The fifth argument I offer for God’s existence in my “Does God Exist?” podcast series is the moral argument. Moral arguments argue from the reality of morality to the existence of God. If morality is real > God is real.I just published the first of nine episodes, which is a 1-N-Done episode. In the series, I explain why God is the only adequate explanation for our moral experience, and then address the most common objections against the moral argument.
You can listen to the series wherever you get podcasts, or at https://thinkingtobelieve.buzzsprout.com.
You can also read a paper I have written on the topic, available at the link below:
Moral Argument – Extended Version
The paper is 49 pages long, so if that’s more than you would like to read, I’ve also written three, more concise versions of the paper that will be easier to digest.
Moral Argument – Short Case (21 pages)
Moral Argument – Shorter Case (11 pages)
Moral Argument – Shortest Case (3 pages)
Also, be sure to check out William Lane Craig’s excellent animated video on the argument. It’s a great summary:
Thinking to Believe 
December 16, 2023 at 10:41 pm
The moral argument is rooted in man’s intuition of right and wrong. Since most people intuitively reject the claim that moral values are always subjective, a universal foundation for objective values make sense, and highlighting this perception can be an effective evangelistic tool for bringing people to the knowledge of God.
However, goodness is defined here as based on God’s essentially good nature and the commands which are commensurate therefrom. Since God is supposed to be infinitely just, pure, holy and true, His nature is the objective standard against which all things are measured. And while I can agree with that per se, its problem is in the precise definition of good. What exactly is the good? You previously told me that human intuition demonstrates its basic elements, but that can hardly provide an objective basis for morality (due to the historically disparate “intuitions” of what constitutes moral behavior). Objective goodness is demonstrable regardless man’s intuitions. It stands as the measure of man’s conduct regardless his feelings on the matter. We thus need a stronger argument for goodness which provides a crystal clear definition. Once that is provided, it will be easy to see why God’s nature is infinitely good and why all things in the universe are measured against it.
The answer to the question of goodness is that God exists; therefore, objective moral values exist. And we know that objective moral values exist because we understand what God’s nature is.
LikeLike
December 21, 2023 at 12:49 pm
Scalia, your question about what the good is, is a good and important question (no pun intended). It’s vague, however. Are we talking about the ontological foundation for the good (what it is rooted in)? Are we talking about how we know the good (an epistemological question), or are we talking about identifying individuals goods (applied ethics)? I vaguely remember our past conversation on this. I don’t recall the specifics, but I would never say that human moral intuitions is the ontological foundation for morality (as you seem to imply). God’s nature is the ontological foundation for morality. Human moral intuitions are merely the means by which we become aware of moral truths.
What I seem to recall about our conversation is that we were talking about how we know what is good and evil – the specific acts/behaviors that are good and evil. That is an important question, but not one related to the moral argument. The moral argument concerns itself with moral ontology, not moral epistemology or applied ethics. It’s taken as a given that humans know moral truths exist, and can identify at least some of those moral truths. The moral argument seeks to explore the grounding for such moral truths, and we both seem to agree that God’s nature provides that grounding.
LikeLike
December 22, 2023 at 11:43 pm
Jason, I realize that you assert the ontological foundation of goodness in God. What I have asked in the past is your precise definition of goodness and precisely why God’s nature is good. As you know, there’s a world of different between a claim and a proof. I think it’s insufficient to merely claim that God is infinitely good.
As to our moral intuition and its objective basis, my previous questions relate to how we demonstrate the objective basis for the moral positions we take. For example, we can say that the unjustified killing of a human being is wrong, but who determines what’s justified? One man’s murder is another man’s (or society’s) pleasure or self-defense. Why do I have to justify the killing of a human being? I don’t have to justify killing a spider, so who says I have to have somebody else’s legitimate reason for homicide? And of course, we cannot appeal to societal mores if we’re to establish an objective basis for the rule. You would agree that homicide isn’t wrong merely because God says it is. There is something ontologically fundamental and universal, rooted in God’s nature, that makes murder objectively wrong, not merely a societal faux pas. What is your definition and what is your argument? And how does your definitions apply across the board to morality in general?
Also, will you be answering my other objections in the KCA thread?
