Apologetics

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October 27, 2008

Abortion Restrictions Reduce Abortions

Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Bioethics, Politics
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If anyone doubts this, see this piece in Public Discourse from The Witherspoon Institute (Princeton).

Some pro-lifers are arguing that the US Supreme Court is highly unlikely to overturn Roe, and thus we need to quit basing our vote largely on a candidate’s position on abortion.  Even if I agreed with this assessment of the future of Roe (I don’t), it does not follow that a politician’s position on abortion is irrelevant.  As the article makes clear, pro-life politicians who have passed laws restricting abortion are largely responsible for the declining abortion rates in this country.  Does anyone think pro-abortion politicians would have passed such restrictions?  Does anyone think that if pro-abortion politicians dominate public offices, they will not seek to undo those restrictions, and hence increase the number of abortions?  You betcha!

We have a choice between Obama and McCain for president.  Even if I granted that McCain will not appoint strict constructionists to the bench (as some say), or that those he appointed would not overturn Roe because of stare decisis, the fact remains that there would be fewer legal abortions under a McCain presidency than under an Obama presidency.  Each candidates’ position on abortion is relevant!  Obama has vowed to sign the Freedom of Choice Act if he becomes president. What would that do? It would repeal every restriction on abortion in every state in the union, including partial birth abortion.  He would also repeal the Hyde amendment which prevents the government from spending tax dollars to fund elective abortions.  A vote for Obama, then, is not equal to a vote for McCain.  The fact of the matter is that a vote for Obama will result in more dead babies than a vote for McCain, wholly apart from the future fate of Roe.

 

October 20, 2008

All-or-Nothing for South Dakota Right to Life

Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Bioethics, Politics
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Two years ago I reported on the outcome of South Dakota’s attempt to ban all abortions that were not necessary to save the life of the mother.  The initiative was narrowly defeated (56% no; 44% yes).  Polls indicated that a majority of voters would have supported the initiative if it included an exception for rape and incest as well.  I wrote back then, that while I agreed with the initiative as written, tactically and practically speaking, SD would have been better off to include the exceptions for rape and incest. 

Why?  Is it because I believe children conceived by rape and incest do not deserve the protection of the law?  No.  They do.  It’s because to date, we have not been able to persuade a majority of our fellow citizens that the circumstances surrounding conception make no moral difference to the question of abortion.  But many people, including those in South Dakota, recognize that abortion should be outlawed in all other circumstances.  So why not write an initiative that outlaws the abortions that a majority of people agree should be outlawed, and then work on outlawing the rest later?  Considering the fact that less than 1% of abortions are due to rape or incest (for 2006, only 0.004% of abortions in SD were due to rape/incest), such a bill would save 99% of babies currently being aborted. 

It just so happens that SD has an initiative on the November ballot similar to the 2006 version, but adding exceptions for rape and incest.  In a perfect world I would not support such a bill, but in an imperfect world I would-and I think all pro-lifers should.  But not all pro-life groups see it this way.  South Dakota Right to Life does not support the initiative because of the rape/incest exceptions.  For them, it’s all-or-nothing.  Since this bill does not go for a complete ban on abortion, they do not support it. 

I think this approach is wrong-headed.  It makes a statement, but does not effect change.  An incremental approach to outlawing abortion is better than an all-or-nothing approach, because an incremental approach has the effect of preventing a lot of abortions, whereas the all-or-nothing approach has proven to prevent none!  If we are truly pro-life, we should support any bill that has the effect of saving babies.  It is morally indefensible to vote against a bill that would save 99% of aborted babies from abortion, just because less than 1% will not be protected by the bill. 

While I do not doubt the sincerity of those who oppose incremental legislation like the one SD is proposing, I do doubt their wisdom.  They seem more interested in making a moral statement than they do with making a moral difference in our world.  This is morally irresponsible.  Being pro-life is not a position.  It is a goal, and to get to that goal we have to chip away at the culture of death bit-by-bit, just like William Wilberforce did to slavery in England.  We should not be opposed to steps that are taken in the right direction, just because they do not take us to the destination we see as ideal.

But isn’t this about conscience?  Some will argue that their conscience will not allow them to vote for a bill that would explicitly allow the abortion of some babies.  I do not doubt that this is true, but I do doubt that such a person has a properly informed conscience.  After all, if one’s conscience commends them for voting no on a bill that could have saved thousands upon thousands of innocent babies from medical execution, on the basis that they stood up for the right principle, something is seriously wrong with their conscience.  Yes, they stood up for the ideal principle, but they did not advance life when they had the chance to do so.  A properly informed conscience would condemn such an act as an abandonment of the very people we say we want to save.  Allowing thousands to die when we have the chance to stop it is hardly pro-life.

