Apologetics


HR 2560, a.k.a. The “Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007”, was defeated 213-204. This bill pretended to ban human cloning by defining human cloning as the implantation of a cloned embryo in a uterus (though they did not say “cloned embryo”), rather than the creation of the embryo itself.

The bill states that “it shall be unlawful…to perform or attempt to perform human cloning.” So far so good. It goes on to make it unlawful “to ship, mail, transport, or receive the product of human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology knowing that such product is for the purpose of human cloning.” My question is, What’s the difference? What is the unnamed “product” to which they refer? Considering the fact that somatic cell nuclear transfer technology is the technology used in cloning (it’s what was used to create Dolly the sheep), the product is none other than a cloned human being. But wait…I thought the bill banned human cloning. Silly me! I’m using “human cloning” in a scientific way. These politicians aren’t doing that. They are making up their own political definitions of these terms so they can trick the public. Here is how the bill defines “human cloning” and “somatic cell nuclear transfer”:

Human cloning: “The implantation of the product of human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology into a uterus or the functional equivalent of a uterus.”
Human somatic cell nuclear transfer technology: “Transferring the nuclear material of a human somatic cell into an egg cell from which the nuclear material has been removed or rendered inert.”

The fact of the matter is that somatic cell nuclear transfer is the process by which a human clone is created. Once the nuclear material of a human somatic cell has been transferred into an enucleated egg and fused together, the act of cloning is complete. Where one puts the newly cloned human being after that (whether in a uterus, Petri dish, or trash can) has nothing to do with cloning. Shame on the politicians who are writing these deceptive bills (including an earlier Senate bill, and several different state bills), but thank goodness for the sanity of those in Congress who voted to defeat this bill.

Three independent research groups have reported successful adult cell reversion to embryonic-like stem cells in mice. While this is yet to be tested in human adult cells, if it is equally successful there won’t be any need for embryonic stem cells. This has the potential to end the moral debate over stem cells.

Over the next couple of days I am going to post a quick 1-2 response to five different empty slogans of religious pluralism. Here are the first two: 

 

 

 

“I feel each person has a right to believe as they choose.”

 

I agree in the sense that a person should not be coerced into believing anything. They should have the liberty to choose what to believe or not believe, but what they choose to believe should be determined by whether those beliefs are true to reality. If those beliefs do not correspond to reality, why believe them?


 

Clearly not all religious beliefs can correspond to reality because they contradict each other at vital points. God cannot both be one and be many; God cannot both approve of and disapprove of homosexuality; we cannot both be resurrected and be reincarnated at death, etc. Someone’s beliefs are mistaken. Determining whose beliefs are right and whose are in error matters because beliefs have consequences. True beliefs have positive consequences, and false beliefs have negative consequences (whether in this life or in the life to come), both in the physical realm and in the spiritual realm. That is why we ought to be concerned about who is right and who is wrong when it comes to religious questions, and use our best thinking to sort the truth from the error.


 

 

“People should believe whatever works for them.”

 

Discussions about religion are never helped by appeals to empty slogans like “whatever works for you.” Beliefs about spiritual things should not be based on their utility or our personal preferences, because reality is not concerned with what we prefer to believe about it. You may like to believe you are invisible and won’t be harmed by standing in the path of oncoming traffic, but reality has a way of converting those who don’t take it seriously! The only reason to believe anything is because it’s true; i.e. it corresponds to the way the (spiritual) world really is.

Part of our theodicy for the problem of evil includes the point that it was logically impossible for God to create a world in which humans enjoyed free will (a good thing), and yet were unable to use that freedom to choose evil as well as the good. I accept that as true, and yet Christianity proclaims there is coming a day in which there will be a world consisting of humans with libertarian free-will, who will never choose evil: heaven. The future hope of Christians seems to undermine one of the central premises in our theodicy. Can this be reconciled?


One might point out that the future world void of evil is only possible because God will glorify our humanity. But this is not a solution; it is an admission of the problem. Glorification is being put forward, not to show that such a world cannot exist, but rather to explain how it will become a reality. If in the future God is able—through glorification—to make human beings such that they have free will, and yet will not choose evil, then it falsifies the claim that God cannot create a world in which humans enjoy libertarian free will, and yet never choose evil. Indeed, He will do so in the future. In light of such, we might ask why God did not do this from the onset. Why didn’t He create humans in a glorified state to begin with, if glorified humans can exercise free will and yet not choose evil?


