Apologetics


I had an experience today that is instructive in what not to do, tactically speaking. I was composing a response to a question about free will while riding the train home from work. The train was less than a minute from its destination, when the gentleman next to me—having noticed what I was writing about—asked me if I studied theology. I explained that I do, at which point he asked me, “Do you really believe in what you are writing about?” By this time the train had come to a complete stop, and the man was getting out of his seat to exit the train. As I was putting my computer in my bag I answered him, “Yes, actually I do.” As he continued to walk away I added in a slightly louder voice, “And for good reason.” But it was too late. He was already walking out the door.

 

Hindsight is always 20/20, this being no exception. I missed out on the chance of continuing our dialogue by giving a direct answer to the gentleman’s question. What I should have done is responded with a question. I might have asked an open-ended question such as, “What do you mean by believe?” or “What is it you think I am claiming to believe?” That would have compelled him to stick around a little longer, rather than continue his commute home. Who knows where the conversation would have ended had I done so. Lesson learned.

While the law is a moral enterprise on its face, it is not possible, nor is it wise to legislate against every kind of moral wrong.For example, while it is morally wrong to deliberately harm one’s body, and smoking cigarettes deliberately harms one’s body, it is generally not advisable to deny one the freedom to smoke cigarettes by outlawing smoking.The general principle is that we should only legislate against moral wrongs that have a major impact on the common good, or interfere with the exercise of the fundamental rights of our fellow citizens.A certain measure of liberty should be left to the individual to choose even those things that are morally wrong, because outlawing that evil may result in an overall increase in evil, and because it is practically impossible for the State to legislate against every form of moral wrong, yet alone to enforce it.

Some attempt to employ this principle as an argument for the legalization of same-sex marriage.It is argued that since liberty is to be preferred to constraint unless an exercise of liberty is to the detriment of the common good, the liberty of marriage should be extended to same-sex couples (even though same-sex marriage is immoral) because same-sex relationships are not detrimental to the public good.How might opponents of same-sex marriage respond to this argument?

While it is true that we should not legislate against all instances of moral wrong, this principle cannot be employed indiscriminately.If it were, no laws aimed at prohibiting immoral behavior could be passed!The burden of proof is on the person arguing we should not legislate against this or that particular moral wrong, to show why we should not do so.In this case, it is being argued that same-sex marriage, though morally wrong, does not negatively affect the public good.Like smoking, then, it should not be prohibited.Is it true that same-sex marriage will not impact the public good in a negative way?There are good reasons to think this is false.

First, extending the institution of marriage to same-sex couples is social declaration that homosexual sex/relationships and heterosexual sex/relationships are equal.This is manifestly false.The purpose of heterosexual sex and homosexual sex are very different (the former is for procreation and recreation, while the latter is only for recreation), as well as the health risks involved with both behaviors.There are virtually no health risks for engaging in monogamous heterosexual sex, but there are many health risks for engaging in (even) monogamous homosexual acts.

Second, it is a social declaration that moms and dads are not necessary for optimal child development.There is no denying the fact that the legal recognition of same-sex couples to adopt and rear children naturally and legally follows from the legal recognition of same-sex relationships as a valid form of civil marriage (in some instances the legal right to adopt actually precedes the legal recognition of same-sex relationships as a valid form of civil marriage).Granting marriage rights to same-sex couples, then, has ramifications for child-rearing.To recognize same-sex relationships as civil marriage is a tacit admission that moms and dads are not necessary for optimal child development—that two moms or two dads will equally suffice.This is wrong.Both moms and dads are needed for optimal child development.

This argument also fails because it ignores the critical difference between allowing people to participate in certain immoral behaviors without the threat of law, and actively declaring through the law that such behaviors are legally protected.The law is a moral teacher.To enshrine something into law is to make a moral declaration about that something: that it is good, or that it is bad.To give legal sanction to same-sex marriage where such sanction did not exist previously would require the creation of new legislation to redefine the institution of marriage.This legislation would have the effect of actively declaring that our society finds same-sex marriage to be a moral good.This is utterly different than the situation we find ourselves in today, in which same-sex couples can openly engage in committed relationships with one another, but without the blessing of society.The difference is one of social approval.Allowing them to engage in committed relationships without the threat of law is to grant them liberty; sanctioning their relationships by enacting laws recognizing their relationships as valid instantiations of civil marriage is to grant them social acceptance.

Ultimately, then, the argument from liberty fails.We should not open up the institution of marriage to same-sex couples.Not only would same-sex marriage negatively impact the common good of our society, but doing so would have the implicit effect of teaching society that a moral wrong is a moral good.

