Just for fun…. There are age-old questions that circulate from generation to generation, supposedly unanswerable. Surprisingly enough, most of these questions are far from being an intellectual enigma. They can be answered, and answered quite easily at that. Here are a few:


If a tree falls in the forest, and there is no one present to hear it, does it make a sound? Of course! Sound waves are produced whether there is anyone present to receive them or not.


Did Adam and Eve have belly buttons? No. Belly buttons are scars from the umbilical cord attached to us during our prenatal stage of life. Adam and Eve were created as adults. Since they never experienced the prenatal stage of life, they never had an umbilical cord attached to their bodies, and thus they never would have developed a belly button.


Where did Cain get his wife? It was his sister! Yes, I know, that’s gross. But it’s true nonetheless.


Which came first—the chicken or the egg? The chicken! For the egg to produce a chicken it would have to be a chicken egg, meaning it would have to contain the genetic blueprint for building a chicken. But where would such a blueprint come from if not a chicken? Without a prior chicken, there could be no egg capable of producing a chicken. The chicken would have to exist as a species before it could reproduce itself.


Why did the chicken cross the road? To lay the first egg. See above.


If you are inside a falling elevator, if you jump in the air before the elevator hits the ground, will you escape injury? No. While inside the elevator your body is traveling at the same speed as the elevator. If the elevator is falling toward the ground at a rate of 15 mph, your body is also falling toward the ground at a rate of 15 mph (even though it still relative to the elevator). Jumping in the air will only slightly delay your impact into the ground at 15 mph, and only slightly delay your injuries! If you are not convinced, think what would happen if you were sitting on the hood of a car going 15 mph, and the car suddenly slammed on its brakes. Your body would continue to travel at 15 mph, catapulting you from the hood of the car to the gravel on the road. The same principle applies with the elevator.


So there you have it. Can you think of any other examples?

The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life conducted an extensive poll measuring the religious landscape of the U.S. A summary of the report can be found here. They also created interactive tools to illustrate their findings. I must say they are quite impressive. Not only do they provide detailed information on a visual level (and by state), but it allows you to customize comparisons of statistics of religious traditions side-by-side.

Here is some of the most pertinent and interesting data:

–America is 78% Christian. 51% are Protestant, and 24% are Catholic. A full 26% of the country is Evangelical Protestant.

–Non-Christian religions constitute less than 5% of the nation. Jews take the lead at 1.7% of the population, followed by Buddhists (.7%), Muslims (.6%), and Hindus (.4%).

–16% of the country is not affiliated with any religion. Of this number, only 1.6% are atheists, and 2.4% agnostics. The rest are “nothing in particular.” These people can be secular or religious, but are not affiliated with any religion. A full 1 in 4 young people aged 18-29 claim no religious affiliation.

–The Catholic Church loses the most people to other religions, but their numbers remain static because of Catholic immigrants (mainly from Mexico). One in three adults in the Catholic Church are Latino.

–37% of married couples are married to someone of a different religion (or denomination).

–Only 37% of those who were raised Jehovah’s Witnesses are still JWs. JWs have the lowest retention rate of any religious group.

In his new book, The Case for Civility: And Why Our Future Depends on It (pp. 66-7), Os Guinness has some perceptive insights on the issue of school prayer:

[S]upporters of school prayer have found themselves on the horns of a dilemma of their own choosing. Insisting on official Christian prayer in such pluralistic settings, they either ignore the diversity and pray as if everyone shared their faith—thus scandalizing those who do not; or they respect the diversity and pray in an inoffensive way that tries to appeal to as many faiths as possible—thus secularizing their own faith while still offending those who reject public prayer of any kind. …

The founders’ first principles of religious liberty can of course be applied to school prayer in several ways. For example, the golden rule of equal liberty for all could be applied to school prayer as “One in, all in” and respected by praying a different prayer every day of the school month–Christian one day, Jewish the next, Muslim after that, then Buddhist, Hindu, Mormon, Scientologist, Wiccan, and so on, until all the faiths in the school are covered. Such a policy would surely lead to chaos and indifference rather than tolerance. …

The alternative application of the golden rule would be to say, “One out, all out,” and to conclude—I think rightly, for religious even more than constitutional reasons—that public schools are not the place to have official teacher-led prayer, Christian or otherwise. A moment of silence, perhaps; and free to pray alone at any time; and freedom to pray in student-initiated groups after school hours, certainly; but not official prayer in public schools when contemporary levels of the social fact of pluralism mean that the principle of religious liberty for all is contravened.

