It’s no surprise that the Gospels are full of Jesus’ sayings since they are dedicated to telling the account of what Jesus said and did. But it is surprising that Jesus’ followers don’t quote Him but a few times outside the Gospels. Considering the many theological and practical issues the apostles addressed in their epistles, why didn’t they invoke Jesus’ teachings to settle the matters? As strange as I find the phenomenon, it actually serves as a good argument against those who assert the disciples freely invented many sayings of Jesus. If the disciples were in the habit of inventing sayings of Jesus, why not do so when it would be most convenient: to settle theological arguments or moral quagmires not addressed by Jesus? The fact that the disciples did not appeal to a saying of Jesus to solve such matters argues for the historical veracity of Jesus’ sayings found in the Gospels. If the disciples would not put words into Jesus’ mouth in the epistles, they were not likely to do so in the Gospels either.
Apologetics
May 3, 2007
The Apostles Did Not Put Words Into Jesus’ Mouth
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bible, Theology[6] Comments
May 1, 2007
In the last post I addressed the argument that all religions must be human inventions because they are markedly different from one another, and tend to be limited to a specific culture and/or geography. A more common “argument” against religion comes in the following form: “You are only a Christian because you were born in America where Christianity is the cultural religion. If you would have been born in India, you would probably be a Hindu. You believe in the religion you believe in because you inherited it, not because it is true.”
I put parentheses around “argument” for good reason: this is not a valid argument against the truth of religion in general, or Christianity in particular. As an empirical observation, it is undeniable that one’s religious beliefs are largely determined by where they live, and/or the religious beliefs of their parents (an accident of history, not the result of critical examination and rational reflection). But does it follow from this that the object of all religious faith must be a human invention? No. It is non sequitur.
This sort of thinking commits the genetic fallacy (invalidating a view based on how a person came to hold that view). The fact of the matter is that the truth of a belief is independent of the influences that brought one to believe it. While I may be a Christian because I live in a society in which most people are Christians, it does not mean that my Christian beliefs are not true. The truth of Christianity depends on the veracity of the claims themselves, nothing more and nothing less.
It is not important how someone came to hold the view they hold; all that is important is the soundness of the reasons for which they hold the view they do. If I was born in India I would probably have been raised a Hindu, and might even be a Hindu today. But that would not change the fact that Hinduism is false, and Christianity is true. The empirical observation that people tend to inherit their religious beliefs tells us nothing about the truth value of those beliefs.
This argument is a double-edged sword that can be turned against the atheist as well. American atheists were born in America, and educated in a school system where scientific naturalism and secularism are the prevailing philosophies. Is it any wonder, then, why they believe in no god? If they had been born in Saudi Arabia they would probably be a Muslim theist. Does that mean scientific naturalism is therefore false? Of course not! The truth-value of scientific naturalism, Christianity, and Islam must be determined on the merits of those views themselves.
This “argument” also ignores the conversion factor: instances in which large numbers of people of one religion convert to a different religion. Think of Christianity. Christianity originated in a thoroughly Jewish culture. People who held Jewish beliefs abandoned them by the thousands in favor of Christian beliefs. Pagans did the same. Why? Because they found something to be true of Christianity they did not find in their own religion. The claims of Christianity were so compelling that they abandoned the religion of their parents/nation. It was a matter of truth, not inheritance.
May 1, 2007
Religion as a Human Invention Part I
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Pluralism[8] Comments
Most skeptics and all atheists think of religion as a human invention because (1) religions differ greatly from one another, and (2) religious views are often culture-specific. Let me address each in turn.
Religions differ from one another
It is reasoned that if God exists and is knowable by man, everyone should be in basic agreement about who he/she/it/they is/are. Instead, religious views are often very different: God is one, God is many; God is personal, God is impersonal; Jesus is God incarnate, Jesus is a heretic; the world exists, the world is an illusion. Skeptics conclude that either God is unknowable by man (in which case the whole question of religious truth is irrelevant), or more likely, God does not exist to begin with. Religion is just a human invention, and the variegated expressions of religion reflect the variegated creativity of man.
