This is a sad commentary on our times. A man bludgeons another man with a hammer, while 10 bystanders do nothing. This is nothing short of shameful and inhuman.
September 8, 2008
Renee Descartes was the first modern philosopher. He was a rationalist. His goal was to ground knowledge in something that could not be doubted. He found such a grounding in his famous formulation, Cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am). The question to be answered was how he could know he existed. The answer was to be found in his act of contemplation of the very question. To contemplate existence requires a contemplator who exists. That he was thinking about doubt was something he could not rationally doubt, and thus concluded he knows indubitably that he exists. He reasoned deductively as follows:
P1 The act of thinking requires the existence of a thinker
P2 I experience the act of thinking
______________________________________________
I exist as a thinker
Some argue that Descartes key insight actually turns out to depend on a logical fallacy: begging the question. The question is whether there exists a personal subject, “I.” And yet “I” is smuggled into the second premise of the argument. That is question-begging, for it assumes there is an I to experience the act of thinking, and then concludes that there is an I who thinks. I am conflicted about this. On the one hand, this seems reasonable to me. Descartes reasoning does seem to beg the question. On the other hand, Descartes argument seems valid: the ability to contemplate one’s existence requires that they exist. What do you think?
If Descartes did beg the question, invalidating his argument, then it seems there is no non-question-begging argument that could indubitably prove I exist. Of course, this does not mean I do not exist. I do, and I know I do. It simply means we can’t demonstrate how we know this, other than an appeal to basic intuition.
I think this is a helpful lesson for skeptics. One does not need to be able to prove (or know how) X is true in order to know X is true. Some truths are properly basic; i.e. they are self-evident, do not need to be questioned, and do not need evidential demonstration.
UPDATE 3/1/17: Perhaps the supposed question-begging nature of the argument is merely the fault of how analytic philosophers structure the argument. For example, if we state the argument as follows, it does not beg the question:
P1 The act of thinking requires the existence of a thinker
P2 There are acts of thinking ______________________________________________
Thinkers must exist
September 8, 2008
There is a short, concise examination of cremation over at the Parchment and Pen blog. The author, Jeff Spry, concludes that burial, not cremation, is the Biblical norm. He demonstrates that cremation is viewed quite negatively in Scripture.
What are your thoughts on cremation? Is it acceptable for a Christian? Should it be viewed equally with burial?
August 29, 2008
Last Friday Obama announced Joe Biden as his VP. That was somewhat of a shocker for me. But I guess the only thing better than one egomaniac on the ticket is two egomaniacs! (Clearly, I’m showing my political hand here!)
Today, McCain has announced his VP pick: Sarah Palin, governor of Alaska. I haven’t exactly been thrilled over John McCain, but his VP choice isn’t going to make it much easier for me to vote for him (but I will, as I am much much less thrilled over Obama).
Why am I not excited over Mrs. Palin? After all, from what I know of her so far, she seems pretty conservative, both morally and fiscally. What more could one ask for in a candidate? Experience! Substantive ideology needs to be matched with experience, particularly when they job they are “applying” for is the second highest position of power in this country (with a chance of taking the top spot if their boss kicks the bucket or behaves illegally). Not only is Mrs. Palin very young, but she has very little political experience. She has only been governor for a little over a year and a half. Sure, she was a two-term mayor as well, but she was mayor of a city with a population of less than 10,000. Running a small town, and running the most powerful country in the world aren’t exactly the same. I don’t have any reason to believe Mrs. Palin is prepared to be president of this country.
I’m also disappointed that McCain picked a woman. No, it’s not because I am a chauvinist. It’s because McCain seems to have picked a woman for strategic reasons, rather than because Mrs. Palin was the most qualified for the job. Surely, there were other Republicans more qualified. Why didn’t McCain pick one of them? Dare I say it’s because he’s hoping to women voters, particularly those who were Hillary supporters? It’s not a bad strategy when you think about it. A lot of women vote Democrat, and many were rooting for Hillary as the first woman president. Well, we all know that boat didn’t float. So McCain comes along and gives women another chance at getting one of their own into the White House. The hitch is that they have to vote for the other party. Brilliant!