Journalist Denyse O’Leary co-authored a book with neuroscientist Mario Beauregard titled The Spiritual Brain. The book explores evidence for the existence of mind/soul from the field of neuroscience. One of the evidences they present is the placebo effect. The placebo effect is when people feel better because they think they are supposed to feel better. I would highly recommend the book, but in the meantime I will direct you to a short article Denyse wrote giving concrete evidence of the placebo effect in medicine. It’s very interesting.

When the topic of abortion comes up, invariably the question of when life begins is put forth. And invariably, someone will claim that no one knows when life begins (most often, but not always, this will be the person supporting abortion rights). And invariably, they will use this “fact” as the basis on which to argue that the decision to abort or not abort is a personal decision that government should not meddle in.

This logic has always struck me as odd. It seems to me that ignorance of when a human life begins is the best reason not to abort the unborn, and the best reason for government to step in and put a moratorium on the procedure until the question is finally and fully answered. But that is not what I want to focus on here. I want to focus on a quick tactical response to the assertion that ignorance regarding when life begins requires the government not to interfere with a woman’s choice to abort.

We might respond to this assertion by asking, “Does that mean that if it could be determined when life begins, and we discover that it begins at conception, you would agree that government should interfere in the choice of others to abort their babies? If they say no, then it exposes their argument as a front. They think women should have the legal right to choose an abortion even if the unborn is a human being.

If they say yes, then point out to them that the question of when life begins has been settled for decades. A new, distinct human life begins at conception. Offer proof, such as quotes from standard texts on embryology. If they truly think the right to abortion free from government interference is justified on the basis of ignorance about when life begins, they should change their mind on the matter upon confirming the evidence. If they persist in their pro-abortion anti-government-involvement stance, chances are their argument was just a front for a deeply held belief/desire they have no intention of giving up. They are pro-abortion for reasons other than what they stated: emotional and preferential, rather than rational. In my own personal experience I have found that most pro-abortion advocates will maintain their belief in abortion rights, even when all of their rational arguments have been demonstrated to be fallacious or mistaken. But even with these people, at least the question serves to get to the heart of the matter, and expose their true commitments for what they are.

Radio host, Andrew Tallman, has been running a series over at Townhall on the topic of capital punishment that is absolutely superb. He makes a persuasive case for capital punishment, and does an outstanding job answering both religious and secular objections to it. I would highly recommend his articles on this subject.

In a recent 60 minutes interview, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia shared his thoughts on abortion. In response to a question about how his Catholicism affects his judicial decisions, Scalia said:

“I’m a law-and-order guy. I mean, I confess I’m a social conservative, but it does not affect my views on cases. On the abortion thing for example, if indeed I were, you know, trying to impose my own views, I would not only be opposed to Roe versus Wade, I would be in favor of the opposite view, which the anti-abortion people would like adopted, which is to interpret the Constitution to mean that a state must prohibit abortion. … There’s nothing there. They did not write about that.”

A little later he continued in the same vein:

“My job is to interpret the Constitution accurately. And indeed, there are anti-abortion people who think that the constitution requires a state to prohibit abortion. They say that the Equal Protection Clause requires that you treat a helpless human being that’s still in the womb the way you treat other human beings. I think that’s wrong. I think when the Constitution says that persons are entitled to equal protection of the laws, I think it clearly means walking-around persons. You don’t count pregnant women twice.”

I’m not so sure I agree with Scalia’s hyper-originalism here (I think a good case can be made that abortion is unconstitutional), but pro-life advocates need to take notice of what he said. Some pro-life supporters are not only hoping for Roe v Wade to be overturned by the Supreme Court in the near future, but they are hoping the Supreme Court will completely reverse itself, and declare that the Constitution protects the life of the unborn as well as the born. This would invalidate all democratically instituted abortion laws, just as Roe invalidated all democratically instituted anti-abortion laws. Scalia is one of the most conservative judges on the Supreme Court. If he does not think abortion is unconstitutional, there is virtually no chance the Supreme Court will ever decide as much in our lifetime, if ever. At best the Supreme Court will overturn Roe, returning the issue of abortion back to the states, and giving us the opportunity to persuade our fellow citizens to outlaw abortion in our state, in every state across the nation.

