There are two senses in which something can be considered good. Something can be good in a pragmatic sense: that which is the most effective means for obtaining some desired outcome. For example, if we desire to eat an ice cream cone without getting ice cream on our clothes, it is “good” to start eating from the top of the cone rather than the bottom. This kind of goodness is judged by something’s utility. It is considered good because it works well, and the human subject values the fact that it works well. We might call this kind of goodness “pragmatic goodness.”
Something can also be good in the sense that it has intrinsic moral virtue/character. For example, it is “good” to try to save someone who is drowning. This kind of goodness is judged by the intrinsic moral character of the act itself, rather than its utility. Indeed, risking one’s life to save a stranger has little utility for the rescuer, but great moral virtue nonetheless. This sort of goodness is not determined by what we desire or the value we attach to the outcome, but is rooted in the moral character of the act itself, wholly independent of what any human may think about it.[1] We might call this kind of goodness “moral goodness.” This is the kind of goodness moral philosophers have in mind when they talk about objective morality. (more…)
Thinking to Believe 