 

October 15, 2008

Existence and Necessity

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Philosophy, Theism, Theistic Arguments
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*Read previous post before reading this one.*

There is a difference between the question, Is existence necessary?, and Does X exist necessarily? The first question asks about existence in general, whereas the second asks about the existence of some specific thing within the larger domain of existence.

Regarding the first question, is it necessary that something exist? The answer to this question depends on whether one is speaking of historical possibility, or metaphysical possibility. Historically speaking, the answer is an emphatic yes. Something must exist, and must exist eternally. Why? Because something does exist. If there was ever a time when absolutely nothing existed, absolutely nothing would “exist” now, because nothing has no potentiality to ever become something. And yet there is something, so we know there has never been a time when nothing existed.

But from a metaphysical perspective, there is no reason to think existence itself is necessary. We can conceive of absolute nothingness. Furthermore, there is nothing logically incoherent about the concept of non-existence. Existence, then, is not necessary, but contingent, and contingent things require an explanation for their existence. What, then, is the explanation of existence? Why is there something, rather than nothing?

The second question is quite different. It does not ask whether existence itself is necessary, but whether the existence of some particular X is necessary. In cosmological arguments, X stands for the universe. Does the universe exist necessarily?

Some atheists assume the answer to this question is wrapped up in the first: Since something must exist eternally, the universe must be eternal. While it is true that something must have always existed, why think the universe is that something? Not only are there compelling scientific and philosophical reasons to think the universe exists contingently, but this begs the question in favor of atheism. It assumes materialism from the start (i.e. the universe is all that exists), reasoning that since something must be eternal, and the universe exhausts reality, then the universe must be eternal. But that the universe exhausts reality is what stands to be proven.

Secondly, thinking the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature is a grandiose claim that few philosophers are willing to countenance. To say the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature does not merely affirm the necessity of a universe in general, but the necessity of our universe in particular. It is an affirmation that the very fundamental particles of our universe–quarks, neutrons, electrons, etc.–are necessary, not just in kind, but in number and arrangement as well. But this is absurd. There is no reason to think the universe could not have been composed of a different set/number of fundamental particles, arranged in a different way, operating by a different set of physical laws, resulting in a totally different kind of universe. In fact, it is quite possible to conceive of a physically empty universe, or no universe at all. There is no physical or logical law that requires the universe to exist. So modal logic alone demonstrates the universe is not necessary. It is contingent, meaning it is metaphysically possible that it might have never been.

We can agree with the atheist that existence is necessary as a historical fact, and that the universe does not exist necessarily. But these two truths, coupled with the scientific and philosophic evidence for the finitude and contingency of the universe, provide a strong argument for a personal God. Something must exist eternally, and since the universe is not that something, it must be something else. Whatever caused the spatio-temporal-material universe to exist must itself be eternal, non-spatial, and immaterial.

Only two things fit such a description: abstract objects, or an unembodied mind. Since abstract objects are causally impotent by definition, they cannot be the cause of the universe, and thus are unlikely to be that which has always existed. That leaves us with an unembodied mind as the eternal reality. This makes sense. Not only are we are intimately acquainted with the idea of minds creating things, but it also makes sense of the design and order we see in the universe. An intelligent agent best explains why the universe exists as it does. Since an eternal, non-spatial, immaterial, intelligent mind is what most mean by “God,” it is best to conclude that God is that which exists eternally, and hence necessarily. He is a necessary being, who contains within Himself the sufficient reason for His own existence, and is the cause of everything else.

 

October 15, 2008

Why is there Something Rather than Nothing?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Theism, Theistic Arguments
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Something exists. For all but radical skeptics, this much is clear. But why does something exist? Why is there something rather than nothing at all? There is, after all, nothing logically incoherent about the concept of non-existence. It seems possible, at least, that nothing exist. So why is there something rather than nothing?

Interestingly, modern science has garnered several lines of empirical evidence highly suggestive that nonexistence was a historical reality. Cosmogonists hold that the physical universe came into being ex nihilo a finite time ago. Matter, space, and time all had their beginning at an absolute point of origin, before which there was no physical reality. While the scientific evidence does point to an absolute origin of physical reality, it does not preclude the possibility of a preexistent, immaterial reality from which the physical universe emerged-and thus does not require that physical existence emerge from absolute nonexistence. That question is left open, as it is beyond the realm of scientific inquiry.

Materialists, however, are only a little hesitant to deny the existence of such an immaterial reality, and subsequently affirm that the universe popped into being from literally nothing. As atheist and physicist, P.C.W. Davies wrote, “The coming-into-being of the universe as discussed in modern science…is not just a matter of imposing some sort of organization or structure upon a previous incoherent state, but literally the coming-into-being of all physical things from nothing.” This is echoed by physicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler: “At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo.” We have then, as a matter of historical fact, a point in time in which nothing existed-at least nothing physical. And yet now, physical reality exists. But why?