Modern science is guided by the philosophy or methodology of naturalism. This means they either believe that, or go about their discipline acting as if God does not exist, or at least is not involved with the cosmos. As a result, most scientists deny that a designing intelligence is the cause of life on Earth. And yet the more scientists seek to find a naturalistic explanation for the origin of life on Earth, the more impossible it seems. Some have gone so far as to suggest that life must have been seeded on Earth by an alien civilization. This, of course, allows for the presence of a designing intelligence. To my amazement, Richard Dawkins holds this out as a scientific possibility. In the documentary, Expelled: No Intelligence Allowed, Ben Stein asked Richard Dawkins how life began. After admitting that scientists do not know, Dawkins held out the possibility that life on Earth was seeded by aliens, and considered this a scientific hypothesis. The exchange was as follows:

BEN STEIN: What do you think is the possibility that Intelligent Design might turn out to be the answer to some issues in genetics or in evolution.
DAWKINS: Well, it could come about in the following way. It could be that at some earlier time, somewhere in the universe, a civilization evolved, probably by some kind of Darwinian means, probably to a very high level of technology, and designed a form of life that they seeded onto perhaps this planet. Now, um, now that is a possibility, and an intriguing possibility. And I suppose it’s possible that you might find evidence for that if you look at the details of biochemistry, molecular biology, you might find a signature of some sort of designer.

Four things are of interest, here. First, when scientists have to resort to aliens to explain how life on Earth could have originated, you know they have no clue at all about the origin of life!

Secondly, Dawkins admits that design is empirically detectable. If that is true, then contrary to the anti-ID talking points, Intelligent Design is a genuine scientific theory.

Thirdly, this hypothesis—even if true—would not explain the origin of life in general, but only the origin of life on Earth. Alien life would go unexplained.

Fourthly, he is willing to countenance the possibility that a designing intelligence is responsible for life on Earth, so long as that designer is not a divine being. This reveals the fact that he not truly opposed to the existence of genuine design in biology, but simply prejudiced against the existence of a divine designer.

This says a lot.

“Ignorance may be bliss, but it is not a virtue.” –D.A. Carson, Exegetical Fallacies, p. 23

Who Was Adam? by Fazale Rana and Hugh Ross

Rana and Ross build a Biblical model of human origins, and then subject it to scientific testing. Point by point they show how a Biblical model of human origins fits the data much better than an evolutionary model. Anyone who doubts that creationist models can be tested scientifically or that human evolution is a shut case should read this book.

There is a good survey of major fossil finds, and how anthropaleontologists have gone about interpreting them. It’s interesting to discover how the experts are far from decided on the proper interpretation. There is not one evolutionary tree of human origins, but multiple trees. And the more data we gather, the more the trees appear to rot.

A lot of time is spent on research into the age and relationship of humans and other hominids. Good stuff.

Five Views On Apologetics edited by Steven Cowan

If you aren’t into (and I mean really into) apologetics, you probably won’t enjoy this book. But if you are, it’s a must read. It is one of Zondervan’s Point-Counterpoint books. Five apologists are featured, each making a case that his apologetic philosophy and methodology is the preferred strategy. There is a good discussion on the role of apologetics in evangelism, what we should expect our apologetic to do, whether faith is warranted without evidence, and the like.

The law of non-contradiction (LNC) states that A cannot be both A and not A at the same time and in the same way. For example, my car cannot be said to be both in the garage and not in the garage at the same time and in the same way. It could only be both in the garage and not in the garage at the same time if by being “in the garage” in the first instance means something different than it does in the second. For example, it would not be a contradiction if in the first instance I mean to refer to the body shop where my car is being repaired, and in the second instance I mean to refer to its normal storage space where it is currently absent.


 

Postmodern types disparage the LNC (as with all laws of logic) as a Western invention. No argument is made for such a claim. It is just asserted (any argument offered against the LNC would require them to presuppose its truth, because the premises and conclusion of the argument are not the same as their negation). I have a sneaking suspicion I know why they want to axe the LNC: their worldview is inherently self-contradictory.

 

Postmodernism claims there is no truth, or that truth cannot be known. And yet, this is a contradiction because the claim that there is no truth, or that truth cannot be known is itself a claim to know something that is true. If the LNC is true, then postmodernism is false. The LNC must be axed to save postmodernism as a worldview.


 

When you point out the self-referential and incoherent nature of postmodernism, the postmodernist will retort that such an analysis depends on the LNC. Since the LNC is a Western invention, it is inappropriate to subject postmodernism to its criterion. In fact, doing so is just a power play to subjugate others.


 

What can you say to those who deny the LNC? Greg Koukl has offered a good strategy. When someone claims the LNC is not true, but an invention of Western logic, respond, “So what you are saying, then, is that the LNC is true?” They will protest, “No, I am saying it is not true.” We might respond, “Oh, so you are saying the law of contradiction is true, then. Thank you for clarifying.” Frustratingly they will reply, “No, no. That is not what I am claiming. I am claiming the LNC is not true.” We might graciously answer, “Exactly. That is what I said you said: The LNC is true.”