 

I’ve been mulling these questions around in my mind, and here is a possible explanation I have come up with. Could it be that the presence of sin—and our subsequent struggle against it—are necessary to create the kind of free creatures who will not exercise their free will to choose evil? Is God using evil as an immunization of sorts, in which our experience with it actually creates in us a hatred for it, to the extent that if our fallen nature were removed, we would always choose the good in the future—a choice we would not be able to make without first experiencing evil (a la Adam)? In this schema, evil is used as a divine teaching tool to create in us the ability to always and freely choose the good. Our present problem consists of our inability to actually perform what we presently will to perform because of our fallen nature. But in the end, God will restore humanity to its original state—removing from us our natural propensity toward evil—so that we can truly perform what we have learned to will in this life: the good.


 

On this proposal, evil is necessary to exercise our moral being to the point of maturity, so that in the next life we will only choose the good, and will do so freely. The purpose of glorification is not to remove the possibility of choosing evil, but to remove the barrier that is currently preventing us from choosing what we want to choose: the good.


 

What do you think about this proposal? Do you have a different one?

A United Methodist pastor has undergone a sex-change surgery from female to male. The ruling body does not see a problem with this. I bet the Presbyterian Church USA is mad that the Methodists beat them to this! These two organizations seem to be in a competition of whose ministers can be more sexually deviant. John Wesley is probably turning in his grave right now.Update: Arthur uncovered a news article indicating that the Presbyterians did beat the Methodists to it. See the comments section.

Philosopher Jerry Fodor made the following remarks in his review of Galen Strawon’s Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, on why materialist explanations for consciousness (particularly Strawson’s) do not work:

So, then, if everything is made of the same sort of stuff as tables and chairs (as per monism), and if at least some of the things made of that sort of stuff are conscious (there is no doubt that we are), and if there is no way of assembling stuff that isn’t conscious that produces stuff that is (there’s no emergence), it follows that the stuff that tables, chairs and the bodies of animals (and, indeed, everything else) is made of must itself be conscious. Strawson, having wrestled his angel to a draw, stands revealed as a panpsychist: basic things (protons, for example) are loci of conscious experience. You don’t find that plausible? Well, I warned you.

Nor, having swallowed this really enormous camel, does Strawson propose to strain at the gnats. Consider, for example: he thinks (quite rightly) that there are no experiences without subjects of experience; if there’s a pain, it must be somebody or something’s pain; somebody or something must be in it. What, then, could it be that has the experiences that panpsychists attribute to ultimate things? Nothing purely material, surely, since that would just raise the hard problem all over again. So maybe something immaterial? But monism is in force; since the constituents of
tables and chairs are made of matter, so too is everything else. So, Strawson is strongly inclined to conclude, the subjects of the experiences that basic things have must be the experiences themselves. Part of the surcharge that we pay for panpsychism (not, after all, itself an immediately plausible ontology) is that we must give up on the commonsense distinction between the experience and the experiencer. At the basic level, headaches have themselves.

I find amazing the lengths to which materialists will go to avoid a non-materialistic perspective of consciousness. They would rather confess that tables and chairs experience consciousness than admit that consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon that cannot be explained in terms of philosophical naturalism, and the sciences. In light of their belief that science can explain everything without an appeal to the immaterial, they spew forth nonsense such as this.

HT: Denise O’Leary at

 

Mindful Hack

Melinda Penner of Stand to Reason has another terrific post, this time on the topic of the appropriateness of God’s claim to worship and obedience. She writes:

A common objection has been raised by a number of the “new atheists.” In the ABC News debate, Kelly’s remark express it well: Even if there is a God, she “would rather go to hell than go to heaven and worship a megalomaniacal tyrant.” It comes up on Hitchens new book.

It’s one way of interpreting the God of the Bible who expects worship and
obedience. I don’t think it’s the accurate interpretation, and I don’t think it’s how we normally respond to appropriate authority in our lives and society. The expectation of respect, obedience is a very familiar one to us.

