While I do not think the objectivity of moral values makes sense in an atheistic or purely naturalistic world, many atheists and naturalists affirm the objectivity of moral values anyway (for which I am happy). When you press them to explain what makes it wrong to steal, rape, or murder, however, they will often respond that such things are morally wrong because they cause unnecessary suffering. This is unhelpful. The question seeks to know the ontological grounding for the moral values that exist in the world. Rather than provide that grounding, the atheist appeals to another moral value (any X that causes unnecessary suffering is wrong). But you can’t explain what makes moral values “moral” by citing another moral value. The moral value that it is wrong to cause harm unnecessarily needs to be grounded ontologically just as much as the moral value that it is wrong to steal or right to tell the truth needs to be grounded ontologically. Since it can still be asked what makes it wrong to cause unnecessary harm, the ontological grounding for morality must go deeper.
Tuesday, March 13th, 2012
Daily Archive
March 13, 2012
Yes Moral Facts are Obvious, but the Question is Why?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments[3] Comments