In one sense I love it, because it gives McCain better odds at beating Obama, and I want nothing more than to see that happen. An Obama presidency would be a disaster in my opinion. But in another sense, I am not at all thrilled with the prospect of “President Palin” in the event John McCain dies in office. But who knows. Maybe my initial judgment of Mrs. Palin is wrong. Maybe she has wisdom beyond her years, and beyond her political experience that will make her a good vice president, and possibly a good president. We’ll see.
August 27, 2008
Deceiving Students for the Cause of Evolution
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Evolution[9] Comments
Chronobiologist Bora Zivkovic, who is the online community manager for the Public Library of Science (PLoS), had some interesting things to say about the teaching of evolution. Zivkovic recognizes that teaching evolutionary theory to those who have religious objections to it can be difficult. Zivkovic also recognizes that some of the “proofs” for evolution are not accurate. Is he advocating that those proofs be abandoned? Not at all. So long as they are useful in converting creationists to the cause of evolution, he is all for it:
You cannot bludgeon kids with truth (or insult their religion, i.e., their parents and friends) and hope they will smile and believe you. Yes, NOMA [Non-Overlapping Magasterium, which means science and religion are in two entirely different spheres of thought that have no bearing on one another] is wrong, but is a good first tool for gaining trust. You have to bring them over to your side, gain their trust, and then hold their hands and help them step by step. And on that slow journey, which will be painful for many of them, it is OK to use some inaccuracies temporarily if they help you reach the students. If a student…goes on to study biology, then he or she will unlearn the inaccuracies in time. If most of the students do not, but those cutesy examples help them accept evolution, then it is OK if they keep some of those little inaccuracies for the rest of their lives. It is perfectly fine if they keep thinking that Mickey Mouse evolved as long as they think evolution is fine and dandy overall. Without Mickey, they may have become Creationist activists instead. Without belief in NOMA they would have never accepted anything, and well, so be it. Better NOMA-believers than Creationists, don’t you think?
It’s scary to realize that some evolutionists are so intent on spreading their scientific dogma, that they are willing to deceive their students to accomplish their goal. ‘Tell them whatever you need to tell them so they’ll join us,’ appears to be the motto. Very sad.
August 27, 2008
In my former post, I liked to an article by Rob Stein of the Washington Post. While the article was well-written, and very informative, I was troubled by one line in particular. Richard Doerflinger, of the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, has been a prominent feature in the stem cell debates. He is critical of embryonic stem cell research, but supportive of adult stem cell research. Here is how Stein prefaced Doerflinger’s response to the news of this breakthrough: “Even the harshest critics of embryonic stem cell research hailed the development as a major, welcome development.” He then goes on to quote Doerflinger.
It seems to me that Stein’s emphasis is entirely misplaced given the subject at hand. Embryonic stem cell research was not the topic at hand, so why bring up Doerflinger’s position on that research? How is it relevant?
Furthermore, by prefacing Doerflinger’s quote by saying “even the harshest critics…”, it conveys the idea that Doerflinger would normally be opposed to something like this, but even he thinks it’s great. The fact of the matter is that Doerflinger is a strong proponent of the very kind of research Stein was writing about. A more proper and fitting preface would have been, “The strongest proponents of adult stem cell research could not have been more pleased with this breakthrough. As Richard Doerflinger has said….”
The fact that his comments were prefaced with a negative tone, related to a different topic, makes me think Stein might have a bias against those who oppose embryonic stem cell research–a bias so strong, that he cannot help but to express it, even in an article that celebrates the success of the very kind of research his ideological opponents have championed.
Or maybe it was his way of trying to tie this breakthrough into the larger debate over embryonic vs. adult stem cells. I don’t know, but either way, he seemed to poison the well before letting Doerflinger have his say, and it wasn’t fair. After all, he never prefaced the comments of embryonic stem cell supporters with, “Even those most critical of the ultimate value of adult stem cell research hailed the breakthrough as a welcome development.” What else are we to conclude?
