Epistemology

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October 9, 2009

Everyone Thinks He is Right

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Logic, Tactics
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A few years back I watched a debate between an evangelical Christian (Greg Koukl) and a new age guru (Deepak Chopra) on the issue of truth.  Mr. Chopra employed a common tactic to dismiss Mr. Koukl’s arguments.  The exchange went something like this:

DC: “Everyone thinks they are right.  You think you’re right.  The Hindu thinks he’s right.  The Buddhist thinks he’s right”

GK: Yes, that’s right.  And that’s why psychological confidence in one’s faith is not enough.  Something more is needed.  I am not interested in knowing that someone believes their view is right; I am interested in knowing why they believe their view is right.  This requires evidence.  We must weigh the evidence to determine who has better reasons supporting their view.

DC: chirp, chirp, chirp, chirp, chirp, chirp…

(more…)

 

October 8, 2009

You’re only a Christian because you were born in America

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Logic, Pluralism, Relativism, Thinking
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Religious pluralists often claim that religious beliefs are culturally relative: the religion you adopt is determined by where you live, not the rationality/truth of the religion itself.  If you live in India you will probably be a Hindu; if you live in the U.S. you will probably be a Christian.  One’s personal religious beliefs are nothing more than a geographic accident, so we should not believe that our religion is true while others are not.

This argument is a double-edged sword.  If the religious pluralist had been born in Saudi Arabia he would have been a Muslim, and Muslims are religious particularists!  His pluralistic view of religion is dependent on his being born in 20th century Western society!

A more pointed critique of this argument, however, comes from the realm of logic.  The line of reasoning employed by the pluralist commits the genetic fallacy (invalidating a view based on how a person came to hold that view).  The fact of the matter is that the truth of a belief is independent of the influences that brought you to believe in it.  While the observation that one’s religious beliefs are often determined by where they live is valid from an empirical standpoint, what follows from that observation?  Nothing.  While I may be a Christian because I live in a society in which most people are Christians, it does not mean that my Christian beliefs are not true.  The truth of Christianity depends on the veracity of the claims themselves, nothing more and nothing less.

 

October 5, 2009

Reality, Belief, and Truth

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Philosophy
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We often use words like reality, belief, and truth without thinking much of what we mean by them.  With some inspiration by J.P. Moreland I have devised a brief definition of each that makes it clear how they differ from each other.

Reality is the way the world really is independent of our beliefs about it.

Beliefs are what we think reality is like.

Truth is the corresponding relation between our beliefs and reality.  If our beliefs about reality correspond to the way the world really is, truth is obtained.  As J.P. Moreland says, truth puts us into contact with reality.  We have truth when we have true, justified beliefs about reality.

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October 2, 2009

Part-Time Postmodernists, or Verificationist Modernists?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Philosophy, Pluralism, Relativism
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During an interview at Cambridge University William Lane Craig was asked how postmodern students reacted to his “rational approach.”  He said:

Frankly, I don’t confront many students who are postmodernists. For all the faddish talk, I think it’s a myth. Students aren’t generally relativistic and pluralistic, except when it comes to ethics and religion. But that’s not postmodernism, that’s modernism. That’s old-style verificationism, which says things that are verifiable through the five senses are factual, but everything else is just a matter of taste (including ethics and religion). I think it’s a deceit of our age to say that modernism is dead.

Craig echoed similar sentiments in To Everyone An Answer on pages 21-22:

[E]nlightenment rationalism is so deeply imbedded in Western intellectual life that these antirationalistic currents like Romanticism and postmodernism are doomed, it seems, to be mere passing fashions. After all, no one adopts a postmodernist view of literary texts when reading the labels on a medicine bottle or a box of rat poison…In the end, people turn out to be subjectivists only about ethics and religion, not about matters provable by science. But this is not postmodernism; this is nothing else than classic Enlightenment naturalism–it is the old modernism in a fashionable new guise.

