically impossible for human beings to hear certain frequencies. That is, the way we are conscious of sound prevents our hearing certain frequencies. In order to hear them, the way we perceive frequencies must change, else we will forever be unable to hear them. Again, to be conscious is to be aware, but we cannot be conscious of sounds if we cannot hear them. To hear is to entail a different manner of perceiving (awareness). A different manner of awareness is, by definition, a different manner of consciousness.
e) A different manner of consciousness (awareness) is thus necessary to enable what was previously impossible.
2) God can suffer according to His divine nature. What does this mean? It means, in part, that God is enabled to experience (be aware of) phenomena that was previously impossible. The “state” (mode of being) that enables this is the assumption of a human nature. The assumption of a human nature is a change of state that effects the way God experiences the universe. Thus the manner in which He perceives phenomena in a human state, by definition, entails a distinction from the manner of perception (awareness-consciousness) in a divine state. If the manner of consciousness (perception) changes, it is, by definition, distinct from the previous conscious state. This was shown previously:
~A (Cannot be aware of pain), x (except), H (Assumption of human nature).
H (Human nature was assumed).
Therefore A.
You acknowledge the Incarnation is what enables suffering, but you don’t appear to think that through. Suffering is perception, perception is awareness, and awareness is consciousness. To enable suffering is to enable a conscious state previously unrealized.
Part of your problem is your insistence that a distinction in consciousness is a distinction in person; but such a construal is not justified by the definition of consciousness. Consciousness is simply a state of awareness. State, as heretofore defined, does not necessitate another person. A distinction in consciousness, defined, is merely a distinction in the manner of perceiving.
Consequently, (5) is false.
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January 26, 2011 at 8:11 pm
Scalia:
Thank you for #25 – I sincerely appreciate it, as it was quite helpful. My engineer’s mind works much better when things are broken down, with all definitions and inferences made explicit. It allows us to identify and clarify anything that remains vague, and then zero in on the real points of contention.
1d – Actually, it remains impossible for God to be aware of pain or otherwise suffer according to His divine nature. The Incarnation made it possible for God (the Son) to be aware of pain or otherwise suffer according to His human nature.
1d1 – You made a subtle shift in terminology here, and I wonder if this is a major source of our disconnect. A different MANNER of awareness/consciousness is not what I mean when I say that a distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in person. Rather, I am talking about the unified self that, by definition, MAKES someone an individual person.
Let me try offering an example of my own. Suppose that I am watching TV with the volume turned off. Then I go into the next room, and while I am there, someone else turns the volume up loud enough that I can hear it. I am the same person in both cases, with the same consciousness, but I am aware of the TV in two different ways. If I go back into the first room, I can even be aware of the TV in both ways simultaneously. My manner of awareness with respect to the TV has changed, but my consciousness – the unified self that makes me a person – is the same.
1e – Again, what was previously impossible is still impossible; God still cannot suffer according to His divine nature. Of course, “previously” is a problematic concept when we talk about God, since He is not bound by time according to His divine nature.
2 – I assume that you intended to say, “God can suffer according to His human nature.” You then went on to use the word “state” in several different ways, which I find confusing.
a. “State” is parenthetically defined as “mode of being.”
b. The assumption of a human nature is the state that enables God to suffer.
c. The assumption of a human nature is a change of state.
d. God perceives phenomena in two different states, human and divine.
e. A manner of consciousness (perception) is a conscious state.
f. Suffering is a conscious state.
g. Consciousness is a state of awareness.
h. State does not necessitate another person.
Forgive me, but I need your help to disambiguate all of this. Can you please define precisely what you mean by “state” and then reframe your argument accordingly? I apologize for stretching your patience even farther than I already have.
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January 26, 2011 at 10:18 pm
aletheist, at long last, it appears we are getting somewhere. My schedule is very hectic, and all of my posts are typed under extreme duress. So it doesn’t surprise me that mistakes like “God can suffer according to His divine nature” will emerge now and then. Yes, your correction is what I meant.
1d) I don’t think you’re disagreeing with me with your “remains” comment. If it is impossible for a necessary being to be aware (conscious) of pain 2000 years ago, it is equally impossible today and tomorrow — into eternity.
You affirm the Incarnation made it possible for God to be aware of pain. So far, so good.
d1) Yes, this is the where the logjam is. When you define consciousness as a distinct person, then it follows dual consciousness necessitate two persons. However, that is not how that word is defined, as previously noted. Since “consciousness” is a state of awareness, then it follows that multiple states of awareness do not necessitate multiple persons.