I couldn’t agree more. I am opposed to bringing teacher-led prayer (TLP) back into the public schools. One thing advocates of TLP often overlook is that the prayers being offered by that teacher will reflect that teacher’s religious views, which may or may not be Christian. If they are not Christian, then what advantage is there of the prayer? I think it is in our best interests to adopt the “one out, all out” approach.

HT: Justin Taylor

Futile care theory is something going on in many parts of the world, including the United States. The essence of futile care theory is that doctors have the right to cut off, or withhold wanted medical care to the cognitively impaired, based on a personal value judgment that their life is not worth preserving, because their life is not worth living.

While I find this practice unethical, those in support of futile care theory make a persuasive case that can beguile the public. Consider bioethicist Arthur Schafer. In the Winnepeg Free Press he wrote:

Inevitably, doctors are the gatekeepers for patient access to medical resources. You can’t obtain restricted medicines unless a doctor is willing to write a prescription; you can’t gain admission to hospital unless a doctor decides that you will benefit thereby. There is a scarcity of intensive care beds; so, to admit or keep patients in the ICU who cannot benefit is to rob others who could benefit. Put simply, one person’s provision is another person’s deprivation. It’s unethical to waste scarce life-saving resources.


If a patient will never again know who or where he is, as appears to be the case for Golobchuk [a Canadian man who is the subject of a legal battle because doctors want to deprive him of medical care], then to artificially prolong his breathing seems at best a waste of precious ICU resources and at worst a cruel ordeal for the patient. Doctors and nurses are not simply technicians providing marketplace services to customers. They are health-care professionals who are bound by the ethical obligation “first of all, do no harm.” When a patient has irreversibly lost self-awareness, then using medical high technology in a vain attempt to resist death is often experienced by doctors and nurses as both unprofessional and deeply demoralizing. Physician integrity includes the right, even the duty, to say “no” when treatments offer no genuine benefit to the patient.


Schafer’s argument is very utilitarian and pragmatic, and this appeals to Westerners (who are very utilitarian and pragmatic). So what is wrong with it? Wesley Smith, a lawyer and long-time advocate against euthanasia and futile care points out the flaws:


Forget for the moment the many times doctors have been wrong about people never regaining consciousness. Schafer is the one de-professionalizing medicine. A plumber can refuse to unclog a pipe, but a doctor has no right to abandon his or her patient. Moreover, Schafer wants doctors to impose their value judgments–as instructed in continuing education clases by bioethicists like Schafer–that the burden of treatment isn’t worth the benefit of continuing to live. But that isn’t a medical judgment, it is a value judgment that we have always been told resides with the patient and family. Moreover, the treatment isn’t being stopped because it doesn’t or might not work but because it does or will–and hence it is not really a “vain attempt to resist death,” but a potentially successful one. And thus it is really the patient who has been declared futile.


Schafer says that staying alive when that is what the patient wants offers no genuine benefit to the patient. He only has the right to make that claim for himself, not for Mr. Golobchuck, you, me, or anyone else. You are watching the redefining of the ultimate purpose of medicine before your very eyes. It isn’t keeping patients alive who want to live, it is treating those who can be cured and reserving the right to refuse service to those who probably won’t improve.


This is what socialized medicine–and its’ private equivalent the HMO–creates. Medical futility is health care rationing that pits one cadre of patients against others, leading to division and discord. It is the end of trust in medicine because if you are too sick or profoundly disabled, medicine wants little to do with you.


