Theistic Arguments

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June 10, 2010

Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 4

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments
[17] Comments 

Alternative Responses (cont)

 Colin McGinn, philosopher at the University of Miami

As mentioned in my second post, Colin McGinn (echoing Immanuel Kant) makes a distinction between asking why some particular existent within the whole of existence exists, and why the whole of existence itself exists.  The former question can be answered by appealing to some other preexistent existent within the whole of existence, but the latter question appeals to some existent outside the whole of existence to explain the whole of existence.  It is impossible, however, for something to exist outside the set of the whole of existence.  By definition there cannot be additional entities outside the set of “every existing thing.” 

 McGinn thinks this problem can be remedied by reformulating the question as “Is it true of every concrete thing that it exists contingently, or necessarily?”  He affirms that every concrete entity exists contingently.  So far so good, but why do concrete entities exist, then?  Here is where McGinn fumbles.  He affirms that the whole of concrete, contingent existence just exists inexplicably!  Surely this is absurd.  Contingent beings, by definition, derive their being from something outside themselves, and thus there must be an explanation for why they exist.  It is metaphysically absurd to speak of an uncaused contingent being.  Inexplicability is appropriate for a necessary being, but not contingent beings (and all concrete entities are contingent beings).

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June 9, 2010

Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 3

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments
[5] Comments 

Alternative Responses

Now that I have put my own view on display (See parts 1 and 2 of this mini-series), let us take a look at how a few philosophers have answered this puzzling philosophical question. We will explore the views of Quentin Smith, John Leslie, Colin McGinn, Hubert Dreyfus, and Bede Rundle.

Quentin Smith, philosopher at Western Michigan University

According to Quentin Smith, the answer to why there is something rather than nothing is so simple that it seems rather trite: The reason Y exists at time t4 rather than nothing is because X existed at time t3, and caused Y to exist.  Likewise, X exists at time t2 rather than nothing because W existed at time t1, and caused X to exist, and so on.  In other words, the present something exists because a previous something caused it to exist.  Why did that previous something exist rather than nothing?  The reason is that it, too, was caused by something that existed before it, and so on.  The answer to the question of why there is something rather than nothing, then, is simply that something is always preceded by something else.

The problem with Smith’s answer is two-fold.  First, he shifts the locus of the question from why anything has ever existed to why something exists right now.  The question, however, seeks a reason for the whole of reality, not just each temporal state of reality. 

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June 3, 2010

Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 2

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments
[34] Comments 

Why is there Something, Rather than Nothing?

“Why is there something rather than nothing?”  This is considered by many to be the most fundamental of all philosophical questions. The question, however, presumes that “nothing” and “something” are two equally possible states – that nothingness is a genuine alternative to something.  If what I have argued thus far is sound, nothingness is metaphysically impossible, and thus it is not a logical alternative to something.  Something must exist.  But what if my reasoning is flawed, and it turns out that non-existence is logically possible?  How would we answer this long-standing philosophical question, then? 

To answer the question we first need to be clear about what is being asked.  For example, what is meant by “why?”  Are we seeking to discover the cause of existence, or the purpose for existence?  If we are seeking a purpose for existence, then we are already presupposing the existence of some supreme mind, because only personal agents create things for particular reasons and with some purpose in mind.  Without access to that mind, it is difficult to discover what purposes it had for creating.  It is much simpler to identify the cause of existence: the what rather than the why. 

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June 2, 2010

Thinking About a Whole Lotta Nothing, Part 1

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments
[6] Comments 

Women often wonder what men are thinking about.  Jerry Seinfeld once joked that the answer is, “Nothing.”  For the past several weeks, I too, have been thinking about nothing – not nothing as in “not anything,” but nothing as in the concept of nothingness.  What is nothing?  Is it possible that there could have been nothing rather than something?  If so, why is there something rather than nothing?

What is Nothing?

Nothing is a very difficult concept to wrap one’s mind around.  As A.J. Ayer pointed out, we are often fooled by the grammar of nothingness into think that since “nothing” is a noun, it must refer to something.

But “nothing” is a term of universal negation, not a term of reference.  It’s similar to words like “no one ” and “nowhere.”  “Nowhere” does not refer to a place, but to the absence of any place (not anywhere).  Likewise, “nothing” does not refer to something, but to the absence of anything (not anything).  If someone asked you what you had for lunch today, and you say “nothing,” you don’t mean you had lunch, and what you ate was called nothing, but rather that you did not have anything for lunch.  If they ask you what nothing tasted like, tell them, “Chicken, of course.”

The minute we begin to think about nothing, we mentally transform nothing into a something; an object to be contemplated.  It is even impossible to imagine nothingness, because every image we conjure up is an image of something.  We often imagine nothing as an infinite expanse of black, empty space (a vacuum) – but empty space is something, not nothing.  Nothing is “not-even-space.”  Nothing is not a little bit of something, or “something-lite,” but literally no-thing; the absence of being.  Perhaps Macbeth said it best when he said, “Nothing is but what is not.”  It is the absence of any and every existent, including the very concept of existence.  Could this kind of nothing “exist”?

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May 24, 2010

Thinking About Nothing

Posted by Jason Dulle under Cosmological Argument, Philosophy, Theistic Arguments
[2] Comments 
 

March 9, 2010

Omnipotence and Monotheism

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Nature of God, Theistic Arguments, Theology, Theology Proper
[18] Comments 

I think a good argument can be made for the existence of God based on the existence of the universe.  We know the universe began to exist.  Given that whatever begins to exist requires a cause external to itself to bring it into existence, there must be a cause external to the universe to explain why it came into being.  Whatever brought time, space, and matter into existence cannot itself be temporal, spatial, and material, and thus the cause of the universe must be eternal, non-spatial, and immaterial.  Furthermore, the cause must be personal in nature since there are only two known sources of causation—events and personal agents—and it is impossible to explain the first event in terms of a prior event.  Therefore, an agent must be the cause of the universe.  A personal, eternal, non-spatial, and immaterial being is what most theists mean by “God.”