Thank you for your counterexample, but it doesn’t relate to my example. With respect to hearing and watching TV, there is nothing impossible about those activities, unless you are deaf and/or blind. If you are blind, you cannot watch TV no matter where you are. You must in some manner be given the ability to see or you will never watch TV. Whatever enables you to see necessarily causes you to pass from one state of awareness to another. Using the definition of conscious, such a “distinction” of consciousness does not necessitate two persons.
Since you recognize we are defining terms differently, it appears you are tacitly agreeing with me if we define these terms as I have done. Of course, if we define those terms as you have done, two persons are necessitated; but that’s a given.
1e) Yes, I agree that “previously” should be in quotation marks; but since WE are discussing the Incarnation, our discussion is necessarily chronological. 🙂
2) I use “state” here as defined in (c). I use this word in various ways (due to our previous inability to understand each other) to demonstrate the distinction of awareness between both states of being (as they relate to God). Here goes:
2a. “Mode of being” is one of the definitions of state. The Incarnation is a mode of existence distinct from divine existence. If the distinct mode of existence enabled an awareness (consciousness) not possible without that mode, then the resulting consciousness (as defined by our trusty dictionaries) is, by definition, a distinct state of consciousness.
2b. This follows from 2a.
2c. Ditto.
2d. This follows from 1 & 2.
2e. I did not write it the way you describe. I said, “[T]he manner in which He perceives phenomena in a human state, by definition, entails a distinction from the manner of perception (awareness-consciousness) in a divine state.” In other words, the way (manner) He perceives phenomena in one state (human existence) is distinct from the way (manner) He perceives phenomena in another state (divine existence).
2f. Suffering is a condition (state) of awareness.
2g. Ditto.
2h. Follows the whole argument.
To encapsulate, there were numerous distinct states of awareness at the Incarnation. Not only were they distinct from each other, they were very distinct from His state of awareness in His divinity. These facts sustain Jason’s, “A distinction in consciousness necessitates a distinction in experience as well,” and negates your (5). As heretofore noted, going from negative consciousness to positive consciousness moves the agent to a distinct conscious state. In this unique circumstance, the agent holds distinct states of consciousness simultaneously.
Given the above, if we are closer than what each of us thought at the onset of this discussion, the real debate is whether Oneness or Trinity is the best explanation for the Incarnation (and everything else, for that matter). The fact Jason initiated this thread to discuss patripassianism, we should perhaps wait until he opens that up.
As usual, this is typed in a great rush, so please forgive the typos.
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January 27, 2011 at 4:07 pm
Scalia:
It is indeed encouraging that we finally seem to be making some headway. I am also busy; in fact, I am traveling tomorrow and working all day Saturday, so I may not be able to check back here for a while.
1d1 – I had a nagging feeling all along that we were using “consciousness” differently, but it obviously took a few rounds for me to put my finger on it. You meant a manner of awareness, I meant the unified self who is aware. My example was only intended to illustrate this, not counter yours.
2a – As you might expect, I am uncomfortable with the term “mode of being” because it naturally brings modalism to mind, which of course I reject. The standard terminology is that Jesus Christ has two distinct natures, not two distinct modes of being/existence or two distinct states of awareness/consciousness.
2e – I still object to the notion that God (the Son) exists in two distinct states, divine and human. Rather, He exists in a single, unique, divine-human state. We do not actually know HOW He perceives phenomena; we only know THAT He has experiences according to both natures. The same person, who is eternally incapable of suffering according to His divine nature, suffered and died according to His human nature.
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January 28, 2011 at 7:31 am
Jason Excellent post. And it makes sense that we stick to biblical terminology. That said Is. 9:6 “everlasting Father” phrase causes many to find no problem at all in saying the Father robbed himself in flesh and became a Son in order to suffer for our sins.
aletheist You said in your first comment:
Then you said in your last post:
It appears that you are still not defining “consciousness” the same. If it is the “unified self” then the Son can only be a divine human. His divinity would be contingent upon his humanity and vice versa. What Scalia has been trying to point out is that you are making the Son into two persons when you say the Son can’t suffer according to his divinity. In your argument you are making the case for the Oneness of God. Because if you say the Son can remain divine and not suffer yet remain one person we can say God can attain suffering through the flesh and yet still be one person.
Pardon my lack of precision this is hurriedly typed. 🙂
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January 28, 2011 at 8:58 am
I found a few minutes and an Internet connection while on the road.
cs:
Please elaborate – How does the fact that God the Son is a unified self (a single person) entail that He is a “divine human” whose “divinity would be contingent upon His humanity and vice versa”?