LikeLike
December 26, 2023 at 4:36 pm
In other words, it’s one thing to say that God is infinitely just; it’s quite another to demonstrate why He is infinitely just (pure, holy, good, benevolent, etc.). Incomplete theistic arguments invite such objections.
LikeLike
January 13, 2024 at 8:17 am
“The answer to the question of goodness is that God exists; therefore, objective moral values exist. And we know that objective moral values exist because we understand what God’s nature is.”
How can one demonstrate that God exists? And why would moral values have to be objective, since they could simply be based on God’s whim? And if God’s ways are not our ways, how can anyone claim to understand God’s nature? And how would God’s nature be distinguishable from evil, rather than good? It seems to me you have a lot of claims that are just assertions that lack any convincing support.
LikeLike
January 14, 2024 at 1:17 am
Dumbo the Dingbat strikes again. His memory-challenged brain has forgotten that I will not engage in a discussion with him because he’s a bald-faced liar who refuses to engage in good-faith argument.
Now, for any honest atheist or agnostic out there, I’ll be more than happy to discuss the matter with you. I will not interact with proven liars.
LikeLike
January 17, 2024 at 4:10 am
Ah, so you still want to use our pet names for each other? Okay. I presume you call me “Dumbo” because it starts with my first initial and you think I’m stupid and uneducated. Fine, I’ll do the same. I’ll call you “Sphincter,” because it starts with your initial and it refers to the body part most congruent with your personality. Fair enough?
It’s always amusing how when religious zealots realize they are losing arguments against atheists, they resort to ad hominems or feign indignation at some imagined minor slight and resort to pearl-clutching and refusing to engage—ANYTHING to extricate themselves from a battle they know they can’t win. Sphincter has resorted to both (so did PreacherTeacher, for that matter).
I understand that during heated arguments, sometimes people make mistakes, and that the mature thing to do is simply correct those mistakes and move on. This is why I’ve never taken umbrage at his antics, even when he himself has repeatedly lied about me.
But Sphincter’s behavior isn’t about an honest and reasonable discourse; it’s about not allowing himself to admit that the atheist’s arguments are better than his own. So hurl those insults instead of reasoned arguments! Clutch those pearls tightly and refuse to engage! That way you can convince yourself you are claiming the high road without having to defend your positions! Leave that thin skin uncut! It’s easy to do when you’ve learned to ignore the cognitive dissonance caused by your religious belief.
Well, whatever lets you sleep at night…but you and I both know your beliefs are built on a house of cards, and that you couldn’t defend those beliefs if you tried.
Still, I’ll respect your wishes. Bye-bye (for now).
LikeLike
January 18, 2024 at 11:09 am
It’s been explained to Dumbo multiple times that there’s a difference between avoiding a debate (perhaps out of fear) and refusing to debate an arrant liar who doesn’t argue in good faith. The latter is the case here. It’s pointless to burn hundreds of posts with somebody who lies, refuses to acknowledge obvious errors, reframes arguments, and even forgets his own position to argue against it! I’ve provided links to our previous interactions multiple times. They prove beyond doubt that Dumbo lied then as he is lying now.
For those interested in a short read, you will find the proof in Bye Bye Roe. It’s only 15 posts, but Dingbat’s mendacity is on full display.
Again, for any interested honest skeptic or atheist, I’m more than happy to provide the arguments for God’s existence and to interact in good faith!
LikeLike
January 18, 2024 at 3:22 pm
Test.
LikeLike
January 18, 2024 at 3:27 pm
As I stated multiple times on these boards, I will not debate anybody who is a demonstrable liar, who does not argue in good faith, who reframes arguments to attack something that wasn’t argued, who pretends to be knowledgeable about subjects he’s ignorant of, and who refuses to acknowledge the most obvious of errors. There’s a world of difference between not debating somebody who engages in that kind of behavior and running from somebody whose arguments are superior to yours. As I’ve linked several times now, my claims are demonstrable (see this site’s Bye Bye Roe for example). Besides, why continually argue with somebody who’s arguments aren’t even clearly thought through (as shown previously)?
Anyway, my offer to any honest skeptic or atheist stands. If you’re interested in a good-faith discussion over the merits of theism, I’m more than willing to engage you in respectful dialog.