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September 30, 2009

I just know that I know that I know…

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Tactics, Thinking
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If you are like me, you have encountered countless individuals who “argue” for their point-of-view based on some experience, rather than providing good reasons.  These people just know that they know that they know what they believe is right because of some experience that brought them psychological confidence that they are right.  While this approach to the issue of truth is endemic in Pentecostal circles, it is not limited to us by any means.  Mormons, Baptists, Hindus, Muslims, and just about every other religion today claims to have had an experience, and argue that their experience justifies the validity of their truth-claims.  When two people claim to have had an experience, and both use that experience to give validity to their opposing truth-claims, either one or the other is right, or both are wrong.

(more…)

 

September 1, 2009

Quote of the Day: I’m not a modernist because I believe in reason

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Logic, Quote of the Day, Thinking
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Sorry for not posting much as of late.  I’ve been involved with so many projects, I have had computer issues, and I took an excursion to Lake Tahoe.  As I get caught up over the next few days, I’ll begin posting again.  Here’s a short post in the interim:

Back in May of this year, Greg Koukl had some insightful comments about being labeled a “modernist” for believing in truth and logic that I’d like to share with you.  Greg wrote,

Yes, I believe in the legitimacy of reason, but this doesn’t make me a modern simply because the Enlightenment period exalted reason to idol statues.  Pre-moderns of all stripes…trusted reason not because it was a pop idol, but because it as an undeniable feature of reality.

Exactly.

 

June 30, 2008

How Do You Know It’s Jesus You Feel in Your Heart?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology
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When people ask Christians how we know Christianity is true, it is common for us to respond with something like, “Because I feel Jesus in my heart” or “Because I have experienced the risen Christ.” While I think faith is rational even apart from rational evidences/arguments, this sort of justification for Christian belief seems inadequate. It can always be asked how we know it was Jesus we encountered, as opposed to some other deity. Did Jesus appear to us? No. We merely had an experience that seemed undeniably supernatural in nature. So why think it was an experience with Jesus, then?

I would venture to say that we claim to have encountered Jesus because of the context in which our supernatural encounter occurred. We encountered the supernatural after having heard and believed the message of Jesus’ resurrection, and then interpret the encounter to be the result of such a belief, and confirmation that the belief is true. Hence, we say we felt Jesus in our heart, or experienced the risen Christ.

The problem is that a wide variety of religions, each with competing truth claims, profess to experience the divine. They also interpret their experience in light of the religious teaching they have been taught. They conclude that they have experienced God X, and that such an experience vindicates the truth of their religious tradition.

A religious pluralist might argue that no group experiences the deity they claim to have experienced (Jesus, Allah, Brahman, etc.). They might argue they had a genuine experience with the unknowable God, but mistakenly tried to identify Him with the God as described by their faith tradition. So when a Christian encounters God, he thinks he has encountered Jesus, and this is proof that Christianity is true. When a Muslim encounters God, he thinks he has encountered Allah, and this is proof that Islam is true. How do we respond to such an interpretation?

On one level, I agree with the religious pluralist. His explanation makes sense of the variegated inter-religious claims to have encountered with God. People actually do encounter God as he reaches out for them, but they misidentify Him because they interpret their experience of Him in light of their false religious tradition. Where I think the pluralist is mistaken is that he applies his interpretation to all religious traditions, not holding out the possibility that one faith tradition may have properly identified the God whom they have encountered.

If it is possible that one religious tradition properly identifies the God people experience, how would we know which religious tradition it was? What has been said already should highlight the problem of using religious experience as a proof for one religious tradition over another. Something more than an experience is needed to adjudicate competing religious traditions, otherwise we are left arguing in a circle. So how can we know that our interpretation of the divine is the correct one, as opposed to theirs? I would argue that we must test the various faith traditions using our rational faculties. Are they philosophically viable? Are they internally consistent? Are they confirmed/contradicted by scientific or historical data? And the list goes on. When various faith traditions are subjected to such tests, I think Christianity comes out on top as being the most viable, and that is good reason to believe the God we encountered in our experience is indeed the risen Christ.

 

May 29, 2007

Conscious Tables?