I actually took Scalia to be agreeing with me that God cannot suffer according to His divine nature; God (the Son) can only suffer according to His human nature. I am not “making the case for the Oneness of God,” I am affirming the personal union of the divine and human natures in Jesus Christ. God the Father and God the Holy Spirit are eternally distinct persons who cannot suffer at all, because they only have a divine nature.
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January 28, 2011 at 11:33 am
aletheist
The reason is you cannot personify natures. In your case, “God the Son” cannot be considered deity only in any case. Biblically speaking, the Son is the point in time when God became a man. Nowhere in the OT is there a “God the Son” mentioned. Yet, you continue to argue the point that the “Son” can’t suffer according to his deity but even using the word “Son” is speaking of God in flesh only! There is only one Son who is both God and man. The only one born of a virgin that laid down his life for our sins and that is God in flesh – the Son.
I actually took Scalia to be agreeing with me that God cannot suffer according to His divine nature; God (the Son) can only suffer according to His human nature.
Is the Son one unified whole? God before the incarnation can’t suffer, in that we all agree because there was never a way for God to suffer until he became a man. God manifested in the flesh.
Actually you are affirming what we believe by saying One person can be both God and man without making a distinction in persons or splitting and separating God’s being. The Son suffered is this not true? You keep saying according to the Son’s deity and yet you fail to realize you are making the deity a separate person by giving him a consciousness other than what the human had. Please show an example where the bible speaks of the Son as deity only.
This may sound snippy but what verse are you quoting? All of God was in Christ, if all of God was in Christ then that would be each member of your trinity. In our case when we say God was in Christ it is the same person as God. Is. 9:6.
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January 28, 2011 at 11:36 am
Correction above:
This is a quoute from Aletheist, my tags didn’t work on that one… sorry.
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January 28, 2011 at 12:47 pm
aletheist writes,
Given your follow-up comments, I doubt that very much. The only “progress” is your realization my dictionary definition of conscious is different from yours.
You continue:
The terms we use are either accurate or inaccurate. Anybody committed to rational thought should be “comfortable” with correct terminology. I have no problem saying Jesus has “two distinct natures,” even though that term appears to be “standard” among trinitarians. Following the term you prefer, since Jesus’ awareness (consciousness) of phenomena is different (distinct) from nature to nature, it follows Jesus has two distinct conscious natures (states). That’s not a matter of opinion and has nothing to do with my being a Oneness believer. It is a linguistic fact.
You further write,
After repeating myself time and again and after indulging your request to precisely define (again) my terminology, and after demonstrating the terms I use cohere to the conclusion, all you can say is, “I still object” and reiterate your original assertion?? No, aletheist, we are making no progress whatsoever.
Finally, you write,
Let’s break this sentence down:
We do not actually know HOW He perceives (is conscious of) phenomena; we only know THAT He has experiences (is conscious of phenomena) according to both (distinct — to use YOUR terminology — Post 28) natures (states – by definition).
Based upon this sentence, Jesus is conscious of phenomena in two distinct states. What He can be conscious of in one nature (state) He cannot be conscious of in the other nature (state). Consequently, Jesus has, simultaneously, two distinct conscious states.
I would prefer you refrain from merely repeating your position. We all know what you believe. I have tried time and again from every angle I could think of to demonstrate my position. If the boundary isn’t clear by now, I don’t know what could make it clearer.
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January 28, 2011 at 12:50 pm
Praise the Lord, Bro. cs!
Yes, I agree with you that aletheist has provided all the ammunition one would need to demonstrate the self-refuting nature of his argument as it relates to the Godhead proper. As I observe above, considering the length of this thread, wisdom would dictate we take that up at another time. However, should that other time come, I am doubtful any “progress” will be made with aletheist, since he appears to to an ideologue.
All the best, my friend.
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January 28, 2011 at 1:07 pm
aletheist
Jason said,
Rereading this paragraph it is apparent Jason is expressing what I’ve been attempting to express, only MUCH BETTER. What is your take on this paragraph?
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January 28, 2011 at 1:08 pm
Blessings Scalia! You’ve been more thorough than I could ever be!!!
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January 28, 2011 at 2:23 pm
altheist, would you say that you would agree with impassibility or passability ?
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January 28, 2011 at 8:07 pm
cs:
Where did I say otherwise? Jesus Christ is one person with two natures, divine and human.
Biblically speaking, the Incarnation was the event in time when God the Son, eternally distinct from the Father, assumed a human nature.