While I think this argument demonstrates the existence of the divine, it cannot tell us anything about the number of divine beings responsible for creating the universe.  There could be one, or there could be billions.  An additional argument is needed if one is going to prove the existence of one and only one God.  In the past I argued for monotheism on the basis of divine omnipotence.  I reasoned that the property of omnipotence cannot belong to more than one being, for if two or more beings have to share power, then neither being can be said to have “all” power.  So God, then, must be one if He is omnipotent.

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February 10, 2010

Five Arguments for God’s Existence: Contra the New Atheists

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
[2] Comments 

William Lane Craig has written a “fairly” condensed article (30 pages) consisting of five arguments for God’s existence, and examines how the new atheists such as Richard Dawkins have responded to these arguments.  This is probably the most lay-accessible, condensed written treatment I have seen from Craig on this topic.  Highly recommended.  

You can read it in HTML, PDF, or at Scribd.

HT: Justin Taylor

 

November 6, 2009

How to Identify a Moral Constructivist

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Relativism, Theistic Arguments
[2] Comments 

42-16341014To determine if someone believes morals are merely social constructs ask, “If no humans existed, would objective moral values exist?”  If they say “no” then they are moral constructivists.  If they say “yes” then they believe morals exist in some objective sense independent of the human mind and human culture.

If they do exist in some objective sense independent of the human mind and human culture, what exactly is their source?  God…maybe?!?!

 

July 20, 2009

God’s existence is necessary

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments
[5] Comments 

BudziszewskiJ. Budziszewski made a great summary of the cosmological argument for God’s existence.  He wrote, “Anything which might not have been requires a cause.  Philosophers call such things ‘contingent beings.’  But the universe…is itself a contingent being, so the universe must have a cause.  Now if we say that the cause of the universe is another contingent being, we merely invite an infinite regress.  For the regress to have an end, we must eventually reach a being which is not contingent but necessary—not something which might not have been, but something which can’t not be.  Furthermore this necessary being must be sufficient to cause its effects, and so it must have all of the qualities traditionally ascribed to God: Eternity, power, and all the rest.”

 

February 2, 2009

Quentin Smith’s Version of the Self-Caused Universe as a Response to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments
[7] Comments 

QuentinSmithThe kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence goes as follows:

(1) Anything that begins to exist requires a cause
(2) The universe began to exist
(3) Thus, the universe requires a cause

With some additional philosophical reasoning, the cause of the universe is ultimately identified as God.  Many atheists object to the first premise, claiming that the universe just exists inexplicably.  Such include Frank Wilczek, Chrispen Wright, Bob Hale, and John Post.  Atheist philosopher, Quentin Smith, rejects this response as intellectually inadequate.  He agrees that the universe needs a cause, but identifies that cause as the universe itself.  He is not the first to do so.  Daniel Dennett et al have made similar claims, but Smith’s version is much more sophisticated.  Unlike most others, his version is rationally coherent (even if it is ultimately untenable), and thus deserving of attention.[1]

In Smith’s cosmogeny,[2] the beginning of the universe consists of an infinite number of simultaneous events, each causally connected to the next so that nothing popped into existence uncaused.  Since the chain of events is infinite, there is no first event that lacks a causal explanation, and thus there is no need to posit God as the first cause of the universe.  Each part of the universe is fully caused by another.

The events are identified by Smith as elementary particles (such as electrons and quarks).  If we let t = 0 stand for the beginning of the universe, “…” stand for an infinite regress, e stand for electrons, q stand for quarks, and > stand for simultaneous causal relations, we can picture the beginning of Smith’s imagined universe as follows:

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January 6, 2009

Can Morality be Grounded Outside of God?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Moral Argument, Theistic Arguments
[32] Comments 

443909a-i10Many attempts have been made to ground morality outside of a personal God, but all fall miserably short.  At best, non-theistic ethical systems offer a rationale, or principle by which one can justify a system of prescriptions and proscriptions, but in what do they ground the rationale?  The guiding principle may provide for a consistent system of ethical thought, but just because a system is consistent does not mean it is true, or that anyone is obliged to adopt it.  Offering a rationale for saying one ought to do X is very different from grounding that moral imperative itself.

The only way to ground a moral imperative is to anchor it in some transcendent source.  Any system that is grounded on principles created by man cannot transcend man because it has no objective value.  It is entirely subjective; a social convention; morality by the people, of the people, and for the people.  Society could choose to adopt a totally different rationale that supports a totally different set of prescriptions and proscriptions without violating any moral truths, because non-theistic moral systems are not representations of moral reality.  Indeed, there is no such thing as moral reality (moral anti-realism).  In the end, non-theistic moral systems provide no ontological basis on which to hang objective moral rules, and thus offer no compelling reason to abide by the rules of the system.

Some atheists believe objective moral rules exist as part of the fabric of the universe (they are moral realists).  These moral laws are said to exist as inexplicably as the laws of nature itself.  If so, the grounding problem would be solved, because there would be an objective basis for moral prescriptions and proscriptions.  But why think we are obliged to align our lives with these moral rules?  Obligations are grounded in relationships, and relationships entail personal agents.  If moral rules are not grounded in a transcendent moral being, it makes no sense to think we are obligated to follow them.  They can be safely ignored without enduring consequence.

But what if we chose to follow them anyway?  Would it matter?  No.  Our moral choices would be insignificant because the finality of the grave allows for no moral accountability.  I will not be rewarded for having obeyed the natural moral laws, and you will not be punished for having ignored them.  The outcome is the same.  In the end, it becomes meaningless.  A moral realism that is meaningless is no better than a moral anti-realism that is meaningless.  Only theism can ground objective moral values, our duty to submit to those values, and supply us with a rational reason to fulfill our moral obligations.

I should make it clear that the question is not whether non-theists can recognize objective moral laws apart from belief in God, or even keep them apart from belief in God.  They can, and do.  The question is how they can make sense of that which they recognize, and make sense of that which they do.  Apart from theism, I think the answer is negative.