LikeLike
January 25, 2024 at 1:53 pm
What is the definition of goodness? I can’t say that I’ve worked out a good definition of goodness myself. At this moment, I would probably define goodness as “perfect moral virtue.” But I’m inclined to think a precise definition does not matter much for this discussion. It’s a question of moral semantics, and moral semantics takes a back seat to moral epistemology in the same way that moral epistemology takes a back seat to moral ontology. We don’t need a definition of goodness (moral semantics) to know what good is (moral epistemology). We simply experience goodness and we know that the good is good. I don’t know what courage is because I first developed a definition of courage, but because I experience/observe courage. Similarly, I don’t know that courage is good because I have a precise definition of courage. I know courage is good because I experience/observe courage and experience the moral intuition that courage is morally good. Our moral experience and moral intuitions are the starting point for any definition of goodness. And any definition we come up with will simply try to capture what it is that we already know by moral intuition and experience of the thing needing to be defined.
As to the question of why God’s nature is good, I will address this soon when I get to the objections portion of my series. I’ll quote here from my soon-to-be published paper:
“Asking whether God’s nature is good because God declares it to be good or because it conforms to an independent standard of goodness is no more meaningful than asking why the good is good or why green is green. It just is! As the metaphysical ultimate, there is no ontologically deeper level of justification. God just is the paradigm of goodness. As William Lane Craig explains, ‘If the non-theist should demand, ‘Why pick God’s nature as definitive of the Good?’ the answer is that God, by definition, is the greatest conceivable being, and a being which is the paradigm of goodness is greater than one which merely exemplifies goodness. Unless we are nihilists, we have to recognize some ultimate standard of value, and God is the least arbitrary stopping point.’
“Every moral realist, including atheistic moral realists, must ground the good. Whatever x the atheist postulates as that foundation, we can ask of it, ‘What makes x good? Is it good because it recognizes the good, or declares the good?’ The atheist would have to respond, ‘It just is the good.’ Likewise, God’s nature is good because God just is the good. We both have an ultimate stopping point for locating the good. The difference between the atheist and the theist is that the atheist must choose a finite or contingent stopping point. The theist’s ontological grounding is an appropriate stopping point, given the fact that God is the metaphysical ultimate. It is not arbitrary to stop where one can advance no further. William Lane Craig writes: ‘[S]ome have demanded: is something good because of the way God is or is God that way because something is good? The critic isn’t listening. We’ve already said that something is good because of the way God is. “But why is God good?” the critic persists. It’s hard to make sense of this question. The moral theory just is that God is the paradigm of goodness, and it makes no sense to ask why the paradigm of goodness is good.’
“Consider the old meter bar in Paris that defined what a meter was. It didn’t define what a meter was by conforming to some abstract length or some external standard. Rather, it was the paradigm of a meter itself. It wouldn’t make any sense to ask why it is a meter long. It is the ultimate standard for measurement, and all other meters are judged against it. Likewise, God is the paradigm and standard of goodness. He is not measured by goodness, and does not conform to goodness. Instead, the goodness of all other things are measured by whether they conform to God’s good character.
“Why think that God is essentially good? If God exists, He is a maximally great being. Goodness is greater than evil, so God must be good. Furthermore, since it is greater to be the paradigm of goodness rather than to merely exemplify goodness, God must be the very paradigm of goodness itself.”
Concerning your comments about the objective basis for our moral intuitions, I’ve never claimed that our moral intuitions are infallible. Nor have I ever claimed that all moral truths are obvious to everyone equally. Sometimes, it can be difficult to determine what the morally right course of action to take is. Sometimes, people disagree on the facts to which the moral truths must be applied. Sometimes, people purposely try to skew the moral truths they clearly apprehend because they want to justify their evil. But this is a discussion about moral epistemology. While that is an important question of moral philosophy, it is inconsequential to the moral argument for God’s existence because the moral argument focuses on moral ontology. All that’s required for the moral argument to be successful is for a person to believe that moral truths exist objectively. Even if our apprehension of those moral truths is not always objective, it doesn’t matter. If moral truths exist, they must be grounded ontologically in a source that is transcendent to human beings. So I don’t need to demonstrate the objective basis for any moral positions I take in order for the moral argument for God’s existence to be successful. People can argue about applied ethics until they are blue in the face, but the moral argument for God’s existence would still go through.