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made through him, and without him was not any thing made that was made . . . And the Word became flesh and dwelt among us, and we have seen his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father, full of grace and truth . . . No one has ever seen God; the only God, who is at the Father’s side, he has made him known.” (John 1:1-3, 14, 18)
The Word, the only Son from the Father – not the Father Himself – became flesh and dwelt among us in the Incarnation. The Word was in the beginning, and the Word was God – He did not come into existence at the Incarnation; in fact, He was involved in the Creation of everything that God made. The Word was with God, and even now He is at the Father’s side – He was and is a distinct person.
Yes; again, the Son is one person (unified whole) with two natures (divine and human). God was not just manifested in the flesh, God (the Son) became flesh.
The doctrine of two natures is perfectly consistent with the doctrine of the Trinity. One person IS both God and man – the second person of the Trinity, God the Son, Jesus Christ. Trinitarians are not “splitting and separating God’s being;” they recognize that the one being/substance/essence of God is revealed to us in three persons, each of which is fully God – not a part of God.
Sorry, you lost me here. Yes, God the Son suffered, but only according to His human nature; He did not and cannot suffer according to His divine nature. The same person, God the Son, is the subject in both cases. Scalia is the one arguing that He has distinct divine and human consciousnesses, not me.
From where I sit, this is NOT an accurate summary of the Trinitarian position. What I can say for sure is that I have never argued in my comments here that ONLY God the Father is impassible; rather, I have stated very clearly that God the Son is ALSO impassible according to His divine nature, but could and did suffer according to His human nature.
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January 28, 2011 at 8:11 pm
Scalia:
And that is precisely the progress to which I was referring. We understand each other better, even though we are not any closer to agreeing with each other.
Awareness, consciousness (in your sense), and states are NOT the terms that I prefer, and never have been. Those are YOUR terms. Jesus has two distinct natures, but this does not entail that He has two distinct states of awareness, as you keep asserting. The fact is, we do not know how Jesus perceives His experiences with respect to His two distinct natures. What we do know is that He experiences them as a single, unified person.
You have not demonstrated your position any more than I have. Rather, we have both repeatedly tried to explain our positions in various ways. I agree that, by now, we have each given it our best shot, and there is probably nothing more to say at this point. We should simply agree to disagree.
And yet, you have failed to demonstrate anything of the sort, because you insist on imposing your own terminology despite my repeated objections to it.
How charitable of you. Do you honestly believe that you are any more open-minded on this issue than I am? Besides, I stated very early on that these kinds of philosophical considerations are below Scripture and history in my hierarchy of authorities on this subject. I submit my human reason to the Word of God – and again, this is not to say that they are in conflict.
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January 28, 2011 at 8:13 pm
James Anderson:
Hopefully it is clear by now – I believe that God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit are impassible according to their (one) divine nature, and that God the Son is capable of suffering according to His human nature.
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January 28, 2011 at 8:41 pm
Francis Pieper, in his Christian Dogmatics, provides this succinct and helpful summary of the traditional Trinitarian position on divine impassibility with respect to God the Son.
“It is true, human reason cannot understand how the Son of God, impassible in His divine Person, could really and truly share in the suffering of His humanity. It is evident how at this point Christian teachers have wrestled with human speech, as Cyril’s paradox: ‘Without suffering the Son of God suffered’ shows. That sounds like yes and no at the same time. Manifestly, however, Cyril meant to stress three thoughts: 1. According to Scripture, the Son of God in Himself is impassible; 2. According to Scripture, the Son of God did actually suffer in His human nature; 3. Any further explanation of the how must not be attempted.” (Vol. II, p. 140)
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January 28, 2011 at 9:01 pm
aletheist writes,
It is not my sense. That is the exact definition of the term.
Given the ebb and flow of this discussion, it is obvious who is employing subjective analysis. One of us is adhering to what words mean, and the other is ignoring them to avoid concession.
But aletheist “knows” enough about Jesus to insist His divine nature cannot suffer and His human nature can; yet aletheist doesn’t know enough about what those words mean to see that one is distinct from the other. Remarkable.
Hands over the eyes AND ears this time. If you would like precise quotations from every dictionary I’ve used, I suggest you look them up yourself since they’re readily available online. It isn’t demonstrable TO YOU because you don’t want to believe anything but your tradition.
You object to it because the actual definitions of the words force you to concede a point your tradition (or bias – since I’ve met many trinitarians who wouldn’t dream of contesting the points you have) will not accept. I have analyzed your sentences logically and have provided precise definitions for every critical word I’ve used. Your reply? You don’t accept my terminology. That’s not rational debate, aletheist, that’s burying your head in the sand. Not one of your many posts in this thread even attempts to logically identify the inferential mistakes you think I’ve made. The closest you’ve come is to express confusion over the way I have used certain words and to ask for clarification. Nothing you’ve written comes close to logical analysis.