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Mind, Naturalism
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Philosopher Jerry Fodor made the following remarks in his review of Galen Strawon’s Consciousness and Its Place in Nature, on why materialist explanations for consciousness (particularly Strawson’s) do not work:

So, then, if everything is made of the same sort of stuff as tables and chairs (as per monism), and if at least some of the things made of that sort of stuff are conscious (there is no doubt that we are), and if there is no way of assembling stuff that isn’t conscious that produces stuff that is (there’s no emergence), it follows that the stuff that tables, chairs and the bodies of animals (and, indeed, everything else) is made of must itself be conscious. Strawson, having wrestled his angel to a draw, stands revealed as a panpsychist: basic things (protons, for example) are loci of conscious experience. You don’t find that plausible? Well, I warned you.

Nor, having swallowed this really enormous camel, does Strawson propose to strain at the gnats. Consider, for example: he thinks (quite rightly) that there are no experiences without subjects of experience; if there’s a pain, it must be somebody or something’s pain; somebody or something must be in it. What, then, could it be that has the experiences that panpsychists attribute to ultimate things? Nothing purely material, surely, since that would just raise the hard problem all over again. So maybe something immaterial? But monism is in force; since the constituents of
tables and chairs are made of matter, so too is everything else. So, Strawson is strongly inclined to conclude, the subjects of the experiences that basic things have must be the experiences themselves. Part of the surcharge that we pay for panpsychism (not, after all, itself an immediately plausible ontology) is that we must give up on the commonsense distinction between the experience and the experiencer. At the basic level, headaches have themselves.

I find amazing the lengths to which materialists will go to avoid a non-materialistic perspective of consciousness. They would rather confess that tables and chairs experience consciousness than admit that consciousness is an immaterial phenomenon that cannot be explained in terms of philosophical naturalism, and the sciences. In light of their belief that science can explain everything without an appeal to the immaterial, they spew forth nonsense such as this.

HT: Denise O’Leary at

 

Mindful Hack

 

May 22, 2007

Quote of the Day: Irrational True Beliefs

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Thinking
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“Rationality isn’t just what you believe, it’s also why you believe it. I’m quite sure many Christians hold true beliefs for unjustified or even no good reason. A lot of Christians believe in the Trinity but can’t explain it coherently, much less defend it. They don’t really understand it despite believing it to be true. It’s an irrational true belief.” –Melinda Penner

 

November 2, 2006

Free Will is a Necessary Illusion

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Epistemology, Mind, Naturalism, Philosophy
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In the same vein as my post on Richard Dawkins’ comment…in Dennis Overbye’s New York Times review of What the Bleep, Down the Rabbit Hole (a documentary about quantum mechanics and [new age] religion) he explicated his take on free will given his materialist worldview: “Take free will. Everything I know about physics and neuroscience tells me it’s a myth. But I need that illusion to get out of bed in the morning. Of all the durable and necessary creations of atoms, the evolution of the illusion of the self and of free will are perhaps the most miraculous. That belief is necessary to my survival.”


 

That’s right. I know it’s not true, but I have to live as if it were. I feel the same way about trains. I know the train on the track is not real, but I feel forced to wait for it to pass the crossing as if it were really there! Has Overbye ever stopped to wonder why he needs the illusion of free will to get out of the bed in the morning; why it is necessary for survival? Overbye’s view is incoherent. When one’s worldview is inconsistent with their experience of reality, it is a sure sign that something is wrong with their worldview. Worldviews are snapshots of reality. If they do not help us navigate reality, maybe our snapshot is out of focus, and needs to be changed.


I thought atheists were atheists because atheism is so rational? Hardly! Atheists are atheists despite the irrationality of its implications.

 

November 2, 2006

No I Don’t, Yes I Do Believe in Free Will

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Dawkins, Epistemology, Mind, Philosophy
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William Dembski reported on his friend’s exchange with Richard Dawkins at a D.C. bookstore, where Dawkins was promoting his new book The God Delusion. Dembski’s friend “asked Dawkins if he thought he was being inconsistent by being a determinist while taking credit for writing his book.” The exchange was recorded. The transcript reveals the bankruptcy of atheism as a worldview:


 

Questioner: Dr. Dawkins thank you for your comments. The thing I have appreciated most about your comments is your consistency in the things I’ve seen you written. One of the areas that I wanted to ask you about and the places where I think there is an inconsistency and I hoped you would clarify it is that in what I’ve read you seem to take a position of a strong determinist who says that what we see around us is the product of physical laws playing themselves out but on the other hand it would seem that you would do things like taking credit for writing this book and things like that. But it would seem, and this isn’t to be funny, that the consistent position would be that necessarily the authoring of this book from the initial condition of the big bang it was set that this would be the product of what we see today. I would take it that that would be the consistent position but I wanted to know what you thought about that.