With all of that said, the answer to your question about what makes something good or evil is that it reflects (or fails to reflect) the nature of God. What makes something right or wrong is God’s commands (which constitute our moral duties). But obviously, people will disagree about what God commanded or how to apply that command to a particular set of facts/circumstance. Human sinfulness and epistemic limitations will always mean that we’ll experience difficulties knowing what is good/right and getting others to agree with us in our conclusions. None of that subjectivity or uncertainty, however, undermines the moral argument .
I’ll try to get to your additional comments in the KCA thread too. Not sure when.
LikeLike
January 30, 2024 at 11:13 am
I must not have subscribed to this thread, because I didn’t see your latest post until just now. So, sorry for the delay. I hope to reply soon.
LikeLike
February 2, 2024 at 7:53 am
“Moral arguments argue from the reality of morality to the existence of God. If morality is real > God is real.”
If that were true, why is it that the hundreds of millions of atheists in the world aren’t running around killing, robbing, raping, enslaving and torturing people? Why are the nations with the best overall health, best education, highest happiness levels, highest life expectancy, highest incomes, highest freedom index, lowest crime rates, lowest abortion rates, lowest teen pregnancy rates, lowest STD rates, lowest infant mortality, lowest unemployment, lowest income inequality, and lowest gender inequality also among the nations with the highest populations of atheists. These countries include Japan, France, South Korea, Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Iceland, Australia, Ireland, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Israel, Canada and the UK. The health and crime statistics for those nations are also mostly better than those for the United States, which is one of the most religious nations in the developed world. Meanwhile, the countries that are the poorest, least healthy and most violent also tend to be among the MOST religious nations.
Also, in the US, why are secular citizens LESS likely to commit crimes than Christians. In 2015 atheists represented just 0.1% of the total US federal prison population, which is only a small fraction of the 3-6% of the general population who were atheists. Compare that with Christians, who are only slightly underrepresented in prison populations. Why are we so massively underrepresented in prison populations? https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/are-prisoners-less-likely-to-be-atheists/
Well, although correlation does not necessarily equate to causation, atheism IS correlated with higher intelligence, better education, better economic status, and lower incarceration rates when compared to Christians. We also tend to espouse philosophies like secular humanism, which include objectively more well-being-based morality than does Christianity. For instance, there’s nothing in secular humanism that would ever make slavery, rape, genocide or torture acceptable, whereas the God of the Bible commands or condones all of those atrocities and more. We don’t have to tap dance around topics like slavery that the Bible clearly endorses–we know it’s wrong and can condemn it without equivocating.
Apologists often claim that without a code of conduct provided by divine decree, morality is purely subjective. Well, nobody enjoys being made to suffer, so it makes perfect sense to avoid inflicting misery on others if you don’t want others to inflict it upon you. So is treating others the way you want to be treated objective or subjective? Well, there would be no objective morality in any absolute sense, but when we have something to measure it against–like well-being vs. harm, societies we want to live in, etc.–it’s relatively easy for morality to be objectively determined, based on the evidence of effectiveness.
Also, to someone who believes in an eternal afterlife, this life is really nothing more than a waiting room before passing though the door to eternity. But to an atheist, this is the ONLY life we have, so we’d better make the best of it. I want to live in a world where people treat each other well, not one rife with violence, abuse and destruction…so I work toward making the kind of society I want to live in. You don’t need religion in order to understand that. All you need is compassion.
It’s important to keep in mind that we’re genetically predisposed to care about others. Many species–even relatively simple ones–have genes that encourage them to be protective of their offspring because it increases their chances of survival. And as we often see in nature, it doesn’t take much to extend that protective instinct beyond the family unit.
Furthermore, there is a strong evolutionary basis for morality. Social species can cooperate and specialize, which gives them an advantage over solitary species. However, to be social requires codes of conduct to interact safely and effectively…which is why even piranha know not to attack one another. Thus, genes for behaviors that improve social cohesion and cooperation become selected for in nature. Since human beings are among the most social of social species, we have evolved a capacity for complex moral behavior…although how that manifests itself can vary substantially among different societies.