Sigh. Don’t know what the word ideologue means? Here we go again:
From Merriam-Webster, an ideologue is, in this context, an often blindly partisan advocate or adherent of a particular ideology.
Nowhere do I imply somebody who rationally attempts to adhere to h/er belief system is an ideologue. An ideologue is a person who will not go where reason takes h/er. S/he has h/er beliefs, which s/he will defend if she can, but if not, will blindly follow it anyway. That this perfectly describes you comes from your own mouth:
You cannot be “committed” to a book you do not understand, and you cannot understand it unless you employ logic. Although you add the caveat there isn’t “necessarily a conflict between” logic and the scriptures, you leave that door wide open. You thus could care less how irrational your position is because you’ve decided beforehand you have the truth anyway.
Yes, let’s close it now. If you’re to be helped, it’ll have to come from somebody else, because I’ve done my best.
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January 29, 2011 at 5:02 pm
Scalia:
Many words can have different meanings, depending on the context. Consciousness is one of them. You have been using it in the sense of “the quality or state of being aware,” while I have been using it in the sense of “the totality of conscious states of an individual.” Both definitions appear in my copy of Merriam-Webster.
Natures do not suffer, persons do – remember? Jesus cannot suffer according to His divine nature, but can (and did) suffer according to His human nature. You keep extrapolating from having two distinct natures to experiencing two distinct “states of awareness,” but you refuse to spell out any warrant for this move. You and I only have a single nature, so how can we possibly say definitively what being conscious of experiences according to two distinct natures is like? Unless God Himself has revealed it in Scripture – and as far as I know, He has not – we cannot.
Ah, so what you were really doing was accusing me of being irrational. Again, how charitable of you. This is a common rhetorical strategy when an opponent persists in not finding your argument convincing – try to make it seem like any rational person would necessarily adopt your position. Again, we have each made our cases; I say, let readers decide for themselves which is stronger. (If anyone else has stuck with us this far . . .)
And you have concluded all of this about me on the basis of a handful of comments on one blog, on a topic that I have acknowledged from the beginning is not an area of my expertise, and on which you and I have firmly held but diametrically opposed convictions. You do not know me, Scalia; if you did, you would be aware that I have a strong commitment to rational thought and dialogue, as well as a strong commitment to the infallible Word of God. I think that some of my past comments here on other subjects bear this out.
I do appreciate the attempt, if not some of the specific tactics that you have employed; no doubt you meant well overall. Blessings to you!
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January 29, 2011 at 6:32 pm
aletheist writes,
Extended dialog can cause some individuals to lose their way and forget what was said. You apparently forgot what I wrote in Post 27:
And you have apparently forgotten:
If you define another conscious state as another person, then you have another person if you have another conscious state. That’s like saying if you have a cat, then you have a cat.
Since you acknowledge multiple meanings, all you needed to say was, “Yes, Scalia, if you define those terms as you have done, your conclusion follows and (5) is false.” Instead, you argued as if yours was the only interpretation in order to sustain your false allegation that distinct conscious states necessitate another person.
Yes, what you’ve written is in Merriam-Webster, but you still don’t understand what it means. When “consciousness” is defined as the totality of conscious states of an individual, that means one individual can have multiple conscious states. You cannot have plural states of consciousness if one state isn’t distinct from another state, else the plural is unintelligible. Consequently, one person can have distinct conscious states. I am truly shocked you didn’t realize that when you looked it up. In other words, you’ve just shot yourself in the foot.
I’ve done this time and again, but given your misreading of Merriam-Webster, it doesn’t surprise me you missed it. Re-read Webster’s definition for your “warrant.”
Nobody, including me, has argued to “know what [it] is like.”
Well, you’ve finally understood something I wrote.
aletheist, I’ve been involved in MANY debates. I know whether or not somebody has an argument, and you certainly don’t. Your whole deportment has been to simply say, “I don’t accept your terms, I don’t find your argument convincing.” That’s not logical analysis, for the umpteenth time.
It’s obvious you’re out of your element here, and that is all the more reason you should have asked questions instead of engaging in dialog about something you’re unprepared to discuss. One shouldn’t argue with somebody a subject about which they have no expertise. Asking questions is fine, arguing isn’t
Then you need to be more careful about what you type. I’m not talking about typographical errors (I make plenty of them myself). Don’t say you’re committed to something over logic if that is not what you mean. I was taught to say what I mean and if I don’t mean what I say, then I shouldn’t say it.