Traditionally, atheists punted on this question, responding that the existence of the universe is just a brute, inexplicable fact.1 As Bertrand Russell famously quipped, “The universe is just there, and that’s all.” This sort of response might work given an eternal universe, but it is preposterous to pass this off as an acceptable answer if the universe is finite and contingent. Everything that begins to exist has an external cause. If the universe began to exist, it stands to reason that it, too, requires an external cause. It is unbelievable and irrational to think the universe could just pop into existence uncaused from absolutely nothing.

When one reflects on it for a moment, however, Russell’s response is not rational even for an eternal universe. According to Leibnitz’s principle of sufficient reason, everything that exists has an explanation for its existence either in the necessity of its own nature, or in an external cause. An eternal universe cannot have an external cause, because that which is eternal is by definition uncaused. It exists by a necessity of its own nature. Given the principle of sufficient reason, then, the defender of an eternal universe must confess that the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature. And yet few atheists are willing to countenance the notion. And for good reason.

To say the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature does not merely affirm the necessity of a universe in general, but the necessity of our particular universe. It is an affirmation that the very fundamental particles of our universe-quarks, neutrons, electrons, etc.-are necessary, not just in kind, but in number and arrangement as well. But this is absurd. There is no reason to think the universe could not have been composed of a different kind/number of fundamental particles, arranged in a different way, operating by a different set of physical laws, resulting in a totally different kind of universe. In fact, it is quite possible to conceive of a physically empty universe, or no universe at all. There is no physical or logical law that requires the universe to exist.2 It is contingent, meaning it is metaphysically possible that it might have never been.

The defender of an eternal universe, then, is in the unusual spot of having to deny that the universe exists in virtue of an external cause, and not willing to accept that it exists by a necessity of its own nature. Whence does it exist, then? No sufficient reason is given, which is intellectually unacceptable. The atheist must offer an explanation for why the universe exists, or offer an explanation for why no explanation is necessary. Merely asserting that there is no explanation, or that the question is meaningless is not a satisfactory answer. Surely no atheist would accept this kind of answer for anything else. Indeed, atheists often challenge theists to explain why God exists, and are unwilling to accept the answer that He exists inexplicably. They rightly demand that His existence be explained, so on what grounds are they justified in exempting the universe from explanation?

To date, no atheist has provided a non-question begging explanation for why the universe does not require an explanation. Some argue that a cause of the universe is logically impossible, because any such cause would have to obtain prior to the universe. And yet, since nothing existed prior to the emergence of the universe, no cause can obtain. But this assumes all causal relations are temporal, and that the only possible state of affairs prior to the universe is a physical state of affairs. This begs the question in favor of materialism and atheism, and thus an explanation for why the universe needs no explanation still stands.

If no explanation as to why the universe does not require an explanation can be provided, then the atheist is under rational obligation to embrace an external cause as the sufficient reason for the universe, or the necessity of its own nature. Given the fact that the latter is absurd, it is more reasonable to embrace an external cause for the universe. In doing so, he will have to abandon his belief in an eternal universe, and embrace a finite universe, causing him to squarely face our original question: Why does the universe exist, rather than not?

Why and how did something emerge from nothing? The most basic ontological principle is that out of nothing, nothing comes; and yet in the case of the universe, out of nothing something came. There must be a sufficient cause for the universe to come into being, and that requires that something exist external to the universe. Given that whatever caused space, time, and matter to begin to exist cannot itself be spatial, temporal, or material, we are limited to two possible causes of the universe: abstract objects, or an unembodied mind.

Since abstract objects are causally impotent by definition, they cannot be the cause of the universe, and thus are unlikely to be that which has always existed. That leaves us with an unembodied mind as the eternal reality. This makes sense. Not only are we are intimately acquainted with the idea of minds creating things, but it also makes sense of the design and order we see in the universe. An intelligent agent best explains why the universe exists as it does.

Since an eternal, non-spatial, immaterial, intelligent mind is what most mean by “God,” it is best to conclude that God is that which has always existed. He is a necessary being, who contains within Himself the sufficient cause for His own existence, as well as the existence of everything else.

1. Some have also responded to the question of why the universe exists, that such a question is irrelevant. All that matters is that it does exist. But surely this is false. Imagine walking through the forest, and coming upon a translucent ball off the beaten path. Would it be relevant to ask why it exists, and from whence it came? Of course. An explanation of its existence is in order. It would be absurd to think there is no explanation for why it is there. Explicability would still be required even if we increased the size of the ball to the size of a planet, or even the size of the universe. Increasing its size does not remove the need for an explanation. Likewise, the universe begs for an explanation. Its size does not exempt it from the causal principle.
2. Even if there was such a law, it would itself have ontological existence, and thus we would still have to ask why it exists, ad infinitum.