Dawkins: The philosophical question of determinism is a very difficult question. It’s not one I discuss in this book, indeed in any other book that I’ve ever talked about. Now an extreme determinist, as the questioner says, might say that everything we do, everything we think, everything that we write, has been determined from the beginning of time in which case the very idea of taking credit for anything doesn’t seem to make any sense. Now I don’t actually know what I actually think about that, I haven’t taken up a position about that, it’s not part of my remit to talk about the philosophical issue of determinism. What I do know is that what it feels like to me, and I think to all of us, we don’t feel determined. We feel like blaming people for what they do or giving people the credit for what they do. We feel like admiring people for what they do. None of us ever actually as a matter of fact says, “Oh well he couldn’t help doing it, he was determined by his molecules.” Maybe we should… I sometimes… Um… You probably remember many of you would have seen Fawlty Towers. The episode where Basil where his car won’t start and he gives it fair warning, counts up to three, and then gets out of the car and picks up a tree branch and thrashes it within an edge of his life. Maybe that’s what we all ought to… Maybe the way we laugh at Basil Fawlty, we ought to laugh in the same way at people who blame humans. I mean when we punish people for doing the most horrible murders, maybe the attitude we should take is “Oh they were just determined by their molecules.” It’s stupid to punish them. What we should do is say “This unit has a faulty motherboard which needs to be replaced.” I can’t bring myself to do that. I actually do respond in an emotional way and I blame people, I give people credit, or I might be more charitable and say this individual who has committed murders or child abuse of whatever it is was really abused in his own childhood. And so again I might take a …

Questioner: But do you personally see that as an inconsistency in your views?

Dawkins: I sort of do. Yes. But it is an inconsistency that we sort of have to live with otherwise life would be intolerable. But it has nothing to do with my views on religion it is an entirely separate issue.

 

Dawkins actually recognizes that his behavior and emotions are inconsistent with his worldview, and yet he cannot help but to behave and feel the way he does. In his words he can’t bring himself to blame molecules for bad behavior. But who else is there to blame if all we are is a combination of molecules? Dawkins wants to blame a free-will agent, while denying the existence of that which is necessary for free-will agency: an immaterial soul. Atheists are incapable of living out their worldview because their worldview is not true to reality.


 

Tom Magnuson remarked,


 

Richard Dawkins is a staunch materialist who simply cannot follow his worldview to its logical conclusions. He follows his innate moral intuition, which cannot be explained by material processes, and concedes that he cannot truly live out his worldview.

Dawkins’ naturalistic determinism requires that anything like consciousness, self-awareness, and freedom must be emergent properties of matter. Humans must deal with this “reality” as best they can. The concession is huge because it means Dawkins’ scientism has no place for “humanness”.

 

Well said.

 

 

June 25, 2006

Knowledge, Truth, and Christianity

Posted by Jason Dulle under Epistemology, Logic, Philosophy, Thinking
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Greg Koukl’s lecture at the 2006 Master’s Series in Christian Thought was on the topic “Truth is a Strange Sort of Fiction: The Challenge from the Emergent Church.” It was a masterful presentation! He argued that truth and knowledge are essential to the enterprise of Biblical faith, and demonstrated this both Biblically and philosophically. What made it so profound was that He provided the philosophic underpinnings for what all of us know intuitively, explaining why it is that we know what we know. I would recommend you buy the 2+ hour lecture from www.str.org, but I would like to summarize some of the lecture for you here.

 

Koukl began by arguing that knowledge of the truth is fundamental to our daily survival. If we were not able to know the truth about the world with a high degree of accuracy we would not be able to survive more than a few hours.