Do parents expect to be obeyed and respected by their children? Of course, because there is a certain relationship in place. Do we tend to show respect to a boss? Of course. Don’t we naturally show respect, and even awe, when we meet someone for whom we have tremendous respect because of their achievements? Yes. We experience relationships all the time where a certain deference is due the person in the higher station. That’s the case with God. It’s not at all outrageous.

It’s not megalomaniacal for someone to expect the kind of deference due his accomplishments and station. The expectation isn’t arbitrary; it’s appropriate given accomplishments and position.

Now grant for a moment that God is the person who created the universe, created each one of us, sustains us and provides for all of our needs and well-being, if He
is perfect, holy and good, then wouldn’t it be reasonable that respect, obedience, and even worship are due Him? We don’t worship other human beings, but if God is the being the Bible describes, then worship seems like an appropriate expectation, and it’s not a strange, outrageous expectation given familiar human relationships.

Well said.

The President’s former speech writer, Michael Gerson, wrote an article in the Washington Post on Giuliani’s incoherent position on abortion. He writes:

In early debates and statements, he has set out his views on this topic with all the order and symmetry of a freeway pileup. His argument comes down to this: “I hate abortion,” which is “morally wrong.” But “people ultimately have to make that choice. If a woman chooses that, that’s her choice, not mine. That’s her morality, not mine.” This is a variant of the position developed by New York Gov. Mario Cuomo in 1985. In this view, the Catholic Church’s belief in the immorality of abortion is correct, in the same sense that its belief in the Immaculate Conception is correct. Both beliefs are religious, private and should not be enforced by government.

But the question naturally arises: Why does Giuliani “hate” abortion? No one feels moral outrage about an appendectomy. Clearly he is implying his support for the Catholic belief that an innocent life is being taken. And here the problems begin.

How can the violation of a fundamental human right be viewed as a private matter? Not everything that is viewed as immoral should be illegal…but when morality demands respect for the rights of a human being, those protections become a matter of social justice, not just personal or religious preference.

This view is likely to dog him in the primary process, not only because it is pro-choice but because it is incoherent.

HT:

Between Two Worlds

Part two of the interview with Jacob Needleman (see the previous post on 5/18) contains a perceptive quote about the current imbalance between scientific progress and ethics (embryonic stem cell research, human cloning, etc.):

 

 

One of them [obstacles to being good] is a kind of a belief, not in science so much, but in scientism. That is the religion of science. We know that our scientific progress and our technology [have] gotten way out in front of moral development. We are like little children sitting in a big powerful locomotive playing with the switches — we don’t know what the hell we are doing. I think our moral development, maybe our culture, has in some sense lagged behind our intellectual development.


I just finished reading two papers from two evolutionists who are trying to set the historical record straight when it comes to Charles Darwin. Did you know that Darwin did not even use the word “evolution” until the sixth edition of his The Origin of Species? Did you know Darwin was not the first to come up with the idea of natural selection, or even to coin the phrase “survival of the fittest”? Neither was he the first to propose that man descended from apes. He knew so little about animals that he wasn’t even the one to notice the differences in beak sizes among the finches he collected from the Galapagos Islands, yet alone the significance of the adaptations. While Darwin is hailed as the icon of evolution, he contributed very little to the idea.

Paul A. Rees, senior lecturer in the School of Environment & Life Sciences at the University of Salford (England) wrote an article in the Journal of Biological Education titled “The Evolution of Textbook Misconceptions about Darwin.” He explores how Darwin is portrayed in 12 advanced-level biology textbooks, and discovers seven major historical errors.

Hiram Caton, of Griffith University (Australia), wrote an article in the journal, Evolutionary Psychology, titled “Getting Our History Right: Six Errors About Darwin and His Influence.” Caton identifies six major errors about Darwin and his contribution to evolutionary theory that appear in the Darwin Exhibit at the American Museum of Natural History in New York. For starters, Caton shows that Darwin did not rock the theological world with his views. Victorian society was already beginning to accept evolutionary ideas prior to Darwin. He only helped popularize evolutionary thought by synthesized existing ideas, and illustrating them in fresh ways through concrete biological examples.

Check out the articles. You’ll never look at Darwin the same again.