 

October 14, 2008

Robert George on Obama and Abortion

Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Bioethics, Politics
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Robert George has an excellent article discussing Obama’s abortion extremism.  For those of you not familiar with George, he is a top-notch legal scholar and bioethicist.  He teaches jurisprudence at Princeton University, and is a member of the President’s Council on Bioethics.

 

October 13, 2008

Connecticut Supreme Court Imposes Same-Sex Marriage

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Politics, Same-sex Marriage
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It’s official.  Connecticut is now the third state in the nation to legalize same-sex marriage.  Just as Massachusetts and California, this was the result of a ruling by the state Supreme Court, not an expression of the will of the people.  It’s amazing how these courts keep discovering rights in their constitutions that hundreds of justices had not seen before!  I’m sure this will not be the last court to do so.  This seems to be a trend, and I see no end in sight.

According to the AP, the civil union law CT passed in 2005 essentially granted same-sex couples all the rights and benefits available to heterosexual married couples, so as I noted in my comments on the CA case in which same-sex marriage was legalized, it only makes sense to extend the name “marriage” to the package of benefits already conceded.  We are finding ourselves in the bed of our own making.  Did we honestly think we can give legal recognition and benefits to same-sex couples, and yet deny them the name by which we identify that packet of benefits?

 

October 6, 2008

Atheists Have Some ‘Splainin’ to Do

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Theistic Arguments
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Atheists like to think theists alone bear the burden of proof when it comes to the question of God’s existence. They assume atheism is the default position unless, and until sufficient evidence for God’s existence can be mustered. This is simply not true. Atheism is a worldview (or, more accurately, is a component of many worldviews), just like Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. All worldviews make truth-claims, and he who makes a truth-claim assumes the burden of proof to demonstrate the veracity of those claims, including atheists. Each worldview must stand on its own merits. The lack of evidence for other worldviews is not in itself evidence in favor of another. That’s why it is illegitimate to think a (supposed) lack of evidence for theism is itself evidence for atheism.

All worldviews are charged with explaining reality, both as it is, and as we experience it. Atheism is no exception. If anyone is to take their worldview seriously, atheists must explain the existence of the universe, free will, rationality, consciousness, and the like without reference to God. Indeed, they must show that an atheist explanation is superior, and more likely than other theistic alternatives. This project is doomed to failure. The explanatory scope and explanatory plausibility of atheism is inferior to theistic worldviews. How so?

Atheism requires that we believe the universe just popped into existence out of nowhere, caused by nothing. Theism, on the other hand, posits an eternal, intelligent agent who caused the universe to come into being. Unlike atheism, this is in line with our modal intuition that being only comes from being, not non-being.

Atheism requires that we believe free will is an illusion, because as mere physical stuff, humans are not exempt from the determinism inherent to purely physical systems. Theism, on the other hand, posits the existence of an immaterial entity within man, allowing him to transcend physical determinism, to freely choose among options undetermined by external physical constraints. Unlike atheism, this is in line with our experience of genuinely choosing A rather than B.

Atheism requires that we believe rationality developed by evolutionary means, and it is by pure accident that rationality helps us to discover truth about the world. Theism, on the other hand, posits that God is a rational being. Humans are rational because we are made in God’s image, and God desired to endow us with the means to discover true propositions about our world.

Atheism requires that we believe consciousness arise from non-conscious matter. Theism, on the other hand, posits that human consciousness arises from spiritual, rather than material substances. Consciousness is a function of the soul, and is derivative of the consciousness exemplified by a personal God.

Which worldview better explains the world and our experience of it? I think the answer is simple. Theism has greater explanatory scope and explanatory power than atheism, making theism the preferred worldview. Theism does not need to deny something so intuitive as the principle that being only comes from being, that every effect requires a prior cause, or that humans have causal powers undetermined by other material processes.

For further reading see my article titled Not so Fast: There is no Presumption of Atheism.

 

September 30, 2008

Evicting God from the Garden of Eden

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism
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The recent spate of anti-religion books written by militant atheists such as Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens make the charge that theism is not only wrong, but evil. It’s an interesting twist on the Biblical story of creation. According to Judaism and Christianity, in order to get evil out of the Garden man needed to be removed. According to the new atheists, in order to get evil out of the Garden we need to remove God Himself. Ironic?!

 

September 24, 2008

Quote of the Day

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Quote of the Day
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“Agnosticism seems to be a more tenable commitment than atheism. Problem is, in action one must act as if God does not exist (etsi deus non daretur), or as if He does. In action one must make a commitment that one cannot quite make on purely intellectual grounds. It is by our deeds that we show what we most deeply believe.”[1] 

[1]Michael Novak, “Empathizing with Atheists“

 

September 24, 2008

Euthanasia will not stay limited to the suffering terminally ill

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bioethics, Euthanasia
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Euthanasia advocates begin their advocacy by assuring us suicide will only be permitted for the terminally ill who are suffering great pain.  That’s what they say.  But it’s not long after suicide is legalized that those same advocates push for expanding suicide to the non-terminally ill, and expand the definition of suffering to include emotional suffering.  We’ve seen this kind of thing in Belgium and the Netherlands.  In fact, in those two countries we’ve seen euthanasia expand from a voluntary choice, to non-voluntary, and even involuntary.  