 

December 12, 2008

Answering the “Temporal Necessity” Objection to the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Theism, Theistic Arguments
[6] Comments 

The kalam cosmological argument (KCA) for God’s existence goes as follows:

(1) Anything that begins to exist requires a cause
(2) The universe began to exist
(3) Thus, the universe requires a cause

With some additional philosophical reasoning, the cause of the universe is ultimately identified as God.  Some seek to undermine this causal argument for God’s existence by defining causality as a wholly physical principle limited to physical reality, rather than a metaphysical principle with broad application to both physical and non-physical reality.  If this assessment is correct, then the causal principle does not apply to the question of cosmic origins because it came into being concomitantly with the universe, thereby exempting the origin of the universe itself from its influence.  This would effectively undermine premise 1 of the KCA, because the universe would be an example of something that begins to exist, and yet does not require a cause.

But why think causality is a wholly physical principle?  I have yet to hear an argument to substantiate this claim that does not beg the question in favor of naturalism/atheism.  The most common argument is that causes necessarily precede their effects in time.  Since time began concomitantly with the universe, there was no time prior to the universe in which a cause could have occurred, and thus the universe must be an effect without a cause.  This begs the question in favor of naturalism/atheism, for only by assuming the truth of naturalism/atheism does it follow that causes necessarily precede their effects in time.  But it’s the truth of naturalism/atheism that the causal argument brings into question!  It is fallacious to argue the causal argument is meaningless because it posits a cause outside the spatio-temporal universe, when the causal argument itself is grounds for calling into question the naturalistic/atheistic assumption that causation is a wholly physical principle, limited to the spatio-temporal universe.

While temporal priority may be a common property of causation (particularly as we experience the causal principle in a temporal world), it is not a necessary property.  Causes can be prior to their effects in one of two ways: temporally, logically.  Even Immanuel Kant recognized this.  As an example of logical causal priority, he asks us to imagine a heavy ball resting on a cushion from eternity past.  The physical proximity of the ball and cushion forms a concave depression in the cushion that is coeternal with the ball and cushion.  What, then, is the cause of the concavity?  Neither the ball nor the cushion enjoys temporal priority over the other (the ball never began to rest on the cushion, and the cushion never existed apart from the ball’s resting on it), so there is no temporally prior cause.  If we adopt the naturalist’s assumptions, we should conclude it is uncaused.  But surely this is unreasonable!  As a contingent property, the concavity of the pillow begs for a causal explanation.  If the cause-effect relationship cannot be temporal in nature, then it must be logical in nature.  The ball is the logically prior to the pillow’s concavity (surely the concavity of the pillow does not cause the sphericity of the ball!), and thus is the cause of the concavity.  Likewise, as a contingent being, the universe demands a causal explanation.  That cause cannot be temporally prior to the universe, so it must be logically prior.  If there can be causal relations independent of temporality, then the naturalist’s objection to the KCA’s first premise fails.  Everything that begins to exist, including the universe, requires a cause.

Up to now I have granted the objector’s presupposition that causes precede their effects in time, but I think there are good reasons to believe that causes are concomitant with their effects.  If so, then the cause of the universe would be temporal after all, and the objection against premise 1 of the KCA fails.  William Lane Craig makes a good case for the temporal simultaneity of cause and effect:

Imagine C and E are the cause and the effect. If C were to vanish before the time at which E is produced, would E nevertheless come into being? Surely not! But if time is continuous, then no matter how close to E’s appearance C’s disappearance takes place, there will always be an interval of time between C’s disappearance and E’s appearance. But then why or how E came into being when it does seems utterly mysterious, for there is no cause at that moment to produce it.[1]

God’s causing the universe to come into being, then, may be simultaneous to the universe’s coming into being (effect).  If so, the temporal necessity objection against the KCA fails, and the conclusion stands: the universe requires a cause.

Even if all of my previous responses to the temporal necessity objection fail, we can know it is false because time itself does not cause anything even in the spatio-temporal world.  Time is not part of the causal equation.  While cause and effect occur within a temporal framework, time is not causing any effect.  Time is incidental to cause and effect, not essential to it.  If time is not part of the causal relationship, then there is no reason to reject the idea that the universe needs a cause on grounds that the cause would have to be outside of time.

[1]William Lane Craig, “Causation and Spacetime”; available from http://www.reasonablefaith.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=7935; Internet; accessed 17 Deceber 2010.

 

December 2, 2008

The Multiverse, God, and Reason

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Intelligent Design, Naturalism, Science, Theistic Arguments
[5] Comments 

The universe is incredibly finely-tuned, not only for its own existence, but for the existence of complex, intelligent life.  This fact does not set well with naturalists and atheists.  It is enormously difficult to explain the unfathomable specificity and precision of the cosmos on the basis of chance alone.  Indeed, the value of some physical constants were initial conditions present at the universe’s origin, and thus cannot possibly be explained by random chance processes.  So how do non-theists explain how our universe got so lucky?

While there are a few different approaches floating out there, the one garnering the most attention and support recently is the multiverse hypothesis (a.k.a the Landscape).  Multiverse theory proposes the existence of a near-infinite number of universes.  Given the multitude of universes–it is reasoned–there is bound to be at least one that is life-permitting.  As David Berlinski writes, “[B]y multiplying universes, the Landscape dissolves improbabilities.  To the question What are the odds? the Landscape provides the invigorating answer that it hardly matters.”[1]

Scientist who subscribe to the multiverse view it as the only viable naturalistic alternative to a divine creator.  As Tim Folger wrote:

Physicists don’t like coincidences. They like even less the notion that life is somehow central to the universe, and yet recent discoveries are forcing them to confront that very idea. Life, it seems, is not an incidental component of the universe, burped up out of a random chemical brew on a lonely planet to endure for a few fleeting ticks of the cosmic clock. In some strange sense, it appears that we are not adapted to the universe; the universe is adapted to us.

Call it a fluke, a mystery, a miracle. Or call it the biggest problem in physics. Short of invoking a benevolent creator, many physicists see only one possible explanation: Our universe may be but one of perhaps infinitely many universes in an inconceivably vast multi­verse. Most of those universes are barren, but some, like ours, have conditions suitable for life.