I emailed Mr. Stein these questions. We’ll see if he responds.
August 27, 2008
Adult Stem Cells Repgrogrammed in vivo
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Bioethics, Stem Cell Research1 Comment
In a major breakthrough, Harvard scientists have been able to reprogram adult pancreatic stem cells into beta cells capable of producing insulin, simply by flipping three genetic switches. That is cool enough in itself, but the real kicker is that they did this in vivo.
Last year it was shown that an adult stem cell could be reverted back to an embryonic-like state (induced pluripontent stem cells). But this process is one that takes place in vitro. Not only do the stem cells need to be removed from the body, but then they need to be reverted to an embryonic state, then coaxed into differentiating into the desired cell type, and finally be placed back in the body for therapeutic purposes. The Harvard team skipped all but the third step. They have shown that adult stem cells can be transformed into other types of cells without being removed from the body, and without having to be retovertered into embryonic form. Not only does this make for a less invasive procedure, but it would also avoid the current problem facing embryonic and embryonic-like stem cells: tumor formation.
While this is definitely a big breakthrough, only time will tell whether it can be safely used in humans, and how many conditions can be treated with this procedure. One thing seems certain, however: this is just one more nail in the coffin for embryonic stem cell research. It is becoming both impractical, and irrelevant.
August 25, 2008
Abortion Should be A Right Even if the Unborn are Human Beings
Posted by Jason Dulle under Abortion, Apologetics, Bioethics, Politics[6] Comments
This is how Nancy Pelosi answered Tom Brokaw’s question about when life begins: “I would say that as an ardent practicing Catholic this is an issue that I have studied for a long time, and what I know is over the centuries the doctors of the Church have not been able to make that definition. And St. Augustine said three months. We don’t know. The point is it that it shouldn’t have an impact on a woman’s right to chose.”
Does she really mean to say that if we did know when life begins (which we do), and it turns out life begins prior to the time abortions are allowed, that this should not impact a woman’s right to have an abortion? Is Pelosi so pro-abortion, that even in when the evidence is clear that what is being aborted is a living human being, that the right to an abortion trumps the life guaranteed to that human being in the Constitution? Talk about a radical position!
HT: Justin Taylor
August 25, 2008
Possibility and Existence
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Atheism, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments[2] Comments
According to David Berlinski, Thomas Aquinas argued the universe must have begun at a finite time in the past by appealing to Diodorus’s (1st cent. B.C. Greek philosopher) view of possibility: if it is possible that something not exist, then it is certain that at some time or another it did not exist. Only that which has a necessary existence can be, and must be eternal. [1]
Aquinas argued that while our universe does exist, it does not have to exist. It is contingent, not necessary. This much seems reasonable. After all, it is possible to conceive of our universe not existing. There is nothing about the physical constituents of the universe that demands they exist. Using Diodorus’s principle, Aquinas concluded that since it is possible that our universe not exist, then it is certain that at some time in the past it did not exist.
Berlinksi thinks Aquinas’ argument commits the fallacy of composition (e.g. just because every part of an elephant is light, does not mean the elephant as a whole is light). He argues that while Diodorus’s principle might be true of things in the universe, it is not necessarily true of the universe as a whole. But I think Berlinski misses the point. The point is that only necessary things must exist eternally. Nothing else needs to, or can for that matter. Contingent things have causes, and hence beginnings.
What do you think of Aquinas’s argument, Berlinski’s criticism, or my response? I tend to think this is a decent argument for the finitude of the universe. What do you think?
August 14, 2008
Is This a Good Argument for a Finite Universe?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Cosmological Argument, Theistic Arguments[11] Comments
David Berlinksi, an agnostic philosopher and mathematician, summarizes one of the philosophical arguments for a past-finite universe as follows:
“If a series of causes do not start, it cannot get going, and if it does not get going, then there will be no intermediate causes, and if there are no intermediate causes, then over here, where we have just noticed that a blow has caused a bruise, there is no explanation for what is before our eyes.[1] Either there is a first cause or there is no cause at all, and since there are causes at work in nature, there must be a first.[2]
Essentially, the argument is that the universe must have a finite past because we experience intermediate causes, and intermediate causes would not be possible if they were not preceded by a first cause that began the whole series.