Finally, if Futile Care Theory prevails, what in the world makes anyone think that the forced removal of people from wanted treatment will stop at the ICU? People who only need feeding tubes will soon be dehydrated (if they are not lethally injected first), and care will be rationed based on other criteria. For example, as reported in my books, I once asked a futilitiarian what would come after futile care, since cutting off the dying would not save a lot of money. He immediately said restricting “marginally beneficial care.” I asked for an example. He responded, “An 80-year-old woman who wants a mammagram.”


Be afraid. Be very afraid.


Well said.

All Evangelicals are conservative Republicans, right? Evangelicals are a political force for the Right, right? That’s what the media would have you believe. This is not true. The Center for American Progress Action Fund (CAPAF) and Faith in Public Life (FIPL) discovered that the major network’s exit polls only ask Republican primary voters to identify themselves as “born-again or Evangelical Christian.” The same question does not appear on Democratic exit polls.

CAPAF/FIPL commissioned Zogby International to fill in the gap of our knowledge by doing post-election polling in the states of Missouri and Tennessee. The results are stunning for all those who have bought into the idea that Evangelicals are a mindless voting bloc for the Republican party, and that Evangelicals are only concerned about abortion and same-sex marriage.

One out of three voting white Evangelicals, voted in the Democratic primary. Indeed, 19% of all voting Democrats in Missouri, and 29% of all voting Democrats in Tennessee were white Evangelicals.

What are white Evangelicals concerned about? In Missouri, 30% of white Evangelicals ranked jobs and the economy as the most important issue, while only 14% ranked abortion and same-sex marriage as the most important issue. In Tennessee 34% of white Evangelicals ranked jobs and the economy as the most important issue, while only 19% ranked abortion and same-sex marriage as the most important issue.

So not only are 1/3 of voting white Evangelicals voting for Democrats, but as a group, they are twice as concerned about economic matters as they are moral matters (if we take MO and TN as representative of the nation as a whole). This is extremely significant. Of all Christian groups, Evangelicals are the most conservative, both theologically and morally. When that group is twice as concerned about their own pocketbook as they are about issues of moral justice, we are in trouble!

Philosophers Philippa Foot and Judith Jarvis Thomson devised a moral thought experiment called the Trolley Problem. It goes like this (in the words of Steven Pinker):

On your morning walk, you see a trolley car hurling down the track, the conductor slumped over the controls. In the path of the trolley are five men working on the track, oblivious to the danger. You are standing at a fork in the track and can pull a lever that will divert the trolley onto a spur, saving the five men. Unfortunately, the trolley would then run over a single worker who is laboring on the spur. Is it permissible to throw the switch, killing one man to save five?

Most people say yes. But consider a slightly different scenario:

You are on a bridge overlooking the tracks and have spotted the runaway trolley bearing down on the five workers. Now the only way to stop the trolley is to throw a heavy object in its path. And the only heavy object within reach is a fat man standing next to you—the same man who was laboring on the spur in the previous scenario. Should you throw the man off the bridge?

Most people say no. The question is why. In both scenarios (1) one person must die to save the five, (2) the fat man is the person who must die if the five are to be saved, and (3) your action is required to save the five. So why is it ok to flip the lever but not toss the fat man? Is it due to the relationship of physical proximity to humanization? That is to say, the closer we are physically to someone, the more we regard their person (similar to the way seeing someone die personalizes the concept of death, much different than mere knowledge that people die). Are we repulsed by the idea of tossing the fat man because his increased physical proximity (actually having to touch the man that is about to die because of our direct action) increases our perception of him as a valuable human being (whereas seeing him from afar and touching a lever does not), raising the emotional stakes too high for us to act as we know we should? If so, then the difference in response is merely emotional, not moral. If you think there is a moral difference between the two, however, what is the moral principle involved?

Now consider another, similar scenario:

On your morning walk you see a trolley car hurling down the track, the conductor slumped over the controls. In the path of the trolley is Osama bin Laden and Mother Theresa. You are standing at a fork in the track and can pull a lever that will divert the trolley onto a spur, saving them both. But doing so would cause the train to run over five murderers. Should one throw the switch (killing the five murderers, and sparing Mother Theresa and bin Laden), or should they do nothing (letting the train kill bin Laden and Mother Theresa?