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January 29, 2011 at 8:04 pm
And all you needed to say was, “Yes, aletheist, if you define those terms as you have done, your conclusion follows and (5) is true.” Instead, you argued as if yours was the only interpretation in order to sustain your false allegation that I was claiming that distinct conscious states necessitate another person.
What I was actually claiming was that distinct totalities of conscious states necessitate another person. It is obviously incoherent to say that a single person can have more than one totality of conscious states – which, we eventually established, is not what you were saying. So – yes, Scalia, if you define those terms as you have done, your conclusion follows and (5) is false.
There, I said it. Will you now reciprocate?
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January 29, 2011 at 11:16 pm
aletheist asks,
Please re-read Post 27, paragraph 6.
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January 30, 2011 at 12:25 am
Trying to turn tables, aletheist charges,
Way back at Post 12, I wrote the following:
I clearly stated the dual consciousness issue is on par with what Jason is arguing. Jason clearly states his belief that Jesus simultaneously had conscious experiences as God and conscious experiences as a man; yet, He is one person. Your original claim wasn’t made in a vacuum, for Post 2 was in direct reply to Jason’s comment about consciousness. It was your incorrect construal of Jason’s position that prompted my reply. Your misguided attempt to apply an incorrect definition to Jason’s position (that his argument necessitated another person) left us with limited interpretive options. Since Jason came nowhere close to arguing that the “totality of conscious states” of Jesus was limited to one mode of existence, the only rational option was that you denied distinct conscious states can be held by one person. You disavow that, but that makes your initial objection all the more incoherent.
As I’ve stated several times, you either make Christ two persons, or you agree with us in affirming simultaneous dual conscious states. Since Jason has made his position clear, your original objection is a non-starter.
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January 30, 2011 at 1:29 pm
Scalia:
Okay . . .
Great, thanks; sorry, I forgot that you had already acknowledged this, and now I notice that you repeated it in comment #44. I have an unfortunate tendency to get a little bit lost in the blizzard of words (from both sides) when an online exchange drags out this long. I can see how that would get really annoying for those engaging with me, and I hope that you will forgive me.
Going back to Jason’s post, he mischaracterized the traditional Trinitarian position, as I explained in comment #38, responding to the specific paragraph that cs had quoted in comment #35. Jason also said . . .
This is blatantly incorrect; Trinitarians do, in fact, apply divine impassibility to God’s nature, such that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are all impassible according to that nature. Only the Son could and did suffer – according to His human nature, something that neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit possesses. This means that Jason was attacking a straw man in his attempt to absolve Oneness theology from the charge of patripassianism.
To show that he was unsuccessful, let me now formalize the argument that I have been (poorly) trying to articulate all along.
P1. A distinction in totalities of conscious states necessitates a distinction in person (by definition).
P2. The totality of the Father’s conscious states does not include suffering (divine impassibility).
P3. The totality of the Son’s conscious states does include suffering (according to His human nature).
C1. From P2&P3, the totality of the Father’s conscious states is distinct from the totality of the Son’s conscious states.
C2. From P1&C1, the Father and the Son are distinct persons.
This is perfectly valid, so if premises P1-P3 are true, conclusions C1-C2 are necessarily true, as well. We have established that P1 is uncontroversially true, and I am confident, based on past statements, that you (and Jason) also affirm P3. That leaves denying P2 as the only way to deny C2; but then you are saying that the totality of the Father’s conscious states includes suffering – i.e., espousing patripassianism.
Now, Jason does not seem to have a problem with this – he advocates that we simply “jettison divine impassibility” with a wave of the hand and not deem patripassianism to be heretical after all, despite the church’s consistent historical stance to the contrary. You, however, seem to have indicated your agreement with divine impassibility on several occasions.
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January 30, 2011 at 1:34 pm
Rats, I wish that there was a way to preview comments before posting them. In #48 above, everything from “In context” to the end consists of my words, not a quote from Scalia. Sorry about that.
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January 30, 2011 at 4:10 pm
aletheist, I agree there needs to be a preview screen here. I’ve tried to see if that feature can be added to WordPress, and I’ve even asked Jason about it, but we haven’t found anything so far.
After reading Post 48, I see your reformulated argument does not engage Post 47. Jason’s characterization of passibility is something you expressed from the beginning you were not touching. Indeed, in Post 8 you said,
Again, you mischaracterized Jason’s position on Christ’s consciousness by saying his position necessitated another person. Your disagreement with Oneness notwithstanding, Jason never argued Jesus’ totality of conscious states is restricted to one mode of existence. Given that, the only way to interpret your objection is that you denied a person could have multiple conscious states. Since you explicitly stated it was not your intention to address the passibility issue, it’s a little late now to try to pat it into place in order to avoid acknowledging you made a false claim. You simply zigged when you should have zagged.