Berlinksi thinks this is a weak, but not an absurd argument. Personally, I am conflicted about its cogency. On the one hand, it does appear weak. It rests on a tautology, and begs the question. To see how, let’s put the argument in deductive form:
P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If a causal series does not begin, it cannot get going
P3 If a causal series cannot get going, there will be no intermediate causes
P4 We experience intermediate causes
P5 Therefore a causal chain got going
P6 Therefore a causal chain began
P7 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past
Premise 2 is clearly a tautology. It could be restated as “only that which begins, starts,” or “only that which begins, begins.” Not only is this an unhelpful truism, but it begs the question. In saying a causal series cannot “get going” unless it “begins” is to assume from the start what needs to be proved: that the universe “got going” as opposed to “has always been going.”[3] Says who? If the universe is eternal, nothing ever “got going,” and yet, clearly, there exists a causal series that “is going.” One cannot just stipulate that a causal series cannot exist unless it had a beginning, and then conclude that since a causal series does exist, it must have begun. One must demonstrate why it is that a causal series that did not begin cannot be.[4] I think this can be done.
A causal chain must begin with a first cause to avoid the problem of the impossibility of traversing an infinite. Just as it would be impossible to reach the top step of an infinite staircase, it is impossible to traverse an infinite number of past moments to reach the present. An endless series of events, by definition, has no end, and yet today would mark the end of that series. The concept of an infinite past, then, is incoherent. The past cannot consist of an infinite number of causal events. There had to be a first cause in the finite past that caused all subsequent, intermediate causes. In other words, it is impossible for there to be intermediate causes unless they find their origin in a first cause.
While this vindicates the conclusion of the original argument, it rests on premises that are so different that it can hardly be said to be a modification of the original argument. It seems to be a separate argument altogether. In deductive form the “modified” argument would appear as follows:
P1 The universe consists of a causal series of events
P2 If the causal series is infinite, today would mark the completion of that series
P3 It is impossible to complete an infinite series of events
P4 Therefore the causal series of events had a beginning
P5 Therefore the universe began to exist in the finite past
Does this mean, then, that the original argument should be discarded? Is the tautological nature of premise 2 beyond repair, dooming the entire argument? What do you think of my criticism of the argument? What about my logic? I have been thinking and writing on this for about five hours now. The more I think about it, and the more I write about it, the murkier it gets in my mind. I would appreciate the input of someone who is taking a fresh look at this argument for their insights. Thanks!
[1]Berlinski seems to have made a mental slip in saying the “blow has caused a bruise,” for this assumes a casually-connected chain of at least two events. But according to the argument, no causal relationship can be established between any events unless there is a first cause. As the argument goes, not only would we be unable to explain the cause of the blow, but we would be unable even to say the blow was causally related to the bruise.
[2]David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New York: Crown Forum, 2008), 68-69.
[3]Not only does premise 2 beg the question, but it stacks the deck in favor of a past-finite universe by declaring that a causal series of events, to be an actual causal series of events, must have a beginning event. This is little short of definitional fiat.
[4]It should be pointed out that the defender of an eternal universe has no explanation for the causal series. If only that which has a beginning needs a cause, and the causal series has no beginning because the universe has no beginning, then there can’t be any cause or reason for it. It’s just been going on forever, inexplicably. This is not an intellectually satisfying answer, for it goes against our causal intuitions that everything has a cause, and an infinite regression of causes is impossible. Our causal intuitions tell us the regress must stop at some ultimate cause.
August 12, 2008
We are Not Living in a Post-Modern World
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics | Tags: Postmodernism |[2] Comments
These days, it is common to hear that we are living in a post-modern society. I have echoed this many times myself. William Lane Craig, however, argues that this is serious a misdiagnosis of culture. According to Craig, not only is post-modernism unlivable, but it is not the cause of the religious and moral relativism of our day. Craig argues that these phenomena are outgrowths of modernism, particularly the mid-20th century philosophy of Verificationism. Rather than living in a post-modern culture, we are living in a post-Christian culture.