Both conclusions are flawed in that they confuse epistemology with ontology. Just because people have different answers to the same question (epistemology) does not mean there is no correct answer (ontology), or that no one knows the correct answer. If ten math students give ten different answers to the same math problem, it does not mean there is no correct answer, or that none of the students possess the correct answer. Difficulty in knowing a thing does not translate into an inability to know that thing, or the lack of a thing to be known in the first place. At best, the existence of a multiplicity of religious beliefs only highlights a possible epistemological problem associated with knowing God. It is not a good argument against the existence of God/gods (an ontological issue).
If the Bible is to be believed, the problem is not so much with epistemology as it is corrupted volition. Deep down men know the one true God, but in rebellion they will to suppress that knowledge, making up religions that are more palatable to their tastes. Think Romans 1-3.
Religious views are culture-specific
This is the more important of the two reasons. When you look at religion on a global level it becomes readily apparent that religious perspectives are often specific to a particular culture or geographical locale. It is claimed that the most reasonable explanation for this phenomenon is that religions are mere cultural inventions passed on from generation to generation. They don’t spread beyond the culture because—as an invention—they are not the sort of things that are accessible to, and discoverable by men outside the community in which they arose.
The observation that religions tend to be isolated to a particular culture and geography is true. The question is why that’s so. Is it because they are human inventions, or is there some other reason? I think the atheist is largely correct when he concludes from the multiplicity of geographical and culture-specific religions that religion is a human invention. Indeed, because they are markedly different from one another, they can’t all be right about God. At best, only one of them can be right, relegating the rest to human imagination. Where the skeptic errs is in his conclusion that all religions must be mere human inventions. Indeed, one religion could be the correct one.
But how could it be that only one culture has the truth about God, and none of the others (this isn’t to say there is no truth to be found in false religions, but only that on the macro-level, one religion is true and the rest are false)? It could be that God only chose to reveal Himself to one people, or it could be that all but one people remained faithful to the truths God revealed to them about Himself. It could be any number of other reasons as well. The point is that we need not conclude all religions are mere human inventions because they tend to be cultural and/or geographical-specific. That conclusion does not follow from the premises.
My next post will address a similar argument against religion.
April 25, 2007
A New Earth, Astronomy Style?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Evolution, Science[2] Comments
Scientists discovered a planet 20.5 light years away from Earth that they believe may be similar to Earth, and thus hospitable for life. The planet (Gliese 581c) is slightly larger than Earth, and has a climate similar to our own. Scientists speculate that there may be water on the planet as well. This is a significant find, because until now, scientists have never found another planet like Earth. Interestingly, the author of the news in UK’s The Daily Mail wrote, “This remarkable discovery appears to confirm the suspicions of most astronomers that the universe is swarming with Earth-like worlds.”
People who want to believe in evolution and extraterrestrial life seem to jump on anything that bolsters their faith, this being no exception. How does finding one planet, 20.5 light years away, confirm that the universe is “swarming” with Earth-like planets hospitable to life? For one, the article makes it very clear that scientists know very little about this planet yet, including whether it contains water or rock. Second, this is the only potential Earth-like planet we have found, so how can it be scientific confirmation that the universe is swarming with them? This is an exaggerated claim. We should not be surprised at this, however. The church of Darwin requires that its followers believe in evolution whether it be supported by evidence or not. Most Darwinian claims are exaggerations extrapolated from scant evidence open to multiple interpretations.
See Stephen Jones’ post on the topic for reasons to doubt the claim that Gliese 581c is similar to Earth.