England is pushing for Euthanasia.  Ironically, one of their leading bioethicists is being honest about what circumstances she thinks euthanasia should be legal in before “basic” euthanasia is legalized.  During a recent interview for the October 2008 edition of Life & Work-a Church of Scotland publication-Baroness Mary Warnock made the following assertions about the duty to die: “If you’re demented, you’re wasting people’s lives – your family’s lives – and you’re wasting the resources of the National Health Service.”  She is very clear that the right and duty to die is not tied to insufferable pain: “I’m absolutely, fully in agreement with the argument that if pain is insufferable, then someone should be given help to die, but I feel there’s a wider argument that if somebody absolutely, desperately wants to die because they’re a burden to their family, or the state, then I think they too should be allowed to die.”[1] 

Don’t buy into the “it will only be limited to the terminally ill and suffering” polemic.  It’s not true. 

 

HT: Al Mohler

[1]“A Duty to Die?” in Life and Work, October 2008; available from www.churchofscotland.org.uk.

 

September 18, 2008

To speak of Nothing is to Speak of Something, and Yet it Remains Nothing

Posted by Jason Dulle under Philosophy, Thinking
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Some concepts are so heady that they are difficult to put into words.  For example, how does one talk about what God was doing before creation, when creation marks the beginning of temporality?  There cannot be a “before” the beginning, and yet we can conceive of God’s existence before time began.  While it is difficult to put this into words, one way of doing so is to speak of God existing “without the universe.”  Problem solved. 

There are other concepts, however, which are impossible to put them into words.  Consider “nothing.”  It is impossible for us to even imagine nothingness, yet alone to reduce it to words.  For example, according to the Big Bang theory of cosmic origins our universe came into existence from literally nothing about 13.7 billion years ago.  But to say our universe came into existence “from” nothing treats nothing as if it were somewhere from which the universe emerged.  It isn’t, and that’s not what scientists mean to say, but that is the picture that emerges when we try reducing this concept to words.  

We might even conceive of a “time when nothing existed,” but this too is unintelligible.  There cannot be a “time” when nothing existed, because a state of nothingness includes the absence of temporality.  I’ve done it again.  I referred to nothingness as a “state,” but it is not a state.  It is nothing!  The fact of the matter is that no matter how we choose to refer to the concept, the moment we do so, we reify it in the process.  We do the same thing for other concepts.  Consider darkness.  Darkness, as such, does not exist.  It is the absence of all light.  And yet the moment we refer to “darkness,” we reify it, as if it were an existent.  This is a shortcoming of language we have to live with, but we need to be cognizant of the fact that speaking of nothingness, or of something coming from nothing, does not mean nothing is something.  It means no-thing.

 

September 14, 2008

Theism is not Falsifiable. So What?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Logic, Theism
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During Greg Koukl’s August 10th radio broadcast, he shared some thoughts about the criterion of falsifiability as it relates to theism, that I found worth passing on (with some expansion and commentary of my own).

Some claim theistic belief is not reasonable, because theism cannot be falsified.  For something to be falsifiable requires that there be an imagined set of circumstances that would demonstrate a particular view to be false.  For example, Christianity would be falsified if archaeologists ever unearthed Jesus’ body from a grave outside Jerusalem.  The idea behind the principle of falsifiability is that if, in principle, there can be no evidence that counts against a view, then it is not possible to have a reasonable conversation about the merits of the view.

While this is a useful principle, clearly it is not an absolute criterion for a theory/belief to be reasonable, nor is it necessary to have a reasonable conversation about its merits.  For example, consider the belief that you exist.  Can you imagine any set of circumstances that could convince you that you do not exist?  No.  It is inconceivable.  And yet we are fully reasonable in our belief that we exist.

While falsifiability is a useful way to evaluate a theory/belief, the merits of that theory/belief do not hang on its falsifiability.  Its merits hang on the evidence in its favor.  Theism has several lines of evidence in its favor.  That body of evidence serves as the basis for a reasonable dialogue concerning the veridicality of theism.

More to the heart of the matter, falsifiability cannot be an appropriate test for theism because it is impossible to falsify a universal negative.  And in order to falsify God’s existence, one would have to prove a universal negative: God does not exist.