August 5, 2008
How Do You Know God is Ineffable?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Nature of God, Pluralism, Theology | Tags: Divine Attributes, God, Ineffability |[10] Comments
It has become quite common for people to assert that we cannot know anything about God, or that anything we ascribe to Him is neither true nor false, but simply meaningless. God is said to be ineffable. This assertion is often offered in the context of evangelism. In our attempt to persuade someone to become a Christian, we make certain truth-claims about God, and are met by the “God is ineffable” response, effectively shutting down the conversation. What can you say to such a person? I would suggest you ask a simple question: why? Why should we think God is ineffable? Typically, the reasons proffered will include “Because God is wholly other,” “Because God transcends language,” or “Because God surpasses human categories of thought.”
Do you notice something amiss about these responses?: They all ascribe certain characteristics to God’s nature, and these characteristics are thought to be true descriptions of God. In essence they are saying it is true that God is wholly other, and transcends human language and categories of thought, and this is why nothing can be true of God. Or similarly, they know God is wholly other, and transcends human language and categories of thought, and this is why nothing can be known of God.
This is self-refuting. They are claiming to know certain truths about God, that make it impossible to know truths about God. The advocate of an ineffable deity is left in the strange situation where he is unable to provide any reason for thinking God to be ineffable, without having to claim to know something true about Him. If the “ineffabalist” cannot provide a reason for thinking God to be ineffable without giving us true knowledge about Him, there is no reason to think God is ineffable.
July 28, 2008
How did God prevent Abimelech from sinning?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Sin, Theology | Tags: Free will |[8] Comments
For those who believe in free will, Genesis 20:6 presents an interesting problem. Abraham was traveling in Gerar. He feared one of the inhabitants might kill him, so he could take his wife Sarah, to be his own. To spare his life Abraham lied to Abimelech, king of Gerar, saying Sarah was his sister. Abimelech took Sarah to be his wife, but he did not have sexual relations with her. In a dream, the Lord told Abimelech the truth about Sarah, and that He had prevented Abimelech from having sexual relations with her.
How is it that God prevented Abimelech from having sexual relations with Sarah? Was Abimelech denied freedom of his will? Walter Schultz, a philosopher from Northwestern College, proposed an answer to these questions in the latest volume of Philosophia Christi (Vol. 10, 2008) that I found both interesting and plausible.
Humans are free rational agents, meaning they have the freedom to choose among options apart from external constraint. They also have intentions, and initiate acts that serve to fulfill those intentions. Intentions can be either proximal, or distal. A distal intention is future-directed (e.g. an intention to vote in the next election), while a proximal intention is directed at the here-and-now (e.g. an intention to raise my arm). There is an imperceptible, but real temporal gap between an agent’s exercising of his mental power to choose X (proximal intention), and the actual execution of that choice. Furthermore, time is required both to form the intention, and to act on that intention to fulfill it.
Schultz proposes that God was able to prevent Abimelech from sinning without depriving him of his free will by intervening during the formation of his freely chosen proximal intention, interrupting the conditions necessary for Abimelech to complete his proximal intention, thereby averting the otherwise certain outcome. On this view, God intervenes after the human agent has freely chosen X, but before the effect. From the human perspective, we would consider this a case of akrasia, or weakness of will, similar to the person who says, “I always wanted to travel to Europe, but never seemed to get around to it.” The person intends to do X, but find themselves unable to do so for reasons they do not fully understand. So Abimelech freely chose to have sexual relations with Sarah, but God interrupted the completion of his proximal intention, thus aborting its effect.
What do you think about Schultz’s theory?
July 24, 2008
Differences in the Gospels II
Posted by Jason Dulle under Bible Difficulties, Theology[10] Comments
In an earlier blog entry, “Differences in the Gospels,” I examined some supposed contradictions in the Gospels. I argued that these are not contradictions, but differences in what and how each author chose to portray the events in question, and that the only reason we find these texts problematic is because we fail to understand how ancient writers wrote. Unlike modern folks, they were not concerned with the minutiae. They were concerned with the big picture: the gist. They even felt free to report the historical facts in such a way so as to fit their literary purpose.