The idea is controversial. Critics say it doesn’t even qualify as a scientific theory because the existence of other universes cannot be proved or disproved. Advocates argue that, like it or not, the multiverse may well be the only viable non­religious explanation for what is often called the “fine-tuning problem”-the baffling observation that the laws of the universe seem custom-tailored to favor the emergence of life.[2]

What I find particularly interesting is how fine-tuning is viewed as a problem in the first place.  No theist would view it as a problem.  It is only problematic to atheists and naturalists because it implies a designing intelligence, and such a being is anathema to them.  In order to avoid the obvious conclusion that an intelligent being was responsible for fine-tuning the universe for existence and life, they propose a naturalistic theory that is, admittedly, not even scientific (because it is neither provable nor falsifiable).  Proponents of the multiverse are honest about this fact.  Consider Andre Linde.  When asked if physicists will ever be able to prove the multiverse hypothesis, he responded:

“Nothing else fits the data.  We don’t have any alternative explanation for the dark energy; we don’t have any alternative explanation for the smallness of the mass of the electron; we don’t have any alternative explanation for many properties of particles.  What I am saying is, look at it with open eyes. These are experimental facts, and these facts fit one theory: the multiverse theory. They do not fit any other theory so far. I’m not saying these properties necessarily imply the multiverse theory is right, but you asked me if there is any experimental evidence, and the answer is yes. It was Arthur Conan Doyle who said, ‘When you have eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.’?”

In other words, it doesn’t need to be proven by evidence.  It doesn’t even need to be probable.  It only needs to be the last man standing.  I’ll agree with Linde that no other naturalistic hypothesis has more explanatory power than the multiverse (even though it has no empirical support), but when the list of live options is expanded beyond naturalistic hypotheses, there is a better explanation of the data: theism.  But Linde excludes theism a priori from the list of live options.  Why do that?  Theism has more explanatory plausibility and rational evidence in its favor than the multiverse, and thus should be preferred.

The reason those like Linde take the multiverse hypothesis seriously, is not because they are following the evidence where it leads, but because the evidence points to a designer of the universe, and they wish to avoid such a being at all costs, even if it means believing in an improbable, improvable theory.  As Bernard Carr, a cosmologist at Queen Mary University of London said, “If there is only one universe you might have to have a fine-tuner. If you don’t want God, you’d better have a multiverse.”  Apparently “it is better to have many worlds than one God.”[3] If ridding themselves of one supposed fairy tale (theism) requires belief in another, so be it.

The father of multiverse theory, Leonard Susskind, is very clear about the anti-theistic motivations of theories such as the multiverse.  When asked if we are stuck with an intelligent designer if his Landscape theory doesn’t pan out, he responded:

I doubt that physicists will see it that way. If, for some unforeseen reason, the landscape turns out to be inconsistent – maybe for mathematical reasons, or because it disagrees with observation – I am pretty sure that physicists will go on searching for natural explanations of the world. But I have to say that if that happens, as things stand now we will be in a very awkward position. Without any explanation of nature’s fine-tunings we will be hard pressed to answer the ID critics. One might argue that the hope that a mathematically unique solution will emerge is as faith-based as ID.[4]

His point could not be clearer.  The desire of naturalists is to find a plausible naturalistic explanation on par with the design hypothesis is their driving motivation.  Any theory will do, even if, according to Susskind, it is as faith-based as Intelligent Design.  It appears that blind faith is acceptable in science, so long as its object is not God.  They’ll blindly believe in the existence of universes they cannot see, but not in the existence of a God who has made Himself known in the very cosmos they study.

[1]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions(New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 124.[2]Tim Folger, “Science’s Alternative to an Intelligent Creator: the Multiverse Theory” in Discover magazine; available from http://discovermagazine.com/2008/dec/10-sciences-alternative-to-an-intelligent-creator; Internet; accessed 11 November 2008.
[3]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 135.[4]Leonard Susskind, in an interview with Amanda Gefter of New Scientist, “Is String Theory in Trouble?”, December 17 2005 edition, p. 48; available from http://www.newscientist.com/channel/fundamentals/mg18825305.800.html; Internet; accessed 5 January 2006.

 

November 18, 2008

Big Bang Cosmology and Atheism Go Together Like Peas in a Blender

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Cosmological Argument, Naturalism, Science, Theism, Theistic Arguments
[27] Comments 

big-bangFor millennia philosophers maintained that the universe is eternal.  The philosophical payoff of this view was that it avoided the God question.  If the universe has always been, it did not need a creator.  The emergence of the Big Bang theory in the early part of the 20th century, however, changed all of that.  The Big Bang model successfully predicted that the universe–including all spatio-temporal-material reality–had an absolute origin at a point in the finite past, from which it expanded, and continues to expand today.

The theistic implications of this model were recognized instantly.  If the universe began to exist, it seemed to require a supernatural cause (one outside the confines of the natural world).  That’s why it was met with fierce opposition, and why it took several decades and many lines of empirical confirmation to become the reigning paradigm it is today.  Even now, cosmogenists continue to put forth alternative models in hopes of averting the beginning of the universe, many of which are little more than exercises in metaphysical speculation, incapable of both verification and falsification.

While not friendly to an atheistic worldview, many atheists eventually made their peace with the empirical evidence, and accepted the theory.  But the theistic implications of a temporally finite universe have not gone away.  Anything that begins to exist requires a cause.  If the universe began to exist, what caused it to exist?  It could not be a natural law, because natural laws originated with the universe.  It could not be self-caused, because this is incoherent.  Something cannot bring itself into existence, for that would entail its existence prior to its existence.