This one is more complex. Unlike the first and second scenarios, here we have a choice between a group of evil people, and a group consisting of both good and evil people. On the one hand, sparing the most people would require that an innocent person be killed, and evil people live. But we would also kill an extremely evil person in the process. On the other hand, acting to spare one innocent person results not only in the death of five evil people, but also the continued life of a person whose evils add up to more than all the evils of the five murderers combined.

This scenario forces us to think about whether it is permissible to hurt the innocent to punish the evil, and whether the cumulative evil of lesser evil people adds up to more evil than a singular, extremely evil man. What do you think? What would you do?

This one is just for fun.

Back on 9/14 I posted “Re-measuring Goliath: 9’9” or 6’9”?” In the comments section I brought up an issue I want to make the focus of a new post: the quality of the Masoretic Text of the OT. It seems that it may not represent the original wording in significant places, particularly in books like Jeremiah and 1 and 2 Samuel. Here are the relevant portions from J. Daniel Hays’ article:

As in the book of Jeremiah, there is quite a difference between the Septuagint text of 1-2 Samuel and the Masoretic Text of 1-2 Samuel. Also similar to the textual situation in Jeremiah is the fact that in 1-2 Samuel the Hebrew text from the Dead Sea Scrolls (4QSama) generally aligns with the Septuagint over against the MT. In addition, the story in 1 Samuel 16-18 represents the place where the differences between the two are the most severe. In the Septuagint text of Codex Vaticanus, our oldest complete Greek Bible, 1 Samuel 16-18 is 44% shorter than in the MT. Not only are entire verses missing but entire paragraphs are missing. In the David and Goliath narrative these include 17:12-31, twenty verses that explain about David and his brothers and how he came to be at the battle, and 17:55-58, the four puzzling verses in which Saul doesn’t seem to know who David is in spite of the fact that David had been playing music for Saul back in 1 Samuel 16. As in Jeremiah, the differences between the Septuagint and the MT go well beyond anything that could be attributed to scribal errors or transmission mistakes. And 4QSama generally (but not always) agrees with the Septuagint against the MT. Either somebody added a large chunk of text to the original autograph, somebody deleted a large chunk of text, or else two different accounts of 1-2 Samuel developed separately.

Practically all scholars agree that the evidence from 4QSama implies that at the time of Christ there were two different Hebrew text traditions of 1-2 Samuel. As mentioned above, the vorlage or text tradition behind the MT in 1-2 Samuel contains many more readily identifiable scribal errors that the tradition reflected in 4QSama/LXX. Furthermore, and of great interest to those of us who try to connect the doctrine of inspiration into our theories of composition, it should be underscored that when using 1-2 Samuel as a source, the author (compiler, editor, etc.) of 1-2 Chronicles (as reflected in the MT) used a Hebrew text from the textual tradition reflected in 4QSama/LXX and not the one that is reflected in the MT of 1-2 Samuel.14 That is, frequently the MT in 1-2 Chronicles disagrees with the MT in 1-2 Samuel, but agrees with the reading in 4QSama and/or the Septuagint. So the inspired author/editor of 1-2 Chronicles either did not have a copy of the MT tradition text of 1-2 Samuel or elected to use the text tradition reflected in 4QSama/LXX, presumably because he regarded it as a superior text.


Our theory of inerrancy has to account for stuff like this. What do we do with ~23 extra verses in the MT version of I Samuel 17-18? If the LXX and DSS preserve the original, inspired form of the book (as seems likely), are we prepared to cross those verses out of our Bibles in the same way we should change Goliath’s height from 9’9” to 6’9”? This is a matter of textual criticism, and is not altogether unlike what we see even in NT text criticism in which the authenticity of long passages is disputed (the longer ending of Mark, the periscope of the woman caught in adultery). The difference here is the quantity of verses that are suspect. Either way, we should be open to the evidence and not shut our eyes to the facts because they make us uncomfortable.