With respect to your formalized argument, as I stated before, if you have a cat, then you have a cat. If there is one person here and another person there, then you have two persons. Nobody contests otherwise.
The rest of your argument assumes the Trinity which, as you know, we reject. Consequently, I do not accept P2 & P3 as you have written them. C1 & C2 only follow if there is a Trinity; they do not follow if there isn’t.
You write,
Again, if you’re looking for agreement here, you should be aware we reject pre-incarnational sonship. For us, the term “Son” relates to humanity, not eternal generation. I would rewrite P3:
The totality of God’s conscious states does include suffering (according to His human nature).
You then assert:
If you affirm the immutability of God the Son, and at the same time affirm the ability of God the Son to suffer “according to His human nature,” consistency dictates God the Son remains immutable. As you have stated, God the Son remained God during the incarnation, so God, as such, does not suffer, even though the same person suffered according to His human nature. If God, as such suffers, you are, as I’ve observed, a Deopassianist. However, if God the Son can take on a human nature without suffering in His divinity (only in His humanity), then the charge of Deopassianism is false. Consequently, if there is one person in the Godhead, and “IF” we call that one person the Father, the fact that the Father takes on a human nature no more makes one a Patripassian than your position makes you a Deopassian. Immutability is not impeached by the Oneness doctrine.
You observe,
Yes, I believe in divine simplicity (entailing impassibility) whereas Jason does not. That notwithstanding, the arguments I’ve presented here merely assume certain doctrinal positions to make a point — namely, that one person can experience dual conscious states.
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January 31, 2011 at 12:09 pm
Indeed, I did not intend to wade into the patripassianism issue when I made my initial comments. However, as a result of our subsequent discussion, I came up with the specific argument in comment #48.
Not deliberately – I misunderstood his (and your) use of the term “consciousness,” but thanks to your persistence, we eventually got it straightened out. However, I still contend that Jason mischaracterized the Trinitarian position on divine impassibility.
That being the case, what is your take on the first chapter of John? I summarized my understanding of that passage in comment #38. The Word, the only Son from the Father – not the Father Himself – became flesh and dwelt among us in the Incarnation. The Word was in the beginning, and the Word was God – He did not come into existence at the Incarnation; in fact, He was involved in the Creation of everything that God made. The Word was with God, and even now He is at the Father’s side – He was and is a distinct person.
I see; in Oneness theology, it does not make sense to attribute a totality of conscious states to a mode of existence, which is what the terms “Father” and “Son” designate. Right?
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January 31, 2011 at 12:31 pm
aletheist writes,
Whew. After fifty-two posts, we can finally shelve that.
You ask,
As stated above, I’ve been in many, MANY Oneness/Trinity debates, so I’m in no manner reluctant to wade into it again, but given that is not the topic of this thread, and given the fact our extended discussion mostly touched the periphery of the topic, we should get a green light from Jason before proceeding. I will only say that if you’re familiar with Oneness theology, you know what I will say. If you are not, there is plenty of material online from Oneness authors. Since this is Jason’s blog, you may want to read his paper, Understanding the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
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January 31, 2011 at 4:24 pm
Scalia:
Fair enough, thanks. Is my last statement in #51 accurate?
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January 31, 2011 at 7:02 pm
aletheist, the short answer to your question is, yes.
For some reason, the link to Jason’s article isn’t working. I’ll try again:
Understanding the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.
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February 1, 2011 at 5:39 pm
Scalia:
Thanks for the link. It was an interesting and informative read, but ultimately it just confirmed for me that Trinitarianism is the most straightforward interpretation of Scripture taken as a whole. Perhaps we will have an opportunity to discuss other aspects of the debate in the future.
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February 1, 2011 at 7:53 pm
So, I’ve read the exchange and refrained from posting anymore. I keep reading where Jesus suffered according to his humanity but his deity remained impassable. Being a One God believer (One as in a numerical value)I’ve dialogued a few times and at one point in time I was accused of splitting Christ into two persons. Why? For simply saying that the flesh prayed. What I meant by that phrase is that he prayed according to his flesh but no trinitarian would hear my explanation and continued to accuse me of splitting Jesus into two persons. Now my question is, what can natures actually do? Experience?
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February 1, 2011 at 9:55 pm
aletheist writes,
I am not even slightly surprised. The link was only provided to provide some of the reasons we reject preincarnational sonship.
