There’s been a lot of buzz in both theistic and atheistic camps regarding Stephen Law’s evil-god argument, and many think it poses a serious challenge to the theism. Edward Feser sums up the essence of the argument nicely when he writes:
Law claims that the evidence for the existence of a good God is no better than the evidence for the existence of an evil god, and that any theodicy a theist might put forward as a way of reconciling the fact of evil with the existence of a good God has a parallel in a reverse-theodicy a believer in an evil god could put forward to reconcile the presence of good in the world with the existence of an evil god. Now, no one actually believes in an evil god. Therefore, Law concludes, since (he claims) the evidence for a good God is no better than that for an evil God, no one should believe in a good God either. That’s the “evil god challenge.”[1]
Perhaps I am missing something, but I don’t think the evil-God “argument” is actually an argument against God’s existence at all, yet alone a good argument. Consider the following three points:
(1) The evil-god “argument” is merely an undercutting defeater to the theist’s undercutting defeater to the atheist’s argument that evil makes God’s existence unlikely/impossible. In other words, it’s a counter-objection to an objection to an argument, not an argument itself. It is parasitic on both the argument from evil and a particular theistic response to that argument. The exchange goes as follows:
The atheist argues: “The existence/amount of evil in the world makes the existence of God impossible/unlikely because a good God would not want/allow (so many) things to occur in the world contrary to His nature.”
The theist retorts: “But God may have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil (contra the logical problem of evil), and we are not in an epistemic position to know those reasons to be able to say there is too much evil for a good God to exist (contra the probabilistic problem of evil).”
To this the atheist responds with the evil-god objection: “The same could be said of an evil God—He could have morally sufficient reasons for permitting good. Your response no more proves that God is actually good than the opposite response would prove that God is evil. If we have as much reason to think God is evil as we have for thinking He is good, and we recognize that belief in an evil God is ridiculous, then we should also recognize that the existence of a good God is equally ridiculous. And if both a good God and an evil God are equally ridiculous, then there is no God.”
(2) There are several problems with this line of argumentation. First, it’s not at all clear that the existence of an evil God is ridiculous. While most people do not think God is evil, one could make a decent inductive argument for the existence of an evil God.
Secondly, theists do not accept the atheist’s assertion that we lack good reason to think God is good rather than evil. The classical arguments for God’s existence, and the metaphysics that undergird that conception require that if God exists, He must be goodness itself.
Thirdly, even if the theist did not have good reason to think God is good, I fail to see why the notion of a good God is just as ridiculous as the notion of an evil God. The atheist has to do more than merely assert that both are equally ridiculous.
Fourthly, it is guilty of a false dichotomy. It assumes that God must be either good or evil, and since the notion of a good God and an evil God are both ridiculous, the notion of God is ridiculous. But there is a third option. Perhaps God is an amoral being, in which case moral categories do not apply to Him. In that case, the atheist’s arguments against either a good or evil God are impervious to the showing that God does not exist. The conclusion is non sequitur.
Fifthly, the evil-god objection is an attempt to show that the theist is not justified in thinking God is good. This is a red herring since the issue at hand is not our epistemic justification for thinking God is good, but whether or not the existence of (so much) evil in the world is compatible with the existence of a good God. The evil-god objection does nothing to show that a good God cannot co-exist with a world filled with evil. It only shows that perhaps God is evil, and it is good—rather than evil—that God permits for some morally sufficient reason. And thus the evil-god objection does nothing to bolster the argument against God from evil in the face of the theist’s defeater, yet alone offer an independent argument against God’s existence.
It’s worth pointing out that in the context of the debate, it is not the theist who is assuming that God is good, but the atheist. The argument against God from evil could not be made unless one first assumes that God is good (the existence of evil surely would not disprove an evil god).The theist is merely responding to the argument as it is presented to him. It is not his burden to show that God is good, but only to show that the atheist’s argument against a good God on the basis of evil in the world is not sound. And he does so by showing that God may have a morally sufficient reason for permitting the evil that, due to our epistemic limitations, we are not privy to.