 

I would venture to say they would be exasperated with you by this point; aggravated that you would contradict But this exposes the very problem with their claim that the LNC is a Western convention, rather than a universal and necessary feature of human rationality. While they deny the LNC with their lips, they cannot help but to recognize that “is” and “is not” are contradictory, and thus your restatement of their view contradicts their stated view. That is inescapably self-refuting. They cannot deny the existence of contradictions on the one hand, and then correct your contradiction on the other.

 

 

For a person who truly believes the LNC is a fiction of Western logic, the only appropriate response to your restatement is a confirmatory, “Yes.” But no one would respond in this way. He would initially seek to correct your contradiction, assuming you have misunderstood him. Even if one dared to respond in this way, I would venture to say he does not believe that which he speaks. For if he believed it, he would have to acknowledge that there was a difference between his believing it, and not believing it. And if such a difference exists, the LNC must be true. The LNC is a first principle of thought that cannot be avoided (rational intuition). It is universal and necessary to all human reasoning—even for those who seek to deny it.


 

Of course, there are other more persuasive ways of illustrating this truth that guarantee your postmodern friend will come to acknowledge the truth of the LNC. The early 11th century Medieval Muslim philosopher, Avicenna, devised an infamous way for helping someone see the irrationality involved in denying the LNC. Avicenna wrote, “Anyone who denies the LNC should be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not the same as not to be burned” (Metaphysics 1). By no means would I suggest using this tactic, but if this wouldn’t convince your postmodern friend of his error, nothing can!

Just for fun…. There are age-old questions that circulate from generation to generation, supposedly unanswerable. Surprisingly enough, most of these questions are far from being an intellectual enigma. They can be answered, and answered quite easily at that. Here are a few:


If a tree falls in the forest, and there is no one present to hear it, does it make a sound? Of course! Sound waves are produced whether there is anyone present to receive them or not.


Did Adam and Eve have belly buttons? No. Belly buttons are scars from the umbilical cord attached to us during our prenatal stage of life. Adam and Eve were created as adults. Since they never experienced the prenatal stage of life, they never had an umbilical cord attached to their bodies, and thus they never would have developed a belly button.


Where did Cain get his wife? It was his sister! Yes, I know, that’s gross. But it’s true nonetheless.


Which came first—the chicken or the egg? The chicken! For the egg to produce a chicken it would have to be a chicken egg, meaning it would have to contain the genetic blueprint for building a chicken. But where would such a blueprint come from if not a chicken? Without a prior chicken, there could be no egg capable of producing a chicken. The chicken would have to exist as a species before it could reproduce itself.


Why did the chicken cross the road? To lay the first egg. See above.


If you are inside a falling elevator, if you jump in the air before the elevator hits the ground, will you escape injury? No. While inside the elevator your body is traveling at the same speed as the elevator. If the elevator is falling toward the ground at a rate of 15 mph, your body is also falling toward the ground at a rate of 15 mph (even though it still relative to the elevator). Jumping in the air will only slightly delay your impact into the ground at 15 mph, and only slightly delay your injuries! If you are not convinced, think what would happen if you were sitting on the hood of a car going 15 mph, and the car suddenly slammed on its brakes. Your body would continue to travel at 15 mph, catapulting you from the hood of the car to the gravel on the road. The same principle applies with the elevator.


So there you have it. Can you think of any other examples?

Futile care theory is something going on in many parts of the world, including the United States. The essence of futile care theory is that doctors have the right to cut off, or withhold wanted medical care to the cognitively impaired, based on a personal value judgment that their life is not worth preserving, because their life is not worth living.

While I find this practice unethical, those in support of futile care theory make a persuasive case that can beguile the public. Consider bioethicist Arthur Schafer. In the Winnepeg Free Press he wrote:

Inevitably, doctors are the gatekeepers for patient access to medical resources. You can’t obtain restricted medicines unless a doctor is willing to write a prescription; you can’t gain admission to hospital unless a doctor decides that you will benefit thereby. There is a scarcity of intensive care beds; so, to admit or keep patients in the ICU who cannot benefit is to rob others who could benefit. Put simply, one person’s provision is another person’s deprivation. It’s unethical to waste scarce life-saving resources.


If a patient will never again know who or where he is, as appears to be the case for Golobchuk [a Canadian man who is the subject of a legal battle because doctors want to deprive him of medical care], then to artificially prolong his breathing seems at best a waste of precious ICU resources and at worst a cruel ordeal for the patient. Doctors and nurses are not simply technicians providing marketplace services to customers. They are health-care professionals who are bound by the ethical obligation “first of all, do no harm.” When a patient has irreversibly lost self-awareness, then using medical high technology in a vain attempt to resist death is often experienced by doctors and nurses as both unprofessional and deeply demoralizing. Physician integrity includes the right, even the duty, to say “no” when treatments offer no genuine benefit to the patient.