“Rationality isn’t just what you believe, it’s also why you believe it. I’m quite sure many Christians hold true beliefs for unjustified or even no good reason. A lot of Christians believe in the Trinity but can’t explain it coherently, much less defend it. They don’t really understand it despite believing it to be true. It’s an irrational true belief.” –Melinda Penner

A younger Dawkins is stumped, then ducks the question of where we find new genetic information being produced in the biological world. The video is rather funny. Dawkins replies to the video here. You be the judge of whether his explanation is just a further dodge or not. If you’ll notice…he still doesn’t answer the question!

One final note on the abortion poll…. Did you notice how support for aborting a baby because s/he was conceived due to rape or incest enjoys the same level of support as saving the life of the mother (70% vs. 75% respectively). While I am persuaded that the logic of the pro-life persuasion does not justify abortion in cases of rape/incest, at this point in time any attempt to outlaw abortion that does not make an exception for such cases is likely to fail. On a tactical level, we would do well to work towards passing legislation that limits abortion in those areas where the majority of Americans support such limitations. Once we have accomplished those limitations (which constitute 94-95% of all abortions), then we can take on the rape/incest justification. Of course, that is on a legal plane. In our personal, one-on-one pro-life evangelism we should demonstrate how the pro-life logic rules out rape/incest as morally justifiable exceptions as well.

Continued from below….

 

The Ayres, McHenry & Associates poll also gauged the public’s support for specific abortion rationales. Ironically, while a slight majority of Americans favor abortion rights, the vast majority of Americans reject the reasons for which the vast number of abortions are performed in this country. The majority of Americans think it should be illegal to obtain an abortion for the following reasons:

 

Legal / Illegal

  • The woman does not like the gender of the fetus 17% / 79%
  • The woman thinks a child would interfere with her education or career plans 24% / 72%
    The fetus has a physical abnormality that could be repaired, such as a cleft palate 28% / 66%
  • The woman feels she cannot afford to raise a child 31% / 65%
  • The woman has all the children she wants 32% / 64%
  • The woman feels she is not yet ready to raise a child 32% / 63%
  • The woman is not married 32% / 62%
  • The pregnancy could cause depression or pose other mental health problems 42% / 51%

 

What reasons do justify an abortion?:

 

Legal / Illegal

  • The pregnancy endangers the life of the woman 75% / 18%
  • The pregnancy poses a threat to the physical health of the woman 70% / 21%
  • The pregnancy resulted from rape or incest 70% / 24%
  • The fetus has a serious physical or mental deformity 55% / 36%

This is quite amazing. We know that only 5-6% of all abortions are obtained to protect the health of the mother (in which “health” is so broadly defined so as to include mental health, rather than just physical health), because of fetal abnormalities, or due to rape/incest. The other 95% are obtained because the child will interfere with the mother’s education (10.8%), will cause financial hardship (21.3%), the mother is not ready for children yet (29.6%), the mother does not want any more children (7.9%), etc. That means Americans actually oppose 94-95% of all abortions being performed in this country!! This tells me Americans don’t know what their support for abortion in general, and their support for Roe in particular, is actually accomplishing. We would do well to inform them that their support of Roe not only allows the 5-6% of abortions they think are legally justified, but also the 94-95% they think should be illegal. A reasonable response by the pro-abortion majority would be to call for the overturning of Roe, and then work in their state to restrict abortion rights to the particular circumstances they believe to be legally and/or morally justified. Of course, a reasonable response by the pro-life minority would be to restrict abortion even further according to our own persuasions of what abortions are morally justifiable.

 

In conclusion, while the majority of Americans support Roe, the margin would be reduced to a statistical wash if Americans were correctly informed of Roe’s real import. Furthermore, while the majority of Americans support abortion rights, they only do so for a slim fraction of all abortions. We would do well, then, to educate the public that overturning Roe will not make abortion illegal in the U.S., and that their support of Roe has the unintended effect of killing the very babies they think should be protected by law.

The Ethics and Public Policy Center and Judicial Confirmation Network suspected that many who support Roe do so because they are under the false impression that if Roe were overturned, abortion would become illegal in the United States. If the public were properly informed that overturning Roe would simply return the abortion issue back to the states to decide the matter for themselves, public support for Roe would decrease. To test their hypothesis they hired a national public relations firm, Ayres, McHenry & Associates, to conduct a poll that would gauge the genuine public support for Roe v Wade, as well as other abortion-specific questions. The findings are quite significant to our understanding of the supposed public support for abortion rights.