 

Truth is a life or death matter, and people die for the truth all the time. People die for the truth of cancer when they don’t take their doctor’s advice seriously. They die for the truth of drunk driving when they underestimate the power of alcohol to impair their driving abilities. They die for the truth of inertia and mass when they cross the street without looking both ways before crossing. In all these instances people actually die, not for the truth, but because they don’t have the truth. They die because they have false beliefs about important things. Not only must we know the truth, but we must act on that truth if we hope to survive.

 

Belief

 

While knowledge of the truth is necessary for survival, what does it mean to say we know something? At the very least it means you believe it is so; i.e. it accurately describes reality. That’s why it makes no sense to say “I believe X, but I’m not saying it’s true” as do so many postmodern thinkers. To say you believe something is to say you think you are right in your belief. If that is not what is meant the statement becomes entirely vacuous and meaningless.

 

Could our beliefs be mistaken? Yes. That’s why it takes more than merely believing something for it to be true. But at the very least to say you believe something is to say you think it is true, even if your belief turns out to be false.

 

Why should we believe anything (to be true)? For good reasons (justification). Justification comes in degrees. When the level of justification rises to the level of “beyond reasonable doubt” we can rightly claim to know something even though our level of justification does not reach certainty.

 

Truth

 

What is truth? Truth is when your statement corresponds to the way the world really is. It is a relationship between something in the mind of a knowing subject and the objective world. What makes the belief true is the objective world. Reality, then, is the truth maker. Something is not true simply because we believe it to be true.

 

The Relationship of Knowledge to Faith

 

Knowledge is critical to the faith project because faith is active trust in what we know to be true. If we do not know what is true (what corresponds to the way the world really is), or cannot know what is true (according to postmodernism), we cannot exercise faith in it. Since knowledge is the basis for our active trust, if we cannot have knowledge we cannot have Biblical faith.

 

Does knowledge save by itself? No. You can know medicine X will heal you, but if you stop there you will die. An extra step is needed: active trust in that knowledge.

 

Does faith save by itself? No. Muslims have active trust, but their faith is in the wrong object. Trust can be misplaced. Salvation obtains only when active trust is combined with accurate knowledge. If there is no truth/knowledge (or if we cannot know what the truth is) there can be no saving faith, and if there is no saving faith there can be no Christianity! That is why postmodernism (including the Emergent Church which has adopted postmodern epistemology) and Christianity are philosophically incompatible.

 

June 10, 2006

Humility is Not the Opposite of Conviction

Posted by Jason Dulle under Epistemology, Thinking
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In the past I have recommended that you check out www.bethinking.org. It is a great apologetics resource, containing articles and mp3s of all the best apologists. You can subscribe to a monthly email letter that will highlight a particular “bethinking characteristic,” as well as let you know what’s new on the site. This month’s email highlighted humility, explaining both what it is and what it is not. It is worth repeating here:

“Humble : bethinkers know that our understanding of some truths is fallible, and will not press a point beyond what the evidence allows.”

Being less sure doesn’t make you humble. That’s just a plain fact. In the past, humility was the opposite of pride. But now it has become the opposite of conviction. Being sure of something is now often considered a character flaw. There three basic reactions to being challenged. Reaction one is to turn the volume up. For example Fundamentalists seemed to have more “certainties” than they could every justify from Scripture. The next reaction is to turn the volume right down. This might seem humble, however, the danger might be that we overreact with equally arrogant assertions of uncertainty when God has clearly spoken. The third and final reaction is to turn the volume to a level so that you can actually hear the conversation or challenge and interact with it, but while you still keep the music on.

In the wake of all of this we should ponder carefully this question – Do we have the humility to doubt ourselves while having the courage to witness to the truth as it has been revealed?

 

 

April 27, 2006

Faith Does Not Need Reasons, but They Sure are Nice!

Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology, Philosophy, Thinking
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In Stand to Reason’s February newsletter, Moments of Truth, Greg Koukl addressed the issue of unbelievers who dismiss the Bible as “only written by men.” How do we respond to this? As an apologetics organization you would expect the newsletter to detail the many reasons we can be confident that the Scriptures are divinely inspired, and encourage believers to whip out those evidences for an unbeliever when the first opportunity arises. Greg took another route. He talked about how it is that he—and most other Christians—come to believe the Bible is the Word of God. Interestingly, it did not begin with evidentiary lines of argumentation. I will quote Greg at length:

For years I have taught six of these reasons in a talk called, “The Bible: Has God Spoken?” If you’ve heard the talk and are able to recall the points and explain them, you may get someone thinking. It’s a way of putting a stone in their shoe, so to speak. But this approach is much more effective after something else has happened first. Before I tell you what that is, I have a confession to make. Though I give this talk often, these are not really the reasons I believe the Bible is God’s Word. They are sound evidences and they have their place…, but they are not how I came to believe in the Bible’s authority in the first place. I suspect they’re not the reasons you believe, either, even if you’ve heard the talk and thought it compelling.

I came to believe the Bible was God’s Word the same way the Thessalonians did, the same way you probably did. They encountered the truth firsthand and were moved by it. Without really being able to explain why, they knew they were hearing the words of God and not just the words of a man named Paul. I think I understand better now what happened then. Now I know there is a powerful role the Spirit plays that is very hard for us to describe. This is not something we’re able to explain very well to others.

For one, it is personal, subjective. Two, it’s non-rational. In a sense, we were not persuaded, as such. We were wooed and won over, and that’s very different from weighing reasons and coming to conclusions. Note, I didn’t say it was ir-rational, but non-rational. God used a different avenue to change our minds about the Bible.

Even so, the reasons I give in the talk are still vital. Here’s why: The objective reasons are important to show that our subjective confidence has not been misplaced, that what we’ve believed with our hearts can be confirmed with our minds. The ancients called this, “Faith seeking understanding.” … When you start giving people reasons to change their minds—to believe in the Bible, for instance—their first instinct is to resist, to keep on believing what they’ve always believed. It’s human nature. Don’t get me wrong. I think offering good reasons is a fine approach. I do it all the time. In this case, though, they’ll find reasons for the Bible more compelling if something else happens first. First they must listen.

When soldiers were sent to arrest Jesus, they returned empty handed. Why had they disobeyed orders? They had listened. “Never has a man spoken the way this man speaks,” they said (John 7:46). Jesus didn’t start with reasons why they should believe His words. Instead, he let the words do the work themselves. And this they did because they were the very words of God.

If you want people to believe in the Bible, the best way to succeed is not simply by giving them reasons. First, try to get them to listen to the Word. … Talk about the biblical view of the world. Encourage him to simply listen to Jesus for a while, then draw his own conclusions. Most people respect Jesus. They’ve just never listened closely to what He’s said. They’ve never allowed the words to have their impact.

Don’t get into a tug-o-war with skeptics about inspiration. Instead, invite others to engage the ideas first, then let God do the heavy lifting for you. The truth you’re defending has a life of it’s [sic] own because the Spirit is in the words. Once your friend has listened a bit, any further reasons you give for biblical authority will have the soil they need to take root in. (emphasis mine)

I find this important for three reasons. First, it demonstrates how powerful the Word of God is. If we let it speak for itself it will speak volumes. Secondly, it emphasizes the importance of presenting information in the right order: first the Word of God, then the evidence. Thirdly, it explains why evidentiary apologetics is so important for those who already believe the Bible is the Word of God. It demonstrates to the believer that what he believes is intellectually credible, and rationally justified. It increases his confidence in what he believes. Christianity is not something we believe just because, but rather because.

In its bare essence faith is simple trust. We trust in God rather than in ourselves, or something else. But more specifically faith is a persuasion based on reasonable evidence. Those who initially come to faith in Christ have reasons for placing their trust in Him, even if the reasons for such trust are minimal, not well thought out, or rationally justified. But where faith is really seen to be “a persuasion based on reasonable evidence” the most is in the growth of the believer. While they already possess some level of justification for their decision to trust Christ, they grow in that trust as they discover more and more reasons that their trust is properly grounded in reality; i.e. based on reasonable evidence. Evidence is a vital component of faith. The author of Hebrews made this clear when he said faith is the assurance of things hoped for, and that this assurance comes from the evidence of things unseen. A mature faith is trust based on evidence—trusting in things you have reason to believe are true. As we grow in knowledge we will also grow in faith.

 

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