Moral Argument

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May 20, 2024

Summary Arguments for God’s Existence #5 – Moral Argument

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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There are so many ways to summarize the moral argument for God’s existence that I have a hard time boiling it down to just one or two. The most concise summary of the deductive moral argument for God’s existence could be stated as follows: “If objective morality exists (and it does), then God exists.”

This summary is so concise, however, that it does little more than state the logic of the argument. Why think that only God can explain morality? Here is a concise summary that also attempts to explain the connection in a bit more detail: “If God didn’t exist, there would be no moral laws and no moral obligations. But all of us know that moral laws exist and that we have an obligation to obey those laws, so God must exist. Laws require law-givers and obligations require persons to be obligated to. God is the source of moral values and the One to whom we are obligated.”

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January 29, 2024

Michael Ruse’s Evolutionary Account of Morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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Currently, I am in the midst of my podcast series on the moral argument for God’s existence. This reminded me of an article that the famed atheist and philosopher of science, Michael Ruse, wrote in The Guardian back in 2010 as a response to the question, What can Darwin teach us about morality? Ruse’s multifaceted answer is intriguing, and at times, incoherent, but also quite enlightening about where atheistic and evolutionary thought leads.

Ruse admits that without God “there are no grounds whatsoever for being good.” Morality, he says, is just a matter of emotion and personal taste on the same level as “liking ice cream and sex and hating toothache and marking student papers.” But he’s quick to point out that just because there are no grounds for being good, it doesn’t mean we should be bad. While this is true insofar as it goes, it fails to answer the more important question: Why – in the absence of a moral law giver, and thus in the absence of any objective moral law – should anyone behave in ways traditionally thought to be “good” if and when it is in their own self-interest to do otherwise? In the name of what should they deny their own impulses? In the name of the Grand Sez Who?

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December 15, 2023

Theistic Arguments #5: The Moral Argument for God’s Existence

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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The fifth argument I offer for God’s existence in my “Does God Exist?” podcast series is the moral argument. Moral arguments argue from the reality of morality to the existence of God. If morality is real > God is real.
I just published the first of nine episodes, which is a 1-N-Done episode. In the series, I explain why God is the only adequate explanation for our moral experience, and then address the most common objections against the moral argument.

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January 20, 2023

Moral Relativism series

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Relativism
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I told you about my relativism series in the last post. It is divided up into three sub-series: epistemological relativism (there is no truth at all), moral relativism (there is no moral truth), and religious relativism (there is no religious truth. I finished up the sub-series on epistemological relativism in December, and I’ve posted the first two episodes in the moral relativism sub-series in the last week.
In the first episode I provide an outline for the sub-series, explain the differences between moral objectivism and moral relativism, distinguish moral relativism from moral skepticism, explore how pervasive moral relativism is in our culture, and explain why we should be concerned.
In the second episode, I explain why people reject moral objectivity in favor of moral relativity: (1) It seems to follow from atheism; (2) It gives intellectual justification for one’s sin; (3) They desire moral neutrality and non-judgmentalism; (4) They think moral disagreements means there is no moral truth. After critiquing each of these reasons, I go on to discuss why it is that humans disagree on moral matters.
Give it a listen at https://thinkingtobelieve.buzzsprout.com or wherever you get your podcasts from.
 

October 19, 2022

Understanding the difference between subjective and objective morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Relativism
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There is a lot of confusion about what is meant by “moral relativism” and “moral objectivism/realism”

“Subjective” and “objective” tell you about the source of the truth maker; i.e. what makes something true. Is it the beliefs of the subject (the person’s mind) that make it true, or is it an object in the external world? My belief that homemade vanilla ice cream is the best ice cream is what makes it true that homemade vanilla ice cream is the best ice cream for me. In contrast, the curvature of space-time is what makes gravity true – not just for me, but for everyone. Gravity is true regardless of what I believe about it.