The main reason I bring this up is not to cause anyone to doubt the reliability of Scripture. Indeed, I could write a series of posts arguing for the trustworthiness of Scripture. The reason I bring this up is because it provides an answer for why we find so many contradictions between Samuel and Chronicles when it comes to numbers. For example:

1. In 2 Sam 8:4 David takes 700 horsemen, whereas in 1 Chron 18:4 he takes 7000.

2. In 2 Sam 10:18 David slew the men who drove 700 Syrian chariots, and 40K horsemen, whereas in 1 Chron 19:18 David slew 7000 charioteers and 40K footmen.

3. In 2 Sam 23:8 we are told that David’s chief captain slew 800 men at one time with his spear, whereas in 1 Chron 11:11 he is said to have slain 300.

4. In 2 Sam 24:9 Joab counted 1,300,000 fighting men, whereas in 1 Chron 21:5 he is said to have counted 1,570,000.


Why the discrepancy? It could be due to copyist errors, or a misunderstanding of certain numerical values due to the evolution of the Hebrew numerical system. Given the fact that not all numbers disagree between the two books, this option is unlikely. The best answer is that the Chronicler was using a different Hebrew text of Samuel that had different numerical values in certain places, which means there were at least two competing manuscript traditions of Samuel. Of course, the question remains as to which is the original text, and how the changes were introduced (copyist error, purposeful tampering with the text, misunderstanding of older numerical system, etc.). That is where textual critics enter the stage, and I step off. For what it’s worth, I tend to think the Chronicler was using a superior Hebrew text, and should be given the benefit of the doubt over the MT of Samuel. The MT is a younger text. The DSS and LXX give us a much earlier picture of the text.

On a recent Stand to Reason broadcast, Greg Koukl discussed some bad reasons to vote for, or not vote for a presidential candidate. His insights are worth passing on here.

In this presidential race, some of the candidates stand out. On the Democratic side we have a woman, and an African-American. On the Republican side we have a Mormon and an Evangelical former pastor. Some people are basing their vote largely, if not entirely, on these distinctions. But is this a good way to determine who we will vote for?

Let’s take the Democrats. Is it acceptable for a woman to vote for Hillary Clinton simply because Hillary is a woman? You might think this is acceptable. But let me ask you this: Is it acceptable for someone to not vote for Hillary simply because she is a woman? I imagine you would say no–that such is sexist. What about Barack Obama? Is it acceptable for an African-American to vote for Obama simply because he is black? You might think this is acceptable. But let me ask you this: Is is acceptable for someone to not vote for Obama simply because he is black? I imagine you would say no–that such is racist. Greg asked, if it is sexist to refuse to vote for Hillary on the basis of her gender, is it not equally sexist to base one’s vote for Hillary on her gender? And likewise, if it is racist to refuse to vote for Obama on the basis of his race, is it not equally racist to vote for Obama on the basis of his race? I think a reasonable conclusion is that it is equally sexist, and equally racist. To vote for a candidate simply because of their gender or race is not a good basis for voting.

What about the Republicans? Can the same thing be said for a vote for or against Romney, or for or against Huckabee? Yes and no. Unlike race and gender, religion is ideological in nature. Race and gender are ideologically neutral. Because religion is ideological in nature, it affects the way people view the world, and the decisions they make. Romney’s religious views and Huckabee’s religious views may cause them to make decisions that would differ from the other, as well as from the other candidates. As such, one’s religious persuasions can play a legitimate factor in who we cast our vote for.

But in another sense, basing one’s vote on a candidate’s religion is just as misguided as basing one’s vote on a candidate’s gender or race. We must ask ourselves how–on a practical level–
one’s religious views might affect their ability to perform the function of an executive and commander-in-chief. What matters is their ability to perform their job, and that job is not that of a spiritual adviser. When we elect a president we are not electing a national pastor. We are electing someone to command the army, enforce the Constitution, pass/deny legislation into law, nominate federal justices, and be our diplomatic representative to the nations. So the real question is how one’s theological persuasions will have a bearing on those particular job functions. In most cases, I think it has very little to do with it.