To be fair, I should qualify my statement that a universal negative cannot be proven.  While a universal negative cannot be proven empirically, it can be proven logically.  If something is logically contradictory, or incoherent, we can be sure it does not exist.  For example, I can prove there are no square circles.  I cannot, and need not do so empirically, but I can do so logically.  The concept of a square circle is incoherent, and thus square circles cannot exist.  Some atheists contend that theism is logically incoherent, but few have been persuaded of their arguments.  In the past, the most common attempt to show theism was incoherent was the problem of evil.  It was reasoned that if God is all good and all powerful as theism claims, evil should not exist.  And yet it does, hence, theism must be false.  Philosophers have since come to realize that the existence of evil is logically compatible with the existence of an all-powerful and all-loving God.  It stands, then, that the very nature of theism is that it cannot be falsified, and thus this should not count against the view.  The focus should be on the evidence for theism, not its unfalsifiability.

 

September 8, 2008

Cogito Ergo Mistako?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Logic, Philosophy, Thinking
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Renee Descartes was the first modern philosopher. He was a rationalist. His goal was to ground knowledge in something that could not be doubted. He found such a grounding in his famous formulation, Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). The question to be answered was how he could know he existed. The answer was to be found in his act of contemplation of the very question. To contemplate existence requires a contemplator who exists. That he was thinking about doubt was something he could not rationally doubt, and thus concluded he knows indubitably that he exists. He reasoned deductively as follows:

P1 The act of thinking requires the existence of a thinker
P2 I experience the act of thinking
______________________________________________
I exist as a thinker

Some argue that Descartes key insight actually turns out to depend on a logical fallacy: begging the question. The question is whether there exists a personal subject, “I.” And yet “I” is smuggled into the second premise of the argument. That is question-begging, for it assumes there is an I to experience the act of thinking, and then concludes that there is an I who thinks. I am conflicted about this. On the one hand, this seems reasonable to me. Descartes reasoning does seem to beg the question. On the other hand, Descartes argument seems valid: the ability to contemplate one’s existence requires that they exist. What do you think?

If Descartes did beg the question, invalidating his argument, then it seems there is no non-question-begging argument that could indubitably prove I exist. Of course, this does not mean I do not exist. I do, and I know I do. It simply means we can’t demonstrate how we know this, other than an appeal to basic intuition.

I think this is a helpful lesson for skeptics. One does not need to be able to prove (or know how) X is true in order to know X is true. Some truths are properly basic; i.e. they are self-evident, do not need to be questioned, and do not need evidential demonstration.

 

UPDATE 3/1/17: Perhaps the supposed question-begging nature of the argument is merely the fault of how analytic philosophers structure the argument. For example, if we state the argument as follows, it does not beg the question:

P1 The act of thinking requires the existence of a thinker
P2 There are acts of thinking ______________________________________________
Thinkers must exist

 

August 27, 2008

Deceiving Students for the Cause of Evolution

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Evolution
[9] Comments 

Chronobiologist Bora Zivkovic, who is the online community manager for the Public Library of Science (PLoS), had some interesting things to say about the teaching of evolution.  Zivkovic recognizes that teaching evolutionary theory to those who have religious objections to it can be difficult.  Zivkovic also recognizes that some of the “proofs” for evolution are not accurate.  Is he advocating that those proofs be abandoned?  Not at all.  So long as they are useful in converting creationists to the cause of evolution, he is all for it: 

You cannot bludgeon kids with truth (or insult their religion, i.e., their parents and friends) and hope they will smile and believe you. Yes, NOMA [Non-Overlapping Magasterium, which means science and religion are in two entirely different spheres of thought that have no bearing on one another] is wrong, but is a good first tool for gaining trust. You have to bring them over to your side, gain their trust, and then hold their hands and help them step by step. And on that slow journey, which will be painful for many of them, it is OK to use some inaccuracies temporarily if they help you reach the students. If a student…goes on to study biology, then he or she will unlearn the inaccuracies in time. If most of the students do not, but those cutesy examples help them accept evolution, then it is OK if they keep some of those little inaccuracies for the rest of their lives. It is perfectly fine if they keep thinking that Mickey Mouse evolved as long as they think evolution is fine and dandy overall. Without Mickey, they may have become Creationist activists instead. Without belief in NOMA they would have never accepted anything, and well, so be it. Better NOMA-believers than Creationists, don’t you think?

 It’s scary to realize that some evolutionists are so intent on spreading their scientific dogma, that they are willing to deceive their students to accomplish their goal.  ‘Tell them whatever you need to tell them so they’ll join us,’ appears to be the motto.  Very sad. 

 

HT: Evolution News & Views

 

August 27, 2008

Bias?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bioethics, Stem Cell Research
1 Comment 

In my former post, I liked to an article by Rob Stein of the Washington Post.  While the article was well-written, and very informative, I was troubled by one line in particular.  Richard Doerflinger, of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, has been a prominent feature in the stem cell debates.  He is critical of embryonic stem cell research, but supportive of adult stem cell research.  Here is how Stein prefaced Doerflinger’s response to the news of this breakthrough: “Even the harshest critics of embryonic stem cell research hailed the development as a major, welcome development.”  He then goes on to quote Doerflinger. 