April 24, 2007
Great paper on homosexuality, same-sex marriage, and Scripture
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Homosexuality, Same-sex Marriage[13] Comments
Robert A. Gagnon, associate professor of NT theology at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, wrote a tremendous article on the topic of homosexuality and same-sex marriage titled “Why the Disagreement Over the Biblical Witness of Homosexual Practice?” The article is a response to David G. Myers and Letha Dawson Scanzoni’s 2005 book, What God Has Joined Together? A Christian Case for Gay Marriage.
I must say that this was the single most informative, thoughtful, articulate article on homosexuality I have read to date. It is 130 pages long, so it is no small read, but it is well worth the time. Gagnon does a thorough job debunking the pro-homosexual interpretation of the Bible, makes excellent and articulate arguments against homosexuality in general, and same-sex marriage in particular. If you want to have a well-rounded argument to present to an increasingly pro-homosexual culture, this article is a must read.
April 23, 2007
If You Can Think of God, He Doesn’t Exist?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, ThinkingLeave a Comment
Back in March I published a post about how extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. While atheists often use this to argue against Christianity, the fact of the matter is that it argues against atheism. The claims of atheism are much more extraordinary than the claims of theism.
An individual responded to this post in the comments section, saying, “Yet, believers in GOD(s) forget that all human thoughts are man-made; thus, so is God.” This is so typical of the lazy and convoluted thinking characteristic of postmodern thought. Here is how I responded:
Your statement sounds like a bumper sticker: nice ring to it, but lacking in critical thought. What does it mean to say human thoughts are “man-made”? If you mean humans have the ability to generate thoughts, then what you have communicated is a tautology. The human ability to generate thought (“man-made”) is the definition of “human thoughts.” So saying human thoughts are man-made adds nothing to your original description. Ultimately, then you’re left arguing that since humans have the ability to generate thoughts about God, God must be a figment of our imagination.
But how does that follow? The implicit premise of your argument (that which is needed for your conclusion to follow your stated premise) is that if humans generate a thought about something, the object of our thought must be a figment of our own creation/imagination. Does this premise hold true for objects other than God? Do you apply this logic to food? I would imagine that you have had thoughts of eating pizza. Does this make the object of your thought (pizza) a figment of your imagination? Of course not. How absurd would it sound to argue that “all human thoughts are man-made; thus, so is pizza”? Pizza is an objective part of reality, and your ability to generate thoughts about it doesn’t make it any less so.
As a human thinker, you have the ability to generate thoughts about reality. If God exists in reality, then you would have the ability to generate thoughts about His existence just as you do pizza. I’m not saying the ability to think about God proves that God exists in reality, but rather that the ability to think about God cannot possibly be used to argue for His non-existence anymore than your ability to think about pizza argues for its non-existence. Your observation about the human ability to generate thoughts simply has no bearing on the question of whether God exists or not.
Using your logic, for God to be real we would have to lack the ability to think about Him. For the moment we were able to think about His existence He would cease to be real. That makes absolutely no sense at all.
April 19, 2007
Quote of the Day: Can the Location of One’s Feet Give Them Value?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Quote of the Day[4] Comments
From the editors of National Review Online:
“Partial-birth abortions are not really worse than other methods of late-term abortion. There is indeed something irrational about concluding that a method [I would add ‘the morality’] of killing a seven-month-old fetus should depend on the location of his foot. But just who is responsible for making a fetish of location in the first place? It is the Supreme Court itself that has declared — with no support in the Constitution — that what distinguishes a fetus with no claim to legal protection from an infant with such a claim is whether it is in the womb.”<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>
<!–[endif]–>
<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>National Review editors, “Partial Victory”; available from http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NzMxZWQ0ZGM1NjdjYmZlZDBiYjRlMDc3NzAxOGU2M2Y; Internet; accessed 19 April 2007.
April 19, 2007
Yesterday the Supreme Court of the United States decided the controversial case regarding partial birth abortion, Gonzales v. Carhart. By a 5-4 majority the Court upheld a 2003 Congressional ban of the procedure.