Many Evangelicals are tempted to vote for Huckabee because of his religious beliefs, and against Romney because he is a Mormon, even though they prefer the policies of Romney over Huckabee. They reason that they cannot vote for Romney because he is part of a Christian cult. I think this is terribly misguided. Again, we are not electing a national pastor. We are electing an executive. How would Romney’s Mormonism affect his ability to do the job of the president of the U.S.? The only area one’s religious views might have a bearing on their job as president would be on issues of morality and social justice. Does s/he believe abortion, same-sex marriage, and embryonic stem cell research is wrong. What is s/he willing to do to fight those moral evils? And just because one is of a particular religion does not mean that they will automatically hold the same moral values as us. Think Jimmy Carter. And just because they hold the same moral values as us does not mean they will fight for those values. Think of the many politicians who claim they are personally opposed to abortion, but do not believe abortion should be made illegal. Think Giuliani. What matters is the candidate’s position on the issues that are pertinent to the job of the president; not their religious beliefs or religious affiliation. Remember that when you cast your vote in the primaries, and in the general election in November.

What a relief! After a dismal finish in Florida, Giuliani is going to withdraw from the presidential race. Thankfully this election will not come down to a choice between to pro-abortion candidates, and thankfully, the Republican party was not “forced” to nominate a pro-abortion candidate for the Republican ticket, which could have proved disastrous to the pro-life influence in the future of the party.

Why did Rudy fall? A year ago he was the clear front-runner in all the polls. Maybe the pro-lifers in the party stuck to their principles in the end. Maybe they saw there were better candidates. Maybe Rudy’s strategy of betting it all on Florida doomed him. Whatever it was, he is out, and I am happy!

I just finished reading a very interesting article in the L.A. Times on abortion titled “Abortion’s Battle of Messages.” The authors are former presidents of abortion-choice groups. Frances Kissling is the former president of Catholics for a Free Choice, and Kate Michelman is the former president of NARAL Pro-Choice America. What they say in the article is as interesting as what they fail to say.

They admit that the pro-life movement is a formidable foe with strong arguments and good tactics. They also admit that pro-lifers have moved the debate from the woman’s choice, to the status of the unborn. They also admit that the cards are currently stacked against them in the abortion debate.

Then they note some areas they need to re-message if they hope to convince America of their position. They ended the article by saying, “If pro-choice values are to regain the moral high ground, genuine discussion about these challenges needs to take place within the movement. It is inadequate to try to message our way out of this problem. Our vigorous defense of the right to choose needs to be accompanied by greater openness regarding the real conflict between life and choice, between rights and responsibility. It is time for a serious reassessment of how to think about abortion in a world that is radically changed from 1973.”

That’s what they say. What they did not say is how to deal with the challenges posed by pro-life apologists. They did not attempt to show why our arguments are mistaken. They did not attempt to show that the unborn are not human persons in the human community. They did not offer any content for repackaging the pro-abortion message. They merely presented the daunting challenge abortion-choicers are facing if they hope to turn back the tide. I think that shows us where we are at in the intellectual aspect of this debate: on the winning side.

A common argument for abortion is the argument from bodily autonomy. It is reasoned that a woman — and only a woman — has the right to decide how her body is going to be used. If she does not want to share her body with her developing child, she has the right to rid her body of it, even if that requires ending the child’s life. This argument is summed up nicely in a common mantra of abortion-choice advocates, “My body, my choice.”

Much could be said as to why bodily autonomy is not a good justification for abortion rights, but I do not wish to focus on that here. Instead, I want to focus on a tactical approach to exposing the bodily autonomy argument for what it is: a sham. Let me show you how.

Only the most ardent abortion advocates believe in unrestricted abortion throughout all nine months of pregnancy. Most abortion advocates draw the line somewhere, even if they differ on the precise temporal location. Some say abortion is no longer permissible once the baby reaches viability (roughly 23 weeks). Others say the line should be drawn at seven months. Wherever the line is drawn, the fact that a line is drawn between morally permissible and morally impermissible abortions demonstrates that the argument for the moral permissibility of abortion from bodily autonomy is an ad hoc, rather than principled argument. Here’s why.