I gave a couple of examples to illustrate my point. In one place, John says Jesus was baptizing in Judea. A little later, however, he says it was Jesus’ disciples who were doing the baptizing, not Jesus Himself. Since both statements were penned by the same author, in the same work, in close proximity, it is clear that there is no contradiction here (interestingly, if they appeared in different gospels skeptics would cite this as a contradiction). This demonstrates for us the flexibility with which the Biblical authors reported historical events. John felt free to say Jesus was baptizing in one place, even though He knew it was not Jesus Himself who was doing so. He was not lying; he was not trying to deceive; he was not mistaken. Both reports were true, even though one was more specific than the other. For John, since Jesus’ disciples were baptizing on His behalf, it was entirely legitimate to say Jesus was baptizing (we might call this “projection”). The problem is not with John, but modern readers who demand that ancient writers conform to the standards common to modern writing.
July 21, 2008
It is often said that science is incapable of arriving at certainty because science is based on inductive reasoning, and the conclusions we come to using inductive reasoning are probabilistic, not certain. For example, I could reason that since every crow I have ever seen has been black, that all crows are black. This is probable given our observations, but this conclusion is not certain because it is possible that there are crows of a different color that we have not yet observed.
The history of science has demonstrated just how fallible inductive reasoning is. Many scientific conclusions have proven to be wrong as new data comes to light. For this reason, science is incapable of speaking with any level of certainty to the question of God’s existence. Inductive reasoning simply cannot tell us anything conclusive about God’s existence.
Philosophy, on the other hand, works primarily on deductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning does provide us with certain conclusions. For example, I might reason that
Premise 1 Socrates is a man
Premise 2 All men are mortal
Conclusion Therefore Socrates is mortal.
The conclusion is absolutely certain. Sound philosophical arguments for God’s existence, then, can provide us with certainty about God’s existence. But do they?
While the conclusion of a valid deductive argument is certain, we can only be as certain of the conclusion as we are certain of the premises that support the conclusion. It turns out that the premises in a deductive argument are themselves derived from inductive reasoning or experience, both of which can be mistaken. In other words, deductive arguments provide sure conclusions to probable premises. In the example above, premise two is an inductive conclusion based on our experience with other humans. We have observed that all human beings are mortal, and thus conclude that all human beings are mortal. But it could be the case that there are humans who are immortal that we do not know about. Maybe they live on other planets or in another realm of reality. Granted, the chances of this are slim, but we cannot be certain. The degree to which we can be certain that Socrates is mortal, then, is the degree to which we have reason to believe all men are mortal.
So contrary to popular conception, deductive arguments do not provide certain knowledge. They may provide us with more assurance than inductive arguments, but no argument can provide us with certain knowledge. All knowledge is probabilistic in one sense or the other. While philosophical proofs for God’s existence are vastly superior to inductive proofs, neither can provide us with certainty on this important question.
July 8, 2008
Pew Forum Research into Americans Religious Beliefs
Posted by Jason Dulle under Statistics[3] Comments
In February I blogged on the first report issued by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life based on their expansive U.S. Religious Landscape Survey. The first report surveyed the religious affiliation of Americans. The second report, released a few weeks ago, focuses on the religious beliefs and practices of Americans, and how these relate to our social and political views.
I would highly recommend you read the 18 page summary report, if not the full 268 page report (personally I don’t have the stomach for the latter). But I would like to share some of the findings I found most interesting:
- 70% of religious Americans say many different religions lead to God. Even 57% of evangelicals hold to this view. When more than half the members of the most conservative Christian group are religious pluralists, we have serious problems on our hands. Either the exclusivity of the Gospel is not being proclaimed in churches, or not being defended.