 

To discover if their suspicions were correct, respondents were asked twice to declare their support, or lack of support for overturning Roe: the first time without being informed, and the second time after being informed that overturning Roe would merely return the issue of abortion back to the states, allowing them to decide their own positions on abortion. The poll results confirmed the suspicions of the Ethics and Public Policy Center and Judicial Confirmation Network.

 

Prior to being informed of the import of Roe, 34% of respondents supported overturning Roe, while 55% did not. After being informed that overturning Roe would merely return the issue of abortion back to the states to decide, support for overturning Roe increased to 43%, while opposition decreased to 48%. The margin narrowed from 21% to 5% in favor of not overturning Roe. That is quite a shift! I think the media and pro-abortion advocacy groups like Planned Parenthood are largely to blame for the perception that overturning Roe would ban abortion in the U.S.

 

I will discuss what this poll tells us about how Americans really feel about abortion in a separate post.

Before Thomas saw the risen Christ, he would not believe the report of the other disciples who said they saw Him alive. But then Jesus appeared to Thomas as well, and he believed. Jesus told Thomas, “Because you have seen me, you have believed: blessed are those who have not seen, and yet have believed.” (John 20:29) 

It’s important to note that “believed” is in the aorist tense. Contrary to popular interpretation, Jesus is not referring to those in the future who would believe He rose from the dead without having seen Him alive, but to those in the past who believed He rose from the dead without having seen Him alive. This is important to the discussion we have had on this blog about why the disciples waited so long to proclaim Jesus’ resurrection. For Jesus to say there were people in the past who believed in His resurrection without having seen Him alive requires that the apostles/disciples were proclaiming the resurrection prior to Pentecost! If they had not been proclaiming the resurrection, no one except for those to whom Jesus had appeared to would believe in His resurrection. Of course, we don’t know how many people the disciples told about the risen Christ, or who they told (only previous followers of Jesus, or unbelievers as well), but this passage is evidence that the disciples did not wait until after Pentecost to begin proclaiming the resurrection. That proclamation only intensified and widened after Pentecost.

While the direct object of Jesus’ words were past believers, the principle is equally applicable to future believers. It’s as though John is using Jesus’ words to Thomas to speak to skeptics who argue, “It was all very well for Thomas to believe given His experience with the risen Christ, but you can’t expect me to imitate that kind of faith unless I have the same kind of experience/evidence Thomas had.” John counters this argument by pointing out that there were individuals before Thomas who believed without experiencing what Thomas experienced, and Jesus considered them blessed for having done so. Empirical evidence is not necessary for faith in Christ’s resurrection. 

This passage is often used by those who oppose apologetic arguments for the resurrection of Christ. They argue that if God’s blessing is given to those who believe in Jesus’ resurrection without seeing, then not only are apologetic arguments in behalf of Christ’s resurrection unnecessary for evangelism, they actually rob people of the blessing that comes through faith. This is a misinterpretation of the passage. Jesus did not say, “Blessed are those who believe without evidence,” but rather, “Blessed are those who have not seen me and yet believe.” He is not pronouncing a blessing on those who believed in His resurrection without any reason to do so, but those who believed without actually seeing Him alive in the flesh; He is not pronouncing a blessing on those who believe without any evidence for believing, but those who believe without empirical evidence like Thomas had. While we have many reasons to believe Jesus rose from the dead, we are doing so without having actually seen Jesus, and thus we are blessed.

Ben Witherington had a pro-Barack Obama post on his blog. In the comments section the issue turned to the question of his electability among Christian conservatives, given his stance on abortion. The following question was posed by a commenting blogger: “Will conservatives choose to ignore Obama’s otherwise fine character qualities because he dares to question the sacred pro-life cow?”

 

The way I answered his question gives me the opportunity to convey my thoughts on the primacy of abortion in the way we vote:

 

“Yes, Obama’s stance on abortion is justification to reject him from office. This is particularly so if the purpose of government is to promote justice. If killing innocent and defenseless human beings is a moral wrong, and Obama wants to protect the right of people to commit that moral wrong, then he is not fit for public office. A vote for Obama would be a vote for injustice.