It seems to me that Stein’s emphasis is entirely misplaced given the subject at hand.  Embryonic stem cell research was not the topic at hand, so why bring up Doerflinger’s position on that research?  How is it relevant?  

Furthermore, by prefacing Doerflinger’s quote by saying “even the harshest critics…”, it conveys the idea that Doerflinger would normally be opposed to something like this, but even he thinks it’s great.  The fact of the matter is that Doerflinger is a strong proponent of the very kind of research Stein was writing about.  A more proper and fitting preface would have been, “The strongest proponents of adult stem cell research could not have been more pleased with this breakthrough.  As Richard Doerflinger has said….”  

The fact that his comments were prefaced with a negative tone, related to a different topic, makes me think Stein might have a bias against those who oppose embryonic stem cell research–a bias so strong, that he cannot help but to express it, even in an article that celebrates the success of the very kind of research his ideological opponents have championed.  

Or maybe it was his way of trying to tie this breakthrough into the larger debate over embryonic vs. adult stem cells.  I don’t know, but either way, he seemed to poison the well before letting Doerflinger have his say, and it wasn’t fair.  After all, he never prefaced the comments of embryonic stem cell supporters with, “Even those most critical of the ultimate value of adult stem cell research hailed the breakthrough as a welcome development.”  What else are we to conclude? 

I emailed Mr. Stein these questions.  We’ll see if he responds.

 

August 27, 2008

Adult Stem Cells Repgrogrammed in vivo

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bioethics, Stem Cell Research
1 Comment 

In a major breakthrough, Harvard scientists have been able to reprogram adult pancreatic stem cells into beta cells capable of producing insulin, simply by flipping three genetic switches.  That is cool enough in itself, but the real kicker is that they did this in vivo.  

Last year it was shown that an adult stem cell could be reverted back to an embryonic-like state (induced pluripontent stem cells).  But this process is one that takes place in vitro.  Not only do the stem cells need to be removed from the body, but then they need to be reverted to an embryonic state, then coaxed into differentiating into the desired cell type, and finally be placed back in the body for therapeutic purposes.  The Harvard team skipped all but the third step.  They have shown that adult stem cells can be transformed into other types of cells without being removed from the body, and without having to be retovertered into embryonic form.  Not only does this make for a less invasive procedure, but it would also avoid the current problem facing embryonic and embryonic-like stem cells: tumor formation.  

While this is definitely a big breakthrough, only time will tell whether it can be safely used in humans, and how many conditions can be treated with this procedure.  One thing seems certain, however: this is just one more nail in the coffin for embryonic stem cell research.  It is becoming both impractical, and irrelevant.

 

August 25, 2008

Abortion Should be A Right Even if the Unborn are Human Beings

Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Bioethics, Politics
[6] Comments 

This is how Nancy Pelosi answered Tom Brokaw’s question about when life begins: “I would say that as an ardent practicing Catholic this is an issue that I have studied for a long time, and what I know is over the centuries the doctors of the Church have not been able to make that definition. And St. Augustine said three months. We don’t know. The point is it that it shouldn’t have an impact on a woman’s right to chose.”

Does she really mean to say that if we did know when life begins (which we do), and it turns out life begins prior to the time abortions are allowed, that this should not impact a woman’s right to have an abortion?  Is Pelosi so pro-abortion, that even in when the evidence is clear that what is being aborted is a living human being, that the right to an abortion trumps the life guaranteed to that human being in the Constitution?  Talk about a radical position!

HT: Justin Taylor

 

August 25, 2008

Possibility and Existence

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments
[2] Comments 

According to David Berlinski, Thomas Aquinas argued the universe must have begun at a finite time in the past by appealing to Diodorus’s (1st cent. B.C. Greek philosopher) view of possibility: if it is possible that something not exist, then it is certain that at some time or another it did not exist.  Only that which has a necessary existence can be, and must be eternal. [1]

 

Aquinas argued that while our universe does exist, it does not have to exist.  It is contingent, not necessary.  This much seems reasonable.  After all, it is possible to conceive of our universe not existing.  There is nothing about the physical constituents of the universe that demands they exist.  Using Diodorus’s principle, Aquinas concluded that since it is possible that our universe not exist, then it is certain that at some time in the past it did not exist. 

 

Berlinksi thinks Aquinas’ argument commits the fallacy of composition (e.g. just because every part of an elephant is light, does not mean the elephant as a whole is light).  He argues that while Diodorus’s principle might be true of things in the universe, it is not necessarily true of the universe as a whole.  But I think Berlinski misses the point.  The point is that only necessary things must exist eternally.  Nothing else needs to, or can for that matter.  Contingent things have causes, and hence beginnings.