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June 8, 2022

Problems with the Social Contract Theory of Morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Philosophy
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A view of morality you’ll hear a lot in the public square is social contract theory. Contractarianism holds that “morality rests on a tacit agreement between rationally self-interested individuals to abide by certain rules because it is to their mutual advantage to do so.”1 There is nothing intrinsically wrong with murder, rape, or torture, for example, but since rational self-interested persons do not want these things being done to them, they agree to extend the same courtesy to others.2 Philosopher, Edward Feser, offers at least six helpful criticisms of Contractarianism: (more…)

 

December 31, 2021

The “why not say we don’t know?” response to theistic arguments

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Atheistic objections, Cosmological Argument, Epistemology, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments, Thinking
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When Christians offer arguments for the existence of God based on the beginning of the universe or the objective nature of morality, some atheists will respond by asking, “Why can’t we just say we don’t know what caused the universe or what the objective source of morality is?” How might a thoughtful Christian respond?

I would suggest that you turn the question around. Ask them, “Why can’t we just admit that God best explains the origin of the universe and the objective nature of morality?” The atheist wants to plead ignorance, but we are not ignorant on these matters. It’s not as if we don’t know what the options are. We do. And it’s not as if the evidence is equal for all options. We have solid scientific, philosophical, and logical evidence that points to God as the cause of the universe and ground of morality. In other words, we have knowledge, not ignorance. So why not just say we don’t know? It’s because that would be a false statement. We do know. The evidence clearly favors the theistic hypothesis.

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June 7, 2019

Euthyphro’s Dilemma and Why God Could Not Create the Good

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheistic objections, Moral Argument, Theism, Theistic Arguments
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Theists argue that God is the best explanation for objective moral truths.  Atheists typically appeal to the Euthyphro Dilemma (ED) to show that God cannot be the foundation for morality.  The ED asks whether something is good only because God wills it as such, or if God wills something because it is good.  If something is good only because God considers it good, then goodness seems arbitrary and relative to God’s desires.  If He had so chosen, murder could have been right and truth-telling could have been wrong. On the other hand, if God wills the good because it is inherently good, then goodness would be a standard that exists outside of God.  He is subject to the moral law just as we are.

So either goodness is arbitrary or it is independent of God.  Either God arbitrarily declares what is good or He recognizes what is good based on some standard outside of Himself.  If the good is an arbitrary expression of God’s will, then the good is subjective rather than objective.  While God may serve as the foundation for His subjective morality, He cannot serve as the foundation for objective moral truths.  On the other hand, if God wills something because He recognizes it is objectively good, then something other than God is the standard of objective moral truths.  He may inform us of those moral truths, but they do not depend on God for their existence.

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April 3, 2015

Why Moral Platonism Is Not a Good Explanation for Objective Morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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PlatoVirtually all moral theories end up with a subjective version of morality (including evolutionary explanations of morality), in which moral values have their genesis in the human will in one way or another. In our moral experience, however, we have a basic moral intuition that moral values are objective.

To say a moral value is objective is to say its truth value does not depend on any human knower. So, for example, to say that killing Jews simply because of their ethnicity is immoral in an objective sense is to say that killing Jews is wrong whether anyone believes it to be wrong or not. If Hitler had won the war and eliminated everyone that thought the Holocaust was immoral, such that everyone believed it was moral, it would still, in fact, be immoral.

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March 25, 2015

Morality cannot exist if God exists?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheistic objections, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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Garret Merriam

Professor Garret Merriam argues that if God exists, then we can’t be moral.   In other words, we can only be moral if morality is not grounded in God’s existence.  This is a reversal of the moral argument for God’s existence.  It’s a moral argument against God’s existence.

Like many new atheists, Merriam argues that the Christian God commands and commits evil, so if morality is rooted in God and our moral duties are based on God’s commands, morality is impossible.  I don’t accept the premise that God commands or commits evil, but let’s grant it for the sake of argument.  Does his conclusion follow?  No.