Pro-abortion advocates are up in arms over the decision. But why? The ban only pertains to a particular method of abortion. There are other methods for killing late-term babies that are still legal (namely, D&E). The fact of the matter is that there will be no fewer abortions now that the law is in effect than there were before the law went into effect. It does not restrict a woman’s right to kill her baby. It only restricts the methods doctors may employ to carry out the woman’s desire. Now abortionists have to utilize nicer ways to kill babies! So the next time a pro-abortion advocate complains that this law restricts a woman’s “right to choose”, ask them to explain how it does so.
So why are pro-abortion advocates so upset? I speculate that the reason for their anger is fear. Any law that does not expand abortion rights, chips away at abortion rights. They are afraid that eventually, with enough chipping, the whole edifice will fall. That fear is justified, and I hope their worst fears come true!
April 18, 2007
Abortion-Choicer Reconsiders Her Position…Sort Of
Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, BioethicsLeave a Comment
In recent days my attention was drawn to an article written by an abortion-choice broadcaster from England, Miranda Sawyer. The article details her recent re-examination of her abortion-choice views. Its significance is twofold. First, Ms. Sawyer is honest and candid about the inadequacy of many of the arguments advanced in behalf of abortion-on-demand. Secondly, it reveals just how far people are willing to go to preserve their point of view. The will often trumps the intellect.
Ms. Sawyer was prompted to re-examine her view of abortion after she became pregnant.
“My mind kept returning to the pregnancy test. If my reaction to those fateful double lines that said ‘baby ahead’ had been horror instead of hurrah…then I would have had little hesitation in having an abortion. But it was that very fact that was confusing me. I was calling the life inside me a baby because I wanted it. Yet if I hadn’t, I would think of it just as a group of cells that it was OK to kill. It was the same entity. It was merely my response to it that determined whether it would live or die. That seemed irrational to me. Maybe even immoral. … when you’ve experienced the out-and-out weirdness of pregnancy and birth and the fantastic beauty of the resulting child, it’s hard not to question what a termination does, or is.”
So why not abandon her abortion-choice position in favor of a pro-life one? According to her, it’s because she is “not religious.” This is revealing. Apparently she believes that opposition to abortion could only be justified on religious grounds. This is an indictment on the pro-life movement. We have a responsibility to make a case against abortion that does not appeal (at least primarily) to a religious grounding.
How did Ms. Sawyer resolve the conflict between what she wanted to believe, and what she was being led to believe by both experience and reason? By accepting the abortion-choice philosophical claim that there is a difference between being alive, and being human (or stated by others as a distinction between being human and being a person). In her words:
“In the end, I have to agree that life begins at conception. So yes, abortion is ending that life. But perhaps the fact of life isn’t what is important. It’s whether that life has grown enough to take on human characteristics, to start becoming a person.
“In its early stages, the foetus clearly hasn’t, so I have no problems with early abortions. … But once an embryo has developed enough to feel pain, or begin a personality, then it has moved from cell life into the first stages of being a human. Then, for me, ending that life is wrong. … That’s why late abortion will always be tricky. Who are we to say whether the life inside is a person, or not?”
Her escape hatch is the personhood theory of human value. If the unborn look enough like those of us on the outside of the womb, and if the unborn behave enough like those of us on the outside of the womb, then they are valuable and should be protected. The question is, Who gets to decide how much one must looks and act like us before they are valuable? And who gets to decide what qualities are to be measured. Different people have different lists. Where is the objective basis for determining this? Ms. Sawyer seems to recognize this, but ignores what she recognizes. For while she says we cannot say whether the life inside the womb is a person or not, she has said who is and who is not a person. Those who feel pain and exhibit personality are persons; those who don’t aren’t. What people won’t put their mind through in order to keep their will on the throne!