 

“By no means is this analogy exact, but think of Hitler. Let’s say we had the opportunity to vote for him in an election. Would his stance on the killing of Jews disqualify him from being elected to office? Of course it would. He killed some six million Jews, the same number of people who are killed during a four year tenure of a President through abortion. I sure hope you wouldn’t vote for Hitler. He may have the best economic policies, the best foreign policies, etc., but his support for the killing of millions of innocent people trumps every other quality he may have. You might say, ‘But that is different!’ How so? The only thing that differs between the murder of Jews in Europe and the murder of babies in America is their size, location, level of development, and degree of dependency, none of which are morally relevant to their moral status as members of the human race. Abortion is the defining issue, particularly for the office of President.

 

“Abortion is not some ideological sacred cow that conservatives like to use as a wedge issue. We actually believe it is the slaughter of defenseless, innocent human beings. As human beings, the unborn are of no less value than are the born. If we had a situation in which 1.3 million 6 year olds were being murdered by their parents in this country, a Presidential candidate’s position on the topic would take front and center stage. But when the human being is tiny and hidden behind a veil of flesh, we are told to not be so concerned about the issue. Nonsense. Abortion is the decisive issue of our day, and while a candidate’s view on the issue may not matter for some levels of government, there is no office in which it matters more than the office of President. I don’t see how anyone who opposes abortion can vote for a pro-abortion candidate (assuming one of the candidates is pro-life). It’s not about party; it’s about valuing and protecting human life. That’s more important than the war, and more important than the economy. It trumps all other issues.”

The new liberal mantra on abortion is that “abortion should be safe, legal, and rare,” made famous by Hillary Clinton. I always find this ironic. What other Constitutional rights does anyone work toward making rare? The reason abortion-choicers such as Clinton want abortion to be rare is because they know abortion is immoral (but can’t admit it). After all, if aborting a child is no more moral significance than pulling a tooth; and if aborting a child is a good thing for the mother and society, why work to make it rare?

 

Some abortion supporters are angered at those like Hilary Clinton who say they want to reduce the number of abortions in this country. Why? Because they know it implies that abortion is not a good thing; i.e. it is wrong. Francis Kissling, President of Catholics for Free Choice, wrote an article in the October 2nd edition of Salon Magazine to address the topic:

 

If abortion is a morally neutral act and does not endanger women’s health, why bother to prevent the need for it? After all, the cost of a first-trimester abortion is comparable to the cost of a year’s supply of birth control pills–and abortion has fewer complications and less medical risk for women than some of the most effective methods of contraception.

Is abortion a morally neutral act? Is it, as some have said, an unambiguous moral good? This is where we go limp and get tongue-tied. If abortion is such a good thing — if it results in women coming to terms with their moral autonomy, making good choices for their lives, and acting in the interests of society and their existing and future children — then why, people ask us, do we want to reduce the need for it? Simply put, the movement as a whole and most of our leaders find it difficult to acknowledge publicly that we have spent our lives, our passion, fighting for something that both is central to human freedom and autonomy, and ends a form of human life.

Why then do we get so caught up, so tongue-tied when we are asked if we want to prevent abortion? We spend countless hours trying to find the most nuanced way of answering this question. We worry that some woman will be hurt if we acknowledge the moral ambiguity of abortion.

There are many other quotable sections of this article as well. Kissling argued that being in favor of abortion rights does not mean one has to treat the unborn as worthless things. As life, they are worthy of respect:

We interpret life broadly. We say we are in favor of legal abortion because it protects women’s lives. We do not mean just their physical lives; we mean their capacity to live full, free and happy lives. Why, then, should we think that a presumption in favor of life is inappropriately applied to fetal life? Why do we insist that because the fetus is not a person in any theological, scientific, legal or sociological sense, it does not deserve our consideration? Do not people want to know if those of us who advocate a moral right to choose an abortion also approach all aspects of life with wonder and awe? Can we totally separate our attitude toward the justifiable taking of non-personal life in abortion from the other principles of protecting life that have become crucial to our survival as civilized human beings?