The atheist has two options.  He can either admit to the existence of an external cause of the universe, or affirm that the universe is uncaused.  For most atheists the first option is out of the question.  An external cause of the universe looks too much like God: immaterial, eternal, non-spatial, intelligent, and personal.  That leaves them the second option.  But this won’t do either.  The causal principle is one of the most basic intuitions we have.  Things don’t just pop into existence uncaused from nothing, so why think the universe did?  If everything that begins to exist has a sufficient cause, on what grounds is the origin of the universe excepted?  If one excepts it on the basis that it is impossible to have a cause prior to the first event, they are guilty of begging the question in favor of atheism, for they are assuming that physical reality is the only reality, and thus the only possible cause of the Big Bang must be a physical cause.  But it is entirely plausible that the external cause of the Big Bang was an eternal, non-physical reality.  The only way to demonstrate that the universe cannot have a cause, then, is to demonstrate that the existence of an eternal, non-physical reality like God is impossible.  But the very beginning of the universe is an argument for such a being’s existence!

Some atheists, recognizing the problem the principle of causal sufficiency makes for the atheistic worldview, cling to an eternal universe despite the scientific and philosophic evidence to the contrary.  They recognize that it is nonsense to think something can come from nothing, uncaused.  Something can only come from something.  From nothing, nothing comes.  If there was ever a time when nothing existed (as the Big Bang model predicts), then of necessity there would be nothing still, because nothing has no potential to become something.  And yet there is something, so there could not have been a time when nothing existed.  As a matter of historical fact, there can’t ever be a time when there was nothing.  Something must exist eternally.  If something must exist eternally, and the universe is not that something, then something resembling the God of theism must exist.  Rather than admit the obvious-that this is evidence for the existence of God-these atheists reject the scientific and philosophical evidence for a finite universe, and assert that the universe must exist eternally.

What’s important to see, here, is that this sort of atheist is not being intellectually honest with the evidence.  He has an a priori philosophical and volitional commitment to atheism, and that commitment biases him to such an extent that he will not accept the destination to which the rational evidence leads.  Only theism is consistent with the evidence, and consistent with reason.  While I commend atheists who reject the notion that the universe could come into being from nothing totally uncaused as an irrational leap of faith, I admonish them to go one step further, and recognize that the principle that something only comes from something, combined with the scientific an philosophical evidence for the finitude of the universe, supports theism, not atheism.  To be consistent and honest with the data, they should accept the finitude of the universe, and admit that its existence requires a personal and supernatural cause.

 

November 3, 2008

Is an Unembodied Mind too Abstract a Notion to be the Cause of the Universe?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Philosophy, Theism, Theistic Arguments
[19] Comments 

A cosmological argument for theism looks something like this:

Everyone intuits the causal principle that every effect/event requires a sufficient cause.  What, then, is the cause of the universe?  What is causally sufficient to account for the observed effect?  Since the effect includes time, space, and matter, the cause must be timeless, non-spatial, and immaterial, not to mention intelligent and powerful to account for the specified complexity of the universe.  Only two things fit this description: abstract objects, or an unembodied mind.  Since abstract objects are causally impotent by definition (they do not stand in causal relations with concrete objects), they cannot be the cause of the universe.  That leaves us with an unembodied mind, who is a personal agent.  This makes sense.  Not only are we are intimately acquainted with the idea of immaterial minds causing physical effects, but it also makes sense of the design and order we see in the universe.

In response to this argument, some think we should reject the notion of a disembodied mind on the grounds that it is too abstract; i.e. it is something we are not acquainted with, and hence have no reason to believe is possible.  There are at least three reasons to reject this line of thinking.

First, there is nothing logically incoherent about a disembodied mind.  The notion may not be familiar to us, but we ought not confuse familiarity with plausibility.  A person raised in the remote parts of the jungle has never seen ice, but his lack of familiarity with ice does not mean the existence of ice is implausible.  Neither would it constitute good grounds on which for him to reject evidence being presented to him that ice exists.  Likewise, just because we are not personally acquainted with the idea of an unembodied mind does not mean an unembodied mind does not, or cannot exist.  Neither does it constitute good grounds on which to reject the evidence being presented for the existence of such a mind.  The cosmological argument provides warrant for believing in something we may not have thought probable otherwise.

Second, even if we are not personally familiar with unembodied minds, we are very familiar with the concept of mind (each of us has one), and its causal powers.  In other words, even if the specific form of the mind in question is unfamiliar to us, the function of a mind very familiar to us: minds exercise causal agency.  And I see no reason to think this capacity is dependent on our mind being embodied.  The property of causal agency belongs to the mind, not the body, so there is no reason to think an unembodied mind is too abstract a concept to be the cause of our universe.

One might respond that it would be impossible for an unembodied mind (immaterial) to cause effects in the physical realm.  This must be false.  Why?  Because our minds cause effects in the physical realm all the time, and our minds are an immaterial entity (it may stand in a causal relationship with the brain, but it cannot be reduced to the brain/physicality).  The only difference between our minds and an unembodied mind is embodiment, but I fail to see how embodiment is significant.  The fact remains that human minds, as well as a divine mind, are immaterial in nature, and a source of causation which produces effects in the physical world.

A case could even be made that human minds do not have to be embodied, and indeed, become disembodied upon death.  I am thinking in particular of empirical studies into near-death experiences.  While many of the experiences are unverifiable, a small minority are.  And in these instances, there are examples of continued consciousness, even after brain death.  In fact, in some cases the person is conscious of things happening outside of the room where their body lies (things they could not have possibly known, even if their body were functioning normally).  So I don’t think the idea of an unembodied mind is abstract, or that we are not acquainted with this.  Even if most of us are unacquainted with it experientially, we are acquainted with the concept, and there is nothing incoherent about the concept.  Strange, maybe, but incoherent, no.

Finally, those who wish to reject both abstract objects and an unembodied mind as the cause of the universe need to offer an alternative.  Given the criteria, I cannot fathom what that could be.  If no other alternative is possible, then they must either reject the causal principle and say the universe popped into existence uncaused, or else embrace an eternal universe.  Given the fact that the causal principle is one of our strongest metaphysical intuitions and enjoys undisputed empirical confirmation, and given the fact that the scientific evidence and philosophical arguments against an eternal universe are more than compelling, neither is a good option.  We have good reason, then, to think the cause of the universe was a powerful, intelligent, immaterial, non-spatial, eternal mind.  This is an apt description of what most theists have traditionally meant by the term “God.”