Sixthly, even if we agreed with the atheist that we are assuming without sufficient justification that God is good, this would not demonstrate that God does not exist. Neither would it demonstrate that the theist’s defeater is not successful. At best it demonstrates that we can’t know whether God is good or evil, and thus we could not know whether God is permitting good or permitting evil. But whether God is good or evil, and whether God permits good or evil, the principle of the theist’s defeater still undercuts the argument from evil because it demonstrates that we cannot argue from the mere observation that evil or good exists, to the idea that there is no God. Any God—whether good or evil—could have a morally sufficient reason for allowing things to occur in the world that are contrary to His nature, and thus the existence of such things in the world does not prove that God does not exist, or make His existence unlikely.
(3) Ironically, rather than arguing that the theist’s response to the problem of evil fails in its attempt to provide a good explanation for how God could exist and yet things occur in the world that are opposed to His nature, the atheist cedes the force of the theist’s defeater in principle by adopting its form and just changing the particulars. He responds to the theist’s defeater by pointing out that the same theodicy could be used in reverse to explain why an evil god permits (so much) good in the world, and thus for all the theist knows, God’s nature could be evil, and it is good – not evil – that God has a morally sufficient reason for permitting. But the atheist needs to prove that God (probably) does not exist—not that we can’t know whether the God who exists is good or evil! And yet this is all the evil-god objection gets you. It would be a strange form of atheism that admits the existence of a God, but is merely agnostic concerning His moral nature!
If the theist’s defeater was logically fallacious, or failed to adequately explain how the existence of a good God is compatible with the presence of (so much) evil in the world, surely the atheist would point out the flaw in the defeater rather than employ it in reverse to argue that have just as much reason to believe in an evil God as a good God. By changing the subject from the compatibility of God and evil to the theist’s lack of epistemic justification for thinking God is good, the atheist fails to rebut or undercut the theist’s defeater, and implicitly acknowledges that the theist’s defeater does succeed in undercutting the atheist’s argument against God from evil.
[1]Edward Feser, “‘Broken Law’ (Updated)”; available from http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2011/11/broken-law.html; Internet; accessed 15 November 2011.
Thinking to Believe 
December 5, 2011 at 4:16 pm
Great explanation – thanks!
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January 9, 2012 at 5:47 pm
[…] viaResponding to the “evil god” challenge « Theo-sophical Ruminations. Like this:LikeBe the first to like this post. Leave a comment […]
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January 10, 2012 at 9:37 am
Google the problem of Heaven,please.
The problem is that we ignostics see bot Gods as vacuous, Google the ignostic-Ockham,please.
No, no morally sufficient way exists, dispite Plantinga’s unknown reason argument, just an argument from ignorance. No, despite His supposed greater wisdom and omniscience.
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January 15, 2012 at 9:16 am
Jason, In my opinion, your statement:
“God….could have a morally sufficient reason for allowing things to occur in the world that are contrary to His nature,..”
is logically consistent.
I believe that Alvin Plantinga has provided a logically consistent argument to defeat the “problem of evil.” However, Skeptics such as Lord Griggs in the comment above make a good point. In effect, they are saying “How can you claim there is an all-good and omnipotent God when we see so much evil? Would not an all-good, and omnipotent God create a world without all this evil?” Even though Plantinga’s argument is a way for the Christian to logically get around the problem of evil, there is still the very good question “Why?.”
What is the “morally sufficient reason?” I have some ideas and would like to share them with you. Would you like to hear them?
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January 15, 2012 at 1:55 pm
Randy,thank you!
Plantinga commits another argument from ignorance with the unknown rational defense argument! Theists use of that argument and the argument from personal incredulity underlies their other arguments.
Google the problem of Heaven.
Burton Porter notes that instead of a contrast betwixt good and evil, one could be amongst good,better and best. Or there could just be less evil. He notes that some people undergo no harm themselves but aid others.
John Hick makes the straw man against the logical problem from evil with his all or nothing and slippery slippery arguments,noted in ” Evil and the Concept of God.” I maintain that his argument boomerangs onto him,because ti’s he who proclaims paradise in Heaven. He guesses that people might undergo some kind of purgatory and that there might be heavenly analogues to the virtues. Why not have them here in the first place?