The point to all this is that the existence of gods isn’t necessary to have a strong basis for morality, and it doesn’t require any lawgiver or any one set of absolute rules, just normal evolutionary forces and conduct for the kinds of societies in which we prefer to live.
LikeLike
February 9, 2024 at 7:16 pm
[…] or wherever you get podcasts). That means I have updated the original post to include my paper on the topic. Give it a read. I have different papers of varying lengths for […]
LikeLike
February 14, 2024 at 9:54 am
Okay, I’ve finally gotten some time to reply to your message. Thanks much for your reply. Here goes…
This appears to be incoherent. If we have no idea what a term means, then how can we associate that term with our experience? If it is our experience that corresponds with a term, then we should be able to define it.
Again, our experiences cause us to recognize patterns, and we develop terms for those patterns. In this instance, when we witnessed people facing “difficulty, danger, pain, etc., without fear” (when they exercise bravery), we coined a term for that—courage. Thus, when we’re asked what courage is, we have a definition for it. Thus, I don’t think your explanation here works.
Okay, but I don’t recall arguing otherwise. My critique of your moral intuition position is due to what you precisely acknowledge here—you still don’t have a solid definition of goodness. So, whether the cart comes before the horse is not germane to the point: we have to know what goodness is in order to ascribe it to God. Calling something our moral intuition without being able to define that something opens ourselves to the criticism that we’re being arbitrary.
And what is perfect moral virtue? The word moral is simply one’s or society’s sense of right and wrong, and that can vary greatly from society to society. The same goes for “virtue.” Your definition doesn’t appear to go anywhere.
Sorry, Jason, but I had to wince at that one. First, I am not coming from a Euthyphro’s dilemma position. Goodness does not arise from a decree or from a standard apart from God. Indeed, a standard apart from God is a metaphysical impossibility. Second, I’ve never heard that we should accept “green is just green” as justification for why green is green. There is a scientific explanation why green is green. We don’t accept a “well, it just is,” and then move on. In fact, this is so obvious that I’m wondering whether you’re driving at another point. You must have left something out. Ipse dixit claims are not rational justifications.
First, this still doesn’t tell us what is good. Second, this doesn’t show why God’s goodness entails the absence of all evil in God (e.g., arguments that free will necessitates the causation and/or allowance of evil which renders the efficient agent culpable). Perhaps the greatest conceivable being without any evil is logically incoherent. Appealing to our finite conceivability does not foreclose these kinds of objections. It ultimately projects our finite and varying standards onto God. The persuasiveness of such claims is far below the line of reasonability.
Respectfully, I think this is a red herring. The atheist is under no obligation whatsoever to ground his ascription of good. The burden of proof is always on the person who is attempting to change a person’s mind. And most atheists do not reply, “It just is the good.” Indeed, it may surprise you that atheists generally utilize elements of natural theology. They just refuse to go where that appeal ultimately leads them. In short, while denying that there is some ultimate standard of goodness, organisms want to survive, so they develop rules or behavior patterns to help ensure survivability. Those rules will vary from culture to culture, and whatever they perceive to be a threat to their survivability will be opposed. Whether they can properly ground it beyond that is irrelevant to them, and it’s irrelevant to a theist’s argument. We cannot in any measure rely on their inconsistency to ground our epistemology. Our arguments should stand alone without any reference to the way they think.
A meter bar is a meter long because somebody decided to make a meter bar that is a meter long. Nobody would ask why it’s a meter long because everybody knows why it’s a meter long. If this is supposed to be analogous to goodness, then we’re saying that goodness is good because we call it good. We set up an arbitrary standard (our moral intuitions) and then call that standard “good.” Why is it good? Because we call it good. What is good? Well, we know it when we see it. Sorry, but this seems to reduce morality to subjectivism.
Fair enough, but what I’m getting at is that our fallible intuitions are incapable of defining goodness. An argument for God’s absolute goodness must be independent of subjective intuitions, with a clear definition of what goodness is so that it is recognized as the logical stopping point of the argument.
I think what you mean by success is the persuasiveness of the argument to a particular person. An objective argument is successful whether or not anybody we’re talking to believes “that moral truths exist objectively.” What our opponents believe is irrelevant to the soundness of our arguments.