April 18, 2007
Atheist Tries to Refute Scientific Evidence for the Existence of God
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Cosmological Argument, Naturalism, Science, Theistic Arguments[8] Comments
I am on Skeptic Magazine‘s email distribution. In the April 4th edition, David Ludden reviews Victor Stenger’s new book, God: The Failed Hypothesis. Stenger, a physicist, tries to refute some of the common scientific arguments for God’s existence.
To tackle the problem of how the universe came into being fully charged with energy (the only known violation of the first law of thermodynamics), Stenger argues that there is a “close balance between positive and negative energy” so that “the total energy of the universe is zero.” I heard Peter Atkins make the same claim in a debate with William Lane Craig. This is absolutely nonsensical. If the total energy is zero, then there is no energy. And yet energy exists. How do explain the origin of energy by saying the value of energy is zero? Besides, even if there is positive and negative energy, and these two opposing forces cancel each other out, one still has to explain the origin of positive and negative energy at the point of singularity (Big Bang). Where did it come from?
What about the second law of thermodynamics (disorder increases over time)? If our universe is moving from an ordered to a disordered system, it must have been ordered in the beginning, and this would require a designing intelligence. Not so says Stenger. He says the universe began in a maximum state of disorder, but since it is expanding, that disorder is spread out throughout the universe, giving the appearance of order. Really? If I take a bag full of garbage, and empty the bag of garbage into a large field, I don’t get order when the wind starts dispersing the garbage throughout the field. I simply have lots of space between the garbage. That space is not ordered. It’s simply the lack of garbage. Disorder spread out over a large area cannot create order, or the appearance of order.
Stenger gets bold when he tries to tackle the most important philosophical question of them all: Why is there something rather than nothing? According to Ludden, Stenger argues that “the laws of physics tell us that nothingness is an unstable state and will soon ‘undergo a spontaneous phase shift’ to a state of somethingness. …A state of continuous nothingness is so improbable that it could only be maintained through divine intervention.” I’m not sure what physics Stenger is appealing to. Since so much of physics has become a metaphysical discipline of philosophical speculation, I’m inclined to think the physics he is appealing to are little more than mental gymnastics, having no basis in empirical verification. Be that as it may, notice how he is treating nothing as something. He calls nothingness a state that “undergo[es] a spontaneous shift.” Nothing cannot undergo anything! There is nothing to act, or be acted on. It makes sense to say a caterpillar undergoes a phase shift into a butterfly, but it makes absolutely no sense to say that nothing undergoes change into something. Indeed, if there is nothing, what could cause the phase shift? It can’t be the laws of physics because there is no such thing as physics in a state of nothingness. There are no causes either. There is nothing! Only something can cause something else to come into existence.
It never ceases to amaze me how people who claim to be so intelligent and rational can believe such inane things. There’s no end to the amount of self-deception one can generate when they subjugate the truth to their will. Paul was right. People would rather believe a lie than the truth. They willingly suppress the truth. They would rather believe that energy is zero, and nothing can become something than admit there is a God.
March 31, 2007
Abortion and Emotional Outrage
Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Bioethics1 Comment
I have been in dialogue with a fellow pro-life apologist about the appropriate amount of moral outrage pro-lifers should feel against the genocide of the unborn. I would like to expand the discussion to include you.
What if there came a day in America wherein 10 year olds were being killed in state-sanctioned facilities? Would you feel the same, more, or less emotional outrage at the genocide of these 10 year olds as you do the genocide of 10 week old embryos? Why?
For those of you who answer less, do you think the disparity of emotional response is worthy of a pro-lifer, or does it indicate a deficiency in one’s perspective? Remember, according to the pro-life worldview the humanity and value of both the 10 week old, and 10 year old is equal. If you feel less emotional outrage over the death of the unborn, why do you think that is, given what you know to be true? Why do your feelings not match what you believe to be true?