(more…)

Back in November I directed you to a couple of brief articles by Dan Wallace on Biblical textual criticism. His series has continued since then. For those who are interested, here are the other links (in historical order):

The Nature of Textual Variants
Textual Variants: What Issues Are at Stake?
Textual Variants: What Issues Are At Stake? Part 2
Why Did Scribes Make Mistakes when Copying Scripture? Part 1
Why Did Scribes Make Mistakes when Copying Scripture? Part 2
The Significance of Scribal Corruptions to the New Testament
The Composition of the Original Text

Many of us spend a lot of time commuting. What better way to pass the time than listen to some great teaching, or discussions on matters related to Christian truth. There is a wealth of free audio resources on the web from top-notch thinkers that will help think more clearly about issues of truth. Here are some I would recommend:

Apologetics
Stand to Reason radio
Stand to Reason podcasts
William Lane Craig
Apologetics.com

Theology
Converse With Scholars
Southern Bapist Theological Seminary lecture series

Mix
Veritas Forum
Breakpoint

I guarantee that your mind will be stimulated, or your money back!

If you are like me, you can’t help but to stare at those who look and dress anti-socially. You know, piercings in unimaginable places, hair styles that require enormous amounts of creativity and hairspray, or clothes that even fashion designers would not sport on the runway. What do you say if you get caught staring, and the person says to you, “What are you looking at?” I’ve come up with a little line: “If you want to look different from everyone else in society, don’t be surprised when everyone else in society looks at you differently.

The Alan Guttmacher Institute has just released its report on abortion statistics for the years 2004-2005: Abortion in the United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005. The last time this report was released was in 2003 for the years 1999-2000. Overall, the picture looks good. Abortions and abortion providers are still on the decline. Here are some important snippets from the report:

Total number of abortions

“The number of abortions in the United States declined from 1.61 million (the all-time high) in 1990 to 1.31 million in 2000. Similarly, the abortion rate declined from 27 per 1,000 women aged 15–44 in 1990 to 21 per 1,000 in 2000, a level comparable to levels of the mid-1970s.”

“An estimated 1.2 million abortions were performed in the United States in 2005, 8% fewer than in 2000. The abortion rate in 2005 was 19.4 per 1,000 women aged 15–44; this rate represents a 9% decline from 2000.”

“Abortion rates declined faster between 2000 and 2005 than they had between 1996 and 2000 (5%). The abortion ratio indicates that 22% of pregnancies (excluding those ending in miscarriages) ended in abortion in 2005.”

Abortion providers

“There were 1,787 abortion providers in 2005, only 2% fewer than in 2000. … Indeed, if not for new providers offering only early medication abortion, the total number of providers would have decreased by 8% instead of 2% between 2000 and 2005.”

Number of medication (as opposed to surgical) abortions

“Early medication abortion, offered by an estimated 57% of known providers, accounted for 13% of abortions (and for 22% of abortions before nine weeks’ gestation).”

Legal restrictions on abortion are partially credited for slowing the abortion rate

“At the same time, during the last several years, a number of states have implemented restrictions that may have made it more difficult for women to access abortion services and for physicians to perform abortions. For example, between 2000 and 2004, five states enacted laws that impose burdens on abortion providers. These restrictions range from requiring abortions after 15 weeks to be provided in a licensed surgical center to requiring providers to have expensive ultrasound equipment on-site.”

In 1 Corinthians 14 Paul spoke of singing in tongues. Interestingly, I hear few Pentecostals do so. Do you? If so, do you tend to sing new and unknown songs, or mimic the tune and tempo of known songs?

For all you tongues-speakers out there, can you speak in tongues at-will, or do you have to be in prayer for it to happen? In the days after I first received the Spirit, I had to be in prayer before I could speak in tongues again. But as time went on that was no longer the case. I could start and stop speaking in tongues at-will. But I know not everyone experiences this. What has your experience been?