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March 9, 2015

Can evolution explain objective morality?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheistic objections, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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MoralityThere are two senses in which something can be considered good.  Something can be good in a pragmatic sense: that which is the most effective means for obtaining some desired outcome.  For example, if we desire to eat an ice cream cone without getting ice cream on our clothes, it is “good” to start eating from the top of the cone rather than the bottom.  This kind of goodness is judged by something’s utility.  It is considered good because it works well, and the human subject values the fact that it works well.  We might call this kind of goodness “pragmatic goodness.”

Something can also be good in the sense that it has intrinsic moral virtue/character.  For example, it is “good” to try to save someone who is drowning.  This kind of goodness is judged by the intrinsic moral character of the act itself, rather than its utility.  Indeed, risking one’s life to save a stranger has little utility for the rescuer, but great moral virtue nonetheless.  This sort of goodness is not determined by what we desire or the value we attach to the outcome, but is rooted in the moral character of the act itself, wholly independent of what any human may think about it.[1]  We might call this kind of goodness “moral goodness.”  This is the kind of goodness moral philosophers have in mind when they talk about objective morality. (more…)

 

January 30, 2015

Visual depiction of the moral argument

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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Dr. William Lane Craig has produced another video illustrating a primary argument for God’s existence: the moral argument.  Enjoy!

 

In case you missed his videos on the kalam cosmological argument and the design argument, see here and here.

 

October 1, 2014

No God, no morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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God necessary for moralityIf there is no God, there is no morality either.  Only a transcendent, personal being like God can serve as the ontological foundation for transcendent moral truths and moral duties. Cultural norms and mores may still exist without God, but not moral truths. Without God to provide the ontological grounding for objective moral values, what we refer to as “morality” is nothing more than expressions of our subjective preferences or human pragmatism.  To say “murder is wrong” is no different than saying “chocolate ice-cream is gross” or “you shouldn’t drive on the left side of the road.” Moral obligations fall by the wayside, for in the name of what ought anybody submit to cultural preferences or pragmatic mores?

To believe morals exist but God does not is like believing books exist but authors do not. There wouldn’t be any books in the absence of authors, and there wouldn’t be any moral truths in the absence of a transcendent, personal, holy God to ground those moral truths in reality. Put another way, to believe moral truths exist in the absence of a transcendent source like God is like believing books exist in the absence of authors. And to believe that we are obligated to behave in certain ways in the absence of a moral law maker and judge is tantamount to thinking one is obligated to obey the laws in a nation without legislators.

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June 6, 2013

Are all truth-claims subjective?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Logic, Moral Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments
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Subjective ObjectWhen talking about subjective and objective truths, I’ve heard it claimed that every truth claim is “subjective” since humans are subjects.  On this view, there can be no such thing as objective truth since all truth claims are made by subjects.

This is often applied in the context of the moral argument.  Theists argue that morality is objective, and finds its ontological grounding in the character of God.  In response, some will argue that since God is a subject, His moral commands are subjective, and hence even theistic ethics cannot provide an objective basis for morality.

This is a gross misunderstanding of the terms.  Subjective and objective tell you what a statement is about – not where it comes from.  To say a truth is “subjective” is to say it is about the subject himself; to say a truth is “objective” is to say it is about a mind-independent object in the world.

 

March 5, 2013

“Morality” is a meaningless category if moral relativism is true

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Relativism, Theistic Arguments
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Right and WrongIf moral realism (the notion that moral values exist independently of human minds) is false, then there is no reason to talk of “morality” as if it were something distinct from personal preference.  Given moral relativism, moral beliefs are just personal/social preferences.  What we call “morality” is nothing more than a set of personal preferences regarding certain dispositions and behaviors, or a set of normative social preferences – both of which are subjective in nature and can change over time.  Saying “vanilla ice-cream is better than chocolate ice-cream” and saying “telling the truth is better than lying” are the exact same kind of claims: personal, subjective preference.  No oughts are involved.  They are just autobiographic or (to possibly coin a new term) sociobiographic statements.  They describe rather than prescribe.