Here’s a related question. How important is emotional outrage at the practice of abortion to our advocacy against it? Do you think we can effectively campaign against abortion if we do not feel a sufficient amount of emotional outrage against it? Do you think confessing pro-lifers currently have enough emotional outrage against abortion? If not, why not?
March 29, 2007
Extraordinary Claims Require Extraordinary Evidence
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Cosmological Argument, Naturalism[3] Comments
The assumption of atheism argues that apart from evidence for the existence of God, people are justified in assuming atheism to be true. The motto of this brand of atheism is that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof.” From their perspective, the evidence in favor of theism is not extraordinary, so they are intellectually justified in dismissing theism. Bob and Gretchen Passantino respond to this argument as follows:
It is an extraordinary claim to say this vast and complex universe came from nothing and was caused by nothing. It’s an extraordinary claim to tell us the incredible order we see throughout the universe was caused by blind chance. It’s an extraordinary claim to argue that the innate sense of right and wrong that all of us share – even when it condemns our own actions – came about by non-moral mindlessness or mere human consensus. … In conclusion, no, the evidence is far too weak to believe the extraordinary claim of atheism that there is no God behind these things.[1]
How atheists miss this is an extraordinary phenomenon!
[1]Bob and Gretchen Passantino, “The 2002 Great Debate: Atheism vs. Christianity. Testing the Case: Which View Prevailed”; available from http://www.answers.org/atheism/debate.html; Internet; accessed 26 September 2006.
March 29, 2007
Are the Biblical Witnesses of the Resurrection Disqualified Because They are Christians?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Resurrection, Theology[2] Comments
Some dismiss the independent testimony of the various Biblical witnesses of the resurrection on the basis that these witnesses are Christians, and their testimony is recorded in the Bible. Since they are Christians, it is reasoned, they are biased to believe in the resurrection, making their testimony unreliable. Greg Koukl discussed the merits of this argument on his March 18th radio broadcast. I would like to share some of his comments with you, as well as add a few of my own.
This sort of thinking is logically fallacious. First, it presumes that rational objectivity is impossible if one has taken a position on the matter (in this case, the resurrection of Jesus Christ). This ignores the fact that rational objectivity may be what led these individuals to believe in the resurrection in the first place. The evidence could have been so strong in favor of that conclusion that they were incapable of remaining intellectually honest without affirming that Jesus rose from the dead.
Furthermore, this standard works both ways. Those who deny the resurrection have taken a position on the matter. If taking a position eliminates objectivity, and hence trustworthiness, then we should dismiss the evidence against Christ’s resurrection presented by those who deny it. Their belief that Jesus was not raised from the dead makes their testimony against it unreliable. What’s good for the goose is good for the gander.
It also ignores the fact that those who are psychologically biased (i.e. have come to a conclusion) are still capable of rational objectivity. If that were not so, none of us would ever change our mind about anything we have come to believe. Clearly we have, and thus psychological bias does not preclude rational objectivity. Another way of saying this is that psychological objectivity (i.e. having formed no conclusions) is not a prerequisite for rational objectivity.
Secondly, it presumes that the only valid, objective evidence for the resurrection of Jesus must come from those who do not already believe in the resurrection of Jesus. But if they do not believe in the resurrection of Jesus, why would they present evidence for the resurrection of Jesus? Those who do not believe in the resurrection are not going to provide evidence for that which they do not believe! Can you imagine this standard being applied to any other topic? What if I said the only valid, objective evidence for global warming must come from opponents of global warming? That is nonsensical. We would expect the evidence for global warming to come from those who are convinced that it is a real phenomenon.
Furthermore, if those who deny the resurrection knew the evidence for the resurrection, they would probably believe in the resurrection as did the earliest Christians. At that moment we would have to reject their testimony as well.
The skeptics have set up an impossible, self-serving standard, and then claim victory when it cannot be met. Don’t take the bait. The testimony of those who believe in the resurrection is valid evidence, and needs to be evaluated on its own merits.