 

What do you think of Aquinas’s argument, Berlinski’s criticism, or my response?  I tend to think this is a decent argument for the finitude of the universe.  What do you think?

 

 [1]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 85. 

 

August 14, 2008

Is This a Good Argument for a Finite Universe?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments
[11] Comments 

David Berlinksi, an agnostic philosopher and mathematician, summarizes one of the philosophical arguments for a past-finite universe as follows:

“If a series of causes do not start, it cannot get going, and if it does not get going, then there will be no intermediate causes, and if there are no intermediate causes, then over here, where we have just noticed that a blow has caused a bruise, there is no explanation for what is before our eyes.[1] Either there is a first cause or there is no cause at all, and since there are causes at work in nature, there must be a first.[2]

Essentially, the argument is that the universe must have a finite past because we experience intermediate causes, and intermediate causes would not be possible if they were not preceded by a first cause that began the whole series.

Berlinksi thinks this is a weak, but not an absurd argument. Personally, I am conflicted about its cogency. On the one hand, it does appear weak. It rests on a tautology, and begs the question. To see how, let’s put the argument in deductive form:

P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If a causal series does not begin, it cannot get going
P3 If a causal series cannot get going, there will be no intermediate causes
P4 We experience intermediate causes
P5 Therefore a causal chain got going
P6 Therefore a causal chain began
P7 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past

Premise 2 is clearly a tautology. It could be restated as “only that which begins, starts,” or “only that which begins, begins.” Not only is this an unhelpful truism, but it begs the question. In saying a causal series cannot “get going” unless it “begins” is to assume from the start what needs to be proved: that the universe “got going” as opposed to “has always been going.”[3] Says who? If the universe is eternal, nothing ever “got going,” and yet, clearly, there exists a causal series that “is going.” One cannot just stipulate that a causal series cannot exist unless it had a beginning, and then conclude that since a causal series does exist, it must have begun. One must demonstrate why it is that a causal series that did not begin cannot be.[4] I think this can be done.

A causal chain must begin with a first cause to avoid the problem of the impossibility of traversing an infinite. Just as it would be impossible to reach the top step of an infinite staircase, it is impossible to traverse an infinite number of past moments to reach the present. An endless series of events, by definition, has no end, and yet today would mark the end of that series. The concept of an infinite past, then, is incoherent. The past cannot consist of an infinite number of causal events. There had to be a first cause in the finite past that caused all subsequent, intermediate causes. In other words, it is impossible for there to be intermediate causes unless they find their origin in a first cause.

While this vindicates the conclusion of the original argument, it rests on premises that are so different that it can hardly be said to be a modification of the original argument. It seems to be a separate argument altogether. In deductive form the “modified” argument would appear as follows:

P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If the causal series is infinite, today would mark the completion of that series
P3 It is impossible to complete an infinite series of events
P4 Therefore the causal series of events had a beginning
P5 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past

Does this mean, then, that the original argument should be discarded? Is the tautological nature of premise 2 beyond repair, dooming the entire argument? What do you think of my criticism of the argument? What about my logic? I have been thinking and writing on this for about five hours now. The more I think about it, and the more I write about it, the murkier it gets in my mind. I would appreciate the input of someone who is taking a fresh look at this argument for their insights. Thanks!

[1]Berlinski seems to have made a mental slip in saying the “blow has caused a bruise,” for this assumes a casually-connected chain of at least two events. But according to the argument, no causal relationship can be established between any events unless there is a first cause. As the argument goes, not only would we be unable to explain the cause of the blow, but we would be unable even to say the blow was causally related to the bruise.
[2]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 68-69.
[3]Not only does premise 2 beg the question, but it stacks the deck in favor of a past-finite universe by declaring that a causal series of events, to be an actual causal series of events, must have a beginning event. This is little short of definitional fiat.
[4]It should be pointed out that the defender of an eternal universe has no explanation for the causal series. If only that which has a beginning needs a cause, and the causal series has no beginning because the universe has no beginning, then there can’t be any cause or reason for it. It’s just been going on forever, inexplicably. This is not an intellectually satisfying answer, for it goes against our causal intuitions that everything has a cause, and an infinite regression of causes is impossible. Our causal intuitions tell us the regress must stop at some ultimate cause.

 

August 12, 2008

We are Not Living in a Post-Modern World

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics | Tags: |
[2] Comments 

These days, it is common to hear that we are living in a post-modern society. I have echoed this many times myself. William Lane Craig, however, argues that this is serious a misdiagnosis of culture. According to Craig, not only is post-modernism unlivable, but it is not the cause of the religious and moral relativism of our day. Craig argues that these phenomena are outgrowths of modernism, particularly the mid-20th century philosophy of Verificationism. Rather than living in a post-modern culture, we are living in a post-Christian culture.

 

 

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