 

October 15, 2008

Existence and Necessity

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Philosophy, Theism, Theistic Arguments
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*Read previous post before reading this one.*

There is a difference between the question, Is existence necessary?, and Does X exist necessarily? The first question asks about existence in general, whereas the second asks about the existence of some specific thing within the larger domain of existence.

Regarding the first question, is it necessary that something exist? The answer to this question depends on whether one is speaking of historical possibility, or metaphysical possibility. Historically speaking, the answer is an emphatic yes. Something must exist, and must exist eternally. Why? Because something does exist. If there was ever a time when absolutely nothing existed, absolutely nothing would “exist” now, because nothing has no potentiality to ever become something. And yet there is something, so we know there has never been a time when nothing existed.

But from a metaphysical perspective, there is no reason to think existence itself is necessary. We can conceive of absolute nothingness. Furthermore, there is nothing logically incoherent about the concept of non-existence. Existence, then, is not necessary, but contingent, and contingent things require an explanation for their existence. What, then, is the explanation of existence? Why is there something, rather than nothing?

The second question is quite different. It does not ask whether existence itself is necessary, but whether the existence of some particular X is necessary. In cosmological arguments, X stands for the universe. Does the universe exist necessarily?

Some atheists assume the answer to this question is wrapped up in the first: Since something must exist eternally, the universe must be eternal. While it is true that something must have always existed, why think the universe is that something? Not only are there compelling scientific and philosophical reasons to think the universe exists contingently, but this begs the question in favor of atheism. It assumes materialism from the start (i.e. the universe is all that exists), reasoning that since something must be eternal, and the universe exhausts reality, then the universe must be eternal. But that the universe exhausts reality is what stands to be proven.

Secondly, thinking the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature is a grandiose claim that few philosophers are willing to countenance. To say the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature does not merely affirm the necessity of a universe in general, but the necessity of our universe in particular. It is an affirmation that the very fundamental particles of our universe–quarks, neutrons, electrons, etc.–are necessary, not just in kind, but in number and arrangement as well. But this is absurd. There is no reason to think the universe could not have been composed of a different set/number of fundamental particles, arranged in a different way, operating by a different set of physical laws, resulting in a totally different kind of universe. In fact, it is quite possible to conceive of a physically empty universe, or no universe at all. There is no physical or logical law that requires the universe to exist. So modal logic alone demonstrates the universe is not necessary. It is contingent, meaning it is metaphysically possible that it might have never been.

We can agree with the atheist that existence is necessary as a historical fact, and that the universe does not exist necessarily. But these two truths, coupled with the scientific and philosophic evidence for the finitude and contingency of the universe, provide a strong argument for a personal God. Something must exist eternally, and since the universe is not that something, it must be something else. Whatever caused the spatio-temporal-material universe to exist must itself be eternal, non-spatial, and immaterial.

Only two things fit such a description: abstract objects, or an unembodied mind. Since abstract objects are causally impotent by definition, they cannot be the cause of the universe, and thus are unlikely to be that which has always existed. That leaves us with an unembodied mind as the eternal reality. This makes sense. Not only are we are intimately acquainted with the idea of minds creating things, but it also makes sense of the design and order we see in the universe. An intelligent agent best explains why the universe exists as it does. Since an eternal, non-spatial, immaterial, intelligent mind is what most mean by “God,” it is best to conclude that God is that which exists eternally, and hence necessarily. He is a necessary being, who contains within Himself the sufficient reason for His own existence, and is the cause of everything else.

 

October 15, 2008

Why is there Something Rather than Nothing?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Theism, Theistic Arguments
[9] Comments 

Something exists. For all but radical skeptics, this much is clear. But why does something exist? Why is there something rather than nothing at all? There is, after all, nothing logically incoherent about the concept of non-existence. It seems possible, at least, that nothing exist. So why is there something rather than nothing?

Interestingly, modern science has garnered several lines of empirical evidence highly suggestive that nonexistence was a historical reality. Cosmogonists hold that the physical universe came into being ex nihilo a finite time ago. Matter, space, and time all had their beginning at an absolute point of origin, before which there was no physical reality. While the scientific evidence does point to an absolute origin of physical reality, it does not preclude the possibility of a preexistent, immaterial reality from which the physical universe emerged-and thus does not require that physical existence emerge from absolute nonexistence. That question is left open, as it is beyond the realm of scientific inquiry.

Materialists, however, are only a little hesitant to deny the existence of such an immaterial reality, and subsequently affirm that the universe popped into being from literally nothing. As atheist and physicist, P.C.W. Davies wrote, “The coming-into-being of the universe as discussed in modern science…is not just a matter of imposing some sort of organization or structure upon a previous incoherent state, but literally the coming-into-being of all physical things from nothing.” This is echoed by physicists John Barrow and Frank Tipler: “At this singularity, space and time came into existence; literally nothing existed before the singularity, so, if the Universe originated at such a singularity, we would truly have a creation ex nihilo.” We have then, as a matter of historical fact, a point in time in which nothing existed-at least nothing physical. And yet now, physical reality exists. But why?

Traditionally, atheists punted on this question, responding that the existence of the universe is just a brute, inexplicable fact.1 As Bertrand Russell famously quipped, “The universe is just there, and that’s all.” This sort of response might work given an eternal universe, but it is preposterous to pass this off as an acceptable answer if the universe is finite and contingent. Everything that begins to exist has an external cause. If the universe began to exist, it stands to reason that it, too, requires an external cause. It is unbelievable and irrational to think the universe could just pop into existence uncaused from absolutely nothing.

When one reflects on it for a moment, however, Russell’s response is not rational even for an eternal universe. According to Leibnitz’s principle of sufficient reason, everything that exists has an explanation for its existence either in the necessity of its own nature, or in an external cause. An eternal universe cannot have an external cause, because that which is eternal is by definition uncaused. It exists by a necessity of its own nature. Given the principle of sufficient reason, then, the defender of an eternal universe must confess that the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature. And yet few atheists are willing to countenance the notion. And for good reason.