Fr. Meslier’s the problem of Heaven*- becoming a more known argument- stresses that should free will exist in Heaven and a guarantee not to do wrong exists, then consistency, not a hobgoblin of little minds, would require the same for the Earth.
William Rowe’s evidential argument from evil poses a serious challenge to supernaturalists.
Everyone, please post at any of my many blogs. Thanks.
* Explaining Atheism: From Folly to Philosophy” David Lewis Steele
http://lordgriggs1947.wordpress.com
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January 17, 2012 at 12:10 pm
Randy,
I agree that we will still want to know why God would permit all the evil in the world, but the fact that we cannot figure out what His morally sufficient reasons might be does not mean that He does not have them, or that the presence of (so much) evil in the world is evidence against the existence of God. It’s not. The existence of evil and the existence of a good God may be perplexing, but it is not logically inconsistent. Indeed, I would contend that unless God exists, the concept of “evil” is meaningless. There can only be a problem of evil if God exists. And if God must exist in order for the problem to exist, then the problem of evil is not evidence against God’s existence, but for it.
Sure, go ahead.
Jason
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January 18, 2012 at 4:15 am
No! Please refrain from using the unknown reasn, for it is another argument from ignorance. Anybody can see evi,so, we don’t need Him to declare what is evil. Indeed, we’ve made moral progress since the Tanakh came to be that controverts some of what it calls evil and good!
Fr.Meslier’s the problem of Heaven eviscerates all theogicies and defenses.
Whilst order and regulaiity inhere in Nature, so do chaos and irregularity.God Himself would depend on those matters and natural laws,the primary cause such then that He cannot be the Primary Cause!
Of course, we fabbilists can err!
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January 19, 2012 at 1:23 pm
Griggs,
Appealing to morally sufficient reasons that God may have for permitting evil is not arguing from ignorance. To argue from ignorance is to say “I don’t know X, therefore Y is true.” Clearly that is not the form of the argument. Indeed, it’s technically not even an argument that I am making. Rather, it is an undercutting defeater to the atheist’s argument that God cannot exist because the existence of an omnibenevolent God is logically incompatible with the existence of evil in the world. To undercut that claim, the theist only needs to show a possible way in which the two are logically compatible. And indeed, if God were to have morally sufficient reasons (i.e. morally good reasons), then there is nothing logically compatible with a good God permitting evil. Whether God truly has such reasons is irrelevant. So also is the question of whether we can identify those reasons, or whether we are completely ignorant of them.
Personally, I think we can have a pretty good idea of God’s morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil in a general sense (it produces goods that could not be produced otherwise, soul-building, etc.). What I don’t think we can know is the morally sufficient reason(s) God has for permitting any one particular instance of evil. And for good reason: we can’t see the larger picture to know how this might abound for the greater good. It could cause a chain of events leading to the greater good in my own life in my immediate future, or in my distant future. Or it could cause a chain of events leading to the greater good in someone else’s life, or even someone else’s life in the distant future. We are just not in a place epistemitically to know, evaluate, or judge such things. But that should be no reason to conclude that it is not possible for God to have morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil.
Jason
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June 25, 2012 at 9:59 am
[…] I have already written an assessment of Stephen Law’s evil god challenge, after listening to Law engage in an informal debate on the […]
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January 12, 2017 at 9:46 am
“It would be a strange form of atheism that admits the existence of a God, but is merely agnostic concerning His moral nature!”
I am afraid I have just such a friend. He struggles with this for several years already. However, he is not concerned about this general argument from general evil in the world, he is more confused about apparent cases of God ordering people in the Old testament to do evil (aka genocide). Are you aware of some arguments that could help him? It seems this seriously endangers his spiritual life because he is not sure whether he can trust God or seek his will. Whether Jesus was not just lied to by the Father or something along those lines.
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January 12, 2017 at 10:53 pm
SeekingAnswers, I would suggest that he read Paul Copan’s book, Is God a Moral Monster? He deals with a lot of these kinds of subjects. He also has some online articles about it, so you can Google the subject with his name and I’m sure you’ll find something.
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