Monday, May 7th, 2007


A view of morality I am hearing more and more about in the public circle is the social contract theory. Contractarianism holds that “morality rests on a tacit agreement between rationally self-interested individuals to abide by certain rules because it is to their mutual advantage to do so.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–> There is nothing intrinsically wrong with murder, rape, or torture, for example, but since rational self-interested persons do not want these things being done to them, they agree to extend the same courtesy to others.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–> Philosopher, Edward Feser, offers at least six helpful criticisms of Contractarianism:

 

1. It’s really not a moral theory at all. It is a truce from Hobbes’ “war of all against all.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[3]<!–[endif]–> It is a replacement of morality for practicalities. Ultimately, contractarianism is the opposite of morality because morality often involves the denial of one’s self-interest. Contractarianism is the enshrining of selfishness.

2. One need only pretend to abide by the social contract. Since one behaves “morally” only in their own self-interest (not because they have an objective moral obligation to do so), then if they can secretly behave in ways that are opposed to others’ self-interests and get away with it, they have done nothing wrong.

3. There is no moral justification for claiming one ought to abide by the social contract.

4. Cannot say anyone is immoral. At best, they are being foolish for breaking the social contract, for in doing so they are working against their own self-interest.

5. Cannot provide any meaningful boundaries/restraints for punishing those who go outside the social contract. Why not kill those who steal? Why not torture them? What would be wrong with these punishments? We may choose not to, but contractarian theory offers no reason why we can’t should we choose to.

6. Fails to invoke moral duties to those outside the social contract, such as the mentally retarded. These people cannot assent to the contract, and since they cannot harm someone else, there is no reason to make a contract with them. Why not just kill a retarded person because we had a bad day at work?

 

Just like moral relativism (a close cousin), social contract theory is bankrupt as a moral philosophy.


<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–><!–[endif]–>

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>Edward Feser, “Contract Schmontract”; available from http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=012306B; Internet; accessed 02 February 2006.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–>Ibid.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–>Ibid.

Moral relativists have the difficult position of grounding their moral persuasions. Why should one do x and not y, given the relative nature of morals? For example, why should person p not murder person q when it is not in their interest to do so? A standard response is that murder is wrong because society has collectively determined it is wrong. This response invites three questions:


(1) What if a majority of society determined murder was acceptable? Would the relativist change his position to affirm that murder is morally acceptable? If not, why not?

(2) Why is person p obligated to abide by the dictates of the majority? After all, morals are just personal tastes. A cultural consensus is nothing more than the sum of individuals’ personal tastes. Why should person p be concerned about the personal tastes of the group? Why not assert his own interests over those of the group? Where does the moral obligation to follow the dictates of the majority come from?

(3) If morality is determined by the collective majority, is the moral relativist prepared to acknowledge that all minority views are, by definition, immoral? This would include such views as homosexuality, same-sex marriage, and cloning—all of which do not enjoy the support of a majority in society. A moral relativist cannot argue for the morality of homosexuality within a relativistic framework of morality in which society determines what is right.


The fact of the matter is that moral relativists have no grounding for morality. They try to ground it in the consensus of the public whole, but cannot ground the moral obligation to follow the public consensus in anything but thin air. Finally, they are inconsistent in their application of moral relativism. They try to argue that things such as same-sex marriage are good, even when the public consensus disagrees. They can’t have their cake and eat it too.