To say the universe exists by a necessity of its own nature does not merely affirm the necessity of a universe in general, but the necessity of our particular universe. It is an affirmation that the very fundamental particles of our universe-quarks, neutrons, electrons, etc.-are necessary, not just in kind, but in number and arrangement as well. But this is absurd. There is no reason to think the universe could not have been composed of a different kind/number of fundamental particles, arranged in a different way, operating by a different set of physical laws, resulting in a totally different kind of universe. In fact, it is quite possible to conceive of a physically empty universe, or no universe at all. There is no physical or logical law that requires the universe to exist.2 It is contingent, meaning it is metaphysically possible that it might have never been.

The defender of an eternal universe, then, is in the unusual spot of having to deny that the universe exists in virtue of an external cause, and not willing to accept that it exists by a necessity of its own nature. Whence does it exist, then? No sufficient reason is given, which is intellectually unacceptable. The atheist must offer an explanation for why the universe exists, or offer an explanation for why no explanation is necessary. Merely asserting that there is no explanation, or that the question is meaningless is not a satisfactory answer. Surely no atheist would accept this kind of answer for anything else. Indeed, atheists often challenge theists to explain why God exists, and are unwilling to accept the answer that He exists inexplicably. They rightly demand that His existence be explained, so on what grounds are they justified in exempting the universe from explanation?

To date, no atheist has provided a non-question begging explanation for why the universe does not require an explanation. Some argue that a cause of the universe is logically impossible, because any such cause would have to obtain prior to the universe. And yet, since nothing existed prior to the emergence of the universe, no cause can obtain. But this assumes all causal relations are temporal, and that the only possible state of affairs prior to the universe is a physical state of affairs. This begs the question in favor of materialism and atheism, and thus an explanation for why the universe needs no explanation still stands.

If no explanation as to why the universe does not require an explanation can be provided, then the atheist is under rational obligation to embrace an external cause as the sufficient reason for the universe, or the necessity of its own nature. Given the fact that the latter is absurd, it is more reasonable to embrace an external cause for the universe. In doing so, he will have to abandon his belief in an eternal universe, and embrace a finite universe, causing him to squarely face our original question: Why does the universe exist, rather than not?

Why and how did something emerge from nothing? The most basic ontological principle is that out of nothing, nothing comes; and yet in the case of the universe, out of nothing something came. There must be a sufficient cause for the universe to come into being, and that requires that something exist external to the universe. Given that whatever caused space, time, and matter to begin to exist cannot itself be spatial, temporal, or material, we are limited to two possible causes of the universe: abstract objects, or an unembodied mind.

Since abstract objects are causally impotent by definition, they cannot be the cause of the universe, and thus are unlikely to be that which has always existed. That leaves us with an unembodied mind as the eternal reality. This makes sense. Not only are we are intimately acquainted with the idea of minds creating things, but it also makes sense of the design and order we see in the universe. An intelligent agent best explains why the universe exists as it does.

Since an eternal, non-spatial, immaterial, intelligent mind is what most mean by “God,” it is best to conclude that God is that which has always existed. He is a necessary being, who contains within Himself the sufficient cause for His own existence, as well as the existence of everything else.

1. Some have also responded to the question of why the universe exists, that such a question is irrelevant. All that matters is that it does exist. But surely this is false. Imagine walking through the forest, and coming upon a translucent ball off the beaten path. Would it be relevant to ask why it exists, and from whence it came? Of course. An explanation of its existence is in order. It would be absurd to think there is no explanation for why it is there. Explicability would still be required even if we increased the size of the ball to the size of a planet, or even the size of the universe. Increasing its size does not remove the need for an explanation. Likewise, the universe begs for an explanation. Its size does not exempt it from the causal principle.
2. Even if there was such a law, it would itself have ontological existence, and thus we would still have to ask why it exists, ad infinitum.

 

October 6, 2008

Atheists Have Some ‘Splainin’ to Do

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Theistic Arguments
[18] Comments 

Atheists like to think theists alone bear the burden of proof when it comes to the question of God’s existence. They assume atheism is the default position unless, and until sufficient evidence for God’s existence can be mustered. This is simply not true. Atheism is a worldview (or, more accurately, is a component of many worldviews), just like Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism. All worldviews make truth-claims, and he who makes a truth-claim assumes the burden of proof to demonstrate the veracity of those claims, including atheists. Each worldview must stand on its own merits. The lack of evidence for other worldviews is not in itself evidence in favor of another. That’s why it is illegitimate to think a (supposed) lack of evidence for theism is itself evidence for atheism.

All worldviews are charged with explaining reality, both as it is, and as we experience it. Atheism is no exception. If anyone is to take their worldview seriously, atheists must explain the existence of the universe, free will, rationality, consciousness, and the like without reference to God. Indeed, they must show that an atheist explanation is superior, and more likely than other theistic alternatives. This project is doomed to failure. The explanatory scope and explanatory plausibility of atheism is inferior to theistic worldviews. How so?

Atheism requires that we believe the universe just popped into existence out of nowhere, caused by nothing. Theism, on the other hand, posits an eternal, intelligent agent who caused the universe to come into being. Unlike atheism, this is in line with our modal intuition that being only comes from being, not non-being.

Atheism requires that we believe free will is an illusion, because as mere physical stuff, humans are not exempt from the determinism inherent to purely physical systems. Theism, on the other hand, posits the existence of an immaterial entity within man, allowing him to transcend physical determinism, to freely choose among options undetermined by external physical constraints. Unlike atheism, this is in line with our experience of genuinely choosing A rather than B.

Atheism requires that we believe rationality developed by evolutionary means, and it is by pure accident that rationality helps us to discover truth about the world. Theism, on the other hand, posits that God is a rational being. Humans are rational because we are made in God’s image, and God desired to endow us with the means to discover true propositions about our world.