Schafer’s argument is very utilitarian and pragmatic, and this appeals to Westerners (who are very utilitarian and pragmatic). So what is wrong with it? Wesley Smith, a lawyer and long-time advocate against euthanasia and futile care points out the flaws:


Forget for the moment the many times doctors have been wrong about people never regaining consciousness. Schafer is the one de-professionalizing medicine. A plumber can refuse to unclog a pipe, but a doctor has no right to abandon his or her patient. Moreover, Schafer wants doctors to impose their value judgments–as instructed in continuing education clases by bioethicists like Schafer–that the burden of treatment isn’t worth the benefit of continuing to live. But that isn’t a medical judgment, it is a value judgment that we have always been told resides with the patient and family. Moreover, the treatment isn’t being stopped because it doesn’t or might not work but because it does or will–and hence it is not really a “vain attempt to resist death,” but a potentially successful one. And thus it is really the patient who has been declared futile.


Schafer says that staying alive when that is what the patient wants offers no genuine benefit to the patient. He only has the right to make that claim for himself, not for Mr. Golobchuck, you, me, or anyone else. You are watching the redefining of the ultimate purpose of medicine before your very eyes. It isn’t keeping patients alive who want to live, it is treating those who can be cured and reserving the right to refuse service to those who probably won’t improve.


This is what socialized medicine–and its’ private equivalent the HMO–creates. Medical futility is health care rationing that pits one cadre of patients against others, leading to division and discord. It is the end of trust in medicine because if you are too sick or profoundly disabled, medicine wants little to do with you.


Finally, if Futile Care Theory prevails, what in the world makes anyone think that the forced removal of people from wanted treatment will stop at the ICU? People who only need feeding tubes will soon be dehydrated (if they are not lethally injected first), and care will be rationed based on other criteria. For example, as reported in my books, I once asked a futilitiarian what would come after futile care, since cutting off the dying would not save a lot of money. He immediately said restricting “marginally beneficial care.” I asked for an example. He responded, “An 80-year-old woman who wants a mammagram.”


Be afraid. Be very afraid.


Well said.

Philosophers Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson devised a moral thought experiment called the Trolley Problem. It goes like this (in the words of Steven Pinker):

On your morning walk, you see a trolley car hurling down the track, the conductor slumped over the controls. In the path of the trolley are five men working on the track, oblivious to the danger. You are standing at a fork in the track and can pull a lever that will divert the trolley onto a spur, saving the five men. Unfortunately, the trolley would then run over a single worker who is laboring on the spur. Is it permissible to throw the switch, killing one man to save five?

Most people say yes. But consider a slightly different scenario:

You are on a bridge overlooking the tracks and have spotted the runaway trolley bearing down on the five workers. Now the only way to stop the trolley is to throw a heavy object in its path. And the only heavy object within reach is a fat man standing next to you—the same man who was laboring on the spur in the previous scenario. Should you throw the man off the bridge?

Most people say no. The question is why. In both scenarios (1) one person must die to save the five, (2) the fat man is the person who must die if the five are to be saved, and (3) your action is required to save the five. So why is it ok to flip the lever but not toss the fat man? Is it due to the relationship of physical proximity to humanization? That is to say, the closer we are physically to someone, the more we regard their person (similar to the way seeing someone die personalizes the concept of death, much different than mere knowledge that people die). Are we repulsed by the idea of tossing the fat man because his increased physical proximity (actually having to touch the man that is about to die because of our direct action) increases our perception of him as a valuable human being (whereas seeing him from afar and touching a lever does not), raising the emotional stakes too high for us to act as we know we should? If so, then the difference in response is merely emotional, not moral. If you think there is a moral difference between the two, however, what is the moral principle involved?

Now consider another, similar scenario:

On your morning walk you see a trolley car hurling down the track, the conductor slumped over the controls. In the path of the trolley is Osama bin Laden and Mother Theresa. You are standing at a fork in the track and can pull a lever that will divert the trolley onto a spur, saving them both. But doing so would cause the train to run over five murderers. Should one throw the switch (killing the five murderers, and sparing Mother Theresa and bin Laden), or should they do nothing (letting the train kill bin Laden and Mother Theresa?

This one is more complex. Unlike the first and second scenarios, here we have a choice between a group of evil people, and a group consisting of both good and evil people. On the one hand, sparing the most people would require that an innocent person be killed, and evil people live. But we would also kill an extremely evil person in the process. On the other hand, acting to spare one innocent person results not only in the death of five evil people, but also the continued life of a person whose evils add up to more than all the evils of the five murderers combined.