Yes, I agree completely with this. The problem has been and apparently continues to be your inability to define good and to show why God’s nature is exclusively good (its being impossible for God to be evil). We end up with the same conclusion; I just feel that said conclusion doesn’t follow from your arguments.
LikeLike
October 9, 2024 at 1:29 pm
Scalia, I’m trying to get back to some of the comments from past posts on the arguments for God’s existence. That said, your last comment is just too much for me to respond to. My head is spinning and my time is short, so let me just ask you how you define goodness, your justification for that definition, and why you think it establishes God as being the ontological foundation of goodness.
As for me, I think God is good because He is the greatest conceivable being, and since it is greater to be good than evil, and greater to be the paradigm of goodness than merely to exemplify goodness, God is not only good, but also the paradigm of goodness itself. Other arguments can be given, but that’s the main one for me.
And regarding the definition of good, my point was simply that we can know what something is by experience without being able to adequately define it. For example, what is time? It’s notoriously difficult to define, and yet all of us experience it and would say we know what time is. I think it’s similar for goodness. We all know what the concept of goodness is, even if we can’t offer a definition for it. Indeed, most people could not offer a definition for things that they know. It’s not that definitions are not possible for them, but that we don’t learn the definition first and then learn what the thing is. We first know what a thing is, and then we try to articulate that concept in a precise definition.
LikeLike
October 12, 2024 at 1:06 pm
Hello again, Jason! You write:
The short answer is that good is defined as “the object of desire.” As with the Five Ways, understanding the metaphysical backdrop is key to understanding this definition. And it is vital that “desire” here is not on the surface a conscious desire. It is rather the internal directedness of a thing toward an end in accordance with its nature. In a word: telos.
Everything that exists is actualized as something. Every actuality is a kind of perfection that began as only a potentiality (except in God). An acorn “desires” to become an oak in the sense that the oak is the actualization of the acorn’s potential or the perfection of its purpose (final cause). The actuality of becoming an oak is the “good” since it is a desirable perfection (in accordance with its essence).
Since a good is something desired for what it is, the basic premise is that something is good to the degree to which it actualizes its essence. For example, a squirrel with a tail is better than a squirrel without one because it actualizes its “squirrel essence” to a greater degree. Hence, the more something actualizes its nature, the more actual reality it is and the more good it is considered to be. This is the ancient idea of perfection—the completion of motion, which is the actualization of a potency. So, there is a necessary connection between the degree of reality in X and the degree of goodness in X. That is also why we say that everything that exists must have some goodness, simply by virtue of the fact that it exists, and since God is Pure Actuality, He is infinitely Good by virtue of His essence. No aspect of His existence is dependent on anything to make Him what He is, which makes Him the standard of all goodness. Since it is impossible for Him to suffer any diminution of being, He cannot be evil in any sense of the word.
We thus see that evil is the privation of being because goodness is associated with actual being. And since the privation of goodness is evil, then evil must be the privation of actual being. Evil bars a subject from actualizing its nature or to eliminate a perfection and, thus, to make a subject fall short of its full potential. So, just laws aim to preserve the well-being of every individual regardless of culture or geography and are thus grounded objectively.
The transcendentals include One, Good, Being and True. Each are convertible with the other, with different emphasis on the same thing. The most basic is, of course, being. Being is simply to exist. True is the actual state of affairs under the aspect of the kind of thing one is. One refers to the simple or collective unity of anything in question. And Good is existence in accordance with one’s essence; that is, being under the aspect of essence. It is “good” because it is what is “desired” of its essence. Any degree of imperfection or completion in the good correspondingly degrades its goodness. Thus, evil is the privation of good, both by degree or complete absence.
From this, we can clearly see that there are two kinds of evil: moral and natural. Blindness in a man is a natural evil because man is supposed to see. We wouldn’t say that a rock is blind because a rock isn’t supposed to see. Thus, the absence of sight in a rock isn’t a privation, whereas the absence of sight in a man is a privation. However, if a man’s blindness is caused by another man, the act by definition is morally evil. Moral culpability is concomitant with choice. The human mind is designed to think rationally, and reason will promote good over evil. Consequently, all law is rooted in morality and has its objective basis in God.
LikeLike