Although it would be unjust to place on women’s reproductive decisions the moral burden of upholding absolutely a presumption in favor of life, it is important that we express our belief that the ability to create and nurture and bring into the world new people should be exercised carefully, consciously, responsibly and with awe for our capacity to create life. That is one reason why we must commit ourselves to working to make abortion unnecessary, and be willing to use those words.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>

Apart from my disagreement with Kissling’s philosophical notion that the unborn are non-persons, how can he say they are not persons in any theological sense ? If nothing else, Christian theology teaches that the unborn are persons. Even legally speaking, the unborn are considered persons. The only exception is when they are unwanted by their mother, and killed by a doctor. Then they purportedly cease to be persons.

The article is worth the read. While the author is confused and mistaken, there are hints of honest recognition about the evils of abortion.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>


<!–[endif]–>

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>Francis Kissling, “Should abortion be prevented?: Why the case for abortion rights must include a call for responsibility toward the creation of life”, in Salon; available from http://www.salon.com/opinion/feature/2006/10/03/abortion/; Internet; accessed 02 May 2007.

A view of morality I am hearing more and more about in the public circle is the social contract theory. Contractarianism holds that “morality rests on a tacit agreement between rationally self-interested individuals to abide by certain rules because it is to their mutual advantage to do so.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–> There is nothing intrinsically wrong with murder, rape, or torture, for example, but since rational self-interested persons do not want these things being done to them, they agree to extend the same courtesy to others.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–> Philosopher, Edward Feser, offers at least six helpful criticisms of Contractarianism:

 

1. It’s really not a moral theory at all. It is a truce from Hobbes’ “war of all against all.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[3]<!–[endif]–> It is a replacement of morality for practicalities. Ultimately, contractarianism is the opposite of morality because morality often involves the denial of one’s self-interest. Contractarianism is the enshrining of selfishness.

2. One need only pretend to abide by the social contract. Since one behaves “morally” only in their own self-interest (not because they have an objective moral obligation to do so), then if they can secretly behave in ways that are opposed to others’ self-interests and get away with it, they have done nothing wrong.

3. There is no moral justification for claiming one ought to abide by the social contract.

4. Cannot say anyone is immoral. At best, they are being foolish for breaking the social contract, for in doing so they are working against their own self-interest.

5. Cannot provide any meaningful boundaries/restraints for punishing those who go outside the social contract. Why not kill those who steal? Why not torture them? What would be wrong with these punishments? We may choose not to, but contractarian theory offers no reason why we can’t should we choose to.

6. Fails to invoke moral duties to those outside the social contract, such as the mentally retarded. These people cannot assent to the contract, and since they cannot harm someone else, there is no reason to make a contract with them. Why not just kill a retarded person because we had a bad day at work?

 

Just like moral relativism (a close cousin), social contract theory is bankrupt as a moral philosophy.


<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–><!–[endif]–>

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>Edward Feser, “Contract Schmontract”; available from http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=012306B; Internet; accessed 02 February 2006.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–>Ibid.

<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[2]<!–[endif]–>Ibid.

Moral relativists have the difficult position of grounding their moral persuasions. Why should one do x and not y, given the relative nature of morals? For example, why should person p not murder person q when it is not in their interest to do so? A standard response is that murder is wrong because society has collectively determined it is wrong. This response invites three questions:


(1) What if a majority of society determined murder was acceptable? Would the relativist change his position to affirm that murder is morally acceptable? If not, why not?

(2) Why is person p obligated to abide by the dictates of the majority? After all, morals are just personal tastes. A cultural consensus is nothing more than the sum of individuals’ personal tastes. Why should person p be concerned about the personal tastes of the group? Why not assert his own interests over those of the group? Where does the moral obligation to follow the dictates of the majority come from?

(3) If morality is determined by the collective majority, is the moral relativist prepared to acknowledge that all minority views are, by definition, immoral? This would include such views as homosexuality, same-sex marriage, and cloning—all of which do not enjoy the support of a majority in society. A moral relativist cannot argue for the morality of homosexuality within a relativistic framework of morality in which society determines what is right.


The fact of the matter is that moral relativists have no grounding for morality. They try to ground it in the consensus of the public whole, but cannot ground the moral obligation to follow the public consensus in anything but thin air. Finally, they are inconsistent in their application of moral relativism. They try to argue that things such as same-sex marriage are good, even when the public consensus disagrees. They can’t have their cake and eat it too.

« Previous PageNext Page »