This scenario forces us to think about whether it is permissible to hurt the innocent to punish the evil, and whether the cumulative evil of lesser evil people adds up to more evil than a singular, extremely evil man. What do you think? What would you do?

I just finished reading a very interesting article in the L.A. Times on abortion titled “Abortion’s Battle of Messages.” The authors are former presidents of abortion-choice groups. Frances Kissling is the former president of Catholics for a Free Choice, and Kate Michelman is the former president of NARAL Pro-Choice America. What they say in the article is as interesting as what they fail to say.

They admit that the pro-life movement is a formidable foe with strong arguments and good tactics. They also admit that pro-lifers have moved the debate from the woman’s choice, to the status of the unborn. They also admit that the cards are currently stacked against them in the abortion debate.

Then they note some areas they need to re-message if they hope to convince America of their position. They ended the article by saying, “If pro-choice values are to regain the moral high ground, genuine discussion about these challenges needs to take place within the movement. It is inadequate to try to message our way out of this problem. Our vigorous defense of the right to choose needs to be accompanied by greater openness regarding the real conflict between life and choice, between rights and responsibility. It is time for a serious reassessment of how to think about abortion in a world that is radically changed from 1973.”

That’s what they say. What they did not say is how to deal with the challenges posed by pro-life apologists. They did not attempt to show why our arguments are mistaken. They did not attempt to show that the unborn are not human persons in the human community. They did not offer any content for repackaging the pro-abortion message. They merely presented the daunting challenge abortion-choicers are facing if they hope to turn back the tide. I think that shows us where we are at in the intellectual aspect of this debate: on the winning side.

A common argument for abortion is the argument from bodily autonomy. It is reasoned that a woman — and only a woman — has the right to decide how her body is going to be used. If she does not want to share her body with her developing child, she has the right to rid her body of it, even if that requires ending the child’s life. This argument is summed up nicely in a common mantra of abortion-choice advocates, “My body, my choice.”

Much could be said as to why bodily autonomy is not a good justification for abortion rights, but I do not wish to focus on that here. Instead, I want to focus on a tactical approach to exposing the bodily autonomy argument for what it is: a sham. Let me show you how.

Only the most ardent abortion advocates believe in unrestricted abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy. Most abortion advocates draw the line somewhere, even if they differ on the precise temporal location. Some say abortion is no longer permissible once the baby reaches viability (roughly 23 weeks). Others say the line should be drawn at seven months. Wherever the line is drawn, the fact that a line is drawn between morally permissible and morally impermissible abortions demonstrates that the argument for the moral permissibility of abortion from bodily autonomy is an ad hoc, rather than principled argument. Here’s why.

(more…)

The Alan Guttmacher Institute has just released its report on abortion statistics for the years 2004-2005: Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005. The last time this report was released was in 2003 for the years 1999-2000. Overall, the picture looks good. Abortions and abortion providers are still on the decline. Here are some important snippets from the report:

Total number of abortions

“The number of abortions in the United States declined from 1.61 million (the all-time high) in 1990 to 1.31 million in 2000. Similarly, the abortion rate declined from 27 per 1,000 women aged 15–44 in 1990 to 21 per 1,000 in 2000, a level comparable to levels of the mid-1970s.”

“An estimated 1.2 million abortions were performed in the United States in 2005, 8% fewer than in 2000. The abortion rate in 2005 was 19.4 per 1,000 women aged 15–44; this rate represents a 9% decline from 2000.”

“Abortion rates declined faster between 2000 and 2005 than they had between 1996 and 2000 (5%). The abortion ratio indicates that 22% of pregnancies (excluding those ending in miscarriages) ended in abortion in 2005.”

Abortion providers

“There were 1,787 abortion providers in 2005, only 2% fewer than in 2000. … Indeed, if not for new providers offering only early medication abortion, the total number of providers would have decreased by 8% instead of 2% between 2000 and 2005.”

Number of medication (as opposed to surgical) abortions

“Early medication abortion, offered by an estimated 57% of known providers, accounted for 13% of abortions (and for 22% of abortions before nine weeks’ gestation).”

Legal restrictions on abortion are partially credited for slowing the abortion rate

“At the same time, during the last several years, a number of states have implemented restrictions that may have made it more difficult for women to access abortion services and for physicians to perform abortions. For example, between 2000 and 2004, five states enacted laws that impose burdens on abortion providers. These restrictions range from requiring abortions after 15 weeks to be provided in a licensed surgical center to requiring providers to have expensive ultrasound equipment on-site.”