March 21, 2007
Sonograms are “Emotional Blackmail”
Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, BioethicsLeave a Comment
South Carolina is attempting to pass a bill that would require women to view an ultrasound of their baby prior to electing an abortion. The bill’s key sponsor, Greg Delleney (R), explains the reason for the bill: “I’m just trying to save lives and protect people from regret and inform women with the most accurate non-judgemental information that can be provided.” Providing women information to help them make the best choice sounds fair enough. Rep. Gilda Cobb-Hunter (D), however, disagrees: “I see it as some kind of emotional blackmail, and I think we’re putting an undue burden on our healthcare providers and on folk who are providing those services. … The supporters of this legislation seem to believe that women enter into this decision blindly or without a lot of thought.”Emotional blackmail? Notice how she assumes that viewing the images will arouse an emotion in women—emotions that would likely lead them to keep their child. Abortion-choice advocates know how powerful sonogram images are. Sonograms make it clear that what is being terminated is a nascent human being, not a mere clump of cells. The opposition fears that women who want an abortion will change their minds after seeing the images because their conscience could no longer bear going through with the process. Rather than commending the information-bearers (the sonogram operators) for helping women make a more informed choice, they are characterized as emotional blackmailers. Same ‘ol abortion rhetoric.
March 21, 2007
Illinois jumps on the deceptive cloning bill bandwagon
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bioethics, CloningLeave a Comment
Section 40. Cloning prohibited.
1 (a) No person may clone or attempt to clone a human being.
2 For purposes of this Section, “clone or attempt to clone a
3 human being” means to transfer to a uterus or attempt to
4 transfer to a uterus anything other than the product of
5 fertilization of an egg of a human female by a sperm of a human
6 male for the purpose of initiating a pregnancy that could
7 result in the creation of a human fetus or the birth of a human
8 being.
Attempting to clone a human being has nothing to do with where you put some unnamed “product.” It has everything to do with copying some “product.” In this case we are talking about copying a human being. And if you copy a human being, what do you end up with? That’s right…another human being. So how is it again that this law prohibits cloning human beings?
Like other bills legalizing cloning while pretending to ban it, the intent of the researcher is integral to the definition of cloning. Rather than referring to what the scientist makes in the lab, cloning is said to be defined by what the scientist intends to do with that which he has created. Unfortunately, what a scientist intends to do with the embryos he has cloned is irrelevant. A clone is a clone is a clone, regardless of what the scientist does with them. If he freezes them, they are clones; if he dismembers them for their stem cells to be used in treating other human beings, they are still clones.
In an earlier section they explicitly affirm their intent to clone
embryos:
6 Section 5. Policy permitting research. The policy of the
7 State of Illinois shall be as follows:
8 (1) Research involving the derivation and use of human
9 embryonic stem cells, human embryonic germ cells, and human
10 adult stem cells from any source, including somatic cell
11 nuclear transplantation, shall be permitted and the ethical and
12 medical implications of this research shall be given full
13 consideration.
Even the grammar betrays their deception. The bill says “research involving the derivation and use of human embryonic stem cells…from any source, including somatic cell nuclear transplantation.” “Somatic cell nuclear transplantation” is a process, not a thing. As such, it is not a source for obtaining stem cells; it is a means of obtaining stem cells. What is a source of stem cells? Cloned embryos, created through the process of somatic cell nuclear transplantation. That’s what the drafters were thinking, but they couldn’t say it without blowing their cover.
These lawmakers are distorting science and language for political purposes, and should be ashamed of themselves.
January 12, 2007
Krauthammer’s Good and Bad ESCR Sense
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bioethics, Stem Cell Research[3] Comments
Charles Krauthammer, a social conservative who is pro-abortion and pro-embryonic stem cell research, wrote an article today (1-12-07) in National Review titled “Bush’s Historic Veto.” It’s not the kind of article you would expect from someone I just described. I would suggest reading the whole thing, but I wanted to draw your attention to two sections: one bad, one good.