I would like to keep our attention focused on the passage discussed in my last post. Not only is there the question of 2-3 interpretations per service versus per judgment, but there is also a question of whether there are to be 2-3 messages in tongues followed by a single interpretation, or 2-3 successive couplets of tongues and interpretations. In other words, did Paul mean 2-3 people should give messages in tongues, followed by a single interpretation of those messages, or did Paul mean there should only be 2-3 tongues each accompanied by a separate interpretation?


In support of the single interpretation view, notice that Paul says “someone” (singular) must interpret. That may mean Paul had a singular interpreter and interpretation in mind. Of course, even if we granted that Paul had a single interpreter, it does not resolve the question at hand, for it could be that Paul envisioned a single person interpreting each message individually, so that one person is giving 2-3 interpretations.


In support of the more traditional understanding that there are to be 2-3 interpretations accompanying the 2-3 messages, Paul may have been using “someone” generically to convey the notion that these tongues must have corresponding interpretations, not necessarily one interpretation by a single individual. In support of this view, notice that Paul used “someone” two times in verse 27. He said, “If someone speaks in a tongue, it should be two, or at the most three, one after the other, and someone must interpret.” Clearly the first use of someone does not refer to a single individual or single message, because Paul went on to speak of 2-3 different messages, and noted that they were consecutive. If the context makes it clear that Paul’s first use of the singular “someone” does not preclude multiple messages and speakers, there is no reason to think his second use of the singular “someone” precludes multiple interpreters and interpretations.


Of course, we might even ask whether the question at hand is pushing the text too far. Indeed, one could make the case from this passage that the interpreter should not be one of the individuals who gave a message since Paul makes a personal distinction between the speaker and interpreter in verse 28. But when we look at 1 Cor 14:5 and 13 it appears that the ideal situation is one in which the speaker provides the interpretation. Which is it? I would argue that either is acceptable, and that we only see a contradiction when we try to squeeze hard and fast rules out of passages that are not meant to communicate as much.


So maybe we should not be reading the text with a fine tooth comb, thinking we can glean a hard and fast rule for how many interpretations we should expect. Maybe experience can be our guide in this area, given the obscurity of the text. And when it comes to experience, some people have experienced multiple tongues followed by a single interpretation, while others have experienced 2-3 couplets of tongues and interpretations. If both are the work of the Holy Spirit, then so be it.


What do you think?

When you come together, each one has a song, has a lesson, has a revelation, has a tongue, has an interpretation. Let all these things be done for the strengthening of the church. 14:27 If someone speaks in a tongue, it should be two, or at the most three, one after the other, and someone must interpret. 14:28 But if there is no interpreter, he should be silent in the church. Let him speak to himself and to God. 14:29 Two or three prophets should speak and the others should evaluate what is said. 14:30 And if someone sitting down receives a revelation, the person who is speaking should conclude. 14:31 For you can all prophesy one after another, so all can learn and be encouraged. (1 Corinthians 14:26-31, NET Bible)

As a matter of practice, I have never heard more than three tongues and interpretations in the course of a service. This passage is usually cited to explain why. But does a proper interpretation of this passage limit the number of tongues-interpretations in a service, or does it merely limit the number of tongues-interpretations that can be given prior to an evaluation (judgment) of what was said by the body? The latter seems more probable given the context, and given common sense.

While Paul does not specifically mention a time for judging the interpreted tongues, he does mention a time for judging prophecies. Since Paul equated prophecy and interpreted tongues (1 Cor 14:1-5), and since both are revelatory speeches from God, and since Paul spoke of both in the same context, it stands to reason that the body must judge the content of both. Once the body has judged the content of the interpretations, however, why couldn’t more be given?

Logically speaking I don’t see why interpretations would be limited to a particular service. It seems rather arbitrary. If God provided us three tongues-interpretations, and we break for ½ lunch, and then return for more church, does the clock start over? Given the traditional interpretation of this verse, the answer would be yes. But that seems silly. Paul’s emphasis is not on how many interpretations can be given per se, but how many interpretations can be given before somebody evaluates their revelatory worth. After such an evaluation has been made, more could follow.

If you disagree with me, I’d be interested to hear your reasoning.