Atheism requires that we believe consciousness arise from non-conscious matter. Theism, on the other hand, posits that human consciousness arises from spiritual, rather than material substances. Consciousness is a function of the soul, and is derivative of the consciousness exemplified by a personal God.

Which worldview better explains the world and our experience of it? I think the answer is simple. Theism has greater explanatory scope and explanatory power than atheism, making theism the preferred worldview. Theism does not need to deny something so intuitive as the principle that being only comes from being, that every effect requires a prior cause, or that humans have causal powers undetermined by other material processes.

For further reading see my article titled Not so Fast: There is no Presumption of Atheism.

 

August 25, 2008

Possibility and Existence

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments
[2] Comments 

According to David Berlinski, Thomas Aquinas argued the universe must have begun at a finite time in the past by appealing to Diodorus’s (1st cent. B.C. Greek philosopher) view of possibility: if it is possible that something not exist, then it is certain that at some time or another it did not exist.  Only that which has a necessary existence can be, and must be eternal. [1]

 

Aquinas argued that while our universe does exist, it does not have to exist.  It is contingent, not necessary.  This much seems reasonable.  After all, it is possible to conceive of our universe not existing.  There is nothing about the physical constituents of the universe that demands they exist.  Using Diodorus’s principle, Aquinas concluded that since it is possible that our universe not exist, then it is certain that at some time in the past it did not exist. 

 

Berlinksi thinks Aquinas’ argument commits the fallacy of composition (e.g. just because every part of an elephant is light, does not mean the elephant as a whole is light).  He argues that while Diodorus’s principle might be true of things in the universe, it is not necessarily true of the universe as a whole.  But I think Berlinski misses the point.  The point is that only necessary things must exist eternally.  Nothing else needs to, or can for that matter.  Contingent things have causes, and hence beginnings.

 

What do you think of Aquinas’s argument, Berlinski’s criticism, or my response?  I tend to think this is a decent argument for the finitude of the universe.  What do you think?

 

 [1]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 85. 

 

August 14, 2008

Is This a Good Argument for a Finite Universe?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments
[11] Comments 

David Berlinksi, an agnostic philosopher and mathematician, summarizes one of the philosophical arguments for a past-finite universe as follows:

“If a series of causes do not start, it cannot get going, and if it does not get going, then there will be no intermediate causes, and if there are no intermediate causes, then over here, where we have just noticed that a blow has caused a bruise, there is no explanation for what is before our eyes.[1] Either there is a first cause or there is no cause at all, and since there are causes at work in nature, there must be a first.[2]

Essentially, the argument is that the universe must have a finite past because we experience intermediate causes, and intermediate causes would not be possible if they were not preceded by a first cause that began the whole series.

Berlinksi thinks this is a weak, but not an absurd argument. Personally, I am conflicted about its cogency. On the one hand, it does appear weak. It rests on a tautology, and begs the question. To see how, let’s put the argument in deductive form:

P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If a causal series does not begin, it cannot get going
P3 If a causal series cannot get going, there will be no intermediate causes
P4 We experience intermediate causes
P5 Therefore a causal chain got going
P6 Therefore a causal chain began
P7 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past

Premise 2 is clearly a tautology. It could be restated as “only that which begins, starts,” or “only that which begins, begins.” Not only is this an unhelpful truism, but it begs the question. In saying a causal series cannot “get going” unless it “begins” is to assume from the start what needs to be proved: that the universe “got going” as opposed to “has always been going.”[3] Says who? If the universe is eternal, nothing ever “got going,” and yet, clearly, there exists a causal series that “is going.” One cannot just stipulate that a causal series cannot exist unless it had a beginning, and then conclude that since a causal series does exist, it must have begun. One must demonstrate why it is that a causal series that did not begin cannot be.[4] I think this can be done.

A causal chain must begin with a first cause to avoid the problem of the impossibility of traversing an infinite. Just as it would be impossible to reach the top step of an infinite staircase, it is impossible to traverse an infinite number of past moments to reach the present. An endless series of events, by definition, has no end, and yet today would mark the end of that series. The concept of an infinite past, then, is incoherent. The past cannot consist of an infinite number of causal events. There had to be a first cause in the finite past that caused all subsequent, intermediate causes. In other words, it is impossible for there to be intermediate causes unless they find their origin in a first cause.

While this vindicates the conclusion of the original argument, it rests on premises that are so different that it can hardly be said to be a modification of the original argument. It seems to be a separate argument altogether. In deductive form the “modified” argument would appear as follows:

P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If the causal series is infinite, today would mark the completion of that series
P3 It is impossible to complete an infinite series of events
P4 Therefore the causal series of events had a beginning
P5 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past

Does this mean, then, that the original argument should be discarded? Is the tautological nature of premise 2 beyond repair, dooming the entire argument? What do you think of my criticism of the argument? What about my logic? I have been thinking and writing on this for about five hours now. The more I think about it, and the more I write about it, the murkier it gets in my mind. I would appreciate the input of someone who is taking a fresh look at this argument for their insights. Thanks!

[1]Berlinski seems to have made a mental slip in saying the “blow has caused a bruise,” for this assumes a casually-connected chain of at least two events. But according to the argument, no causal relationship can be established between any events unless there is a first cause. As the argument goes, not only would we be unable to explain the cause of the blow, but we would be unable even to say the blow was causally related to the bruise.
[2]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 68-69.
[3]Not only does premise 2 beg the question, but it stacks the deck in favor of a past-finite universe by declaring that a causal series of events, to be an actual causal series of events, must have a beginning event. This is little short of definitional fiat.
[4]It should be pointed out that the defender of an eternal universe has no explanation for the causal series. If only that which has a beginning needs a cause, and the causal series has no beginning because the universe has no beginning, then there can’t be any cause or reason for it. It’s just been going on forever, inexplicably. This is not an intellectually satisfying answer, for it goes against our causal intuitions that everything has a cause, and an infinite regression of causes is impossible. Our causal intuitions tell us the regress must stop at some ultimate cause.

 

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