It’s common to hear people say “I do not expect to change your mind” in the course of debate these days. Just recently I was debating someone on an exegetical issue involving 1Thessalonians 4:14 who said these very words to me after only one round of correspondence.

While there are instances in which this assessment is justified–such as when your opponent declares, “Nothing you say is going to change my mind,” or when, after a sufficient amount of dialogue it becomes clear that your opponent suffers from intellectual stubbornness–it is often used prematurely and inappropriately. I would advise dispensing with such talk for two reasons.

First, I think it communicates a defeatist message, and that prematurely. It may be that neither individual will change his position as a result of the debate (although they often cede various points), but one should let the debate run its course before concluding that their arguments failed to persuade their opponent.

Secondly, and m
ore importantly, the comment is demeaning to either oneself, or one’s opponent. It can be self-demeaning in that it cedes the lack of cogency in one’s argument a priori. How can we be so sure our arguments will not persuade our opponent? If we do not think they are persuasive, why even offer them?

More often, however, such a comment is meant to demean your opponent. It communicates the idea that you don’t think he possesses enough intellectual honesty to change his position in light of the evidence you are presenting. That is very demeaning.

Whether we mean to demean the quality of our arguments, or the intellectual honesty of our opponents, such a statement is demeaning and should be used wisely and infrequently.

And for the record, I do expect my arguments for a limited use of this comment to change your mind! And so should I. If our arguments are good ones, none of us should expect any less.

What relationship does rationality have to faith? While some only convert after they have examined the evidence for Christianity, most people convert based on a personal experience with Jesus Christ. That’s the way it was for me. I came to believe Christianity was true, not by a rational examination of the evidence, but because of my personal encounter with the risen Christ. I remain a Christian, however, not only because of my past and present experience, but because I have examined the rational evidence for Christianity and found it superior to all other worldviews.


Whether one first believes because of what they know by experience, or what they know by rationality, the fact remains that a robust faith requires both. He who first believes based on an experience needs to supplement that experience with a rational inquiry of the faith they now hold. He who first believes based on a rational examination of Christianity needs to supplement his persuasion with a personal encounter of Jesus Christ.


For further reading about the relationship of faith and rationality, see my articles on the topic at IBS:


Faith Has Its Reasons

What is the Relationship of Reason to Revelation?
A Balanced Perspective on Reason and Faith

Investigating Faith: Placing Religious Truth Back Into the Arena of Knowledge

Religious Truth Can Be Known
Scaling the Gulf Between Scientific and Religious Knowledge

Sorry, but I have one more post before leaving on vacation!


Michael J. Fox, in an
interview with Maria Menounos on The Today Show, said he will continue to be an advocate for embryonic stem cell research, even though an alternative method for obtaining the functional equivalent of hES cells has been found. I don’t get it. To my knowledge Fox doesn’t have a financial stake in ESCR. His career is not on the line. He is not aspiring for political office. He is an advocate for ESCR because he wants to find a cure for the Parkinson’s he and many others suffer from, and thinks ESCR is the most promising ticket to get there. Of all the public advocates out there, he is surely most interested in the clinical success of ESCR.

That’s why I am baffled that he would not switch ships at the dock. Why continue to support ESCR when an simpler, more efficient method of obtaining the same kinds of cells has come along? The number of hESCs we can obtain will always be limited to the number of frozen IVF embryos donated to research, or the number of eggs donated for cloning (if human cloning ever proves successful). But with iPS cells, we can create a virtually unlimited supply. All we need is a skin cell! Furthermore, labs all over the world can create iPS cells, whereas only a relatively few were equipped to do ESCR and cloning.

Furthermore, surely Fox must be aware of the fact that moral concerns are largely responsible for the slow pace of ESCR. Why not support the research that everyone agrees is morally acceptable? It can only speed up the progress, because it will enjoy the support of everyone, including the federal government. I can’t figure Fox out.

HT: Jivin J

Paul Davies recently wrote a piece in The New York Times titled “Taking Science by Faith. Davies is a astrophysicist, origin of life researchers, and philosopher. He is also a pantheist, which is a “religious” version of atheism. That may sound strange, but both share the same ontology (God does not exist). The latter differs from atheism in that it views the universe as an object of religious devotion. For Davies, the laws that govern the universe are the object of religious devotion.