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February 4, 2013

I can be good without God

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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Good without GodSaying “I can be good without God” is like saying “I can be married without a spouse.”  If God does not exist, then there is no ontological grounding for goodness.  While atheists can surely behave in ways that humans have traditionally called “good,” their acts are without moral significance because morals as such cannot exist in an atheistic world.  They are just socio-cultural preferences.  Only the existence of God can ground objective goodness, and thus one can only be good if God exists.

See also:

 

October 2, 2012

Moral Relativism Undermines the Ability to Condemn Anything

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Relativism
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Moral relativism – the notion that there are no moral truths, and thus “morals” are subjective preferences relative to individuals or societies – is widespread in our day, particularly among the younger segments of society.  I would venture to say that moral relativism appeals to so many people because it gives them the intellectual justification they need to engage in their sins of choice.  This cheap form of moral justification is not without its costs, however.

While moral relativism is an easy way to justify participation in acts that others consider morally objectionable, it also makes it impossible to condemn the acts of others that one finds morally repugnant.  And believe me, every moral relativist has a list of beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that they think are morally wrong – not just for them, but for everyone!

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August 8, 2012

Do we need to define goodness to know what is good?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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In the context of the moral realism vs. moral subjectivism and theism vs. atheism debates the question of moral semantics is often raised: How do we define goodness?  Some are under the mistaken impression that if we cannot define goodness (a question of moral semantics) then we cannot claim to know goodness exists (a question of moral ontology) or identify what is good (a question of moral epistemology).  

I do not want to focus on whether it is possible to provide an adequate account of moral semantics, but rather to point out that even if we are unable to do so, it does not follow that there are no objective moral goods or that we are incapable of knowing them.  Greg Koukl illustrates this point beautifully.  He notes how our experience of goodness is similar to our experience of color.  We recognize color as color when we see it.  If someone were to ask us how we know what green is, we would respond, “I just see it.”  We don’t need to define green to know it when we encounter it.  Similarly, we do not need to define goodness to know that we have encountered it.  God has given us moral intuitions to recognize good and discern between good and evil. 

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August 1, 2012

Since you would be good even if God didn’t exist, then God is not necessary for morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
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That’s the claim anyway. Michael Shermer is fond of using this kind of argument in debates.  He reasons that God’s existence is irrelevant to morality because even if God didn’t exist, people would still think killing, stealing, and lying were wrong.  Want proof?  If it could be proven to you today that God doesn’t exist, would you go out and kill/steal tomorrow (particularly if you knew you could do so without getting caught and punished by the authorities)?  No.  There are still good reasons to act morally even in the absence of God.  Therefore, it follows, claims Shermer, that God is not necessary for morality.

While this has great rhetorical force in a debate, Shermer misses the point completely.  The question isn’t whether one needs to believe in God to know and do good, but whether God’s existence is necessary for the good that we know to actually be “good.”

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July 30, 2012

What I’ve Been Reading – Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Nature of God, Theistic Arguments, Theology
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David Baggett and jerry Walls have written an excellent book exploring God’s relationship to morality.  The book aims to provide a moral argument for the existence of God, and to answer criticisms to theistic ethics.  After showing how various non-theistic foundations for ethics fail, the authors take a close look at the most common objection to theistic ethics: the Euthyphro argument.  They critique both horns of the dilemma: pure voluntarism (X is good because God commands it) and non-voluntarism (X is good wholly independent of God and His will).  If goodness is determined by God’s commands, then morality seems arbitrary.  Indeed, if God willed that rape is good rape would be good (abhorrent commands objection).  There is also the epistemic problem.  How would we know what God has commanded, or if God has changed His mind?  The problem with non-voluntarism is that it makes God irrelevant to morality.  Goodness stands outside of God.  Indeed, God is subject to the good in the same way we are.  At best His role is to communicate to us what is good.  He is like the divine meteorologist who reports the weather rather can creating it.  If goodness is independent of God, then God’s aseity (self-existence) is called into question.  He cannot be the metaphysical ultimate.

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