- 78% of Americans believe in absolute moral values. This is much higher than figures posted by the Barna Research Group (22%), and is reassuring. I have to assume that such a large difference must be due to the way the question is worded in the respective surveys. I don’t know how Barna words his questions, but Pew worded theirs as follows: “There are clear and absolute standards for what is right and wrong.” The respondent was requested to rate their level of agreement with this statement. I think it is pretty straightforward. This, combined with the sheer number of participants, makes me lean toward Pew’s findings, and abandoning Barna’s as unrealistic.
- 92% of Americans believe in God. Not everyone in a religious tradition believes in the existence of God. Buddhism, for example, is typically atheistic (although strangely enough, 75% of American Buddhists believe in God). But I would expect for all of the adherents of theistic religions to believe in God. Strangely enough, they don’t. Only 99% of evangelicals do, and 97% of Catholics. The only Christian group in which everyone polled believed in God was Mormonism. Oddly enough, 21% of atheists confessed to belief in God. I’ll never figure that one out!
- 60% of adults believe God is personal; 25% believe he is an impersonal force.
- Only 3 in 4 people believe in life after death, and heaven. This was lower than I expected, especially given the number of theists in this country (92%).
- Six in ten Americans (59%) believe in hell. The gap between belief in heaven and hell has been reported to be much higher in other surveys I have read. It was interesting to see the gap between belief in heaven and hell in various religious traditions. While 95% of Mormons believe in heaven (the highest of any religious tradition), only 59% believe in hell. Jehovah’s Witnesses experience an even larger gap. Only 46% believe in heaven, but a measly 9% believe in hell (the lowest of any religious tradition—even lower than atheists!). I found this very ironic given the centrality these doctrines play in JW theology. Those who were most likely to believe in both heaven and hell were evangelicals (86% vs. 82%).
- Christianity is not the only religion in which those who profess the name often do not confess to its doctrines. Only 62% of Buddhists believe in nirvana, and only 61% of Hindus believe in reincarnation. These are staple doctrines of these religions, so we would expect a higher number of adherents to these doctrines. This goes to show that there are many cultural adherents to other religions, who either do not know the teachings of their religion, or reject them.
- 79% of Americans believe miracles occur today.
- About 40% of Americans attend religious services weekly.
- While more than twice as many people cite personal experience (34%) than religious views (14%) as the main influence on their political views, the researchers found a strong link between religious beliefs and political views.
- Only half of Evangelicals identified themselves with the Republican party.
- Those most opposed to abortion and homosexuality are Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and evangelicals. Those least opposed are Jews, Buddhists, agnostics, and atheists.
- The more people pray, attend religious services, are certain of God’s existence, the more politically conservative they tend to be.
July 7, 2008
It is common to hear Christians argue against atheism on the grounds that it is impossible to prove a negative such as “God does not exist.” Only an omniscient being could do so, but an omniscient being would be God by definition! This sounds convincing, and has great rhetorical value, but it is a bad argument nonetheless.
There are a couple of glaring shortcomings. First, it is a straw-man. Most atheists do not claim to know with certainty that God does not exist. They only claim that His existence is very unlikely, or vastly improbable.
Secondly, the atheist could offer a similar argument against theism. One cannot know God exists with absolute certainty. While there may be very good grounds for thinking God exists, such knowledge is not certain. We could be mistaken (meaning it is not logically impossible for us to be wrong in this belief). In fact, virtually everything we claim to know, we know on probabilistic grounds, and yet we are justified in claiming to know it. If it would be unfair for the atheist to claim theists cannot claim to know God exists unless they have proven it impossible for God not to exist, then it is also unfair for the theist to discount atheism on the grounds that no one can be certain God does not exist. If there are good reasons for thinking His existence is unlikely, then one is justified in claiming to know God does not exist, even if they cannot be certain of this knowledge.
When you think about it, all of us claim to know certain things do not exist (unicorns, leprechauns, Santa Clause, the Greek gods, etc.) without being omniscient, and without proving their existence logically impossible. But are we certain of this? After all, we are making a claim about a negative, and it is impossible to prove a negative. The fact of the matter is that we cannot be certain that unicorns do not exist. They may exist on another planet or in another dimension that we are not aware of, and yet, given the lack of evidence for their existence we are justified in claiming to know they do not exist, even if we could be mistaken. Likewise, atheists are justified in claiming to know God does not exist, even if they cannot be certain of His non-existence. That’s not to say I think they are right, but it is to say their knowledge claim is not an illegitimate one simply because it lacks certitude. If certitude is the criterion for knowledge claims, it would make skeptics of us all.