I was once a trinitarian, and I have both discussed that issue with trinitarian scholars and have read many works on the Trinity from Aquinas forward. Every time I read a defense of the Trinity, it convinces me all the more it is a gross delusion that is both unintelligible and without basis in the Holy Scriptures.
I doubt, given the length of this thread, Jason will open it up here. Perhaps down the road we will have occasion to discuss this in more detail.
Regards.
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February 4, 2011 at 5:08 pm
Aletheist wrote “How do you define a person if having one unified consciousness is not essential to personhood?”
Divine! and I’ll give you a couple of reason why:
1)There are a couple of things (and undoubtedly many more) which make the divine person different than a human person besides infiniteness and not being created such as: the ability to handle more than one stream of information at a time (prayers)
2)…and being able to dwell in multiple people and interact independently with each person. Both of which from a human perspective would mean that the divine person display the capacity of multitudes of human persons while still remaining one divine person.
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May 4, 2018 at 6:31 am
[…] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patripassianism & https://theosophical.wordpress.com/2011/… […]
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January 20, 2019 at 9:19 pm
Hi Jason,
I plan to respond to this (now old) post on my blog after I explain your model of the Incarnation. You may also want to go there and check out my peer-reviewed article on Jesus’ prayers as well (see my CV). I will be blogging through each of its sections as I find the time.
As for this post of yours, I just can’t see how you can claim that “Father” is not a divine Person. For you, “Father” refers to a mode of existence, which seems at bottom to be a range of conscious experience. As I am not identical with my range of conscious experience (assume we’re not Lockeans), neither is the one God identical with the Father.
If the Father is not a Person but is a mode of existence, much of the New Testament is unintelligible. In fact, it also undercuts many of what I would take to be standard Oneness proof-texts for there being only one divine Person. Two that come to mind are John 8:56 and John 17:3. At least with regard to the latter, Jesus addresses the Father as “you.” That is a second person indexical term, which, at face value, ought to signal to us Jesus is praying to the Father as a Person. (It would be odd indeed if Jesus calls the Father “you” and that term doesn’t refer to the Father as a Person.) If he is praying to a range of conscious experience you want to call “Father,” I don’t see how that’s any more biblical than saying the Father died.
Honestly, I think you should just take the approach I give in my paper to Jesus’ prayers and just bite the bullet on Patripassianism. At least then “Father” refers to a divine Person, namely, the one God of the Old Testament. But you can just say Patripassianism is true by implication of New Testament claims and doesn’t need to be directly stated to be biblical.
Feel free to contact me through my blog. I’m sure we’d enjoy interacting.
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January 24, 2019 at 2:01 pm
[…] Natures are just a set of properties that demarcate what kind of thing something is. Natures are not conscious, do not think, and do not act. In short, they do not experience anything. They are objects, not subjects. Only persons are subjects, capable of conscious experience. It should be obvious that death is an experience. If experiences belong to persons, and death is an experience, then who experienced the suffering and death of the cross? If Jesus is a single person, and if we believe the divine person [i.e., God] became incarnate, then it follows that the person who experienced the suffering and death of the cross is none other than God Himself. —“Patripassianism and the Death of God” […]
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June 29, 2020 at 8:57 pm
@Skylar, you write:
Jason can of course speak for himself, but “Father” merely refers to the fact that God is the creator:
Mal 2:10 Have we not all one father? hath not one God created us?
Eph 4:6 One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.
The one God of the Bible is the Father, so of course the Father is a person. If Skylar is the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker, then the butcher is Skylar, the baker is Skylar and the candlestick maker is Skylar. It then follows that the butcher is a person, the baker is a person, and the candlestick maker is a person. “They” are all “persons” because Skylar, who is a person, fulfills every role.
It is essentially no different from God’s attributes. God is not one part love, another part holy, another part judgment and another part mercy. Since God is simple and everything else is composite, and since God is infinite and everything else finite, our finite language can only approximate what God is (analogical predication), and certain things must be categorized in order for finite beings to make sense of what God is. But in God all is one and indivisible. God is love, God is holy, God is judgment and God is mercy.
It is the doctrine of the Trinity (DT) in all its variations that is unintelligible. You must either affirm some form of composition in the divine essence to avoid tritheism, or you must affirm tritheism (obliquely of course) to avoid composition or modalism. Every option forces a contradiction here or there.
In your defense, of course, you’ve perhaps not yet committed to a particular view of God, except to say that you lean in the direction of a monarchial Trinity. No matter. The doctrine of the Trinity (DT) fails no matter which card is played.
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