Krauthammer wrote, “I have long supported legal abortion. And I don’t believe that life — meaning the attributes and protections of personhood — begins at conception. Yet many secularly inclined people like me have great trepidation about the inherent dangers of wanton and unrestricted manipulation — to the point of dismemberment — of human embryos.”
I’m confused. How can someone who supports the idea that women have a right to dismember their unborn child through an abortion be morally concerned about doing the same to embryos? On the level of appearance and emotion, it would seem easier to stomach the dismemberment of days-old lab embryos (embryonic stem cell research) than it would weeks-old, or months-old embryos (abortion). The latter look and feel more human (even though both are fully human). So I’m not sure what to make of his logic.
Now for the good quote. Even though he supports embryonic stem cell research, he recognizes the moral implications involved, and admires the drawing of certain lines. He wrote:
You don’t need religion to tremble at the thought of unrestricted embryo research. You simply have to have a healthy respect for the human capacity for doing evil in pursuit of the good. Once we have taken the position of many stem-cell advocates that embryos are discardable tissue with no more intrinsic value than a hangnail or an appendix, then all barriers are down. What is to prevent us from producing not just tissues and organs, but human-like organisms for preservation as a source of future body parts on demand?
…
The slope is very slippery. Which is why, even though I disagreed with where the president drew the line — I would have permitted the use of fertility-clinic embryos that are discarded and going to die anyway — I applauded his insistence that some line must be drawn, that human embryos are not nothing, and that societal values, not just the scientific imperative, should determine how they are treated.
There’s a lot of truth and wisdom packed in those two paragraphs. Of course I have to wonder, given what Krauthammer just said, why he supports destructive embryonic research. Why does he think his line is better than Bush’s, particularly if he is interested in protecting the “intrinsic value” of human beings. Intrinsic value means that one’s value is not degreed, and it exists the very moment the thing in question exists. If humans have intrinsic value, then embryos—as humans—are just as valuable as Krauthammer himself. So why can they be killed in the lab, but his life should be protected? Again, the logic escapes me.
December 21, 2006
We Can Judge People
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Relativism, Tactics, Theology[5] Comments
Dennis Prager argues against this silly notion that “we should not judge” by pointing out that if we cannot make judgments, then not only are we prohibited from declaring certain people to be evil/immoral, we are also prohibited from declaring certain people to be good. Both require that we judge the merits of a person. People often miss this because they think of “judgment” only in terms of bad.
Furthermore, it would be meaningless to say someone is good unless they are being compared against someone else we have judged not good. In other words, you can’t say someone is good unless you can say someone is bad.
December 21, 2006
The Act of Contemplating Abortion is Immoral
Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, BioethicsLeave a Comment
Georgetown University philosopher, Alexander Pruss, made an insightful comment over at Right Reason about abortion. He argues that not only is the act of abortion immoral, but even the contemplation of the act is immoral:
In weighing whether or not to abort, one is weighing the life of a particular child against other considerations. In engaging in such weighing, one is acting as if this particular child’s life had the kind of value that can be weighed and compared against other considerations (Kant calls this “market value”). Suppose that through the weighing of pros and cons, one chooses not to abort. In that case, one’s later relationship with the child causally depends on one’s having judged that the child’s life outweighs the values implicit in the considerations one had in favor of abortion. This suggests a certain kind of conditionality in the relationship: one’s having engaged in weighing implies that one accepted the possibility that something else at least might be more valuable to one than the life of the child.<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>
Very interesting argument!
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<!–[if !supportFootnotes]–>[1]<!–[endif]–>Alexander Pruss, “A Miscellany of Pro-Life Arguments; II: Unconditionality in Parent-Child Relationships”; available from http://rightreason.ektopos.com/archives/2006/09/a_miscellany_of.html; Internet; accessed 28 September 2006.
December 21, 2006
Thinking to Believe 