June 30, 2008
Presbyterian Church USA to officially ordain homosexual clergy
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, HomosexualityLeave a Comment
On 6/27/08, the Presbyterian Church USA made several moves to sanction the ordination of homosexual clergy at their General Assembly. Now the measures go the 173 presbyteries for vote. It is expected that the will pass. See Albert Mohler’s discussion of this historic and lamentable event.
June 30, 2008
How Do You Know It’s Jesus You Feel in Your Heart?
Posted by Jason Dulle under Apologetics, Epistemology[3] Comments
When people ask Christians how we know Christianity is true, it is common for us to respond with something like, “Because I feel Jesus in my heart” or “Because I have experienced the risen Christ.” While I think faith is rational even apart from rational evidences/arguments, this sort of justification for Christian belief seems inadequate. It can always be asked how we know it was Jesus we encountered, as opposed to some other deity. Did Jesus appear to us? No. We merely had an experience that seemed undeniably supernatural in nature. So why think it was an experience with Jesus, then?
I would venture to say that we claim to have encountered Jesus because of the context in which our supernatural encounter occurred. We encountered the supernatural after having heard and believed the message of Jesus’ resurrection, and then interpret the encounter to be the result of such a belief, and confirmation that the belief is true. Hence, we say we felt Jesus in our heart, or experienced the risen Christ.
The problem is that a wide variety of religions, each with competing truth claims, profess to experience the divine. They also interpret their experience in light of the religious teaching they have been taught. They conclude that they have experienced God X, and that such an experience vindicates the truth of their religious tradition.
A religious pluralist might argue that no group experiences the deity they claim to have experienced (Jesus, Allah, Brahman, etc.). They might argue they had a genuine experience with the unknowable God, but mistakenly tried to identify Him with the God as described by their faith tradition. So when a Christian encounters God, he thinks he has encountered Jesus, and this is proof that Christianity is true. When a Muslim encounters God, he thinks he has encountered Allah, and this is proof that Islam is true. How do we respond to such an interpretation?
On one level, I agree with the religious pluralist. His explanation makes sense of the variegated inter-religious claims to have encountered with God. People actually do encounter God as he reaches out for them, but they misidentify Him because they interpret their experience of Him in light of their false religious tradition. Where I think the pluralist is mistaken is that he applies his interpretation to all religious traditions, not holding out the possibility that one faith tradition may have properly identified the God whom they have encountered.
If it is possible that one religious tradition properly identifies the God people experience, how would we know which religious tradition it was? What has been said already should highlight the problem of using religious experience as a proof for one religious tradition over another. Something more than an experience is needed to adjudicate competing religious traditions, otherwise we are left arguing in a circle. So how can we know that our interpretation of the divine is the correct one, as opposed to theirs? I would argue that we must test the various faith traditions using our rational faculties. Are they philosophically viable? Are they internally consistent? Are they confirmed/contradicted by scientific or historical data? And the list goes on. When various faith traditions are subjected to such tests, I think Christianity comes out on top as being the most viable, and that is good reason to believe the God we encountered in our experience is indeed the risen Christ.
June 27, 2008
I take the train to work. Most days, there is a man playing the saxophone near the staircase at the depot. He always displays some sort of message to the passerbys, usually of a religious or philosophical bent, and not always profound. Today’s message struck me as particularly dumb: For every question, personal experience is the final test of truth.”
Really? I wanted to ask him if he had ever been to Naples. I would expect a negative answer, at which time I would respond, “So I assume you don’t believe Naples exists, then, right?” If personal experience is the final test for truth, and we have not experienced it, then it cannot be true. In my own life, a whole host of things cannot be true: murder, wealth, and the like. Very dumb. And yet, empiricism is how many people go about determining truth.
Thinking to Believe 