Davies’ metaphysical commitments make his article all the more interesting. He argues that both science and religion have faith commitments. While many philosophers have pointed this out, it is rare for a practicing scientist to admit it. Maybe his background in philosophy is forcing his honesty! I quite Davies at length:


Science, we are repeatedly told, is the most reliable form of knowledge about the world because it is based on testable hypotheses. Religion, by contrast, is based on faith. … The problem with this neat separation into “non-overlapping magisteria,” as Stephen Jay Gould described science and religion, is that science has its own faith-based belief system. All science proceeds on the assumption that nature is ordered in a rational and intelligible way. … The most refined expression of the rational intelligibility of the cosmos is found in the laws of physics, the fundamental rules on which nature runs. The laws of gravitation and electromagnetism, the laws that regulate the world within the atom, the laws of motion — all are expressed as tidy mathematical relationships. But where do these laws come from? And why do they have the form that they do?


His point is that before a scientist can even begin the work of science, he must presuppose certain things to be true about the natural world. Those presuppositions are not obtained through the scientific method, but rather give rise to the method itself. Without those presuppositions, science cannot get off the ground.


He speaks of the laws of physics. Where do they come from, and why are they what they are? Why should there be any laws at all? Why doesn’t the physical world behave differently in different places and at different times? Science does not know the answer to these questions. And yet they must rely on the physical laws to inquire of physical reality. He continues:


When I was a student, the laws of physics were regarded as completely off limits. The job of the scientist, we were told, is to discover the laws and apply them, not inquire into their provenance. The laws were treated as “given” — imprinted on the universe like a maker’s mark at the moment of cosmic birth — and fixed forevermore. Therefore, to be a scientist, you had to have faith that the universe is governed by dependable, immutable, absolute, universal, mathematical laws of an unspecified origin. You’ve got to believe that these laws won’t fail, that we won’t wake up tomorrow to find heat flowing from cold to hot, or the speed of light changing by the hour.

Over the years I have often asked my physicist colleagues why the laws of physics are what they are. The answers vary from “that’s not a scientific question” to “nobody knows.” The favorite reply is, “There is no reason they are what they are — they just are.” The idea that the laws exist reasonlessly is deeply anti-rational. After all, the very essence of a scientific explanation of some phenomenon is that the world is ordered logically and that there are reasons things are as they are. If one traces these reasons all the way down to the bedrock of reality — the laws of physics — only to find that reason then deserts us, it makes a mockery of science.


“They just are.” That’s the explanation some atheists give for the existence of the entire cosmos. Why is there something rather than nothing? There is no reason, they say. It just exists as a brute contingent fact, completely inexplicable. As Davies says, this is deeply anti-rational. And yet science, operating on the principle that agent-causation is not a valid explanation for physical phenomena, cannot explain why the universe exists, or why there are physical laws. They are left merely with the observation that they exist, inexplicably. Why? Because the cause of the physical laws, like the cause of the universe, cannot be physical. If science cannot allow a non-physical, agent cause to explain physical phenomenon, science must be content with anti-rational answers like the ones Davies laments. Davies notes the fact that the explanation must lie outside the physical universe:


Clearly, then, both religion and science are founded on faith — namely, on belief in the existence of something outside the universe, like an unexplained God or an unexplained set of physical laws, maybe even a huge ensemble of unseen universes, too. For that reason, both monotheistic religion and orthodox science fail to provide a complete account of physical existence.

This shared failing is no surprise, because the very notion of physical law is a theological one in the first place, a fact that makes many scientists squirm. Isaac Newton first got the idea of absolute, universal, perfect, immutable laws from the Christian doctrine that God created the world and ordered it in a rational way. Christians envisage God as upholding the natural order from beyond the universe, while physicists think of their laws as inhabiting an abstract transcendent realm of perfect mathematical relationships.

It seems to me there is no hope of ever explaining why the physical universe is as it is so long as we are fixated on immutable laws or meta-laws that exist reasonlessly or are imposed by divine providence. The alternative is to regard the laws of physics and the universe they govern as part and parcel of a unitary system, and to be incorporated together within a common explanatory scheme.

In other words, the laws should have an explanation from within the universe and not involve appealing to an external agency. The specifics of that explanation are a matter for future research. But until science comes up with a testable theory of the laws of the universe, its claim to be free of faith is manifestly bogus.


I find it interesting that Davies thinks more research can unveil a materialistic cause for the natural laws. Unless he wishes to advance the notion that the laws of nature developed over time, this project is doomed from the start. Physical laws began with the existence of the universe. If they were there from the beginning of physical reality, physical reality cannot explain their origin. Whatever caused them cannot itself be physical. Only an immaterial source can cause physical reality and physical laws. Davies will never solve the dilemma of where the natural laws came from until he opens himself to the metaphysical possibility of God’s existence. Only an immaterial, personal, intelligent, rational, and powerful being could produce physical reality with all of its attendant laws.

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